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Introduction 
A<ugustine>. Behold, I have prayed to God. 
R<eason>. What then wouldst thou know? 
A. All these things which I have prayed for. 
R. Sum them up in brief. 
A. God and the soul, that is what I desire to know. 
R. Nothing more? 
A. Nothing whatever. 
AUGUSTINE, Soliloquies, translated by C. C. Starbuck, in: Augustine, 
Basic Writings of Saint Augustine. Edited with an Introduction and 
Notes by W. J. Oates, New York: Random House, 1948, Vol. 1,1.7, 262. 
I cannot think of a more fitting way to begin this book than by quoting 
this passage from Augustine. With the support of an authority of such stature, 
devoting a study in the history of philosophy to the soul seems to need little 
justification. ' Augustine's words are, indeed, apt to describe the situation in 
the period under discussion in this book, the late-thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries. After studying the commentary tradition on Aristotle's De anima 
— the most obvious place to look for philosophical discussions on the soul in 
that period — , Augustine's remark no longer seems to be the exaggeration it 
seemed to me to be when I first read the passage.2 The soul is one of the most 
important philosophical subjects in the later Middle Ages. I am not refer-
'The writing of this dissertation was made possible through financial support from the 
Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), grant nr. 276-20-004. This grant 
was awarded to the VIDI project 'Form of the Body or Ghost in the Machine? The Study of 
Soul, Mind, and Body (1250-1700)', directed by Paul Bakker. I also benefited greatly from a 
three-month period of research conducted at the University of Notre Dame on a SIEPM-Notre 
Dame grant. 
2Although the most obvious source, the commentaries on the De anima are not the only 
source for philosophical discussions on the soul. The commentaries on Peter Lombard's Sen-
tentiae in particular contain many interesting discussions on the topic. A recent SIEPM collo­
quium, organized by P. J. J. M. Bakker, Μ. Β. Calma and R. L. Friedman, was devoted entirely 
to the material in these commentaries: "Philosophy and Psychology in Late-Medieval Com­
mentaries on Peter Lombard's Sentences", Nijmegen, 28-30 October, 2009. 
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ring here to the idea that the soul is one of the most important things to gain 
knowledge about, although it certainly was perceived as such by all the com­
mentators on the De anima. Rather, I mean that for a study of the soul in the 
later Middle Ages one had to draw upon, and combine, so many disciplines 
and discussions, that it became a focal point for some of the most important 
philosophical controversies. With the immortal, and somehow immaterial, 
human intellective soul as the noblest among its objects, the scientia de anima 
became much more than just another part of natural philosophy. The unic-
ity or plurality of substantial form, the correct description of the processes of 
generation and corruption, the structure of the soul in terms of its essence and 
powers, the possibility of self-knowledge in this life and perhaps the next, all 
these topics and many more were discussed in the commentaries on Aristotle's 
De anima. 
1.1 Subject matter 
The subject matter of this book is, in short, the history of psychology in the late 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. But although this description is conve­
nient because of its brevity, it should immediately be qualified in two respects. 
First, because it contains an anachronism. The word 'psychology', although 
derived from the Greek, does not occur in any ancient Greek text. Aristotle's 
famous treatise on the soul is simply entided Περί ψυχής, On soul, and he 
never combines the terms 'ψυχή' and 'λόγος'. The same applies to the Latin 
commentary tradition, in which the science that studies the soul is simply re­
ferred to as the scientia de anima. In fact, it is only in the sixteenth century 
that the term seems to have been used for the first time.3 
The earliest use of the word 'psychology' is found in a catalog reference 
to a work by Marko Marulic (1450-1524) entitled Psichtologta de ratione ant-
mae humanae liber I, supposedly written c. 1520. The work itself, however, 
has not been found. The first available work in which the word occurs is Jo­
hannes Thomas Freigius's Catalogus Locorum Commumum, a text that is pre­
fixed to his Ciceromanus (1575).4 But these are still only isolated occurrences. 
The term only becomes widespread in the eighteenth century when Christian 
Wolff ( 1679-1754) uses it in the tide of two of his works: Psychologia empirica 
3The following paragraph is largely based on E. SCHEERER, 'Psychologie', in· J RITTER 
and K. GRUNDER (eds ), Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 7· P-Q, Darmstadt: Wis-
senschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1989,1599-1653, esp. 1599-1601. ButseealsoF. Η. LAPOINTE, 
'Who Originated the Term 'Psychology''' Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 8 
(1972), 328-335. 
4
 LAPOINTE, 'Who Originated the Term 'Psychology''', 332. 
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(1732) and Psychologta rationahs (1734).5 Taking psychology in its current 
meaning, as an experimental discipline, we move to the end of the nineteenth 
century; its beginning is usually dated to 1879, when Wilhelm Wundt opened 
the first psychological laboratory in Leipzig. Still, the anachronistic terminol-
ogy is not that important here; the lack of a word does not imply the lack of 
the corresponding concept. The tradition of the scientia de anima will still 
count as the precursor of psychology if the topics that are discussed in it are 
the same as, or closely related to, those we would now label psychological. 
This brings us to the second, more important qualification, which con-
cerns the scope and the place of the science of the soul. In the Aristotelian 
tradition, at least up until the late fourteenth century, the scientia de anima 
was considered to be a part of natural philosophy; it was therefore subordi-
nated to physics, as one of its special branches. Now physics as whole deals 
with beings in so far as these are subject to motion and change.6 The scien-
tia de anima, in turn, studies these mobile, changing things in so far as they 
are alive. This subordination of the study of the soul to physics implies that 
there is a fundamental difference between the place of contemporary psychol-
ogy in the system of the sciences and that of the scientia de anima.7 But it also 
implies that there is an important difference in the scope of their respective 
subject matters. Whereas psychology studies cognitive being, the scientia de 
anima studies living being. As a result a number of topics that were discussed 
extensively as a part of medieval "psychology" would nowadays be considered 
to be a part of biology or even physiology. This difference should not be ne-
glected. The scientia de anima is as much about animals and even plants as it 
is about human beings. One of things I aim to show in this book is the impor-
tance of always keeping this difference in scope in mind when interpreting the 
commentaries on Aristotle's work. 
In spite of these major differences between contemporary psychology and 
the ancient and medieval scientia de anima, there is a lot to be said for consid-
5E. G. BORING, 'A Note on the Origin of the Word Psychology', Journal of the History of 
the Behavioral Sciences, 2 (1966), 167. 
6ARISTOTLE, Physica, translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, in: J. Barnes (ed.), The 
Complete Works of Anstotle. The Revised Oxford Transfotton, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1984, III.l, 200bl2-14, p. 342: "Nature is a principle of motion and change, and it is the 
subject of our inquiry. We must therefore see that we understand what motion is; for if it were 
unknown, nature too would be unknown." 
7
 By the time the term psychology becomes commonplace, the scientia de anima is no 
longer considered to be a branch of natural philosophy, but a special branch of metaphysics. 
Or more precisely, the most speculative and difficult part of it is assigned to metaphysics (the 
psychologta rationahs). A large part of this transformation from a natural philosophical to a 
metaphysical discipline took place in the Renaissance, but we will see that the seeds for this 
transformation are already sown in the medieval commentaries. 
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ering the latter as one of the most important historical roots of modern-day 
psychology. For although the term 'soul' as Aristotle uses it applies to all living 
things, there is a strong emphasis in the De anima on the human soul. Aristo­
tle's treatise deals with the nature of perception, the acquisition of knowledge, 
the workings of all the senses, and above all —connecting all these themes— 
the ontological status of the soul and its relation to the body. It is just that 
we should never forget that the study of these themes is embedded within the 
same framework that also includes the study of plants and animals. 
1.2 Status quaestionis 
In the past ten years, a substantial body of scholarly literature has been devoted 
to the study of Aristotelian psychology and its reception. Some of these studies 
employ the term 'transformations' when referring to the De anima tradition.8 
The term is well chosen, which is why I also use it in the title of this study on 
the scientia de anima. It is much more accurate to say that the scientia de anima 
transformed over time than simply to say that it changed. The important 
difference is that transformation implies both change and continuity. More 
often than not, the views of predecessors were neither simply discarded, nor 
uncritically taken over. Instead, they were often adapted in subtle ways. This 
book is devoted to describing some of the most important transformations in 
the period from the later thirteenth to the end of the fourteenth century. 
The increasing attention to the tradition of the scientia de anima notwith­
standing, our knowledge of it is still sketchy. There are several reasons for this. 
First, many of the commentaries remain unedited. Second, the vast majority 
of the studies that are available tend to focus so much on the human soul 
that the broader context of the De anima, as a science that studies all souls, 
becomes lost. When it comes to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, our 
knowledge is sketchier still, because the available material from that period 
has never been studied as a coherent whole. Whereas there are several syn­
thetic studies about the period from the introduction of Aristotle's De anima 
into the Latin West up to Thomas Aquinas — even if these studies focus al­
most exclusively on the human soul —, the same cannot be said for the later 
'See for example D. DES CHENE, Life's Form Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul, 
Ithaca [etc ]· Cornell University Press, 2000, vu and even more clearly D. PERLER (ed.), Trans­
formations of the Soul Aristotelian Psychology 1250-1650, Leiden [etc.]: Brill, 2009, where the 
term is used in the title of the volume. Both volumes aim to describe the complex routes in 
which Aristotelian psychology was transmitted and transformed without making reference to 
the traditional, and misleading manner of dividing the history of philosophy into a Medieval, 
Renaissance and (Early) Modern period. 
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periods.9 When it comes to the period from Thomas Aquinas to, let us say, 
Pierre d'Ailly, which is the period I will focus on in this book, there are a few 
good monographs on some individual commentators.10 But what is lacking 
is a more detailed narrative that connects the late thirteenth and fourteenth-
century traditions. As a consequence, we know very little about the develop­
ments in the De anima tradition in that period, let alone about their causes or 
impact. An important first step, however, in describing the transformations 
of the scientia de anima in this period has already been made by Jack Zupko. 
Zupko has argued for a rehabilitation of Ernest Moody's description of the 
fourteenth century as a time of growing empiricism.11 He has tried to show 
that Moody's description is applicable to the developments in the scientia de 
anima, in the period starting from Thomas Aquinas and ending with Nicole 
Oresme, by studying the different views on the subject matter of the scientia de 
anima. One of his main conclusions is that there is a clearly noticeable shift in 
the commentaries on the De anima, namely a shift from trying to determine 
the essence of the soul to focusing instead on its perceptible powers. This shift 
can then be characterized as a growing empiricism because there is (1) an 
increasing emphasis on the perceptible aspects of the soul and (2) a declining 
interest in metaphysical speculations about the soul's essence. 
Zupko's argument deserves careful examination. There can be no doubt 
that there is a change of interest in the fourteenth century. But there are, at 
least at first sight, also several counterexamples to Zupko's claims, especially 
in the commentaries by Buridan and Oresme. For example, when Oresme ar­
gues for the inclusion of the study of the intellect in the scientia de anima, he 
mentions its indivisibility, its being abstracted from the body and its perpetu-
9See for example J. OBI OGUEJIOFOR, The Arguments for the Immortality of the Soul in the 
First Half of the Thirteenth Century, Leuven: Peelers, 1995; R C DALES, The Problem of the 
Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century, Leiden [etc.]: Brill, 1995, and O LOTTIN, Psychologie et 
morale aux ΧΙΓ et XIIIe siècles, Gembloux Duculot, 1957 (deuxième édition). The most recent 
addition is M. BIENIAK, The Soul-Body Problem at Pans ca 1200-1250 Hugh ofSt-Cher and 
His Contemporaries, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2010. 
'
0For instance J.-Β. BRENET, Transferts du sujet La noétique d'Averroès selon Jean dejandun. 
Pans- Vnn, 2003, or the extensive parts on the scientia de anima in J. ZUPKO, John Buridan 
Portrait of a Fourteenth-Century Arts Master, Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 2003. 
' ' For the adjective 'empincal' as applied to the philosophers of the fourteenth century, 
see E. A. MOODY, 'Empiricism and Metaphysics in Medieval Philosophy', Collected Papers 
(1933-1969), in· Studies in Medieval Philosophy, Science, and Logic, Berkeley [etc.]: University 
of California Press, 1975 (Originally published in The Philosophical Review, 57:2, 1958, 145-
163), 353-370, 299; for its revival see J. ZUPKO, 'What is the Science of the Soul? A Case Study 
in the Evolution of Late Medieval Natural Philosophy', Synthese, 110 (1997), 297-334, esp. 
297-299. 
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ity as conclusions belonging to the scientia de anima,11 which seems ad odds 
with a growing emphasis on the empirical study of the soul's powers. And 
how to interpret the debate found in both Buridan and Oresme on the ques­
tion of whether or not a horse would be able to see with its foot, once God 
has created an eye there, in terms of a growing empiricism?13 On the other 
hand, there are several examples that seem to support Zupko's claim. For 
instance, later fourteenth-century commentators often argue that the immor­
tality and indivisibility of the human intellective soul cannot, strictly speaking, 
be demonstrated in the scientia de anima, whereas the late thirteenth-century 
commentators were convinced that this was possible. 
In order to assess how and to what extent the scientia de anima transforms 
in the period c. 1260-c. 1360, two related areas need to be studied. First, 
we need to look at what the commentators say about the methodology of the 
science of the soul in their commentaries on the De anima. What kind of 
science are we dealing with? What exactly do we study in it? And what kind(s) 
of method(s) do we need to follow in order to proceed in this science? This is 
what I will do in chapter 3. This part will pay attention to topics such as the 
subject matter of this science, its particular difficulty, and the certainty of its 
conclusions. 
Second, we need to see how the methodological standpoints are being put 
into practice. Do the commentators adhere to any particular method when 
studying the soul, and if so, in what sense? Is a difference in their discussions 
about the methodological aspects of the scientia de anima always accompanied 
by a difference in doctrinal positions? And if not, then what is the exact func­
tion of the methodological questions in the first book of the commentaries on 
De animai In order to be able to answer these and related questions, I will 
present two case studies. 
First, in chapter 4,1 will look at how the commentators interpreted Aris­
totle's famous definition of the soul as 'the first act of a physical organic body 
that is potentially alive'.14 I will show what elements were being singled out as 
needing discussion, and how the discussion of this definition is closely related 
to the views that commentators held about what happens in generation and 
1 2 NICOLE ORESME, Queestio«es in Anstotehs De anima, in: Β. Fatar, Expositio et quaestiones 
in Anstotehs De anima, études doctrinales en collaboration avec C. Gagnon, Louvain (etc.): 
Peeters, 1995, III. 1, 309: "Tertio est dicendum quod scientia hic accipitur pro aggregatione ex 
multis condusiombus; modo de intellectu multae sunt conclusiones, sicut quod est abstractus, 
quod est perpetuus, et quod est indmsibilis, etc., quarum quaedam sunt de primo, et ahae non 
de primo quia preaedicatum non convertitur cum subiecto." 
13
 See below, 5.1. 
M
 ARISTOTLE, De anima, translated by J. A. Smith, in: J. Barnes (ed ), The Complete Worh 
of Aristotle The Revised Oxford Translation, Princeton· Princeton University Press, 1984, II. 1, 
412a27-28,p.656. 
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corruption. Second, in chapter 5, I will discuss how the commentators de-
scribed the soul in terms of its essence, powers, and acts. The two case studies 
combined give what we might call the metaphysics of the soul, that is, they 
describe the soul-body relation on a general ontological level. This is usu-
ally followed in the commentaries by more detailed questions on the different 
senses individually and then by questions on the intellective powers, but these 
I will not discuss. 
I should make it clear from the start that in chapters 3-5,1 am not trying 
to determine which of the commentators gave the correct interpretation of 
Aristotle. In those cases where I do write about what Aristotle's views were, 
the reader should always supplement this with the quahfication 'according to 
the common interpretation'. Aristotle's De anima is a remarkably complex 
work, and, on top ofthat, the transmitted text suffers from much corruption. 
As a result, there is still no complete consensus on even the basic questions 
of whether or not Aristotle thought that soul and body constitute one thing 
rather than two, or on whether or not the active intellect is a part of the human 
soul.15 
I have chosen not to focus on what is often considered to be the most in-
teresting topic in the De anima, the intellective soul, but rather to focus on 
the soul in general and treat the intellect only insofar as it helps to understand 
this general framework. I have two main reasons for this choice. First, since 
this study is about the relations between methodology and doctrinal position, 
I want to take the aim that the medieval philosophers themselves put forward 
in the beginning of their commentaries seriously. In the footsteps of Aristotle, 
all of them make it clear that they intend to discuss the soul in general and 
not merely the intellective soul. To put this more strongly, they often felt the 
need to argue explicitly for the legitimacy of including a study of the intellec-
tive soul within the scientia de anima, whereas they took it for granted that the 
vegetative and sensitive souls are part of the proper subject matter of this sci-
ence. I would argue that the fact that the human mind proves to be the most 
resistant to a natural philosophical treatment does not imply that it is neces-
sarily the most important (or even controversial) topic within the scientia de 
anima. The second reason for my focus on the soul in general rather than on 
the intellect is that I have become more and more convinced that the body was 
often as difficult to understand philosophically as, if not more than, the soul 
in the later Middle Ages.16 
'
5The interested reader can find information about some of the debates on what Aristotle 
could have meant in the footnotes. 
I6I agree with Caroline Walker Bynum in her study on medieval debates on the resurrection 
of the body when she says that "Yet, for medieval thinkers, body far more than soul raised 
technical philosophical questions about identity and personhood.", although I would place the 
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As a consequence, my approach will focus on the soul as the principle of 
life more than as the principle of understanding. The implications of the soul 
as principle of life are then drawn out in two chapters discussing the Aris­
totelian definition of the soul, its division into various powers, and its mode 
of presence in the body.17 I am convinced that this perspective on the mate­
rial is much more than just a valuable addition to the approaches that focused 
on the intellect. By discussing the intellect in separation from the rest of the 
De anima tradition, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to see why cer­
tain aspects of the intellective soul were being singled out as problematic. For 
this we also need to know which problems already arise on the levels of the 
vegetative and sensitive souls. By looking at the De antma tradition from the 
perspective that the commentators argued for explicitly, namely, as a science 
that studies the vegetative, sensitive and intellective soul both separately and in 
relation to one another, what they write about the human soul and the prob­
lems connected to it will take on a new meaning. This broader perspective is 
therefore not only necessary in order to show how the scientia de anima as a 
whole transformed, but also crucial to appreciating the problems connected 
with the human soul. 
1.3 Periodisation and sources 
In this study I will often, mostly for the sake of convenience, distinguish be­
tween three phases in the period under discussion. As the first phase I take the 
period from the 1260s to 1280s, for which I mainly focus on the commentary 
by Thomas Aquinas and several commentaries by anonymous masters of arts. 
For the second phase, the late 1290s to the early 1320s, I concentrate on the 
commentaries by Radulphus Brito and John of Jandun. Brito's commentary 
turned out to be so interesting that I decided to edit a substantial part it. I have 
included this edition of book I and the first half of book II in the appendices.18 
emphasis on identity rather than on personhood; C. WALKER BYNUM, The Resurrection of the 
Body m Western Chrtsttamty, 200-1336, New York [etc.]: Columbia University Press, 1995, 
xvni. Matthew Klemm points out the importance of the body (in contrast to the soul) from a 
different perspective in his analysis of Pietro d'Abano's Conciliator. See M KLEMM, 'A Medical 
Perspective on the Soul as Substantial Form of the Body. Peter of Abano on the Reconciliation 
of Aristotle and Galen', in: Ρ J. J. M. BAKKER, S. W. DE BOER and C H LEIJENHORST (eds ), 
Psychology and the other disciplines A Case of Cross-Disciplinary Interaction (1250 - 1750), 
Leiden [etc.]· Brill, (forthcoming). 
l 7Dennis Des Chene has studied the later tradition of the science of the soul (1550-1650) 
along similar lines in his impressive study DES CHENE, Life's Form. 
l e The third book had already been edited: RADULPHUS BRITO, Quaestwnes De ammo, liber 
terttus, in: F. Fauser, Der Kommentar des Radulphus Brito zu Buch IH De anima, kritische Edi­
tion und philosophisch-historische Einleitung, Munster: Aschendorff, 1974 
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For the third phase, around the middle of the fourteenth century, I focus on 
the commentaries of John Buridan, Nicole Oresme, and the anonymous com-
mentary published by Benoît Fatar under the name of Buridan. I have good 
reasons to doubt that the ascription to Buridan is correct, which is why I will 
refer to the third commentary as the anonymus Fatar.19 I cannot overempha-
size that this periodisation is primarily for the sake of convenience, and does 
not imply any radical discontinuities that would enable us to talk about a typ-
ical commentary from any one of these periods. As I already indicated, it is 
better to speak of a gradual transformation of the De anima tradition than of 
radical discontinuities. 
Since the subject matter of this book is the transformation of the scientia 
de anima, I only discuss those authors who wrote a commentary on this text. 
Also, I have made no systematic effort to compare the views that someone de-
fends in his commentary on the De anima to his views in other texts. I had, 
however, to make two exceptions to this rule. The first exception is found 
in my discussion of Thomas Aquinas. Although Aquinas wrote a commen-
tary on Aristotle's De anima, his commentary is not structured as a series of 
questions on topics related to the text (per modum quaestionis), but instead 
as an interpretation of each individual passage (per modum expositionis). As 
a result, it is not always equally clear whether we are dealing with Aquinas's 
own view or with his interpretation of what Aristotle meant to say. Given the 
enormous influence that Aquinas exerted over the later tradition, I have used 
several of his other works, especially his Quaestiones disputae de anima and his 
Quaestiones disputatae de spiritualibus creaturis, to supplement what he says in 
his commentary on the De anima. 
The second exception is William Ockham. Ockham never wrote a com-
mentary on the De anima. It turns out, however, that much of what goes on in 
Parisian commentaries from the middle of the fourteenth century is strongly 
influenced by Ockham. So strongly, in fact, that a discussion of Ockham's 
views on the soul is simply necessary to understand this phase of the De anima 
tradition. 
Finally, I will not discuss John Duns Scotus, which is, perhaps, surprising, 
since he did write a commentary on the De anima.20 The reason for this is 
that Scotus's commentary only discusses a part of Aristotle's text. It includes 
no questions on either the methodology of the scientia de anima or on the def-
inition of the soul and its structure in terms of essence and powers. In short, 
"For discussion, see the appendices. 
20The authenticity of this commentary has been conclusively established by the editors of 
the critical edition. See JOHN DUNS SCOTUS, Quaestiones super secundum et tertium de anima, 
edited by C. Bazàn, Κ. Emery Jr., R. Green [e.a.], Washington, DC: The Catholic University of 
America Press [etc.], 2006 (Opera philosophica, 5), 121*-137*. 
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none of the topics I discuss in this study can be found in Scotus's commentary. 
1.3.1 A chronological list of consulted commentaries 
My claims about the transformations that take place in the scientia de anima 
from the 1260s to c. 1360 are mostly based on the following commentaries: 
Anonymus Vennebusch (fl. c. 1260) 
This anonymous commentary per modum quaestionis has been edited by 
Joachim Vennebusch. Vennebusch dates it c. 1260.21 The commentary on 
book III seems to be incomplete, ending after III.5. It is difficult to establish 
the number of questions, because often two or three questions are discussed 
at the same time and are determined together. 
Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274) 
Thomas Aquinas's Sentenaa libri De anima, his commentary on the De anima 
per modum expositionis, has been edited by René-Antoine Gauthier. Gauthier 
dates it between December 1267 and September 1268.22 
Anonymus Giele (fl. c. 1270) 
This anonymous commentary per modum quaestionis, written by a master of 
arts, has been edited by Maurice Giele. Giele dates it between 1270 and 1275.23 
It contains 21 questions on book I and 25 questions on book II. 
Anonymus Bazén (fl. c. 1275) 
This anonymous commentary per modum quaestionis, written by a master of 
arts, has been edited by Bernardo Carlos Bazân. He dates the commentary 
21
 ANONYMUS VENNEBUSCH, Questwnes in tres hbros De anima, in: J. Vennebusch, 
Ein anonymer Anstoteleskommentar des XIII Jahrhunderts, Textedition und philosophisch-
historische Einleitung, Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh, 1963. For the dating, see pp. 85-86. 
2 2THOMAS AQUINAS, Sentenaa libri De anima, edited by R.-A. Gauthier, Roma: Commissio 
Leonina [etc.], 1984 (Opera omnia, 45:1). For the dating, see pp. 2S3*-2S7*. 
23ANONYMUS GIELE, Questwnes in Anstotehs libros I et II De anima, in: M. Giele, F. van 
Steenberghen and Β. Bazén, Trots commentaires anonymes sur le Traité de l'âme d'Anstote, Lou-
vain: Publications universitaires[etc.], 1971, 11-120. For the dating, see pp. 15-16. The ter-
minus post quem is established by its dependence on Aquinas's De umtäte intellectus (1270) 
and the terminus ante quern is fixed by its use by Giles of Rome in De plunficatione intellectus 
possibilis (written before 1275). 
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between 1272 and 1277.24 It contains 7 questions on Book I, 40 on book II, 
and 22 on book III. 
Anonymus Van Steenberghen (fl. c. 1275) 
This anonymous commentary per modum quaestionis, written by a master of 
arts, has been edited by Fernand van Steenberghen. Van Steenberghen dates 
the commentary between 1273 and 1277.25 It contains questions on all three 
books of the De anima, but stops abruptly in the middle of question 22 of 
book III. The commentary contains 21 questions on book I, 45 on book II, 
and 22 on book III. 
Radulphus Brito (c. 1270-c. 1320) 
The third book of Radulphus Brito's commentary on the De anima per modum 
quaestionis has been edited by Winfried Fauser.26 My own edition of book I 
and the first half of book II can be found in the appendices.27 The commentary 
contains 10 questions on Book I, 44 on book II, and 28 on book III. 
Waiter Burley (c. 1275-1344) 
Parts of Walter Burley's commentary on the De anima, an expositw with quaes-
tiones inserted in those place he wanted to elaborate on, have been edited by 
Paul Bakker. The edited questions will be published as part of a broader study 
on the De anima tradition.28 Zdizslaw Kuksewicz has dated the commentary 
to 1316.29 
2 4ANONYMUS BAZAN, Quaestiones super Anstotelts hbrum De anima, in: M. Giele, F. van 
Steenberghen and Β. Bazân, Trots commentaires anonymes sur le Traité de l'âme d'Anstote, Lou-
vain: Publications universitaires[etc ], 1971, 349-517. For the dating, see pp 366-377. 
"ANONYMUS VAN STEENBERGHEN, Questiones in libros Anstotehs De anima, in: M. Giele, 
F. van Steenberghen and Β Bazân, Trois commentaires anonymes sur le Traite de l'âme d'Artstote, 
Louvain: Publications universitaires[etc.], 1971, 121-348 For the dating, see pp. 128-129 
26RADULPHUS BRITO, Quaestiones De anima, liber tertius, in: F. Fauser, Der Kommentar des 
Radulphus Bnto zu Buch ΠΙ De anima, kritische Edition und philosophisch-historische Ein­
leitung, Munster: Aschendorff, 1974. 
27See below, Appendix A. 
2 8 P J. J. M BAKKER, Form of the Body or Ghost in the Machine? The Study of Soul, Mind, 
and Body (1250-1700) (in preparation). 
2 9 Z. KUKSEWICZ, 'The Problem of Walter Burley's Averroism', in: A. MAIERU and A. PARA­
VICINI BAGLIANI (eds.), Studi sul XIV secolo m memoria dt Anneliese Mater, Roma: Edizioni di 
stona e letteratura, 1981, 341-377, 377. 
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John of Jandun (c. 1285-1328) 
There exist two redactions of Jandun's commentary on the De anima per 
modum quaestionis, both of which are not available in any modern edition.30 
The second redaction (composed 1317-1319), is available, however, in a Re­
naissance edition.31 For this study I rely solely on this second redaction. It 
contains 13 questions on Book I, 37 on book II, and 42 on book III. 
John Buridan (c. 1300-c. 1360) 
Buridan has lectured on Aristotle's De anima several times.32 The final redac­
tion of his quaestiones commentary on De anima is designated in some of the 
manuscripts as the ultima sive tertia lectura. The second book of this redac­
tion has been edited by Peter Sobol.33 The third book has been edited by Jack 
Zupko.34 All quotations from book I are from my own, unpublished edition.35 
A group of scholars, including Bakker, Sobol, Zupko, and myself, have joined 
forces in order to publish a new edition of the entire commentary.36 The ul­
tima lectura was probably written after 1347 and before 1357/58.37 There also 
exists another version of Buridan's lectures on the De anima, edited by Georg 
Lokert (1485-1547) and published in Paris in 1518.38 This edition has been 
3 0 In addition, he also wrote a Scriptum super III librum D e anima (1321). For the different 
redactions and the Scriptum, see O. WEIJERS, Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: 
textes et maîtres (ca. 1200-1500). Vol. V: Répertoire des noms commençant par J (suite: à partir 
de Johannes D.), Turnhout: Brepols, 2003 ,94-96 . 
3 I J O H N OF J A N D U N , Quaestiones De anima, Venezia, 1637 (Photo-mechanical reprint 
Frankfurt: Minerva, 1966). For the composition date, see B R E N E T , Transferts du sujet, 13. 
32For the different redactions, see B. MICHAEL, Johannes Buridan: Studien zu seinem Leben, 
seinen Werken und zur Rezeption seiner Theorien im Europa des späten Mittelalters, Berlin: Freie 
Universität Berlin (PhD Thesis), 1985, vol. 2 ,677 -735 . 
" J O H N B U R I D A N , Quaestiones de anima, liber secundus [ultima lectura], in: P. Sobol, John 
Buridan on the Soul and Sensation: an Edition of Book 11 of his Commentary on Aristotle's Book of 
the Soul with an Introduction and a Translation of Question 18 on Sensible Species, PhD Thesis, 
Indiana University, 1984. 
3 4 J O H N B U R I D A N , Quaestiones de anima, liber terttus [ultima lectura], in: J. Zupko, John 
Buridan's Philosophy of Mind: an Edition of Book III of his "Questions on Aristotle's De anima" 
(Third redaction), with Commentary and Critical and Interpretative Essays, PhD Thesis, Cornell 
University, 1989 (2 vols). 
3 5 J O H N B U R I D A N , Questiones de anima (secundum ulttmam lecturam), liber primus, MS Città 
del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Reg. Lat. 1959. 
36For more information about this project and the complete list of participating scholars, 
see http://buridanica.org. 
37For the dating, see M I C H A E L , Johannes Buridan: Studien, 708. The dating is based on the 
reference contained in the text to the condemnation of Mirecourt that took place in 1347. See 
also JOHN B U R I D A N , QdA, xxiii. 
'
eSee M I C H A E L , Johannes Buridan: Studien, 690-691 . 
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transcribed by Benoît Fatar as an appendix to his edition of the Anonymus 
Fatar (see below). 
Nicole Oresme (c. 1320-1382) 
Oresme's commentary on the De anima per modum quaesttoms was first edited 
by Peter Marshall in 1980.39 In 1995 Benoît Fatar published an updated edi-
tion of these quaestiones using an extra manuscript. This updated edition also 
includes Oresme's Exposttio on the De anima.40 The commentary contains 4 
questions on Book I, 21 on book II, and 19 on book III. 
Anonymus Fatar (fl. c. 1340-1350) 
Benoît Fatar has also edited an anonymous set of quaestiones and an anony-
mous exposino commentary on the De anima.41 The two commentaries have 
been published as Buridan's first lecture on the De anima. For reasons that 
can be found in the Appendices, however, I strongly doubt that the ascription 
is correct. I consider these texts to be a set of anonymous commentaries from 
the middle of the fourteenth century. The commentary contains 6 questions 
on Book I, 22 on book II, and 16 on book III. 
1.4 Orthography, punctuation and translations 
I will utilize a variety of early prints, modern editions, and medieval 
manuscripts, which raises some questions about how to deal with the 
orthography of the Latin and the punctuation of the texts. Throughout 
this book I will adhere to the orthography as used in a particular edition. 
When citing from the manuscripts, I will use the medieval orthography, but 
with some exceptions as noted in the preface to my edition of Radulphus 
Brito's commentary found in the appendices. These exceptions are mostly 
the introduction of a u/v and c/t distinction that are not (consistently) found 
in the sources. I will change the punctuation of any existing edition (both 
renaissance and modem) silently when necessary. Given that the punctuation 
3 ,NICOLE ORESME, Questtones super hbros Anstotelts De anima, in· P. Marshall (ed.), 
Nicholas Oresme's Questiones super hbros Anstotehs de anima. A Critical Edition with In-
troduction and Commentary, PhD Thesis, Cornell University, 1980. 
•""NICOLE ORESME, Quaestiones in Anstotehs De anima, in: Β Palar, Expositie et quaestiones 
in Anstotehs De anima, études doctrinales en collaboration avec C. Gagnon, Louvain [etc.]. 
Peeters, 1995. 
41
 ANONYMUS PATAR, Quaestiones de anima, in: B. Patar, Le Traité de l'âme de Jean Buri-
dan [De pnma lecturaj, edition, étude critique et doctrinale, Louvain-la-Neuve. Éditions de 
l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie (etc ], 1991. 
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in medieval manuscripts is inconsistent at best, and absent at worst, treating 
all punctuation in an edition with suspicion is always the best approach when 
trying to understand a text. In some instances I have either corrected an 
edition or chosen a variant reading. In these instances the reading of the 
editor is also given as Koriginal reading ed.>. 
All translations from the Latin are my own, unless stated otherwise. All 
English translations of Aristotle are taken from The Complete WorL· of Aristo­
tle, edited by Jonathan Barnes. 
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To describe what the soul actually is would require a very long account, 
altogether a task for a god in every way; but to say what it is like is 
humanly possible and takes less time. 
PLATO, Phaedrus, translated by A. Nehamas & P. Woodruff, in: Plato, 
Complete Works, edited, with introduction and notes by J. M. Cooper, 
Indianapolis [etc.]: Hackett, 1997, 246a, 524. 
In this chapter I will provide an overview of a few of the more important 
discussions that can be found in the commentaries on the De anima. This will 
help to prepare for the more detailed discussions in the coming chapters. At 
the same time, it will give me the opportunity to introduce a selection of the 
most important Uterature. My aim is not to give a complete account of ei-
ther the secondary literature or the controversies found in the commentaries, 
which would be impossible, but rather to identify some key topics, most of 
which will be treated in much more detail in the following chapters. 
There is an intimate relation between the methodological questions taken 
up in book I of the commentaries on the De anima and the philosophical po-
sitions defended in books II and III of these same commentaries. Even a brief 
glance at the methodological questions shows that these are settled by argu-
ments taken from a variety of often hotly debated topics in the other books, 
such as the ontological status of the human intellect, the relation between 
the soul and its powers, and the unicity or plurality of substantial form. In 
fact, these arguments are so important for understanding the methodological 
questions raised in book I, that it is next to impossible to give an analysis of 
book I without also discussing several topics that are debated in the other two 
books. I have chosen, therefore, to introduce the debates in this chapter, and 
to present a more detailed analysis in the later chapters. 
Before going into the philosophical discussions found in the later medieval 
commentaries on the De anima, however, I will first, briefly, describe how 
Aristotle's treatise on the soul entered the Latin philosophical tradition. 
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2.1 The introduction of the De anima into the Latin 
West 
During most of the Middle Ages, Aristotle's De anima was unavailable in the 
Latin West. In fact, the only works that were available prior to the twelfth 
century were a few of Aristotle's logical treatises.1 The first Latin transla-
tion of the De anima was made, directly from the Greek, by James of Venice 
around the middle of the twelfth century and has been labeled the translatio 
vetus. Around 1230 a second translation (the translatio nova) was made from 
the Arabic, which also included Averroes's long commentary on the text. Al-
though its translator is usually claimed to be Michael Scot, only one out of the 
remaining fifty-seven manuscripts of Averroes's Long Commentary on the De 
anima seems to identity him as such.2 The most influential translation, how-
ever, is the so-called recensio nova, which was made by William of Moerbeke 
and finished around 1266-7.3 This recensio nova is a revision of the translatio 
vetus. 
Although the De anima was available at the time of the rise of the uni-
versities in the late twelfth century, the first official reactions to the use of the 
text were far from positive.4 There is an extant letter from a provincial synod 
held in 1210, presided over by the archbishop of Sens, at which the writings 
of David of Dinant were condemned. It contains a passage that states that 
Aristotle's works in natural philosophy are not to be read — that is, used in 
teaching — at the University of Paris, neither publicly nor in secret, under the 
'These works are the Categoriae and De interpretatione. Together with an introduction by 
Porphyry, the Isagoge, they were translated by Boethius at the beginning of the sixth century. 
These three translations and a small set of commentaries and treatises by Boethius are jointly 
known as the logica vetus. For a list of Boethius's commentaries and treatises, see CHMP, 129. 
2The editor of the Long Commentary, F. S. Crawford, expressed his doubts about the claims 
of Renan and Grabmann, who (between the both of them) claimed that four more manuscripts 
ascribe the translation to Michael Scot. He was unable to find any such ascriptions in those 
manuscripts. See AVERROES, Commentanum magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros, edited by 
F. Stuart Crawford, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953, 
xi. The lack of evidence for the ascription of the translation to Michael Scot was also more 
recently pointed out by D. N. HASSE, Avicenna's De anima m the Latin West. The Formatton 
of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 1160-1300, London [etc.]: The Warburg Institute [etc.], 
2000, 9. 
3This translation survives in approximately 250 MSS. It is described in great detail by R.-A. 
Gauthier in his introduction to THOMAS AQUINAS, SentdeA, 129*-199*. For the composition 
date, see p. 283* of Gauthier's introduction. 
''This brief overview relies mostly on F. VAN STEENBERGHEN, Aristotle in the West. The 
Origins of Latin Aristotelianism, Translated by Leonard Johnston, Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts, 
1955, esp. 59-88. His detailed description of the early phases of the reception of the De anima 
in the Latin West is still accurate. 
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penalty of excommunication.5 
However, less than twenty-five years later, the attitude of the church au-
thorities was already much more positive. In April 1231, Pope Gregory IX 
wrote a letter in which he assigned the task of purging the works of Aristotle 
of any errors to a committee of three members.6 As Augustine had done be-
fore him with Plato, Gregory IX invoked the analogy of the Jews taking the 
spoils of Egypt to point out that Aristotle's philosophical works contain much 
that is valuable and useful.7 The appointed committee seems to have never 
completed its task, however, and by 1252 the reading of Aristotle's De anima, 
in its uncensored form, had been added to the list of requirements for obtain-
ing a bachelor's degree in the arts faculty at Paris.8 
In an influential article, Daniel Callus divided the introduction of the De 
anima in the thirteenth century and the assimilation of its contents into three 
stages: the early reception in which the commentators wrote treatises under 
the influence of Avicenna (until about 1240), the writing of exposition type 
commentaries under the influence of Averroes (until about 1265), and the 
appearance of commentaries in the question form.9 This division has recently 
5CUP 1,11, 70-1 · " . . . nee libri Aristotelis de naturali philosophia nee commenta legantur 
Pansius publice vel secreto, et hoc sub penae xcommunicatioms (sic] inhibemus " According 
to Van Steenberghen, the hbn naturales probably included the Metaphysics as well; the com-
mentaries refer to Avicenna's and perhaps Alfarabi's See VAN STEENBERGHEN, Anstotle in the 
West, 69 It is important to note that these prohibitions applied only to the University of Pans 
This can be gathered from the fact that in 1229 the newly founded University of Toulouse ad-
vertised with the promise that the natural philosophical books that were prohibited in Pans 
could be read at Toulouse. See VAN STEENBERGHEN, Anstotle m the West, 82. 
''CUP I, 87, 143-144: "Ceterum cum sicut intelleximus libri naturahum, qui Pansius in 
Concilio provinciali fuere prohibiti, quedam utilia et inutilia contmere dicantur, ne utile per 
inutile vitietur, discretion! vestre, de qua plenam in Domino fiduciam obtinemus, per apos-
tolica scripta sub obtestatione divini judicu firmiter precipiendo mandamus, quatinus hbros 
ipsos examinantes sicut convenu subtihter et prudenter, que ibi erronea seu scandali vel offen-
diculi legentibus invenentis illativa, penitus resecetis ut que sunt suspecta remotis incunctanter 
ac inoffense in rehquis studeatur." 
7Exodus, 12:35-36; AUGUSTINE, De doctnna chnsttana, II, 401"23 (CCSL, 32). 
eCi/P, I, 201, 227-30. These statutes applied only to the students connected to the English 
nation of the University of Pans. Since the statutes of the other nations for that penod have 
been lost, it is impossible to know whether or not they were subject to the same requirement. 
But if Anstotle's De anima was not yet a required reading for the other nations in 1252, it soon 
would be. For it is included in a list compiled in 1255 that applies to the arts faculty as a whole 
(see CUP, I, 246, 277-79). As F. VAN STEENBERGHEN, La philosophie au Xllf siècle 2? édition, 
mise à jour, Louvain [etc.]: Publications Universitaires [etc.], 1991, 323, says, it is likely that 
the statutes codified existing practices, in which case reading the De anima had already been 
a requirement for some time. For the division of the arts faculty of the university of Pans 
into four relatively independent nations, each with their own statutes, see H. RASHDALL, The 
Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages, Revised and edited by F. M. Powicke and Α. Β Emden, 
Oxford [etc.]: Oxford University Press, 1936, vol. 1, 298-320. 
'See D A. CALLUS, 'Introduction of Aristotelian Learning to Oxford', Proceedings of the 
17 
C H A P T E R 2. OVERVIEW 
been criticized, rightly, by Olga Weijers, mainly because the literary forms of 
the commentaries, especially in the first two periods, turn out to be much 
more varied than Callus's classification suggests.10 This means that the influ­
ence of Avicenna and Averroes on the form of the commentaries was limited. 
Callus was right, however, about their influence on the contents of the com­
mentaries. The early reception of the De anima, especially, was strongly in­
fluenced by Avicenna." Avicenna's treatise on the soul is not a commentary 
on Aristotle's De anima, but it was perceived as such in the Middle Ages.12 
His influence on the commentators in the first half of the thirteenth century 
becomes clearly visible when we turn to Aristotle's views on what the soul is. 
2.2 The soul as perfectio 
In Aristotelian philosophy, 'soul' has a very different meaning than the one 
associated with it nowadays. Many of us tend to associate the term 'soul' with 
some ghostlike spiritual core of human beings, something that is distinct from 
their material composition. 'Soul' is associated with personality, emotions, 
feelings, and, for some, even with immortality. We may be willing to ascribe 
a soul to (some) animals when they exhibit behavior somehow similar to our 
own, but we would certainly not be willing to ascribe a soul to insects or plants. 
To many of us, the soul is at best something elusive, more a matter of faith 
than something the existence of which can be scientifically demonstrated. 
Although several of the elements associated by us with 'soul' are also men­
tioned in Aristotle's De anima, the basic notion of 'soul' that Aristode em­
ploys is fundamentally different from ours. 'Soul' in any philosophy based 
British Academy, 29 (1943), 229-281,264-65. For an overview of the reception of the De anima 
in the thirteenth century up until Thomas Aquinas, see DALES, The Problem of the Rational Soul. 
But note that this study only focuses on one aspect of the reception, namely the discussions 
about the intellective soul. 
'
0See O. WEIJERS, 'The Literary Forms of the Reception of Aristotle. Between Exposition 
and Philosophical Treatise', in: LUDGER HONNEFELDER et al (eds.), Albertus Magnus and the 
Beginnings of the Medieval Reception of Aristotle in the Latin West From Richard Rufus to Fran-
ciscus de Mayroms, Munster· Aschendorff, 2005, 555-584, esp. 578-580 
"See WEIJERS, 'The Literary Forms', 578 and HASSE, Avicenna's De anima, 13-79. D. Ν. 
HASSE, 'The Early Albertus Magnus and his Arabic Sources on the Theory of the Soul', Vivar­
ium, 46 (2008), 232-252, esp. 239-244, shows how even Albert the Great, writing in the 1240s, 
was still strongly influenced by Avicenna in his discussions on the soul Although Albert was 
also familiar with Averroes, this commentator was "not yet perceived as a philosopher of the 
same rank as Aristotle or Avicenna" (ρ 249) 
l 2The Middle Ages were not the only period in which the text was perceived as a com­
mentary on Aristotle. According to HASSE, Avicenna's De anima, 1: "It is a common mistake 
among Western medievalists to call Avicenna's De anima a commentary on, or a paraphrase of 
Aristotle's Pen psyches." 
18 
T H E SOUL AS perfectto 
on Aristotle is first and foremost that by which the living differs from the 
non-living.13 An argument for the existence of soul is, therefore, completely 
unnecessary, simple observation and common sense will suffice. This is very 
well put by Avicenna in the opening lines of his own treatise on soul: 
Dicemus igitur quia, quod pnmum debemus considerare de his, hoc est 
scilicet affirmare esse hums quod vocatur anima, et deinde loquemur de 
eo quod sequitur hoc Et dicemus quod nos videmus corpora quaedam 
quae non nutnuntur nee augmentantur nee générant; et videmus alia 
corpora quae nutnuntur et augmentantur et générant sibi similia, sed 
non habent hoc ex sua corporeitate; restât ergo ut sit in essentia eorum 
principium hums praeter corporeitatem. Et id a quo émanant istae af-
fectiones dicitur anima, et omnino quicquid est principium emandandi 
a se affectiones quae non sunt umus modi et sunt voluntane, impon-
Let us therefore say that we should first consider these things, that is, 
affirm the existence ofthat which is called soul, and subsequently speak 
of that which follows this And let us say that we see some bodies that 
neither feed, nor grow, nor produce offspring, and we see other bodies 
that do feed and grow and produce things similar to themselves, but 
they do not have these <operations> on account of their corporeality, 
it remains, therefore, that in their essence, there exists besides corpo-
reality a principle of these <affections>. And that from which these 
affections flow is called soul. And on altogether whatsoever is the prin-
ciple of the flowing forth out of itself of affections that are not limited 
to one mode and that are voluntary, we impose the name 'soul' l5 
But things are more complicated than they might appear from these open-
ing lines of Avicenna's treatise. It is true that from the earhest commentaries 
'
3Were it not for the extensive commentary tradition on Anstotle's work that renders ψυχή 
as anima, which we can only sensibly translate as soul, I would prefer the tide of the English 
translation made by Charles Collier in the middle of the nineteenth century, which does not 
have the misleading connotations of'soul', ARISTOTLE, On the Vital Principle, translated from 
the original text with notes by Charles Collier, Cambridge Macmillan and Co , 1855 
"AVICENNA, Liber De anima seu sextus De naturahbus, édition critique de la traduction 
latine médiévale par S van Riet Introduction sur la doetnne psychologique d'Avicenne par G 
Verbeke, Louvain Peelers [etc ], 1968-72 (2 vols ), vol 1,11, 14-15 Although the text is not a 
commentary on Anstode's text, it follows the structure of Aristotle's text closely and elaborates 
on it 
l5
'Voluntary' should be taken in a very broad sense here One of the manuscripts on which 
the edition is based supplies some explanation in the form of a gloss (see the apparatus enti 
eus on ρ 16 of the edition) "Quattuor sunt hie species actionum quoniam aliae sunt umus 
modi et voluntanae ut superiorum corporum, aliae sunt umus modi et non voluntariae ut eie 
mentorum, aliae sunt diverso modo et non voluntariae ut vegetabilium, aliae diverso modo et 
voluntanae sicut omnium sensibilium " 
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on the De anima onward, the general term 'soul' has been used in the mean­
ing of a constitutive principle of the living body. But it has also been used to 
refer to a (at least in some sense) self-sufficient and immortal entity.16 The 
resulting ambiguity of the term 'soul' is not, however, the result of a confused 
interpretation of Aristotle. Quite the opposite. The ambiguous status of the 
intellective soul forms the core of Aristotle's De anima. 
The emphasis in Aristotle's treatise is undeniably on soul as a constitutive 
principle of the living body, and this very fact alone makes the De anima one 
of the greatest advancements in philosophical thought about the relationship 
between soul and body. Whereas Plato had a tendency to equate the human 
being with his or her soul, at times even describing the body in terms of a 
prison, Aristotle repeatedly insists on the unity of the living substance and 
dismisses every question regarding the cause of this unity of soul and body.17 
There are no two fundamentally different entities — a soul and a body — 
that are subsequently joined by some unifying cause, whatever that cause may 
be.18 There is always only one entity, the living, functioning, ensouled organ­
ism. Yet each time Aristotle repeats this claim, it is quickly followed by some 
" i t could be objected that the second meaning is usually assigned to the compound term 
'intellective soul' and that 'soul' is used as a general term covering all forms of life Although 
this is true, it does not change the fact the vast majority of philosophers employing these terms 
would also say that the intellective soul is unequivocally a soul. Hence, the intellective soul is 
thought of as both the principle of life of the living substance and an immortal entity in its own 
right. 
'
7Plato's view that man is identical with his soul can be found in PLATO, Alabtades, trans­
lated by D. S. Hutchinson, in: Plato, Complete Worfcs, edited, with introduction and notes by 
J. M. Cooper, Indianapolis [etc.]: Hackett, 1997, 130cl-6, 589· "Since a man is neither his 
body, nor his body and his soul together, what remains, I think, is either that he's nothing, 
or else, if he is something, he's nothing other than his soul." The authenticity of the Alab­
tades is debated, however (for some discussion see PLATO, Alabtades, edited by N. Denyer, 
Cambridge [etc.]: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 14-26) But there are other references in 
Plato's works to the identity of man with his soul, a list of which can be found in L. P. GERSON, 
'Platonic Dualism', The Momst, 69:3 (1986), 352-369, 367, note 13. 
"At least according to the standard reading of Anstode. But in a number of publications 
Abraham Bos has argued that Anstode has been misread by almost all commentators from 
Alexander of Aphrodisias onward. According to Bos, the soul is not the form of an organic 
body (as is commonly held), but of a body that serves as an instrument for the soul, the pneu­
matic body, which is the means through which the soul moves our physical body The most 
detailed discussion can be found in A Ρ Bos, The Soul and its Instrumental Body ARetnterpre-
tatwn of Aristotle's Philosophy of Living Nature, Leiden [etc.]· Bnll, 2003. His interpretation of 
Anstode has also led him to reconsider the status of the De spiritu, included in Bekker's edition 
of the opera omnia but generally regarded as spurious. Since the De spiritu is consistent with 
Bos's interpretation of Aristotle's De anima, he considers the text to be authentic. See Α. Ρ Bos 
and R FERWERDA, Aristotle, On the Life-BeanngSptnt (De spiritu) A Discussion with Plato and 
his Predecessors on Pneuma as the Instrumental Body of the SouL Introduction, Translation and 
Commentary, Leiden [etc.]: Brill, 2008, esp. 23-5. 
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qualification or doubt. Take, for example, the following famous passage from 
the beginning of book II of the De anima: 
If, then, we have to give a general formula applicable to all kinds of 
soul, we must describe it as an actuality of the first kind of a natural 
organized body. That is why we can dismiss as unnecessary the question 
of whether the soul and the body are one: it is as though we were to ask 
whether the wax and its shape are one, or generally the matter of a thing 
and that of which it is the matter.19 
One can hardly ask for a stronger formulation of the fundamental unity 
of soul and body. Not only do they have the strongest unity possible, that of 
form and matter, but it also seems that even the question of whether or not 
soul and body are one loses its meaning.20 It seems dear that the soul is taken 
here as the principle of life, and not as something having its own existence 
apart from the body. Remarkably, however, merely about 25 lines further in 
the text, this statement seems to be contradicted when Aristotle compares the 
soul-body relationship to that of the relation between a sailor and his ship: 
From this it is clear that the soul is inseparable from its body, or at any 
rate that certain parts of it are (if it has parts) — for the actuality of 
some of them is the actuality of the parts themselves. Yet some may be 
separable because they are not the actualities of any body at all. Further, 
we have no light on the problem whether the soul may not be the ac-
tuality of its body in the sense in which the sailor is the actuality of the 
ship.21 
This is not an isolated occurrence; the contrast reoccurs again and again 
in the De anima. Each time that the soul is put forward as the vital princi-
ple, a tentative quahfying remark will quickly follow, in which the intellect 
seems to be put forward as some separate or at least separable entity.22 In the 
"ARISTOTLE, De anima, II, 412b5-8. 
20But see C. SHIELDS, 'The Pnonty of Soul in Aristotle's De anima· Mistaking Categories?' 
in: D. FREDE and B. REIS (eds ), Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy, Berlin [etc ]: Walter de 
Gruyter, 2009, 267-290, for a detailed analysis of this passage, in which he argues, against the 
common interpretation, that according to Aristotle the soul is prior to the body. According to 
Shields, Anstode does not mean that asking the question of the unity of soul and body is asking 
the wrong question, since form and matter are principles, not things. Instead, he means that the 
question need not be asked anymore, because the fact that the soul is the first actuality already 
makes it clear in what sense the soul-body composite is a unity The body is an instrument of 
the soul, and gets its unity from the soul 
21
 ARISTOTLE, De anima, II, 413a4-9. 
22B. C. BAZAN, 'Radical Anstoteliamsm in the Faculties of Arts. The Case of Siger of Bra-
bant', in· LUDGER HONNEFELDER et al. (eds.), Albertus Magnus and the Beginnings of the Me-
dieval Reception of Aristotle in the Latin West From Richardus Rufus to Franciscus de Mayronis, 
Munster: Aschendorff, 2005, 585-629,594-95 gives a series of examples. 
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commentary tradition and texts related to it, this contrast has been dealt with 
in various ways. It was Avicenna's De anima that provided the commenta-
tors with an important tool to do justice to the contrasting passages in the De 
anima while still providing a unified theory of soul. According to Avicenna, 
the soul can be defined from two perspectives.23 It can be defined as it is in 
itself, and as such the soul is defined as a spiritual immortal substance.24 But 
the soul can also be defined in its relation to the body. As such it is defined as 
the body's perfection?5 Notice that (the Latin) Avicenna uses the term 'per-
fection' {perfectio) rather than the term 'form' (forma) when defining the soul 
in its relation to the body. Defining the soul as 'the perfection of the natu-
ral organic body' makes the definition compatible with his other definition of 
the soul, in abstraction from the body, as a spiritual immortal substance. For 
there seems to be no reason why one thing cannot be perfected by another. 
2 ,I am only interested here in Avicenna's description of the soul as the thirteenth-century 
commentators understood it. For a detailed analysis of Avicenna's description of the soul on its 
own terms, see R. WISNOVSKY, Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context, Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2003, 113-141. 
24
 Avicenna's intriguing proof for the possibility of defining the soul apart from its relation 
to the body has become known as the 'flying man' argument. AVICENNA, De anima, I.l, 36-7· 
"Dicemus igitur quod ahquis ex nobis putare debet quasi subito creatus esset et perfectus, sed 
velato visu suo ne extenora videret, et creatus esset sic quasi moveretur in aere aut in inani, 
ita ut eum non tangere! spissitudo aens quam ipse sentire posset, et quasi essent disiuncta 
membra eius ut non concurreren! sibi nee contingerent sese. Deinde videat si affirmât esse 
suae essentiae. non enim dubitabit affirmare se esse, nee tarnen affirmabit extenora suorum 
membrorum, nec occulta suorum intenorum nec animum nee cerebrum, nee aliquid aliud 
extrinsecus, sed affirmabit se esse, cuius non affirmabit longitudinem nec latitudinem nec spis-
situdinem. Si autem, in illa hora, possibile esset ei imaginan manum aut aliud membrum, non 
tarnen imaginaretur illud esse partem sui nec necessanum suae essentiae. Tu autem scis quod 
id quod affirmatur, aliud est ab eo quod non affirmatur, et concessum aliud est ab eo quod non 
conceditur. Et, quomam essentia quam affirmât esse est propria 1II1, eo quod dia est ipsemet, 
et est praeter corpus eius et membra ems quae non affirmât, ideo expergefactus habet viam 
evigilandi ad sciendum quod esse animae aliud est quam esse corporis; immo non eget cor-
pore ad hoc ut sciat animam et percipiat earn; si autem fuerit stupidus, opus habet converti ad 
viam." For a detailed discussion of the argument, see HASSE, Avicenna's De anima, 80-92, for 
the context see M. MARMURA, 'Avicenna's "Flying Man" in Context', The Monist, 69.3 (1986), 
383-395. The claim that the flying man argument was frequently discussed in Latin writings, 
as is found for example in DALES, The Problem of the Rational Soul, 8, is an exaggeration. Al-
though the argument was occasionally discussed, the references are few, especially compared 
to the number of commentaries on the De anima. It is not even discussed by Albertus Magnus, 
who otherwise takes over many elements of Avicenna's discussion of the soul. See HASSE, 'The 
Early Albertus Magnus', 241. 
25
 AVICENNA, De anima, I.l, 296'"6:,. "Ideo anima quam invenimus in animali et in vegetabili 
est perfectio prima corpons naturalis instrumentalis habentis opera vitae." 
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2.2.1 Avicenna's influence 
Avicenna's two definitions of the soul and his use of 'perfection' instead of 
'form' shaped the commentary tradition in the late twelfth and early thirteenth 
century. The distinction between two ways of defining the soul is found in 
many of the philosophers of the first half of the thirteenth century, for exam-
ple in, John Blund,26 Peter of Spain,27, Albert the Great,28 and Bonaventure.29 
And in his use of the term 'perfection', Avicenna was followed by virtually all 
commentators, starting with Dominicus Gundissalinus, the translator of Avi-
cenna's treatise on the soul.30 Also in his own treatise on the soul, Gundissal-
inus rendered Aristotle's definition by using the term 'perfection': "Anima 
est prima perfectio corporis naturalis, instrumentahs, viventis potentialiter."31 
And practically all philosophers who discussed the soul in Aristotelian terms 
followed Gundissalinus's practice when they discussed the soul's relation to 
its body.32 
26DALES, The Problem of the Rational Soul, 17 
27DALES, The Problem of the Rational Soul, 68. 
28See, for example, K. PARK, 'Albert's Influence on Late Medieval Psychology', in: J. A 
WEISHEIPL (ed.), Albertus Magnus and the Sciences Commemorative Essays, Toronto: Pontifcal 
Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1980, 501-535, 503-4 Although Albert uses Anstode's defini-
tion of the soul, he tries to avoid calling the soul a form as much as possible, and prefers the 
term 'perfection' instead. See HASSE, 'The Early Albertus Magnus', 239-243. The rational soul 
can be defined as the act or perfection of the body, he says, but this definition only concerns the 
soul as it is related to the body and not its essence. Since Albert also defends the view that living 
beings, including humans, only have one soul, he has to explain why only the intellective part 
of this one soul is immortal. He does this by distinguishing the soul's powers from its essence, 
a distinction that became very influential (see section 5.3 for the details). Although the whole 
essence of the soul survives the death of the body, only a small set of its powers survives with 
it. Its corporeal powers do not survive the death of the body. 
29DALES, The Problem of the Rational Soul, 99. 
'"For this translation Gundissalinus collaborated with Avendauth. See HASSE, Avicenna's 
De anima, 4-7. It has recently been questioned whether Dominicus Gundissalinus the transla-
tor and Dominicus Gundissalinus the composer of philosophical treatises are the same person. 
But there seems to be no compelling reason to suppose that they are not. For a brief sum-
mary of the discussion, see D N. HASSE, 'The Social Conditions of the Arabic-(Hebrew)-Latin 
Translation Movements in Medieval Spain and in the Renaissance', in: A. SPEER and L. W E -
GENER (eds.), Wissen über Grenzen Arabisches Wissen und fotemisches Mittelalter, Berlin [etc.]: 
Walter de Gruyter, 2006, 73, footnote 30. 
31
 DOMINICUS GUNDISSALINUS, Tractatus de anima, in: J. T. Muckle, 'The Treatise De anima 
of Dominicus Gundissalinus. With an Introduction by Etienne Gilson', in: Mediaeval Studies, 
2 (1940), 23-103, 40'3"'4. Similar to Avicenna, Gundissalinus also supplies a definition of 
the soul on its own as a spiritual substance; DOMINICUS GUNDISSALINUS, De anima, 4214~'5: 
"Anima etiam non est substantia quae sit corpus Restât igitur ut sit substantia quae est spiritus 
rational is." 
32D A. CALLUS, 'The Treatise of John Blund on the Soul', in. Autour d'Aristote, Recueil 
d'études de philosophie ancienne et médiévale offert à Monseigneur A Mansion, Louvain. 
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The common element in all early thirteenth-century attempts to capture 
the soul-body relationship in Aristotelian terms is that the soul is presented 
as a substance in its own right. The technical term used to describe the soul's 
ontoiogical status is 'hoc aliquid', literally a 'this something'.33 A hoc aliquid is 
an entity in its own right, which in itself has a complete essence. The difficulty 
with this description of the soul is that it seems to turn the soul and the body 
into two different things again, which then occasions the question of how they 
can be related in such a way as to constitute one single living being. But dur­
ing this phase of the reception of the De anima, the commentators were not 
so much worried about the details of how the soul relates to the body. Rather 
they were concerned about how the soul, as a substance in its own right, was 
internally structured. No created substance, everyone of them agreed, could 
be completely simple, since that would imply that such a substance could not 
be distinguished from God. So there must be some ontoiogical complexity 
within the soul itself. This required complexity was fleshed out in one of two 
ways. Several commentators argued that the soul is composed of form and 
matter, just as every corporeal substance is. The only difference is that the 
soul is composed of form and spiritual matter, whereas bodies are composed 
of form and corporeal matter. This view that everything, except God, is com­
posed of matter and form is called universal hylomorphism.34 Other com­
mentators turned to Boethius in saying that the soul is composed of quod est 
and quo est (also called es5e).35 But what precisely is meant by this distinction 
seems to differ from one commentator to another. 
When the soul is itself composed of matter and form, the result is that the 
living human being as a whole has a plurality of substantial forms, consisting 
Publications universitaires de Louvain, 1955, 471—495, 491 lists several variants of the defini­
tion that were used in the early thirteenth century, all of which contain the term 'perfectw' 
" F o r a brief discussion of the main passages in which Aristotle discusses the notion 'hoc 
aliquid' (τόδε τι), see Β C BAZAN, 'The Human Soul: Form and Substance? Thomas Aquinas' 
Critique of Eclectic Anstoteliamsm', Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du Moyen Âge, 64 
(1997), 95-126, 98-101 
34The view goes back to Avicebron See, for example, AVICEBRON, Fans vitae, edited by 
C. Baeumker, Munster Aschendorff, 1995 (photomechanical reprint of the edition of 1895), 
1.5, 7-8: "M<agister> Materia universalis et forma universalis. D<iscipulus> Quomodo autem 
totum quod est convenit in his duobus? M Quia haec duo sunt radix omnium et ex his gen-
eratum est quicquid est. D. Quomodo haec duo fuerunt radices omnium quae sunt? M Quia 
haec natura praecedunt omnia, et in ea etiam resoluuntur omnia " 
35The terminology goes back to BOETHIUS, De hebdomadibus (quomodo substantiae in eo 
quod sint bonae sint cum non sint substantialia bona), in· Idem, The Theological Tractates, with 
an English translation by H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand, London: William Heinemann [etc.], 
1926 (Loeb Classical Library; first edition 1918), 40· "Diuersum est esse et id quod est; ipsum 
enim esse nondum est, at uero quod est accepta essendi forma est atque consistit." The group 
of commentators who followed Boethius includes John of la Rochelle and Albert the Great 
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of, at least, the form of the soul and the form of the body. This consequence 
was accepted by many of the commentators in the first half of the thirteenth 
century. The resulting popularity of the plurality of forms position has been 
singled out as a very important element in the reception of the De anima.36 
But, as Bazân has rightly argued, when it comes to the writings on the soul 
prior to Aquinas, it is the element of a soul-body dualism that is fundamental 
and not the element of universal hylomorphism.37 The defense of the com-
mentators of a plurality of forms in any given substance is subordinated to 
their intuition that the soul is a complete substance in its own right. From this 
perspective, those who defend universal hylomorphism and those who opt 
for the Boethian distinction between quod est and quo est have much more in 
common than is apparent at first sight.38 
2.3 The soul AS forma 
Ultimately, a solution in terms of different definitions did not satisfy the com-
mentators, especially as they became increasingly aware of the implications of 
the whole Aristotelian philosophical framework in which the study of the soul 
was embedded. For no matter in how many ways you define the soul, it must 
still be the case that the soul is either the form of the body in a strict sense, in 
which case it seems to perish with the body, or a separate substance, in which 
case the unity with the body is left unexplained and some medium must be in-
troduced. From the 1260s onward, referring to two different definitions was 
perceived as more of a way of avoiding the choice between these two alterna-
tives than as an actual solution of the problem. The most important factor in 
this realization was the continuously improving precision of the terminology 
that was used in the commentaries. 
The commentators from the second half of the thirteenth century began to 
notice that the term 'perfection' did not fully capture Aristode's description of 
the relation between soul and body, and substituted 'perfection' with the more 
precise terms '(first) act' and '(substantial) form'. Once this new terminology 
had been introduced, they began to realize that the Avicennian solution was 
ultimately untenable. How could the soul be a spiritual substance in its own 
right and a substantial form at the same time? The very formulation of two 
definitions of the soul now made it clear that these descriptions were, at least 
^See for example R. ZA VALLONI, Richard de Mediaviüa et L· controverse sur Za pluralité des 
formes Textes inédits et étude critique, Louvain: éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 
1951, esp. 383^19. 
37B C. BAZÂN, 'Pluralisme de formes ou dualisme de substances' La pensée pré-thomiste 
touchant la nature de l'âme', Revue philosophique de Louvain, 67 (1969), 30-73, 70. 
38This is also noted by DALES, The Problem of the Rational Soul, 3. 
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at first sight, incompatible. If the soul is the substantial form, or first act, 
of the living body, it seems that it cannot be a substance in its own right. 
If, on the other hand, the (human) soul is an immortal substance, it seems 
that it cannot be the substantial form of the body. This insight meant the 
beginning of new phase in the commentary tradition on the De anima. In the 
later thirteenth century three solutions were put forward: ( 1 ) A denial that the 
soul in so far as it is immortal and subsistent informs the living body, defended 
by Siger of Brabant, Boethius of Dacia and John of Jandun among others.39 
This position is now known under the name 'radical Aristotelianism';40 (2) A 
new view of what accounts for subsistence, which allowed the soul to be the 
only form of the body and subsistent in its own right, without turning the 
soul into a substance. This was defended by Aquinas; and (3) The position 
that the human soul is both a substance and a form, which was favored by 
many Franciscans. These three solutions will be briefly introduced here. 
2.3.1 Immortal but not personal: radical Aristotelianism 
Already in the twelfth century, Averroes had given an interpretation of the De 
anima that did justice to the intimate relation between soul and body as well 
as to Aristotle's remarks on the subsistence and immortality of the intellect. 
Averroes clearly stated that the soul is the form of the body. But he was also 
fiilly aware that when the soul is a form of a body, this implies that the soul 
is mortal and is corrupted when the body corrupts. To solve this tension, 
Averroes stated that if the intellect truly is immortal, it cannot be a form of the 
body in the same sense in which the vegetative and sensitive souls are forms 
of the body. On the contrary, the intellect has to be a separate form, which is 
somehow conjoined to the body in its operations only. Aristotle's definition 
of the soul, Averroes said, is equivocal.41 Only the vegetative and sensitive 
souls are forms of the body in the regular Aristotelian sense; they give the 
body its being, and they corrupt when the body corrupts. The intellect, on the 
"Or , more precisely, they denied that the immortal intellect inheres in the human body, 
although we can still call it a substantial form of the body on account of the relation with the 
body that it acquires during cognition In the terms of John of Jandun, the separate intellect 
can be called our substantial form in the sense of Operons intrmsecum appropnatum corport' 
For discussion, see BRENET, Transferts du sujet, 52-59. 
40It is also referred to as 'heterodox Aristotelianism', but since this description seems to 
imply the existence of such a thing as an orthodox Aristotelianism, I will not use it. A final label 
that is used to refer to this group is 'Latin Averroism', which points to the strong influence of 
Averroes's long commentary on the De anima. 
41
 AVERROES, Commentanum magnum in DA, II.7, 138'5 20: "Et induxit hunc sermonem in 
forma dubitatioms, cum dixit. Si igitur dicendum est, excusando se a dubitatione accidente in 
partibus istius diffimtioms. Perfectie emm in anima rational! et in alus virtutibus anime fere 
dicitur pura equivocatione, ut declarabitur post." 
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other hand, is a unique, immortal, divine substance existing separately from 
all bodies, although it relates to these bodies in the process of thinking.42 This 
doctrine that all human being share one unique immortal intellect has been 
labeled mono-psychism. 
From the 1270s onward, a small number of commentators tried to develop 
Averroes's interpretation as a solution for the difficulties inherent in Aristo-
tle's description of the soul as form of the body. This group includes Siger 
of Brabant,43 Anonymus Giele,44 and John of Jandun.45 Sometimes Walter 
Burley is also linked to this group.46 They are often referred to as either rad-
ical (or heterodox) Aristotelians or Latin Averroists. Although these philoso-
phers have often been presented as an homogeneous group, Van Steenberghen 
pointed out already in the 1960s that they are not.47 
The label 'radical AristoteUan' has many connotations, all of which are 
explored in an article by Bazàn, but the most important doctrinal aspect in-
cluded under it is the thesis that there is only one, immortal intellect, which 
"Strange as this may seem, there are good philological as well as philosophical arguments 
in favor of this reading of Aristotle's De anima. One of the philological arguments is a parallel 
between the terminology Aristotle employs when he discusses the intellect in De anima III.5 
(430al0-25) and that in Metaphysica XII 7-9, where he discusses the divine intellect. For dis-
cussion see V. CASTON, 'Anstode's Two Intellects: A Modest Proposal', Phronesis, 44-3 (1999), 
199-227, who proposes to read Aristotle's description in the De anima as referring to a di-
vine intellect. The philosophical reasons include, but are not limited to, the immatenahty 
of thought and the fact that two persons can share the same thought. For a discussion of 
some philosophical reasons see especially D. L. BLACK, 'Consciousness and Self-Knowledge in 
Aquinas's Critique of Averroes's Psychology', Journal of the History of Philosophy, 31.3 (1993), 
349-385 and D. L. BLACK, 'Models of the Mind: Metaphysical Presuppositions of the Averroist 
and Thomistic Accounts of Intellection', Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, 
15(2004), 319-352. 
•"Siger's views are discussed in BAZAN, 'Radical Aristotelianism', 603-625 and DALES, The 
Problem of the Rational Soul, 169-180. For a more detailed analysis of Siger's views and their 
context, see F. VAN STEENBERGHEN, Maître Sigerde Brabant, Louvain [etc.]: Publications Uni-
versitaires [etc.], 1977. 
44The possibility that the Anonymus Giele is in fact Boethius of Dacia has been tentatively 
suggested by Giele in his introduction to the edition. But because apart from the doctrinal 
parallels he could find no other evidence for the ascription of the commentary to Boethius of 
Dacia, Giele preferred to publish the commentary as anonymous. 
•"'John of Jandun's views are analyzed in detail in BRENET, Transferts du sujet. 
46For example in A. MAIER, 'Ein unbeachteter "Averroist" des XIV. Jahrhunderts: Walter 
Burley', in· Ausgehendes Mittehlter Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Geistesgeschichte des 14 Jahrhun-
derts, vol. I, Roma: Edizioni di stona e letteratura, 1964,101-121. The reason that Burley is not 
always included in this group is that his thought developed from a more anti-Averroistic to an 
Averroistic standpoint, even within his commentary on the De anima. For this development 
see KUKSEWICZ, 'The Problem of Walter Burley's Averroism'. Kuksewicz also notes that we 
find a similar development in Thomas Wilton (p. 375). 
47F. VAN STEENBERGHEN, La philosophie au ΧΙΙΓ siede, Louvain [etc.]. Publications Uni­
versitaires [etc.], 1966, esp. 391^400. 
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is shared by all of mankind.48 In their commentaries on the De anima these 
philosophers defended in varying manners and degrees that Averroes had, on 
this point, given the right interpretation of Aristotle. They did not, however, 
claim that the philosophical position that emerges from his interpretation was 
necessarily correct. 
Averroes's reading of Aristotle was controversial for theological reasons, 
in particular because it seemed to deny the personal immortality of the soul 
which is required for the personal accountabihty after death for our sins. But 
his reading was just as controversial on philosophical grounds. Those who fol­
lowed his interpretation claimed that the only coherent philosophical account 
of an immortal intellect that has the power to know all things is a unique and 
separate intellect. From this starting point they then proceeded to provide an 
account of individual human cognition in terms of a connection or conjunc­
tion with this shared intellect. Their opponents, in contrast, tended to deny 
the possibility of an impersonal shared intellect from the start on account of 
its incompatibility with our everyday experience of the first-personal aspect 
inherent in cognition. Starting from the premise that any intellect must be a 
personal intellect, they then proceeded to give an account of the relation of 
this individuated intellect to a material substance. But there was at least one 
philosopher who refused to adhere to the terms of this debate. 
In a question entitled 'Whether the intellective soul is, according to its 
substance, joined to the body as its substantial perfection', the anonymous 
author of the commentary on the De anima edited by Giele remarks that al­
though the debate is comphcated, and the arguments against the Averroistic 
position seem difficult to solve, there is, in fact, an easy solution.49 The whole 
difficulty, he remarks, seems to come from the premise that it is an individual 
human being who knows something. But this premise is not itself proven by 
those who refer to it in their argumentation. So a denial of this premise would 
be enough to counter their arguments, which is precisely what he proceeds to 
do: 'Whence I do not concede that properly speaking man understands.'50 He 
certainly has a point, but it is doubtful that many people would have been per­
suaded by this solution.51 The occurrence of this radical solution to the prob-
^ B A Z A N , 'Radical Anstotelianism', 585-93 
•"ANONYMUS GIELE, QdA, II.4, 68-77: 'Utrum anima intellectiva sit secundum suam sub-
stantiam comuncta corpori sicut perfectio eius substantialis'. 
5 0 A N O N Y M U S GIELE, QdA, II 4, 75: "Isti autem accipiunt quod h o m o proprie intelhgit, nee 
hoc probant. Ex hoc supposito arguunt Quodsi istud propositum non est verum, non arguunt 
Unde, quod h o m o proprio sermone intelligit, non concedo." 
5 1
 Compare Aquinas's somewhat irritated remark that "Manifestum est enim quod hie 
h o m o intelhgit si enim hoc negetur, tunc dicens hanc opimonem non intelligit ahquid nee 
est audiendus." ( T H O M A S A Q U I N A S , SentdeA, III.7, 205-206 2 β 2 " 2 8 ' , ) . A similar comment is 
found in A N O N Y M U S V A N STEENBERGHEN, QdA, III 7, 3 1 6 - 3 1 7 " 10. Hissette connects one of 
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lem again shows that referring to radical Aristotelianism as a unified body of 
doctrine is something one should try to avoid. 
Although at first sight it may seem obvious why any interpretation follow-
ing Averroistic lines met with much resistance, things are more complicated 
than they may appear. It is of particular importance to realize why the claim 
of the unicity of the intellect was so controversial. For there is at least one 
sense in which the claim that there is but one intellect for all of mankind is 
perfectly acceptable although not agreed upon by all philosophers. Aristotle 
had made a distinction between two intellects.52 The first one, the so-called 
potential intellect (intellectus posstbilis), is the intellect that is in potentiality 
to knowledge, that is, it is capable of receiving knowledge. The second one, 
the agent intellect (intellectus agens), plays an active role in the acquisition 
of knowledge by transforming sensible images into universal concepts. Had 
these radical Aristotelians only been talking about a unique agent intellect, 
they would never have been labeled radical. The claim that the agent intellect 
is unique and common to all men need not amount to anything more than 
the claim that there must be some external causal influence (other than sense 
perception) that enables understanding to take place, a thesis that does not 
only seem (mostly) harmless, but also had already been defended in one vari-
ant or another by distinguished philosophers, Avicenna included, and even by 
Church Fathers.53 
the articles condemned in 1277 to the position defended by Anonymus Giele in question II 4 
of his De anima commentary; R. HISSETTE, Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Pans le 
7 mars 1277, Louvain. Publications Universitaires, 1977, 233-234, a 143: "Quod homo pro 
tanto dicitur intelligere, pro quanto caelum dicitur ex se intelhgere, vel vivere, vel moven, id 
est, quia agens istas actiones est ei umtum ut motor mobili, et non substantialiter." 
52Aristotle makes the distinction in De anima 111.5. 
53The position that claims that for true and certain knowledge some form of divine illumi-
nation is required — as was defended by Augustine and Bonaventure, for instance — makes 
many claims that are similar to the position that a separate and agent intellect fulfills a causal 
role in cognition. In fact, the two positions are easily combined as is the case in John Pecham. 
JOHN PECHAM; G. MELAMI (ed.), Tractatus de anima, edited by G Melani, Firenze: Studi 
Francescani, 1948, 19-20. "Similiter dico esse in anima intellectiva. Habet enim quasi per-
spicuitatem mentis possibihtatem, qua in omnium formarum simihtudines vel differentias est 
transmutabilis, et haec vis, sicut credo, dicitur intellectus possibihs. Habet etiam vim activam, 
naturalem clantatem vel celentatem ipsam possibihtatem in omnium formarum simihtudines 
vel differentias impellentem Habet lucem supenus radiantem, in qua omnia videt, et tarnen 
ipsam non videt; ipsam attingi! ut rationem videndi et non in ratione objecti... Duphcem 
enim pono intelhgentiam agentem, increatam et creatam, ut lam patet " When Robert Pas-
nau describes the positions of Roger Marston and William of Auvergne, both of whom claim 
that the agent intellect is separate and divine, he puts this more strongly; R. PASNAU, 'Divine 
Illumination', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward Ν Zalta 
(ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/illumination/> (accessed on 11 July 
2010)· "Such cases illustrate how the various medieval disputes over whether human beings 
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Averroes, however, claimed that not only the agent intellect, but also the 
potential intellect is numerically one for all of mankind. And it was this claim 
that seemed to imply that it is strictly speaking not this or that particular hu-
man being that understands, but instead only this single intellect. Not to men-
tion that it threatens the personal immortality of the human soul. To be fair, 
Averroes thought that the implication that individual knowledge would be 
impossible did not follow, and defended the claim that knowledge should still 
be ascribed to particular human beings even when they shared this intellect.54 
But most philosophers remained unconvinced and regarded his claims with 
great suspicion and even hostility. 
2.3.2 Formality and subsistence combined: Thomas Aquinas 
One of the philosophers who were strongly opposed to the interpretation 
of Aristotle by Averroes and the so-called radical Aristotelians was Thomas 
Aquinas. At roughly the same time as the revival of Averroes's interpretation, 
he developed a different, although no less radical solution, which is embedded 
in a comprehensive metaphysical view.55 Every substance, he says, can only 
have one substantial form, which in the case of living beings is their soul.56 
This single substantial form gives a substance its being, its unity, and its defini-
tion. In the most interesting case, that of a human being, this substantial form 
is the intellective soul. This intellective soul is called the substantial form of 
man without any ambiguity-, just as any other substantial form it is the formal 
cause of all the perfections of the substance, including the corporeal perfec-
tions and even corporeality itself. Aquinas, therefore, wholeheartedly accepts 
Aristotle's definition of the soul as the substantial form of the organic body. 
The problem is that this view seems to rule out that the intellective soul is 
also a substance in its own right. If the soul truly is the substantial form of the 
human body, in the same sense as other substantial forms are the substantial 
forms of other substances, it is merely a metaphysical part of a substance, but 
not a substance in its own right. To put this more precisely, the intellective 
soul is not a substance in the sense that it is something that belongs to the 
might share a single intellect — so absurd on their face — are in fact simply alternative formu-
lations of the dispute over divine illumination." 
54
 For a clear explanation of Averroes's real position in contrast to the description of it given 
by Aquinas, see BLACK, 'Models of the Mind'. 
55For an overview of Aquinas's role in the debate on mono-psychism, see DALES, The Prob-
lem of the Rational Soul, 138-180. E. P. MAHONEY, 'Saint Thomas and Siger of Brabant Revis-
ited', Review of Metaphysics, 27.3 ( 1974), 531-553 discusses how Siger of Brabant's views evolve 
in response to Thomas's criticisms. 
^For the novelty of Aquinas's solution, see, for example, BAZAN, 'The Human Soul', 
esp. 113 
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category of substance; it is not a hoc aliqma.57 And if this is so, then it seems 
that the intellective soul cannot survive the death of the body, since the con-
tinued existence of a substantial form depends on the continued existence of 
the substance of which it is the form.58 
Aquinas accepts the implication that the intellective soul is not a substance 
in the strict sense. But he denies that the consequence of this is that the in-
tellective soul perishes with the body. His solution lies in a reformulation 
of what accounts for the subsistence of something.59 The reason that some-
thing subsists, he explains, is not that it is a substance, but that it can perform 
some operation on its own. The fact that in almost all cases only substances 
have their own proper operations should not mislead us. For there is at least 
one exception, and that is our intellective soul. When we consider all the op-
erations exercised by a human being, we find that at least one of these, our 
understanding, transcends matter in the sense that it is not exercised in any 
corporeal organ.60 And if understanding is not exercised in any bodily organ, 
it must be an operation for which the intellective soul does not depend on the 
body, at least not essentially. This means that this operation must belong to 
the intellective soul on its own. And having at least one transcendent opera-
tion is enough to guarantee the continued existence of the soul after the death 
57The soul can still be called a substance in a broader sense. For Aristotle also uses the term 
'substance' to refer to the metaphysical principles of primary substances. In that broader sense 
both the matter and substantial form that constitute the substance can also be called substances. 
ARISTOTLE, De anima, II 1, 412a5-9: "We say that substance is one kind of what is, and that 
in several senses: in the sense of matter or that which in itself is not a this, and in the sense of 
form or essence, which is that precisely in virtue of which a thing is called a this, and thirdly in 
the sense ofthat which is compounded of both." 
^Crucial to the project of incorporating Aristotle's theories of the soul in the later Middle 
Ages was the possibility of accounting for the immortality of the soul. The various arguments 
that were used to demonstrate this immortality in the first half of the thirteenth century are 
discussed in OGUEJIOFOR, The Arguments for the Immortality of the Soul. 
59See, for example, B. C. BAZAN, '13th-Century Commentanes on De anima. From Peter of 
Spain to Thomas Aquinas', in: GIANFRANCO FIORAVANTI, CLAUDIO LEONARDI and STEFANO 
PERFETTI (eds ), // commento filosofico nell'Occidente latino (secoli XIII-XV), atti del colloquio 
Firenze-Pisa, 19-22 ottobre 2000, organizzato dalla SISMEL (Società Internazionale per lo Stu-
dio del Medioevo Latino) e dalla SISPM (Società Italiana per lo Studio del Pensiero Medievale), 
sotto l'egida della SIEPM, Turnhout: Brepols, 2002, 119-184, 178-184. 
"Aquinas's arguments for this are complex, and I cannot discuss these here. In short, the 
most important premise he uses in his argument is that the universality of our concepts is only 
possible when they are received in something immaterial. For a critique of how Aquinas makes 
use of this premise, see J. A. NOVAK, 'Aquinas and the Incorruptibility of the Soul', History of 
Philosophy Quarterly, 4:4 (1987), 405-421 For a more favorable interpretation, see G. KLIMA, 
'Aquinas on the Materiality of the Human Soul and the Immatenahty of the Human Intellect', 
Philosophical Investigations, 32:2 (2009), 163-181, 172-179. Incidentally, the same premise was 
used by Averroes But he drew the conclusion that the immateriality of our intellect implies 
that it is a unique immortal substance that is shared by all humans. 
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of the body. For if the operation can be performed without the need for a 
bodily organ in this life, there seems to be no reason why the intellective soul 
cannot continue to perform it after the death of the body.61 
Aquinas's view of the soul-body relation is now so familiar that it may 
be hard to realize how radical this view actually was when Aquinas put it for-
ward.62 In fact, at the time, it was thought by many to be just as much of a 
threat to the personal immortality of the soul as Averroes's view of a unique 
potential intellect. The common opinion was still that the only way the soul 
can survive the death of the body was when it is a substance in its own right. 
Although Aquinas argued that the transcendent operation of the intellect was 
enough for a continued subsistence of the soul, many philosophers remained 
unconvinced. If the soul is not a substance, but truly a substantial form, it 
seems to be so closely intertwined with the body that it has to corrupt at the 
corruption of the body, the immateriality of our understanding notwithstand-
ing. 
2.3.3 A substance, but also a form 
The third solution, which was often presented as the traditional view, was 
especially popular among Franciscans.63 This solution was to hold simultane-
ously that the rational soul is the form of the body and that it is a substance 
in its own right. To this end, many of these commentators adopted the po-
61
 There is an important proviso here that is often neglected in the secondary literature. Be-
ing embodied belongs to the essence of the human soul, which means that in its unembodied 
state it only has an incomplete essence For Aquinas, this implication carries much more weight 
than is usually noted. It means, namely, that the unembodied soul is in an unnatural state and 
as such this state can only be temporal. Aquinas argues for the necessity of a bodily resurrection 
on the basis of the unembodied soul's unnatural condition. THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa contra 
gentiles, Roma. Commissio Leonina [etc.], 1918-1930 (Opera omnia, 13-15), IV, c. 79, 248-
249· "Ad ostendendum etiam resurrectionem carnis ftituram evidens ratio suffragatur, sup-
posais his quae in supenonbus sunt ostensa. Ostensum est emm in secundo animas hominum 
immortales esse Remanent igitur post corpora a corponbus absolutae Manifestum est etiam 
ex his quae in secundo dicta sunt, quod anima corpon naturaliter unitur: est emm secundum 
suam essentiam corporis forma. Est igitur contra naturam animae absque corpore esse. Nihil 
autem quod est contra naturam, potest esse perpetuum. Non igitur perpetuo ent anima ab-
sque corpore. Cum igitur perpetuo maneat, oportet earn corpon iterato coniungi: quod est 
resurgere Immortahtas igitur ammarum exigere videtur resurrectionem corporum futuram " 
A noteworthy exception to the neglect of this element of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas is 
A C PEGIS, 'Between Immortality and Death: Some Further Reflections on the Summa contra 
gentiles', The Momst, 58 (1974), 1-15, who discusses the passage just quoted in detail. 
62For a detailed analysis of Aquinas's critique on his predecessors, who treated the soul as 
both a substance (hoc ahqmd) and a substantial form, see BAZAN, 'The Human Soul'. 
63
 But similar to the 'radical Aristotelians', this 'traditional' group is also heterogeneous. See 
DALES, The Problem of the Rational Soul, 197. 
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sition that there is a plurality of substantial forms in a substance, including a 
plurality of souls in living beings. On the surface, this view has much in com-
mon with the views of the earlier commentators who followed Avicenna, and 
those who defended it were eager to point out that theirs was the traditional 
view. But in reality it differs from the early thirteenth-century views in several 
important respects.64 The soul is now called a substantial form, whereas the 
earlier commentators had used the term 'perfection'. Also, the vegetative, sen-
sitive and intellective soul are now seen as three distinct forms, whereas most 
earlier commentators had held the view that these are parts of one soul.65 And 
though Augustine is invoked in support of the traditionality of their views, as 
he often is, the position that is ascribed to him has more in common with 
Avicebron and Avicenna than with Augustine. 
This view that the soul is both form and substance was simultaneously 
directed against Averroes's position that all human beings share one unique 
immortal intellect and Aquinas's position that the intellect is the only substan-
tial form of the human being. Some of its more famous proponents are John 
Peckham, Matthew of Aquasparta and William de la Mare. Unfortunately, 
none of the proponents of this view seems to have written a commentary on 
Aristotle's De amma, which is why we must turn to other texts.66 
To see the contrast with Aquinas's solution, William de la Mare's treatise 
entitled Correctorium fratris Thomae is the best starting point. This treatise 
was composed with the explicit aim to correct several philosophical mistakes 
made by Thomas Aquinas, and it quickly became an obligatory companion 
to the study of Aquinas's works in the Franciscan studia.67 Two of the errors 
64
 DALES, The Problem of the Rational Soul, 182: "In the second place, the self-styled de-
fenders of tradition were themselves simply an alternative version of the novelties of which 
they complained. They adopted Anstotle as the 'Philosopher'. They derived the doctrines of 
plurality of forms and universal hylomorphism from Avicebron, even while attributing them 
to Augustine. And much of their thought was more indebted to Avicenna than to the tradition 
of the church." 
65
 Daniel Callus established conclusively that the Franciscan appeal to tradition to support 
their critique of Aquinas's view that man has but one soul has little basis in the textual tradi-
tion. See especially D. A. CALLUS, 'TWO early Oxford Masters on the Problem of Plurality of 
Forms Adam of Buckfield — Richard Rufus of Cornwall', Revue neoscolastique de philosophie, 
42 (1939), 411-445 (which is partly based on a groundbreaking study by O. LOTTIN, 'La plu-
ralité des formes substantielles avant Saint Thomas d'Aquin. Quelques documents nouveaux', 
Revue Neoscolastique de Philosophie, 34 (1932), 449-467) and D. A. CALLUS, 'The Origins of 
the Problem of the Unity of Form', The Thomtst, 24 (1961), 257-285. 
^Several Franciscans compiled their own treatises on the soul instead of commenting on 
Anstode. For example: JOHN PECHAM, Tractatus de anima, JOHN PECHAM, Quaestiones trac-
tantes de anima, quas nunc pnmum in lucem edidit notisque illustravit H. Spettmann, Mun-
ster: Aschendorff, 1918, and MATTHEW OF AQUASPARTA, Quaestiones disputatae de anima XIII, 
edited by Α.-J. Gondras, Pans: Vrin, 1961. 
67William de la Mare's treatise and its influence are discussed in section 4.4. 
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that William singles out are that (1) the soul is not composed of matter and 
form, and that (2) there is only one substantial form in a human being.68 The 
two are closely related, the link being that the human soul is considered to 
be a substance in its own right. Because of its substantiality, the soul must 
have the metaphysical structure of a substance, which, according to William, 
is its composition out of matter and form.69 But even though the human soul 
has the metaphysical structure of a substance, it also functions as the highest 
substantial form of a human being.70 
The substantiality of the soul also implies that the body must have an ac-
tuality of its own. That is, the body must also be composed of matter and 
another form. Or, more precisely, of matter and a series of hierarchically or-
dered forms. The human soul is the final perfection of the human body. But 
it is not the body's only substantial form. Many of William's arguments that 
attempt to demonstrate that the body must have an actuality of its own apart 
from the soul focus on the actuality of the corpse. Clearly, a corpse is still 
something, even though the intellective soul is no longer present.71 Hence, 
the living body must have had other substantial forms besides the intellective 
soul. 
Substantially the same position is found in Matthew of Aquasparta, who 
' 'The composition of the human soul is discussed thrice, in articles 10, 91 and 113, in 
relation to Aquinas's Summa theologtae, Quaesrìones disputatae de anima, and In quattuor libros 
Sententiarum respectively. The unicity of substantial form is discussed in many articles. The 
most explicit discussions can be found in articles 31,48, 90, 98, and 102. 
"The substantiality of the soul and its composition out of matter and form is also defended 
by John Pecham; JOHN PECHAM, Tractatus de anima, 46: "Anima enim, sicut supra probatum 
est, est substantia incorporea, in potentia omnium cognitiva, habens substantiam in omnium 
similitudinem transformabilem, sicut cera ex sui aptitudine transformabilis est in omnium 
similitudinem figurarum."; JOHN PECHAM, Tractatus de anima, 47: "Igitur anima ncque est 
corpus neque forma corporalis, sed est substantia spiritualis, ex materia et forma propria con-
stituta." 
70William de la Mare, unfortunately, is not very clear on the exact details, although he 
briefly discusses the possible objection that being a form of the body and being a substance 
composed of matter and form are incompatible. WILLIAM DE LA MARE, Correctorium fratris 
Thomae, in: P. Glorieux, Correctorium conuptorii 'Quare', Kain: Le Saulchoir, 1927, a. 31, 
131-132: "Sed contra hoc videtur esse quod dixit in quaestione 75, articulo 5, in responsione 
quaestionis: si anima est composita ex materia et forma, nullo modo potest dici forma cor-
poris, cum materia nullius sit forma. Responsio: sicut ponimus virtutes animae sensitivae 
perficere materiam grossiorem corporis mediante corpore subtili quod est spiritus qui est del-
ativus huiusmodi virium, sicut vult Augustinus, De differentia Spiritus et animae, ita ponimus 
formam animae intellectivae primo perficere materiam suam spiritualem et, hac mediante, 
materiam corporalem. Ulterius ergo dico quod materia animae non est forma corporis, sed 
mediante ipsa forma animae informat corpus." 
71
 For example, WILLIAM DE LA MARE, Correctorium, a. 87, 362: "Ergo in homine in quo 
utrumque componentium habet esse per se, sicut corpus et anima, ut patet post separationem 
animae a corpore, potest vere dici quod hoc corpus est." 
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composed a set of disputed questions on the soul between 1275 and 1277. 
The human soul is a spiritual substance that is composed of matter and form, 
substances have a plurality of substantial forms, and the human soul functions 
as the highest substantial form of a human being. What makes Matthew an 
interesting and important supplement to William de la Mare here is that he 
devotes an entire question to the substantiality of the soul, entitled 'whether 
the intellective soul is a hoc altquid', to which he gives a nuanced answer. The 
notion 'hoc aliqutd', he argues, has four connotations.73 It connotes (1) a 
fixed and determinate being; (2) which does not inhere in something else; (3) 
which does not depend on something else for its existence, but is subsistent 
on its own; and (4) which has an absolute and complete existence, in the sense 
that it has a complete essence (est completum in specie). The human soul sat-
isfies the first three of these criteria, but it fails to meet the fourth. It has no 
complete essence on its own.74 The reason for this is that the human soul is 
naturally inclined to the body, without which it has no complete nature. But 
this notwithstanding, we can, according to Matthew, still call the soul a hoc 
altquid.75 
It is curious to see how close Matthew's position actually is to that of 
7 2MATTHEW OF AQUASPARTA, QdA. 
" M A T T H E W OF AQUASPARTA, QdA, 154: "Et in hac parte puta via media procedendum 
esse, distinguendo de hoc aliquid. Importât enim hoc aliquid quattuor, ita quod tria tollit et 
unum ponit. Tollit enim indifferentiam et inhaerentiam et dependentiam, sed pomt perfectam 
et absolutam exsistentiam." 
74
 Matthew supports his position that the soul on its own has no complete essence by ref-
erence to book XII of Augustine's Super Genesim ad litteram Interestingly, the same pas-
sage is also cited by Wdham de la Mare WILLIAM DE LA MARE, Correctonum, a. 113, 420: 
"Ad argumentum tamen aliter dicimus quod cum dicit animam habere esse perfectum an-
tequam comungatur corpon, hoc est falsum; quia enim anima apta nata est esse perfectio 
corporis non habet perfectum naturae suae modum nisi quando habet corpus sibi comunc-
tum, corpus inquam, non animale sed spirituale, id est tanta sibi facilitate obediens ut sit sibi 
glome quod pnus fuit sarcinae, ut habetur XII Super Genesim in fine Ita etiam modo non 
haberet esse perfectum naturae suae nisi esset unita corpon animali, id est quod facit animale " 
See AUGUSTINE, De Genest ad litteram libri VIII-XII, traduction, introduction et notes par P. 
Agaesse et A. Sohgnac, Pans. Desclee de Brouwer, 1972 (Bibliothèque Augustinienne, 49), XII, 
cap. XXXV 68, 452· "Proinde, cum hoc corpus lam non animale, sed per fiituram commuta-
tionem spirituale recepent angehs adacquata, perfectum habebit naturae suae modum oboe-
diens et inperans, vivificata et vivificans tam ineffabili facilitate, ut sit ei gloriae, quod sarcinae 
fuit." 
7 5MATTHEW OF AQUASPARTA, QiiA, 157: "In quantum ergo anima intellectiva non habet 
perfectam naturam speciei, quia pars speciei est, tamquam forma specifica, nee est in specie 
nisi per reductionem, deficit a perfecta ratione eius quod est hoc aliquid. In quantum vero 
est natura per se subsistens, non dependens a materia, sed est a materia separabilis, tamen est 
hoc aliquid, utpote composita ex proprus principns ex quibus habet esse, et ex quibus indi-
viduatur " Compare also MATTHEW OF AQUASPARTA, QdA, 157: "Sic ergo dico quod anima 
intellectiva et forma est corporis, et tamen hoc aliquid et per se subsistens." 
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Aquinas. Aquinas would approve of all four connotations, although he tends 
to include the first two under the 'subsistence' requirement, and he would 
also, strongly, agree that the human soul fails to meet the fourth. This close 
correspondence suggests that their disagreement runs deeper than the correct 
description of the soul. That this is indeed the case can be seen in the next 
section. 
2.4 Unicity versus plurality of substantial form 
Although the fiercest criticism of Aquinas came from the Franciscans, there 
was opposition to his solution from within the Dominican order as well. In 
particular Robert Kilwardby, the Archbishop of Canterbury, strongly resisted 
Aquinas's interpretation of the soul-body relationship. On 18 March 1277 he 
prohibited the teaching of a number of theses in natural philosophy ( 16), logic 
(10) and grammar (4).76 A very large part of the theses in natural philosophy 
targeted precisely the position that there is only one substantial form in every 
substance, which in the case of a human being is the intellective soul. These 
controversies regarding the unicity or plurality of substantial form constitute 
one of the most important backgrounds to the reception of the De anima in 
the period under discussion in this book, from c. 1260-c. 1360. This is why 
I will go into the philosophical intuitions that underly these controversies in 
some detail. 
In Aristotelian philosophy in general, substance is analyzed at its most 
basic level into the principles of matter and form. Form is the active principle 
of determination; it is what makes a thing be what it is, for example a horse, or 
a rock, or a human being. Matter, on the other hand, is the passive principle 
of reception and limitation; it is what makes a thing be this particular thing, 
for example, John instead of Joe. Each substance, that is, each particular self-
subsisting thing, is structured according to these two principles.77 When these 
two principles are interpreted in the strictest possible sense, the result is the 
unicity of substantial form; if they are interpreted in a looser sense, the result 
is some variant of a plurality of substantial forms.78 The difference between 
the strict and a looser interpretation has been formulated by Daniel Callus in 
what I consider to be the clearest possible manner: 
If with Aristotle one holds (i) that prime matter is a completely passive 
76CUP I, 474, 558-60. 
77At least this seems to be the case in Aristotle. But in the Middle Ages it was hotly debated 
whether whether spiritual substances, the angels, are composed of matter and form. 
78For a philosophical analysis of the debate on the unicity and plurality of form ZAVALLONI, 
Richard de MediaviUa is still one of the best starting points. 
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potency without any actuality of its own whatever; (ii) that privation 
is the disappearance of the previous form, and, consequently, has no 
part at all in the composition of the substance; and (iii) that substan-
tial form is absolutely the first determining principle, which makes the 
thing to be what it is, the only root of actuality, unity and perfection 
of the thing; then, consistent with his stated principles, the conclusion 
forced upon us is that in one and the same individual there can be but 
one single substantial form... On the other hand, if one contends (i) 
that primary matter is not absolutely passive and potential, but pos-
sesses in itself some actuality, no matter how incomplete or imperfect 
it may be: an incohatio formae, or any active power; (ii) that privation 
does not mean the complete disappearance of the previous form, so that 
matter is not stripped of all precedent forms in the process of becoming; 
or (iii) that substantial form either meets with some actuality in prime 
matter or does not determine the composite wholly and entirely, but 
only partially; from all this it will necessarily follow that there are in one 
and the same individual plurality [sic] of forms.79 
The reason why I favor Callus's description is that it makes it clear that 
the underlying philosophical controversy in the debate on unicity or plurality 
of forms was about the meaning of the term 'matter', and especially 'prime 
matter'. Looking at the articles that Kilwardby prohibited with this descrip-
tion in mind, there can be no doubt that they target the unicity of substantial 
form in all its presuppositions and consequences. Take for example articles 
3, 'that there is no active power in matter' (quod nutta potentia activa est in 
materia), and 4, 'that privation is nothing real, and that it is present in both 
celestial bodies and in these lower bodies' (quodprivatio est pure nichil et quod 
est in corporibus supra celestibus et hiis inferioribus'). It is the same disagree-
ment over the meaning of the term 'matter' that is the source of the debate 
whether every substance — including the spiritual substances — is composed 
of matter and form.80 This, I would say, is why the descriptions that Matthew 
of Aquasparta and Thomas Aquinas give of the soul in terms oiahoc aliquid 
can be almost similar, whereas they disagree fundamentally on the question of 
whether the soul is composed of matter and form: it is because their funda-
mental disagreement is about what matter is. 
79CALLUS, 'The Origins of the Problem', 258. 
80The combination of the doctrines of universal hylomorphism and of the plurality of 
substantial form has often been called the binarium famosissimum. But this expression is a 
twentieth-century invention and was not used in the Middle Ages. For discussion see P. V. 
SPADE, 'Binarium Famosissimum', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Phdosophy (Fall 2008 Edi-
tion), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/binarium/> 
(accessed on 11 July 2010). 
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Unicity or plurality: a psychological or a metaphysical question? 
There is something else to keep in mind when discussing the unicity and plu-
rality of substantial form. Although the debate on unicity and plurality of 
forms is closely connected with the question of whether a human being has 
one soul or several souls (vegetative, sensitive and intellective), these are in 
fact two different debates. For although any philosopher who claims that there 
is more than one soul in man will hold some variant of the plurality of forms 
position, the converse does not hold. One can be convinced that each man has 
only one soul, and even claim that this soul is his substantial form, while still 
maintaining that there are other substantial forms in such a man as well, for 
example, the form of corporeality.81 The positions that (1) there are multiple 
substantial forms in complex living beings but that (2) there is only one soul 
are logically compatible, and this combination has in fact been defended by 
many philosophers, especially in the early thirteenth century. 
The question on unicity and plurality of substantial forms began as a psy-
chological question about the soul. Are the vegetative, sensitive and intel-
lective soul three distinct souls, or is there but one soul in man responsible 
for all the vital functions such as nutrition, sensation and understanding?82 
The answer that man has but one soul was by far the more popular view in 
the early thirteenth century, and was maintained by John Blund,83 William of 
"Cf. CALLUS, 'The Origins of the Problem', 259 
ë2The unicity position can be traced back to Avicenna's De anima, which entered the Latin 
West both through its translation by Dominicus Gundissahnus and through the inclusion of 
this opinion in Gundissalinus's own treatise De anima. See CALLUS, 'The Origins of the Prob-
lem', 263-8. Gundissalinus's text has also been read by several scholars as defending the plural-
ity thesis instead. For discussion and conclusive proof that this reading is incorrect, see D A 
CALLUS, 'Gundissahnus' De anima and the Problem of Substantial Form', The New Scolastiasm, 
13 (1939), 338-355. The plurality position can be traced back to Avicebron's Fans Vitae and 
also reached the Latin west both though its translation by Gundissahnus and through the inclu-
sion of this opinion in some of Gundissalinus's own works It is found in De processione mundi 
and De umtate. Cf CALLUS, 'The Origins of the Problem', 271. Vennebusch argues against the 
thesis that Gundissahnus is an important source for the plurality thesis, a thesis which is, in his 
words, omnipresent in the secondary literature. His argument is that ascribing a plurality po-
sition to Gundissahnus is based on a misreading ofpartsof hisDc anima (ANONYMUS VENNE-
BUSCH, QdA, 55) Vennebusch's reading of the De anima is correct, as is his assessment of the 
literature However, some years later, Callus traced the plurality formulation not to Gundissal-
inus's De anima, but to other works (see the previous note). Roensch agrees with Callus on the 
source for the plurality doctrine in F. J ROENSCH, Early Thomistic School, Dubuque, Iowa. The 
Priory Press, 1964, 4 I see no reason, therefore, to deny Gundissalinus's influence, although I 
agree that it is the unicity position that is defended in Gundissalinus's De anima. Incidentally, 
Vennebusch mentions Themistius as an alternative source for the doctrine. 
8 3JOHN BLUND, Tractatus de anima, edited by D. A Callus and R. W. Hunt, London The 
British Academy, 1970, 118: "Solutio. Dicimus quod hoc nomen 'anima' significat genus ani-
mae vegetabilis et animae sensibihs et rationahs; et in homme est una sola anima a qua est 
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Auvergne, John de la Rochelle, and Alexander of Hales, among others.84 This 
led Callus to his claim that the plurality of substantial form is not the tradi-
tional position, as was claimed by those who defended the position that the 
human soul is both substance and form against Aquinas. Still, although Cal-
lus is right that the substantial unity of the soul is, in fact, the more traditional 
opinion, there is an important aspect to the debate that he fails to bring to the 
fore in his writings. Aquinas's radical innovation was precisely to transform 
the unity of the soul into a general metaphysical framework. When he refers 
to the substantial unity of our soul, it is often not as a conclusion drawn from 
this framework, but rather as one of the most illustrative examples to support 
it. And the unicity of substantial form is definitely not the traditional opinion, 
especially not if it is applied to all substances. What Callus fails to take into 
account is that Aquinas is the first who truly considers the soul to be a sub-
stantial form, rather than a perfection, which has an ambiguous ontological 
status.85 
As long as the question of the unicity or plurality was only treated as a 
psychological question that was limited to the soul, neither the unicity nor the 
plurality position met with great resistance. But once the question was also 
treated as a metaphysical question with all its implications, which Aquinas 
was the first to do, it became precisely its application to the soul that pro-
voked the strongest opposition. In a way, Aquinas made it impossible to settle 
the psychological question of whether we have one or three souls in abstrac-
tion from the metaphysical question of whether a substance can have more 
than one form. Now, in other words, the psychological question had been 
turned into the most pressing formulation of the metaphysical one. If the 
two questions could be separated in Aquinas, his thesis that man has but one 
soul would probably never have evoked such strong reactions. And once the 
psychological and metaphysical questions have become the same question, it 
matters little whether the view that man has but one soul was defended be-
fore. For the earlier view was still radically different from the one defended by 
Aquinas. 
At first, the formulation of the unicity of substantial form as a general 
metaphysical framework rather than a primarily psychological question met 
vegetano, sensus et ratio. Et anima sensibilis est genus subaltemum, quia anima sensibihs 
est genus animae rationahs et species animae vegetabihs "; cf CALLUS, 'Introduction of Aris-
totelian Learning', 252 
84For a (partial) list of defenders of the substantial unity of the soul during the early phases 
on the debate on unicity and plurality of form, see CALLUS, 'Two early Oxford Masters', 
esp. 411^113. 
85That Aquinas is to first to do so is clearly shown in BAZAN, 'The Human Soul', esp. 106-
113 
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with much resistance. But in the 1290s the strongest resistance had mostly 
disappeared, although Aquinas's position was still being debated.86 The final 
turning point in the discussion occurred during the General Church Council 
of Vienne held in 1311-12. This council took position in the discussions on the 
relation between our human intellective soul and our body by decreeing that it 
was heretical to deny that the intellective soul is per se and essentially the form 
of the human body.87 Strictly speaking the Council's decree takes no position 
in the debate on the unicity or plurality of substantial form. It merely requires 
that the intellective soul is considered to be a substantial form, not that it is 
the only substantial form. But somewhat surprisingly the vast majority of the 
medieval commentators did interpret the Council's decree in such a way, that 
is, that it demanded that there is but one substantial form in man.8 8 
This brings us to the question of why Aquinas so strongly defended the 
position that there is but one single substantial form in each substance, and, 
more importantly, of how it could become so popular. The problems it gives 
rise to in the context of generation and corruption as well as in various theo­
logical contexts (the Eucharist, the actuality of the body of Christ during the 
trtduum, the status of reUcs) seem so substantial that it is hard to see how it 
could have become popular. Although Aquinas constantly insists that only 
his position can explain the fundamental unity of a substance, the plurality 
position seems to be able to account for that unity as well.89 Take, for exam-
^For details, see section 4.4. 
8 7 H . DENZINGER, Enchindton symbolorum, defimttonum et declarattonum de rebus fidet et 
moTum, quod emendavit, auxit, in hnguam germamcam transtuht et admvante Helmuto Hop­
ing edidit Petrus Hunermann, Freiburg [etc.]: Herder, 1999 (38 l l i updated edition), 902, p. 391 
(De anima ut forma corporis). "Porro doctnnam omnem seu positionem temere asserentem, 
aut vertentem in dubium, quod substantia animae rationahs seu intellectivae vere ac per se 
h umani corporis non sit forma, velut erroneam ac ventati catholicae inimicam fidei, praedicto 
sacro approbante Concilio reprobamus- defimentes, ut cunctis nota sit fidei sincerae veritas 
ac praecludatur universis erronbus aditus, ne subintrent, quod quisquis demceps asserere, de-
fendere seu tenere pertinaciter praesumpsent, quod anima rationalis seu intellectiva non sit 
forma corporis humani per se et essentiahter, tamquam haereticus sit censendus." 
" A notable exception is the Franciscan Gerard of Odo, who here, as well as in most mat­
ters of natural philosophy, takes the minority position, and claims that the council's degree 
demands that the body has its own form apart from the intellective soul This was shown by 
Russell Friedman in the paper he presented at the conference Psychology and the other Disct-
phnes, A Case of Cross-disciplinary Interaction (1250-1750), Nijmegen, 31 May - 2 June, 2007, 
organized by P. J. J. M. Bakker and C. H Leijenhorst. For two other examples of Odo's unique 
natural philosophical standpoints, see S W. DE BOER, 'The Importance of Atomism in the Phi­
losophy of Gerard of Odo (O.F.M )', in. C. GRELLARD and A. ROBERT (eds ), Atomism in Late 
Medieval Philosophy and Theology, Leiden (etc ]. Bnll, 2009, 85-106 and Ρ J J. M BAKKER 
and S. W. DE BOER, 'Locus est spattum. On Gerald Odonis' Quaestio de loco'. Vivarium, 47:2-3 
(2009), 295-330. 
8 9For a detailed and precise analysis of Aquinas's position on the unicity of substantial form, 
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pie, William de la Mare's response. The basic intuition is that every substance 
is a unity per se, which, according to Thomas, is the result of its having one 
substantial form. If there were, per impossibile, a second substantial form in 
a given substance, it would not be a unity per se anymore. It would be two 
things, not one. Although William agrees that a substance is per se a unity, he 
denies that such a unity implies having only one substantial form: 
Ad secundum dicendum quod quaelibet istarum formarum dat aliquod 
esse; sed sicut prima forma est in potentia ad secundam completivam 
ipsius, ita esse quod dat prima forma est incompletum et in potentia 
ad esse completum. Pluralitas ergo formarum non est contra unitatem 
compositi essentialem nisi sint tales quae non se habent secundum esse 
completum et incompletum ita quod non possint convenire ad aliquam 
unitatem essentialem.90 
To the second <argument> we should say that each of these forms gives 
some being; but just as the first form is in potency towards the second 
that completes it, so the being which the first form gives is incomplete 
and in potency to complete being. Hence the plurality of forms is not 
contrary to the essential unity of composite, unless these forms are of 
such a kind that they are not related according to complete and incom-
plete being, so that they cannot converge to an essential unity. 
The unity of the substance is guaranteed even with a plurality of substan-
tial forms, because the different substantial forms are themselves in potency to 
each other. Each substance is informed by its various substantial forms in an 
ordered manner, where the last substantial form is also the highest, and most 
specific form. At any point in time during the generation of a substance, that 
substance is an essential unity, even though it is still in potency toward a more 
perfect substantial form. Each new, more perfect form, actuaHzes a potency of 
the previous form. The implication is that until the point that the final sub-
stantial form is introduced, the substance has only an incomplete being. But 
even though incomplete, it is still an essential unity. 
An important advantage of the unicity position seems to be that it 
can more easily account for the difference between generation (substantial 
change) and accidental change. Accidental change presupposes an actual 
subject (that is, something that has a substantial form), whereas generation 
presupposes a purely potential subject, prime matter. If one holds to a 
plurality of substantial forms, the difference between accidental change 
and generation cannot be formulated in this manner. However, on closer 
see J. F. WIPPEL, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas. From Finite Being to Uncreated 
Being, Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000, 327-351. 
^WILLIAM DE LA MARE, Correctonum, a. 31, 133. 
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inspection, it turns out that it is actually the unicity position that has a 
difficult time explaining what goes on during the generation of a substance. 
The description of generation in terms a purely potential subject implies 
the complete corruption of the previous subject including all its accidents, 
something that gives rise to many counter-intuitive consequences.91 
Perhaps the greatest advantage of the unicity position is that it can account 
for the fact that whereas certain capacities are found in a large variety of ani-
mals, they are found in them in very different manners. Take for example the 
power of perception, which is found in all types of animals, including human 
beings. The underlying physiology and the extent of the power is different 
in the case of, say, humans, dogs and fish. An unsophisticated version of the 
plurality of forms position will have to say that all these animals have a certain 
set of forms in common, from the form of corporeity up to the form of the 
sensitive soul. The real cause of diversification is the final forms in these an-
imals, respectively the form of being-human, being-a-dog, and being-a-fish. 
The difficulty then is to explain why the perceptive powers of these animals 
differ, whereas these are all grounded in the sensitive soul, which is similar in 
each of the animals. Or, to put it differently, if all the previous forms remain 
in a substance, how can a higher form so radically alter the operations and 
powers of the lower forms? 
The discussion about the unicity and plurality of substantial form and the 
relative merits and demerits of these positions influences the De anima tradi-
tion greatly. Once Aquinas had turned the unity of the soul into the paradigm 
case for the unicity of substantial form, the De anima becomes one of the fo-
cal points for this metaphysical discussion. And, especially in the fourteenth-
century commentaries, we will see that the discussion is indeed to a large ex-
tent about what matter is, as Callus already indicated. But at the same time, 
Callus's strict definition of what constitutes the unicity position turns out to 
be ill-suited for describing later fourteenth-century positions.92 
For several of these difficulties, see below, section 4.3. 
'"See below, section 4.3.4, esp. p. 189. 
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Theologus habet inquirere qua via contingat ammam mereri et 
demereri, et quid sit ad salutem, quid ad penam. Quid autem anima sit, 
et in quo predicamento sit, et qualiter infundatur corpori, non habet 
ipse inquirere. Ex quo ista scire magis pertinent ad ahum artificem. Ex 
quo ergo theologus solum habet docere qualiter sit merendum et 
demerendum, non habet ipse proprie docere quid sit anima nee quid sit 
eius essentia. 
JOHN BLUND, Tractatus de anima, written in the first decade of the 
thirteenth century (D. A. Callus and R. W. Hunt (eds.), London: The 
British Library, 1970, y15"21) 
In order to understand how medieval philosophers looked at the scientia de 
anima, we should first examine the questions which they explicitly devoted to 
its status. Most commentaries on book I of the De anima contain a number of 
questions that discuss methodological aspects, the most important of which 
are: 
1. Is the scientia de anima really a science? And if so, what is its place in the 
general framework of the sciences? More precisely, does it fall under natural 
philosophy or is it a part of metaphysics?1 
Ά forthcoming collection of essays edited by Paul Bakker and Carla Di Martino will be 
devoted entirely to this question. P. J. J. M. BAKKER and C. Di MARTINO (eds.), L'étude de 
l'âme entre physique et métaphysique. Perspectives grecques, arabes et latines, de l'Antiquité à la 
Renaissance, in preparation. The discussion on the place of the scientia de anima within the 
hbn naturales, which becomes important from the fifteenth century onwards, is not yet found 
in the commentanes of the late-thirteenth and fourteenth centunes. For the later discussions, 
see, for example, FRANCESCO PICCOLOMINI, Expositw m tres libres De anima, Venezia, 1602,1, 
ƒ. Γ: "Cum scientiae de natura libn sunt vani, quem locum inter eos sibi vendicent libri De 
anima non consentiunt expositores. Et quatuor eorum sunt opimones. Pro quarum notitia 
considerandum est scientiam de natura praesertim in duas partes dividi. In quarum prima 
declarantur ea quae sunt communia corpori physico et attinentia ad naturam infra ammam 
collocatami!). In altera vero attinentia ad naturam ad animam extensam et de anima dietam. 
Pars pnma absolvitur in libns Physicorum, De caelo. De ortu et intentu et Meteorologtcorum, 
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2. What is its subject matter? More specifically, is it the soul or the ensouled 
body?2 
3. Is it the most difficult of the sciences? And how does its difficulty relate to the 
supposed certainty of its conclusions? 
In addition, many commentaries also discuss two other methodological 
issues. The first is the question of whether science considers good and honor-
able things. This tends to be a question about science in general and not about 
the scientia de anima in particular. In any case, there is usually little of interest 
to be found in that question.3 The second is whether knowledge of accidents 
contributes to our knowledge of substance.4 
Before discussing the above-mentioned questions in detail, I should first 
briefly say something about how to read and interpret such methodological 
de quorum ordine consentiunt omnes Altera vero includit libros De anima-, De animalibus et 
Plantis, de quorum ordine magna est alteratio. Et quatuor sunt opiniones. Una est Avicennae, 
Alberti et Aegidu, qui inquiunt libros Physicorum, De caelo, De ortu et interitu, Meteorum quinto 
loco sequi libros Defosstltbus et metallts, sexto libros De anima, septimo De planus, octavo De 
animalibus et Parvorum naturalium. Fundamentum est quia ordo librorum respondere debet 
ordini naturae; respondent autem dum relato modo disponuntur. Nam anima est pnncipium 
et origine prior viventibus. Similiter plantae, cum pauciora includant, sunt pnores animalibus. 
Altera opinio est Averrois relata in prooemio Meteorum. Nam sextum locum tribuit libris De 
pfontis, septimum De animalibus, octavum De anima, quos sequuntur Parva naturalia. Quem 
ordinem ait esse partim necessanum, partim ob melius. Ratio autem eius quod de anima 
posterius sit agendum est, quia pnus de matena quam de forma est agendum, cum sit origine 
prior." 
2
 For an overview of the vanous thirteenth-century positions on the subject matter of the 
scientia de anima, see the comprehensive study by T. W. KÖHLER, Grundlagen des philosophisch-
anthropologischen Diskurses im dreizehnten Jahrhundert Die Erkenntntsbemuhung um den Men-
schen im zeitgenössischen Verständnis, Leiden [etc.]. Bnll, 2000, 352-383 Jack Zupko discusses 
some fourteenth-century answers to this question in: ZUPKO, 'What is the Science of the Soul''. 
3The most interesting part of Bundan's question on this topic, for instance, discusses 
whether or not mastering the art of shoe making would be something good for a king. JOHN 
BURIDAN, QdA, 2rb: "Sed iterum etiam dubitatur de boms hommibus, verbi gratia utrum ars 
sutona esset bona regi... Hoc faciliter solvitur dicendo quod nee esset bonum regi addiscere 
illam artem, nee esset sibi bonum uti ea si haberet, quia impediretur per hoc a mehonbus op-
eratiombus et sibi et populo. Sed si posset habere illam artem et aliam, quamcumque sine 
occupatione et impedimento ab aliis mehonbus, ilia esset sibi bona, quamvis non uteretur ea, 
quia perficeret ahqualiter animam eius." 
''This question arose from the following passage; ARISTOTLE, De anima, 1.1,402b 17-22: "It 
seems not only useful for the discovery of the causes of the incidental properties of substances 
to be acquainted with the essential nature of those substances... but also conversely, for the 
knowledge of the essential nature of a substance is largely promoted by an acquaintance with 
its properties." For an overview of the diverse answers to the question of how knowledge 
of accidental properties can contribute to knowledge of the essence of a thing, see P.J.J.M. 
BAKKER, Knowing Substances through Accidents Aristotle's De anima 11, 402bl7-22, in the 
Medieval and Renaissance Commentary Tradition (in preparation). 
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questions in late medieval commentaries. Anyone turning to the medieval 
questions on the status and method of the science of the soul will be disap-
pointed if he or she expects to find a well-thought-out methodology, pre-
sented in an orderly fashion, and then followed strictly in the rest of the text. 
Such a thing will not be found in medieval commentaries on Aristotle.5 Com-
mentaries in the question format especially tend to have only a very limited 
overall systematic organization. And because of this, a single incidental re-
mark in Aristotle can be the sole occasion for the inclusion of a particular 
question in the commentary. The ad-hoc element inherent in such com-
mentaries is clearly visible in the methodological questions found in book 
I. To make matters worse, at least from a modern viewpoint, methodology 
and doctrine are not formally distinguished, which results in methodological 
questions being guided, and often decided, by doctrinal positions. As a con-
sequence, trying to separate the methodological part of the questions in book 
I from the doctrinal part is artificial at best, anachronistic at worst. There are 
better ways to study these questions. 
The most fruitful way, in my view, is to look at these methodological dis-
cussions as occasions for discussing underlying and often elusive doctrinal dif-
ficulties. It is not the method per se that is at stake for the commentators, but 
the method as a means of solving tensions in the scientia de anima that Aristo-
tle left unresolved, or was unclear about. They took Aristotle's comments on 
the status and method of the science of the soul as indicators of both the pos-
sibility and the unity of the science of the soul. And in their questions related 
to these comments, their main concern was always to show that it is possible 
to have a single unified science in which not only the sensitive and vegetative, 
but also the intellective soul form part of its proper subject-matter. 
This approach makes it possible to explain an intriguing phenomenon in 
the tradition of commentaries on Aristotle's De anima, namely that problems 
sometimes migrate from one question to another. A particularly instructive 
example of this is the discussion on the certainty and difficulty of the scientia 
de anima that I will analyze in detail.6 As will become dear in the course of 
this chapter, almost all of these methodological questions revolve, in the final 
analysis, around the ontological status of the human intellect. The peculiar 
character of the methodological questions in the commentaries on book I bear 
witness to what I will call the 'fragile unity' of the scientia de anima. That is to 
say, the discussions in (most of) the late-medieval methodological questions 
are ways of trying to ensure that the scientia de anima remains a single unified 
science, in which both the vegetative and sensitive parts of the soul and the 
5Arguably, it also not found in Aristotle himself. 
6See section 3.3. 
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somehow immaterial intellect form part of its proper subject matter. Or, in 
other words, we can read the methodological questions as ways of addressing 
the unity underlying the otherwise fragmented commentaries in the quaestio 
format. 
3.1 The scientific status of the scientia de anima 
At the beginning of their De anima commentaries, commentators often raised 
one or more questions concerning the scientific status of the scientia de anima. 
These questions usually were, or amounted to: (1) can there be a science of 
the soul (at all)? and (2) can there be a natural science of the soul?7 I will 
first present a classification of the most important arguments. Many of the 
difficulties that are introduced in this classification will be discussed at greater 
length in subsequent sections. After having presented this classification, for 
which I will rely mostly on some anonymous commentaries from the early 
1270s, I will offer a more detailed discussion of two of the later commentators, 
Radulphus Brito and John of Jandun, whose viewpoints on these questions are 
particularly interesting. 
As is often the case in commentaries that use the question format, not 
all of the arguments introduced for or against a position are equally interest-
ing. Some of the arguments merely rely on rather obvious ambiguities or on 
certain rhetorical tricks, and as such, are easily countered by the commenta-
tors who introduce them. As a consequence, these arguments reveal little or 
nothing of the commentator's own views. Other arguments, however, target 
certain inherent difficulties of a position, and these can be quite revealing of 
the details of a commentator's own view. In the discussions on the scientific 
status of the scientia de anima, three general types of such arguments can be 
7These questions are not present, however, in several of the mid-fourteenth-century com-
mentaries on the De anima, for instance, in those by Buridan, Oresme and Anonymus Fatar. 
For some discussion of the role these methodological questions played in the later, sixteenth-
century scholastics, see T. AHO, 'The Status of Psychology as Understood by Sixteenth-Century 
Scholastics', in· S HEINAMAA and M. REUTER (eds ), Psychology and Philosophy Inquiries into 
the Soul from Late Scholasticism to Comtemporary Thought, Berlin [etc.]: Springer, 2009, 47 -
66. The article should be read with some care, however, since some of the claims that the 
author makes in passing about the thirteenth and fourteenth century are incorrect. For exam-
ple, he states that the question of whether a science of the soul is possible at all is a 'somewhat 
non-standard question' that was omitted by most earlier commentators, John of Jandun be-
ing an exception (p. 51). But in fact it was a standard question that can be found in many 
commentaries, including those by Brito, Anonymus van Steenberghen, Anonymus Bazân and 
Anonymus Giele. It is only in the period of Bundan and Oresme that it begins to disappear 
from the commentaries And that 'classical scholastics were unanimous in that the subject <of 
the scientia de anima SdB> must be the soul' (p 52) is also certainly not true. 
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found, linked to three properties that were attributed to the human soul: im-
perceptibility, simplicity and potentiality. This typology is interesting in itself, 
since all three properties are clearly connected to the intellective part of the 
human soul. 
3.1.1 Imperceptibility 
The first and most important of the three types of argumentation targets the 
fact that the soul cannot be perceived by our senses. Already in the early com-
mentary by the Anonymus Vennebusch (probably written around 1260), both 
of the arguments that the author introduces against the possibility of a science 
of the soul are derived from the soul's imperceptibility.8 The first is based 
on the principle that all our knowledge is derived from the senses. Since the 
soul cannot be perceived, we can acquire no knowledge of it.9 The second 
argument claims that any universal notion of the soul must be gained from 
multiple sense perceptions (ex pluribus sensibus). But given that the soul is 
imperceptible, this is impossible.10 And without a universal notion, there can 
be no science. 
Within the Aristotelian tradition, there was an almost complete consensus 
on the idea that our senses are the principal source of all our knowledge. Its 
clearest expression is found in the famous medieval adage that 'nothing is in 
the intellect that was not first in the senses' (nihil est in intellectu, quin prius 
fuerit in sensu).11 This strong emphasis on our senses as the principal source 
of all knowledge makes the imperceptibility of the soul very problematic. So 
it is not surprising that all commentaries on the De anima include at least 
one argument that is based on the soul's imperceptibUity to argue against the 
possibility of a science of the soul. The most popular counterargument to such 
arguments was to make the soul's perceptible operations the starting point of 
'For the composition date, see the introduction to the edition, esp. pp. 85-86. 
'ANONYMUS VENNEBUSCH, QdA, 1.1, 924""6: "Omne nostrum intelligere est a sensu, ut 
habetur tertio huius. De ilio ergo quod non cadit sub sensu, non est sciencia; anima est huius-
modi; ergo etc." 
'"ANONYMUS VENNEBUSCH, Q Ì M , 1.1, 927"12: "Item omnis scientia rei habetur per univer-
sale manens in sui disposicione, ut scribitur primo Phtstcorum et fine Posteriorum; sed ipsam 
animam non contingit habere universale; ergo etc. Minor declaratur: quoniam universale, 
quod est principium scientie, sumitur ex pluribus sensibus, ut habetur principio Methaphisice; 
anima autem non cadit sub sensu; ergo ex pluribus sensibus non potest sumi universale ipsius 
anime." 
"Although the adage expresses an Aristotelian view on the acquisition of knowledge and 
was regularly attributed to Aristotle in medieval texts, it does not occur as such in the works 
of Aristotle. For its history see P. F. CRANEFIELD, O n the Origin of the Phrase Nihil est m 
intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu'. Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences, 
25:1 (1970), 77-80. 
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the scientia de anima rather than the soul's invisible essence.12 Anonymus 
Giele can serve as an example of this strategy, and all the more so since the 
imperceptibUity arguments form the core of his discussion on the possibility 
of a science that studies the soul, and the perceptibility of the soul's operations 
the core of his solution.13 In fact, he claims that the only reason why a science 
of the soul is possible at all is precisely that we have cognitive access to these 
operations, which in turn refer to an underlying essence that explains their 
presence. Were it not for our knowledge of these operations, we would know 
nothing about the soul.14 And if there were a soul whose operations did not 
appear to our senses, it would be inherently hidden {naturaliter occulta), as 
the author puts it. 
Although perceptible operations of the soul might provide enough 
grounds for a scientific study of its essence, the strategy of securing the 
possibility of a scientific study of the soul by appealing to these operations 
is not without its own difficulties. For it is precisely this perceptibility that 
is often denied to the soul's very operations, particularly the operations of 
the intellective soul, namely thinking and willing. That this is a legitimate 
concern is admitted by Anonymus Giele, but he remarks that although the act 
of understanding cannot be perceived by the senses, the lower operations of 
the soul can, and then argues that these lower operations already refer to an 
underlying substance, the soul, in which they inhere. It is unclear whether or 
not he is thinking of some form of self-perception. In any case, the argument 
does not need to rely on self-perception, since the growth of plants and the 
movements of animals would already count as perceivable operations of the 
soul from the perception of which we can infer the presence of a soul that 
accounts for these operations. 
In addition to referring to the vegetative and sensitive functions, Anony-
l2This is also in line with Aristotle's suggestion that in the sctentta de anima we should 
proceed from objects, to acts, to powers. See ARISTOTLE, De anima, II 4, 415al4-22: "It is 
necessary for the student of these forms of soul first to find a definition of each, expressive of 
what it is, and then to investigate its derivative properties, etc. But if we are to express what 
each is, viz. what the thinking power is, or the perceptive, or the nutritive, we must go farther 
back and first give an account of thinking or perceiving; for activities and actions are prior in 
definition to potentialities If so, and if, stdl prior to them, we should have reflected on their 
correlative objects, then for the same reason we must first determine about them, i.e. about 
food and the objects of perception and thought." 
13Anonymus Vennebusch uses a similar strategy: ANONYMUS VENNEBUSCH, QdA, 9479 82. 
"Dicendum ergo quod anima non cadit sub sensu tanquam illud quod habet cognosci a sensu 
per sui speciem; cadit tarnen sub sensu secundum suas operationes sensibiles, quibus delatis ad 
intellectum mediantibus operaciombus sensibihbus devemtur in cogmcionem ipsius animae." 
'^ANONYMUS GIELE, QdA, 2428"30: "Ita quod, si non essent hae operationes animae, nihil 
sciremus de ea, et ideo animam cognoscimus non secundum se, sed secundum quod refertur 
ad istas <ista ed >." 
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mus Giele also offers an interesting argument that is aimed specifically at the 
human intellective soul. It is clear, he argues, that the operations of the prac-
tical intellect can be perceived by the senses even if the operations of the the-
oretical intellect cannot; and our perception of the operations of the practical 
intellect is enough evidence for the inference to the presence of an intellective 
soul.15 This is actually a clever argument. What Anonymus Giele is thinking 
of here are the operations that pertain to the various arts and crafts. Build-
ing a house, making a sculpture, and practicing medicine would be examples 
of such operations. The difference between these operations of the practi-
cal intellect and the operations of the theoretical intellect is that the former 
are transitive, that is, their effect is realized outside of the intellect itself. The 
products of the theoretical intellect, by contrast, are immanent, that is, they 
remain within the intellect. To give some examples of products of the the-
oretical intellect, we can take the various concepts we form and conclusions 
we draw. Now, since the effects of the practical intellect, which are realized 
outside of it, are perfectly visible, this opens up the possibility to infer the ex-
istence of the cause of this effect. When we realize that this cause must be an 
intellect (which is not that difficult), we have solid grounds for including this 
intellect within a scientific study of the soul. To include the intellect within a 
philosophical study of the soul does not amount to the claim that philosophy 
can tell us everything about it, not even when the operations of the practical 
intellect are indeed accessible to our senses. The main reason for this is that 
the intellect somehow transcends matter, and as a consequence transcends 
what is revealed of it through its perceptible, i.e., material operations. 
Taking recourse to the perceptible operations of the soul is not the only 
strategy that allows for the possibility of a science of the soul. The alternative is 
to grant that the soul has a unique immediate cognitive access to itself, without 
any mediation by our sense organs. Since in the soul the cognitive power and 
the object of cognition coincide, it could be claimed that this unique situation 
enables a direct cognition of the soul without the need for perceptibility. Such 
a possibility of a direct insight into the soul would have the added benefit that 
it is supported by a venerable philosophical tradition.16 This solution, how-
I5ANONYMUS GIELE, QdA, 2445~^7: "Et hoc est dicere quod, licet operationes speculativi non 
sunt sensibiles, tamen operationes practici sunt sensibiles; itaque operationes artis declarant 
substantiam animae esse." 
''Augustine, especially, had been a strong proponent of the soul's capacity to contemplate 
itself apart from the body, referring to this possibility in various contexts. An important ex-
ample is Augustine's cogito argument against the skeptics of the Academy, which he formulates 
in De (rimiate, XV, 12 (CCL 50A, 490'^t9125): "Primo ipsa scientia de qua ueraciter cogita-
tio nostra formatur quando quae scimus loquimur, qualis aut quanta potest homini prouenire 
quamlibet peritissimo atque doctissimo? Exceptis enim quae in animum ueniunt a sensibus 
corporis in quibus tarn multa aliter sunt quam uidentur ut eorum uerisimilitudine nimium 
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ever, was not accepted by the majority of commentators. Knowing something 
without the mediation of phantasms was considered to be a mode of cognition 
that is proper to angels, and at best it was conceded that our souls might know 
themselves in this manner in the afterlife once they had been separated from 
our bodies.17 But the soul as it informs the body has no direct knowledge of 
constipatus sanus sibi uideatur esse qui insanit (unde academica philosophie sic inualuit ut 
de omnibus dubitans multo misenus insanirei), his ergo exceptis quae a corporis sensibus in 
animum ueniunt, quantum rerum remanet quod ita sciamus sicut nos uiuere scimus' In quo 
prorsus non metuimus ne aliqua uensimilitudine forte fallamur quoniam certum est etiam 
eum qui fallitur uiuere, nee in eis uisis habetur hoc quae obiciuntur extnnsecus ut in eo sic 
fallatur oculus quemadmodum fallitur cum in aqua remus uidetur infractus et nauigantibus 
turns moueri et aha sexcenta quae aliter sunt quam uidentur, quia nee per oculum cam is hoc 
cermtur. Intima scientia est qua nos uiuere scimus ubi ne illud quidem academicus dicere 
potest: 'Portasse dormis et nescis et in somnis uides'. Visa quippe somniantium similhma esse 
uisis uigilantium quis ignorât' Sed qui certus est de suae uitae scientia non in ea dicit- 'Scio 
me uigilare,' sed: 'Scio me umere'. Siue ergo dormiat siue uigilet, uiuit. Nec in ea scientia per 
somma falli potest quia et dormire et in somnis uidere uiuentis est." Another version of this 
argument can be found m De civitate Dei, XI, 26 (CCL 48, 345 l-34635). But the possibility 
of direct self-knowledge plays a much more important role in Augustine than merely refut-
ing the sceptics; it is one of the cornerstones of his philosophy. For a partial list of passages 
on self-knowledge that clearly shows its importance to Augustine, see G O'DALY, Augustine's 
Philosophy of Mind, London· Duckworth, 1987, 207-211. P. GARY, Augustine's Invention of the 
Inner Self The Legacy of a Christian Pfotomst, Oxford [etc.]: Oxford University Press, 2000 has 
even gone as far calling Augustine the inventor of the self as a private inner space. Another in-
fluential defender of the soul's capacity to contemplate itself apart from the body is Avicenna, 
whose most famous argument for this possibility is known as the 'flying man' argument (see 
p. 22, footnote 24). 
l7See for example RADULPHUS BRITO, Questiones De anima, wis Firenze, Biblioteca 
Nazionale Centrale, Conventi Soppressi, E I 252, Ι.9β β"9 2: "Tarnen ilia operano <i.e. anime 
SdB> non est talis qualem habet in hac vita, quia anima in hac vita intelligit ex sensatis et yma-
ginatis. Sed quando est separata a corpore non sic intelhgit, sed per revelationem supenons 
intelligentie, vel per species infusas, vel per habitus acquisite« hic, vel secundum aliquem ahum 
modum." It is important to realize that even if the separated soul can understand without 
phantasms, in a manner somehow similar to that of angels, this does not imply that this new 
mode of cognition is superior to the embodied mode; THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae, 
Roma: Commissio Leonina (etc.], 1888-1906 (Opera omnia, 4-12), I 89, a 1, 371· "Si igitur 
animae humanae sic essent institutae a Deo ut intelhgerent per modum qui competit substan-
tus separatis, non haberent cogmtionem perfectam, sed confusam in communi Ad hoc ergo 
quod perfectam et propriam cogmtionem de rebus habere possent, sic naturahter sunt insti­
tutae ut corponbus umantur, et sic ab ipsis rebus sensibihbus propriam de eis cogmtionem 
accipiant; sicut homines rudes ad scientiam induci non possunt nisi per sensibilia exempla. Sic 
ergo patet quod propter melius animae est ut corpori uniatur, et intelhgat per conversionem 
ad phantasmata; et tarnen esse potest separata, et ahum modum intelhgendi habere." The idea 
that the separated soul employs a form of cognition without phantasms is not just found in 
those authors inclined to follow Thomas Aquinas; it is commonplace. It is also found, for in­
stance, in ANONYMUS BAZAN, Q Ì M , III. 18,504-5055''~63. For as soon as the possibility of a mode 
of cognition without phantasms is denied, the immortality of the soul becomes impossible as 
is shown conclusively by PIETRO POMPONAZZI, De immortalitate animae, in: Idem, Tractatus 
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itself. Even Anonymus Vennebusch, who stills refers to the soul as the act and 
perfection of the body rather than its form, denies the possibility of any direct 
self-knowledge in this life.18 The principle that all knowledge has its origin 
in the senses excludes the possibility of an immediate knowledge of our own 
immaterial soul. 
3.1.2 Simplicity 
The second type of argument against the possibility of a science of the soul 
focuses on the soul's simplicity. Such arguments claim that the soul can nei-
ther have attributes (passiones)19 nor parts, which rules out the possibility of 
acutissimi, utillimi et mere peripatetici, Venezia: Octavianus Scotus, 1525 (photo-mechanical 
reprint Casarano: Eurocart, 1995), 45": "At quamvis intellectus humanus, ut habitum est, 
intelligendo non fungatur quantitate, attamen, quoniam sensui coniunctus est, ex toto a ma-
teria et quantitate absolvi non potest, quum nunquam cognoscat sine phantasmate, dicente 
Aristotele tertio De anima: 'Nequaquam sine phantasmate intelligit anima.' Unde sic indigens 
corpore ut obiecto neque simpliciter universale cognoscere potest, sed semper universale in 
singular! speculatur, ut unusquisque in seipso experiri potest." For discussion, see L. CASINI, 
'The Renaissance Debate on the Immortality of the Soul. Pietro Pomponazzi and the Plurality 
of Substantial Forms', in: P. J. J. M. BAKKER and J. M.M.H. THIJSSEN (eds.), Mind, Cognition 
and Representation. The Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotle's De anima, Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2007, 127-150, 144-146. 
"ANONYMUS VENNEBUSCH, QdA, I. la, 9593"98: "Quod cognicio anime est nobis acquisita et 
non innata, et hoc mediante sensu et abstraccione facta a sensualibus fantasmatibus, et hoc lo-
quendo de cognicione anime de qua loquitur in ista sciencia, immo ut comunctum inquantum 
actus et perfeccio corporis; loquendo de eius cognicione in statu sue separacionis naturaliter 
cognoscit se ipsam per presenciam." 
'
9The terni 'passio' as it is used in this context is difficult to translate into English. What is 
important is that the translation should bring to the fore that (for the medieval commentators) 
the term is linked to two passages in the Analytica Posteriora. The first is a passage on the unity 
of a science; JACOBUS VENETUS, Analytica Posteriora, edited by L. Minio-Paluello and B. G. 
Dod, Paris [etc.]: Desclée De Brouwer, 1968 (Aristoteles Latinus IV.l), 1.10, 76bll-15, 24^10: 
"Omnis enim demonstrativa scientia circa tria est, et quecumque esse ponuntur (hec autem 
sunt genus, cuius per se passionum speculativa est), et que communes dicuntur dignitates, ex 
quibus primis demonstrant, et tertium passiones, quarum quid significet unaqueque accipit." 
In the English translation it is rendered as follows: ARISTOTLE, Analytica posteriora, translated 
by J. Barnes, in: J. Barnes (ed.), The Complete WorL· of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Trans-
lation, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 124: "For every demonstrative science 
has to do with three things: what it posits to be (these form the genus of what it considers 
the attributes that belong to it in itself); and what are called the common axioms, the prim-
itives from which it demonstrates; and thirdly the attributes, of which it assumes what each 
signifies." The second passage is on demonstrations; JACOBUS VENETUS, Analytica Posteriora, 
1.7,75a43-bl, 1923~2'1: "Tertium genus subiectum, cuius passiones et per se accidentia ostendit 
demonstratio." In the English translation it is rendered as: "third, the underlying genus of 
which demonstration makes clear the attributes and what is accidental to it in itself." To keep 
this link, I have consistently rendered the term 'passio' as attribute. 
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any science that studies it.20 If something is perfectly simple, it is either known 
fully or not at all. Science, by contrast, proceeds by demonstrating that its sub-
ject matter has certain attributes or parts. The common strategy to respond 
to such arguments was to find some manner of introducing a structural com-
plexity within the soul, without jeopardizing its unity. One way of doing so 
was by showing that, its simplicity notwithstanding, there are attributes or 
properties that we can ascribe to the soul.21 
There is, however, a difficulty in claiming that the soul has attributes or 
properties of its own, which is that properties are normally assigned to com-
plete substances and not to matter and form themselves. Matter and form are 
two pnnciples that joindy constitute a substance, but they are not two separate 
things. So stricdy speaking, it seems, one should say that the whole living being 
has certain attributes on account of its having a certain form, namely, the soul. 
Anonymus Van Steenberghen, however, claims that when the soul is respon-
sible for the existence of certain properties in the composite, these properties 
can be said to belong to the soul as their subject— presumably because be-
ing the principle of the existence of these properties, the soul is their ultimate 
source. But the author also draws a much stronger conclusion, namely that 
the soul can remain the subject of these properties even after it has been sep-
arated from the body.22 The argument as a whole is not very convincing and 
seems to rely on an ambiguity between ascribing properties to a subject on the 
basis of where they are exercised (in the composite) and on the basis of where 
they have their source (the soul).23 But Anonymus Van Steenberghen thinks 
2 0 A N O N Y M U S V A N STEENBERGHEN, QdA, 137-1 SS6"". "Nam d e e o non potest esse scientia, 
quod non potest esse subiectum ahcuius accidentis· scientia enim est alicuius generis subiecti 
cuius sunt propnae passiones secundum Anstotelem libro Posterwrum, sed anima non est sub-
iectum ahquarum passionum, turn quia non habet rationem subiecti, cum sit forma, tum quia 
subiectum accidentium est compositum, secundum quod vult Boethius " Compare A N O N Y -
MUS BAZÀN, Q Ì M , 1.1, 389-390"1"27: "Praeterea, de ilio non est scientia quod non habet partes, 
propnetates et passiones; sed anima non habet partes, proprietates et passiones, ergo etc . . . 
Minor probatur, quod anima non habet partes, quia ipsa est indivisibilis; ergo etc. Etiam patet 
quod anima non habet proprietates, quia secundum Philosophum in quinto Metaphysice ma-
teria subiecta formae substat propnetatibus et passiombus; sed anima non est huiusmodi; ergo 
etc " 
2
'Sometimes a commentator mentions both attributes (passiones) and properties (propri-
etates) But the terms seem to be almost interchangeable. 
2 2 A N O N Y M U S V A N STEENBERGHEN, QdA, 1.1, 139-14046"52: "Et cum dicitur: forma sim-
plex non est subiectum accidentium, dico quod falsum est; et verum est quod non est forma 
simplex subiectum accidentium quae consequuntur compositum per matenam, sed tarnen est 
subiectum accidentium consequentium compositum per formam: si enim sint accidentia con-
sequentia compositum per formam, si forma sit separata, potest esse subiectum illorum acci-
dentium." 
23It is surprising that Anonymus Van Steenberghen does not notice this, for elsewhere he 
clearly states that the inference from being the source to being the proper subject is invalid. 
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that this argument is enough to qualify the soul as a subject of scientific study. 
For another example of a simplicity argument, we can look at Anonymus 
Bazân. In contrast to Anonymus Van Steenberghen, he is not only concerned 
with the question of how the soul can have its own attributes and properties, 
but also with the question of how it can have parts.24 As far as its having 
properties is concerned, he counts the vital powers as properties of the soul, 
without considering whether or not they are properly speaking properties of 
the composite rather than of the soul. His argument that the soul has parts 
is more convincing. Although, he argues, the soul has no essential or integral 
parts, it does have parts if we take 'parts' in the sense of its various powers 
(partespotentiates), namely, the vegetative, sensitive and intellective soul. The 
minor difference in approach notwithstanding, the argumentative strategies 
and the philosophical agendas of Anonymus Van Steenberghen and Anony-
mus Bazân are similar: establishing some form of structural complexity within 
the soul, in order to ensure that it can function as the subject matter of a sci-
ence. 
3.1.3 Potentiality 
The third type of argument against the possibihty of a science that studies the 
soul focuses on the potentiality of the intellect. According to Aristode, our 
intellect is in a state of pure potentiality prior to the acquisition of knowledge; 
it can be compared to a blank writing-table {tabula rasa).25 Since something 
can only be known in so far as it is in act, it seems that the intellect itself is 
unknowable. And if it cannot be known, there can a fortiori be no science that 
studies it. This argument is found, for instance, in Anonymous Bazân. In his 
ANONYMUS VAN STEENBERGHEN, QdA, 1.15, ISó47^19: "Ad aliud dicendum quod passiones 
sunt animae ut principii; ex hoc autem non sequitur quod anima sit illud cuius primo sint istae 
opera tiones." 
^ANONYMUS BAZÂN, Q Î M , I.l, 39052"60: "Ad tertium: de Ulo non est scientia quod non 
habet partes, proprietates et passiones, concedo. Sed cum dicitur: anima non habet huiusmodi 
partes, proprietates et passiones, ego nego. Et tu probas quia anima est indivisibilis. Verum est 
secundum partes essentiales et integrales, tarnen anima est divisibilis in multas partes poten-
tiales, utpote in intellectivam, sensitivam et vegetativam. Et tunc ad illud, scilicet quod anima 
non habeat proprietates, dico quod falsum est, imo anima habet proprietates, quae sunt sentire 
et intelligere, et substat proprietatibus suis; ergo etc." In spite of the distinction in this argu-
ment between passiones and proprietates, the terms seem to be almost interchangeable in the 
question. The terminology of parts and wholes as applied to the soul is explored in detail in 
section 5.3. 
"ARISTOTLE, De anima, UIA, 429b30—430a2: "Have we not already disposed of the diffi-
culty about interaction involving a common element, when we said that thought is in a sense 
potentially whatever is thinkable, though actually it is nothing until it has thought? What it 
thinks must be in it just as characters may be said to be on a writing-table on which as yet 
nothing actually stands written: this is exactly what happens with thought." 
53 
CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGICAL DISCUSSIONS 
(brief) reply, the author tries to establish the possibility of self-knowledge in 
order to circumvent this objection. For if the soul can know itself, then there 
can ipso facto be a science of the soul. Now, although it is not possible for 
the soul to have self-knowledge prior to knowing something else — since at 
that stage the soul is nothing but potentiality —, as soon as something else is 
known, the soul can begin to know itself.26 This implies that the possibility of 
some form of self-knowledge is fundamental for the possibility of a science of 
the soul.27 
The necessity of such self-knowledge for the possibility of a science of the 
soul is not as obvious as it might seem. This becomes immediately clear by 
comparing the scientia de anima to the other sciences. Only in the scientia de 
anima is the possibility of self-knowledge considered to be important. The 
implication can only be that the scientia de anima is considered — at least 
partly — to be a reflexive science, which receives its data from some form 
of inner perception. This becomes especially clear in the discussions on the 
certainty of this science.28 
3.1.4 The study of the soul within natural philosophy 
These three types of argument, connected to imperceptibility, simplicity, and 
potentiality, give a good indication of the playing field when it came to dis-
cussing the status of the science that studies the soul. Combined, they were 
powerful enough to enable one to easily exclude the study of the soul from 
most areas of philosophy, with the possible exception of metaphysics. Its study 
could then be left to the theologians. It is interesting in itself that none of the 
philosophers who are being discussed here ever attempted to make this move. 
All of them wholeheartedly agreed with Aristotle in considering the scientia de 
anima a part of philosophy. The arguments described above indicate that they 
considered the soul to be a difficult object to study in a philosophical manner, 
but they would go no further than that conclusion. Moreover, all of them 
26ANONYMUS BAZÄN, QdA, 1.1, 39030"34· "Et tunc arguo: de ilio est scientia quod est ens 
intelligibile; sed anima est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet pruno Posterwrum: de non ente 
non est scientia; ergo propter oppositum est scientia. Minor probatur, quia anima intelhgendo 
alia intelligit se; ergo ipsa anima est intelligibilis, et ita patet quod anima est ens intelligibile." 
Compare RADULPHUS BRITO, Q Ì M , I.l46-60. 
27The topic of self-knowledge deserves a study of its own. For an introduction to the topic 
see J. ZUPKO, 'Self-Knowledge and Self-Representation in Later Medieval Psychology', in: P. J. 
J. M. BAKKER and J. M.M.H. THIJSSEN (eds.), Mtnd, Cognition and Representation The Tradi-
tion of Commentaries on Aristotle's De anima, Aldershot· Ashgate, 2007, 87-107. Much of the 
work for the second half of the thirteenth century has been already done by F. X. PUTALLAZ, La 
connaissance de soi au ΧΠΓ siècle De Matthieu d'Aquasparta à Thierry de Freiberg, Pans: Vnn, 
1991. 
28See below, section 3.3. 
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even agreed with Aristotle that the study of the soul belongs, at least to a large 
extent, to natural philosophy. 
The Anonymi Giele, Bazin, and Van Steenberghen all devote a question 
to the place of the science that studies the soul, after having estabhshed that 
such a science is indeed possible. And all three agree that the scientia de anima 
forms a part of natural philosophy. Again it is the intellect that causes the most 
difficulties, given that the intellect is immaterial and that natural philosophy 
is concerned with matter and motion. But all three commentators are quick 
to point out that even though the intellect is immaterial, it is still related to 
matter in some way. They disagree strongly on the details of this relationship, 
but agree on the conclusion that this relationship is strong enough to include 
the study of the intellect within natural philosophy.29 
This does not mean that there was no room for disagreement on the scien-
tific status of the scientia de anima. But the disagreement did not concern the 
question of whether the soul could be studied in a scientific manner, or even 
whether it should be studied within natural philosophy. Instead, it concerned 
the question of whether apart from a natural philosophical study of the soul 
there could (or, should) also be another kind of study of the soul. To show 
this, I will compare the answers Radulphus Brito and John of Jandun give to 
the questions whether a science of the soul is possible, and if so, whether it 
forms a part of natural philosophy. 
3.1.5 Radulphus Brito against John of Jandun 
When Brito presents the initial objections against the possibility of a science 
that studies the soul, the bulk of their demonstrative force is carried by the im-
29Anonymus Van Steenberghen emphasizes that in so far as the soul is considered to be 
a form that is the act of the body, its study belongs to natural philosophy. ANONYMUS VAN 
STEENBERGHEN, QdA, 1.2, MS36-'12. "Unde, ex ratione posita de anima, patet quod Aristoteles 
considérât animam ut est forma corporis sensibihs, cum dicit quod est actus corporis, et hums 
corporis Et istud est verum de anima sensitiva et vegetativa; item de intellectiva, quia, quamvis 
intellectiva non commumcet corpon per se, communicat tarnen ilh quod per se communicat 
vel convemt corporv communicat emm phantasiae vel imaginationi quae per se convenit cor-
pon, ut patet." Anonymus Bazén uses a similar strategy. ANONYMUS BAZAN, QdA, 1.2, 39236"3,: 
"Ad secundum, cum arguitur de illa forma non est scientia naturalis, quae non est actus ma-
tenae, concedo. Et cum dicitur in minore: anima <intellectiva SiiB> non est actus materiae, 
dico: quamvis non per se, tarnen per accidens; unde anima est actus matenae." Anonymus 
Giele, by contrast, denies that the intellective soul is a form that is the act of the body. Accord-
ing to him, the intellective soul is a separate substance Instead, he claims that it is because 
of the intellect's relation to matter in its operations that it is included in natural philosophy 
ANONYMUS GIELE, QdA, 1.3, 2638~"": "Et ideo potest esse scientia naturalis de anima <intellec-
tiva SdB>, ratione suarum operationum quae communicant matenae sive corpon, ex quibus 
declaratur substantia animae, ita quod, sine matenahbus et physicis, non probatur esse ammae 
intellectivae." 
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perceptibility and simplicity of the soul. Like Anonymus Giele, Brito points to 
the operations of the sensible and vegetative souls to counter these objections. 
Since the operations of the sensible and vegetative souls appear to our senses, 
these can serve as a starting point for a study of the soul. But whereas Anony-
mous Giele also referred to the operations of the practical intellect to find an 
empirical foundation for the science of the soul, Brito does not see how the 
senses could get access to the intellect. So in order to safeguard the intelligi-
bility of the intellect, he looks for an alternative explanation of how something 
can be intelligible without being accessible to our senses. This he accomplishes 
by making a distinction in the manner in which something can be intelligible. 
In the normal, direct manner (primo et prinapahter), something is intelligi-
ble if and only if it is perceptible in itself or through its accidents. But in a 
secondary, indirect manner, things are also intelligible when they are known 
through something else which is itself perceptible. In other words, the intel-
lect must first acquire knowledge of some external perceptible thing, before it 
becomes something actual and ipso facto intelligible itself.30 
But what about the soul's simplicity? In particular, can it have any oper-
ations ascribed to it? Given Brito's emphasis in these questions on the special 
status of the intellective soul, one might expect him to take a common way 
out of claiming that understanding is an operation that belongs to the soul 
alone, rather than to the soul-body composite.31 But not only does Brito not 
take this way out, he emphasizes over and over again that all operations of a 
living being — including understanding — belong to the composite of soul 
and body rather than to the soul alone!32 It is true to say that the soul has 
30RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, LI99"1". "Dico quod ahquid potest esse intelligibile dupliciter 
vel primo et pnncipaliter, vel ex intellectione altenus. Modo dlud quod est intelligibile primo 
est sensibile vel secundum se vel secundum aliqua sui accidentia. Sed illud quod est intelligi-
bile ex intellectione altenus non oportet quod sit sensibile, sed sufficit quod illud sit sensibile ex 
cuius intellectione intelligitur, sicut privationes intelhguntur per habitum Et ideo non oportet 
quod privationes sint sensibiles, sed earum cognitio dependet ex cognitione alicuius quod est 
sensibile. Sic est in proposito, quia intellectus ex hoc quod aha cognoscit vel intelligit est intel-
hgibilis secundano Ita cognitio eius dependet ex cognitione aliarum rerum quas intelhgit. Et 
cognitio illarum rerum dependet ex sensu Sed de operatione anime vegetative et sensitive non 
est ita, quia operationes iste dependent ex sensu et ex hoc intelligimus animam vegetativam et 
sensitivam." 
31
 Many philosophers claim that understanding is an operation proper to the soul alone. See 
for example THOMAS AQUINAS, SentdeA, I 2, IO69"74: "Et ex hoc duo sequntur. Unum est quod 
intelhgere est propria operano anime et non indiget corpore nisi ut obiecto tantum, ut dic-
tum est; videre autem et ahe operationes et passiones non sunt anime tantum, set comuncti.", 
ANONYMUS GIELE, Q Ì M , 1.6, sg67-68· "Sed anima indiget in intelhgere corpore sicut obiecto, 
non sicut subiecto " 
32RADULPHUS BRITO, Q Ì M , I l125 l26 "Unde totius comuncti est intelhgere et sentire 
per animam tarnen.", see also RADULPHUS BRITO, Q Ì M , I.l65-67; RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, 
ILIO24 26. 
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operations, but only if we mean by that claim that the soul is what accounts 
for the presence of operations in the composite living being: 
Et cum dicitur 'anima non habet passiones', falsum est. Licet enim 
anima separata non habeat passiones, ut consideratur hie totum com-
positum ex anima et corpore habet passiones, per ammam tarnen.33 
And when it is said that the soul has no attributes, that is not true. 
For the separated soul may indeed have no attributes. But the whole 
composite of soul and body, as it is considered here, has attributes, yet 
through the soul. 
Given his claim that all operations belong to the composite and none to 
the soul proper, it is not surprising that Brito considers the scientia de anima 
to form a part of natural science. In fact, his question 'whether there can be 
a natural science of the soul' is very brief, probably because he found this to 
be so obvious that he saw no need to add any extra arguments for this claim. 
It is precisely because of the fact that all vital operations are exercised in the 
soul-body composite that the soul is studied within natural philosophy. Brito 
consistently counts understanding among the operations that belong strictly 
speaking to the composite, although he admits that understanding is excep-
tional in the sense that it is not exercised through a bodily organ. 
But surprisingly, it is also Brito who seemingly without any occasion asks 
the question of whether there can also be another science that studies the soul 
as separated from the body.34 After maintaining that Averroes denies that the 
soul can exist apart from the body, whereas faith, truth and Aristotle agree that 
it can, Brito claims that there can very well be (bene potest) a science of the soul 
as separated and in itself. But that science would be a divine science [scientia 
divina), that is, metaphysics, or, perhaps, theology.35 Given that Brito makes 
"RADULPHUS BRITO, Q Ì M , I.l120"122 (ad rationes). 
34
 Bnto raises this issue in the middle of the question 'whether there can be a science of the 
soul', starting at line 73. From the context it is clear that Brito is referring here to the soul in its 
separated state after the death of the body, and not to a study of the soul taken in abstraction 
from the body 
35The term 'scientia divina1 was regularly used to refer to metaphysics rather than to theol-
ogy, because Aristotle had called metaphysics a divine science; ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, trans-
lated by W D Ross, in: J. Barnes (ed.), The Complete Worte ofAnstotle The Revised Oxford 
Translation, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984,1 2, 983a4-8, p. 1555: "For the most 
divine science is also most honourable; and this science alone is, in two ways, most divine. For 
the science which it would be most meet for God to have is a divine science, and so is any sci-
ence that deals with divine objects; and this science alone has both these qualities." There is a 
third possible interpretation The expression 'scientia divina' could also refer to God's knowl-
edge of our soul In that case, God would be the only one who has knowledge of our soul once 
it is separated from our body. 
57 
CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGICAL DISCUSSIONS 
this claim in the very same question in which he denies that the soul has its 
own proper operation, it is unexpected, to say the least. 
It is interesting to contrast Brito's discussion of the question of whether 
there can be a science of the soul with Jandun's, whose philosophical back-
ground is considerably different from Brito's. Whereas Brito's interpretation 
of Aristotle has much in common with the interpretation given by Aquinas, 
Jandun's interpretation stands in the tradition of the commentaries of Aver-
roes and Anonymus Giele. Jandun interprets Aristotle's theory of the soul in 
such way that the intellective soul is considered to be a separate substance; 
this applies to both the potential and the agent intellect. To be sure, when he 
is pressed to answer the question of whether this theory of the separate intel-
lect is true, Jandun will say that according to truth and faith the position that 
posits a separate intellect is wrong. But he consistently interprets Aristotle 
from the perspective of a separate intellect. The question is how much im-
pact this has on his answer to the question of whether there can be a (natural 
philosophical) science of the soul. 
When answering the objection that the soul cannot be perceived, Jandun 
begins by showing that at least the vegetative and sensitive souls are percepti-
ble. He is a bit more careful and precise in his formulation than Brito, claim-
ing only that these souls themselves are perceptible per accidens, whereas their 
operations are perceptible per se. The intellective soul on the other hand is 
(strictly speaking) neither perceptible per se nor per accidens?6 Also, Jandun 
takes exactly the same approach to the intellective soul's intelligibility as Brito: 
although the soul is not intelligible directly on account of its imperceptibility, 
it is intelligible in a derivative sense, since it can be understood through our 
understanding of something else.37 This derived intelligibility is enough to in-
clude the soul among the objects that can be studied by science. But although 
Jandun and Brito follow the same approach when it comes to the soul's im-
perceptibility, they differ when it comes to the soul's simplicity. Jandun does 
not share Brito's conviction that no operation is proper to the soul itself. In-
deed, Jandun's interpretation of the agent and potential intellects as separate 
3 6JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, 11,8· "Anima autem intellectiva nee per se nee per accidens 
videtur sensibilis esse, cum nee secundum se nee secundum operationes suas apprehendatur 
a sensu, nisi forte vellemus vocare sensibile per accidens quod habet habitudinem ad ahquod 
per se sensibile, sicut octavum coelum dicimus locari per accidens, quia habet habitudinem 
ad centrum, quod per se locatur, ut patet quarto Physicorum. Et isto modo anima intellectiva 
posset dici sensibilis, cum habeat habitudinem ad phantasmata, ut patet tertio hmus." 
3 7JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, 11 ,9 . "Uno modo aliquid intelligitur pnmo, sicut quod habet 
proprium phantasma mediante quo potest phantasian, et de tali procedunt omnes tres pro-
bationes. Alio modo aliquid intelligitur non pnmo, sed ex intellectione alterms quod pnmo 
intelligitur, et de tali non procedunt probationes. Modo anima non est intelhgibilis primo 
modo, ad minus intellectiva, sed solum secundo modo." 
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substances presupposes that they have a proper operation, i.e., that they have 
an operation that is not also the operation of the ensouled body.38 
Since the intellective soul has an operation that pertains properly to the 
soul itself, it can, at least in principle, be studied on its own. So we might 
expect Jandun to agree with Brito that it belongs to another, divine science to 
study the intellective soul in itself. The expectation is partly correct. Jandun 
indeed agrees that the soul can be studied in itself, apart from the body. But, 
surprisingly, he still considers this study to be a part of natural philosophy. He 
formulates his position in the context of a critique of some unnamed philoso-
phers, who claim that we can consider the soul in both a natural philosophical 
and a metaphysical way: 
Sed est intelligendum secundum aliquos quod anima intellectiva potest 
accipi dupliciter. Uno modo secundum se et absolute. Et quia ut sic 
est quaedam intelligentia, de ipsa ut sic non est scientia naturalis, sed 
magis spectat ad metaphysicam. Alio modo potest considerari ut est 
principium motuum et operationum in corpore humano. Et isto modo 
de ipsa est scientia naturalis.39 
But according to some people it should be understood that the intel-
lective soul can be considered in two ways. In one way in itself and 
absolutely. And because so considered it is an intelligence, there is no 
natural science of it, but rather it pertains to metaphysics. In another 
way it can be considered as the principle of movements and operations 
in the human body. And in this manner there is a natural science of it. 
Although the 'some people' remain anonymous, the view itself can be 
traced back to Avicenna.40 Jandun, on the other hand, questions the validity 
of this distinction immediately after formulating it, with the clever argument 
that Aristotle counts all the existing separate intellects in his Metaphysica and 
3eJoHN OF JANDUN, QdA, 1.11, 57-58: "Omnis substantia quae non est unita corpori tan-
quam subiecto, cui dat esse, sed secundum esse est subsistens distincta a corpore, habet Ope-
rationen! immaterialem quae non dependet a corpore tanquam a subiecto. Hanc habeo pro 
manifesta." See also the overview given above in section 2.3.1. 
3 ,JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, 1.2, 10. 
40For a discussion of Avicenna's two definitions of the soul and its influence, see section 2.2, 
p. 22. It is found in many commentators of the first half of the thirteenth century, including 
Albert the Great. For Albert the Great, see, for example, T. BONIN, 'The Emanative Psychology 
of Albertus Magnus', Topoi, 19:1 (2000), 45-57, 49. The distinction between a natural philo-
sophical study of the soul and a metaphysical study of it can also be found in the Philosophen 
disciplina (written c. 1254); ANONYMUS, Phdosophica disciplina, in: C. Lafleur, Quatre introduc-
tions à la philosophie au XIIIe siècle, textes critiques et étude historique, Paris: Vrin [etc.], 1988, 
264, 139-141: "De anima absolute determinare in quantum est aliquid in se non est naturalis 
philosophi, set potius metafysici, cuius est considerare substantias spirituales separatas." 
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does not include our intellects as separated from the body in that enumera-
tion. In contrast to Brito, Jandun includes even the study of the intellect as it 
exists on its own, apart from the body {secundum se et absolute) within natural 
philosophy. Metaphysics is only concerned with those things that are entirely 
separate from matter, both for their being and for their first operations (ope-
rationes primas) .4 ' 
The difference between Jandun and Brito is not the result of their use of 
different criteria when deciding the question of whether something is studied 
within natural philosophy. Jandun formulated his criterion in terms of an ob-
ject's relation to matter: only those objects that have no relation to matter at 
all pertain to metaphysics, whereas everything that has some relation to matter 
pertains to natural philosophy. Since the intellect is related to matter in its op-
erations, it can only be studied within natural philosophy. Brito is less explicit, 
but there is no indication that he would disagree. Their disagreement turns 
out to be doctrinal and not methodological. When Brito talks about the pos-
sibility of a study of the soul in itself apart from the body, he is referring to the 
soul as it exists after its separation from the body. But when Jandun is talking 
about the possibility of a study of the soul in itself apart from the body, he is 
talking about the study of the separate agent and potential intellects taken on 
their own. There is a crucial difference between these two perspectives, which 
is that according to Brito the soul is either related to the body (as its form) or 
exists in a separated state, whereas according to Jandun the intellective soul is 
always related to the body (in its operations) and always exists in a separate 
state. In Brito's commentary the doctrinal and the methodological issues are 
strongly connected: 
Modo aliquis dubitarci utrum de anima secundum se considerata pos-
set esse scientia. Commentator diceret quod non, quia ipse ponit quod 
41
 JOHN OF JANDUN, Q Ì M , 1.2, 11· "Et ideo dico quod anima intellectiva secundum se et 
absolute et secundum quod est principium motuum et operationum in homme pertinet ad 
naturalem et non ad metaphysicam, qui solum considérât totaliter separata. Totahter vero 
separata sunt ilia, quae non indigent corpore, nee sibi appropriantur, nee quantum ad sub-
stantiam nec quantum ad operationes eorum primas." Compare the position of Anonymus 
Giele, who also holds the view that the separate intellect is included in natural philosophy in so 
far as its operations are related to the body. ANONYMUS GIELE, Q Ì M , 1.3, 26'2"": "Et est intel-
hgendum adhuc, quamquam anima intellectiva sit separata sive separatum esse habens a cor-
pore, sicut determinabitur infenus expresse, via physica, dico, et, quantum ad hoc, de anima 
non sit scientia naturalis, tarnen, quantum ad operationes quas habet, non est separata, sed 
corpon commumcat quantum ad suas operationes quas habet nonnisi mediante corpore Et 
ideo potest esse scientia naturalis de anima, ratione suarum operationum quae communicant 
materiae sive corpon, ex quibus declaratur substantiae ammae, ita quod, sine materialibus et 
physicis, non probatur esse ammae intellectivae." But in contrast to Jandun, Anonymus Giele 
also claims that in so far as the intellect is ontologically independent from matter, it cannot fall 
under natural philosophy. 
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anima intellectiva non possit separari a corpore. Ymmo ipse vult quod 
semper sit coniuncta corpori quantum ad eius operationem. Et ideo 
secundum ipsum non possumus habere scientiam de ipsa anima in qua 
non determinetur de ipsa ut est coniuncta corpori.42 
Now, someone might doubt whether there could be a science of the soul 
as considered in itself. According to the Commentator there could not, 
because he posits that the intellective soul cannot be separated from the 
body. On the contrary, he wants that it is always conjoined to the body 
in its operations. And according to him, therefore, we cannot have a 
science of the soul in which it is not considered as conjoined as to the 
body. 
Jandun does not defend the exact opinion that Brito ascribes to Averroes 
in this passage, because he argues that there can be a science that studies the 
soul in itself. It is just that even that science would belong to natural philoso-
phy. But the reason why it would still belong to natural philosophy is precisely 
because the intellect is always conjoined to the body in its operations. 
It is interesting to see what happens here. The answers Brito and Jandun 
give to the question of whether a science that studies the soul in itself would 
belong to natural philosophy or metaphysics is determined almost completely 
by their position with respect to the ontological status of the intellective soul. 
And from that viewpoint their answers are understandable. But from the 
viewpoint of how they ascribe operations to either the soul or the soul-body 
composite their answers are the opposite of what one would expect. Brito con-
sistently ascribes all operations, including understanding, to the composite, 
but then wants to leave room for a divine science of the soul as existing apart 
from the composite. Jandun, on the other hand, ascribes proper operations 
to the separate soul, but then includes the study of this separate soul within 
natural philosophy.43 It is not that these commentators never give criteria for 
answering the question, but these criteria function more as an afterthought 
than as guiding principles. Again this shows how the methodological ques-
tions are really ways of solving tensions in the scientia de anima that Aristotle 
left unresolved; in this case, that of how the intellect is related to the body. 
"RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, I.l7'"78. 
""'The proper operation of the intellect is not normal human thought. Jandun makes it very 
clear that it really is this or that man that understands. See BRENET, Transferts du sujet, 340-
362. But in addition to particular thoughts, there is also the eternal understanding of the agent 
intellect by the possible intellect that is independent of any relation to phantasms. See BRENET, 
Transferts du sujet, 380-394. 
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3.1.6 An increasing focus on the intellect 
Although much of the focus in the question of whether or not a philosophical 
study of the soul is possible lies on the intellective soul, the question concerns 
the soul in general, including its vegetative and sensitive parts. Given the dif-
ficulties connected with the intellective soul, the amount of attention devoted 
to it in these questions is understandable, but it is important to keep in mind 
that the question had a broader focus. In the course of the fourteenth century, 
however, the question concerning the study of the soul in general as discussed 
in book I begins to disappear. Instead, some commentators include a ques-
tion on the intellective soul in particular, which they take up in book III. This 
process apparently begins in the commentary of landun, who includes both 
the question on the soul in general in book I and the question on the intel-
lective soul in particular in book III. And it continues with Anonymous Patar 
and Oresme, both of whom omit the issue in book I and include a question on 
the intellect in book III instead.44 As for Buridan, he neither raises the general 
question in book I, nor the more specific question in book III.45 
Is the appearance of this new question a sign that something important 
has changed in the commentary tradition? To answer this, we must look for 
an explanation of its appearance. A first attempt at an answer can be made by 
pointing to the first book of Aristotle's Departibus animalium, which contains 
an extensive section on the study of the soul. The most important passage in 
this context is the following: 
If now the form of the living being is the soul, or part of the soul, or 
something that without the soul cannot exist... if I say, this is so, then 
"Similar to the normal order found in the questions on book I, the question of whether 
the intellect is studied in natural philosophy is the opening question of book III. According 
to Zupko, it seems that only four fourteenth-century philosophers included the question in 
their commentaries on the third book of the De anima. The first three are the commenta-
tors already mentioned: John of landun, Nicole Oresme, and Anonymous Patar (referred to 
as Buridan in the Zupko article). See J. ZUPKO, 'Natural Philosophers on the Nature of the 
Intellect', in: MARIA. C. PACHECO and JOSÉ F. MEIRINHOS (eds.), Intellect et imagination dans 
la Philosophie Médiévale, Actes du Xle congrès international de philosophie médiévale de la 
Société Internationale pour l'étude de la Philosophie Médiévale (S.I.E.P.M.), Porto, du 26 au 
31 août 2002, vol. 3, Turnhout: Brepols, 2006, 1797-1812, 1798. As the fourth, Zupko men-
tions Blasius of Parma, but I have been unable to locate the question. It is not included in the 
tabulae quaesttonum of his Conclusiones de anima and his Quaestiones de anima found in G. 
FEDERICI VESCOVINI, Le quaestiones de anima di Biagio Pelacani da Parma, Firenze: Olschki, 
1974, 13-14 and 27-30. The closest match is question III.8 of the Quaestiones, which is entitled 
'Utrum de intellectu sit scientia'. Nor is the question mentioned in P. MARSHALL, 'Parisian 
Psychology in the Mid-Fourteenth Century', Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen 
Âge, 50 (1983), 101-193. 
45Both questions are also not raised in both Buridan's second set of lectures on the De 
anima and the Lokert edition. 
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it will come within the province of the natural scientist to inform him-
self concerning the soul, and to treat of it, either in its entirety, or, at 
any rate, ofthat part of it which constitutes the essential character of an 
animal; and it will be his duty to say what a soul or this part of a soul 
is; and to discuss the attributes that attach to this essential character, 
especially as nature is spoken of— and is — twofold, as matter and as 
substance; nature as substance including both the motor cause and the 
final cause. Now it is in the latter of these two senses that either the 
whole soul or some part of it constitutes the nature of an animal; and 
inasmuch as it is the presence of the soul that enables matter to con-
stitute the animal nature, much more than it is the presence of matter 
which so enables the soul, the inquirer into nature is bound to treat of 
the soul rather than of the matter... What has been said suggests the 
question, whether it is the whole soul or only some part of it, the con-
sideration of which comes within the province of natural science... But 
perhaps it is not the whole soul, nor all its parts collectively, that con-
stitutes the source of motion... For other animals than man have the 
power of locomotion, but in none but him is there intellect. Thus then 
it is plain that it is not of the whole soul that we have to treat. For it is 
not the whole soul that constitutes animal nature, but only some part 
or parts of it.46 
This passage places the study of the soul unambiguously under natural 
philosophy, but also strongly (although not conclusively) suggests that a study 
of the intellect pertains to some other science, since the natural philosopher 
needs to discuss the soul only in so far as it 'constitutes the essential charac-
ter of an animal'. Given the immateriality and (at least according to many 
commentators) immortality of the intellective part of the soul, the science of 
metaphysics would be the obvious choice. But interesting as this passage from 
Departibus ammaltum is, it cannot be used to explain the emergence of a ques-
tion on the study of intellect in book III in the fourteenth century. For in spite 
of the strong influence this passage was to have on Renaissance commenta-
tors, it played no role in the medieval commentaries.4 7 None of the medieval 
""ARISTOTLE, Departibus ammaltum, translated by W. Ogle, in: J. Barnes (ed.), The Com-
plete Works ofArtstotle The Revised Oxford Translation, Princeton: Pnnceton University Press, 
1984,1, 64lal8-b 10, p. 997-998. 
47For the influence of this passage on Renaissance commentators, which was probably due 
to its inclusion in the commentary on the De anima attributed to Simphcius, see P. J. J. M. 
BAKKER, 'Natural Philosophy, Metaphysics, or Something in Between? Agostino Nifo, Pietro 
Pomponazzi, and Marcantonio Genua on the Nature and Place of the Science of the Soul', in. 
P. J. J. M. BAKKER and J. M.M.H. THIJSSEN (eds.), Mind, Cognition and Representation The 
Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotle's De anima, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007, 151-177, espe-
cially 152-154. A Latin translation of Simphcius's commentary was not available during the 
Middle Ages. The first translation dates from the middle of the sixteenth century, see S SALA-
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commentators I discuss in this study as much as mentioned the passage, let 
alone discussed it. 
A second possible reason for the emergence of a question on the intellect 
in book III is suggested by Zupko, who points out that there seems to be a re-
lation with the Averroistic commentaries. For in commentaries that stay close 
to Averroes's interpretation it makes sense to ask the question about the inclu-
sion of intellect within natural philosophy, given that the intellect is a separate 
substance, ontologicaüy independent from the vegetative and sensitive parts 
of the soul. The continued interest in the question in other commentators can 
then be explained as follows: 
A more likely explanation is that the question interested some non-
Averroistic masters simply because they were reading the De anima 
commentaries of their predecessors, some of whom were Averroists. 
Buridan probably dropped the question by the time he delivered his 
third and final series of lectures on De anima because he had no reason 
to continue asking it, holding as he did that the human vegetative, sen-
sitive, and intellective powers form a per se unity, though one which the 
philosopher is in no position to demonstrate.48 
This is a much more plausible answer than the first one, and I think that 
linking the emergence of this question to the Averroistic tenets in philosophi-
cal psychology can explain why Jandun takes up the question in book HI after 
having already asked the more general question in book I. 
If I am correct in assuming that the author I refer to as Anonymus Fatar is 
not identical with Buridan,49 then Buridan did not drop the question at some 
point in his career; instead, he never took it up in the first place.50 So we have 
two out of three commentators with doctrinally closely related commentaries 
who take up the question in book III, whereas one completely ignores it. This 
reinforces Zupko's suggestion that the occurrence of the question in commen-
tators who do not try to follow Averroes is incidental. Jandun has included it, 
TowsKY, De Anima die Rezeption der aristotelischen Psychologie im 16 und 17 Jahrhundert, 
Amsterdam [etc.]: Grüner, 2006, 76, footnote 169 
" Z U P K O , 'Natural Philosophers on the Nature of the Intellect', 1811 
'"For the arguments, see the appendices. 
^Buridan does devote a question to the apparent similarity between the potential intellect 
and prime matter. JOHN BURIDAN, QdA, III.7, 57-63: 'Utrum intellectus possibilis sit pura 
potentia ita quod non sit ahquis actus, sicut materia prima'. But even though this similarity 
between the potential intellect and prime matter formed the basis of one of the three strate-
gies to argue against the possibility of a science of the soul (see above, section 3.1.3), Bundan's 
motive for raising the question is not that of discussing the potential difficulties of a natural 
philosophical study of the intellect Instead he is concerned with distinguishing between the 
different meanings of 'potentia' "Ista quaestio est formata ad exponendum aliquas aucton-
tates." (p. SS39"40). 
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and so do these commentators. And indeed, as soon as we look more closely 
at how Jandun, Oresme and Anonymus Fatar structure their discussions, it 
becomes dear that the later fourteenth-century commentators simply follow 
Jandun not only in their inclusion of the question, but even in the way they 
treat it. As a result their inclusion of the question has no impact on the tradi-
tion of the scientia de anima. 
On the natural philosophical study of the intellect 
Jandun opens his commentary on book III with the question 'Whether a nat-
ural philosopher should consider the intellect'. Before giving his final answer 
to the question, he distinguishes (following Averroes) between four different 
meanings of the term 'intellect'. It can either mean the possible intellect, or 
the agent intellect, or the habitual intellect — which is defined as the intellect 
as informed by an intelligible species —, or, lastly, the imaginative (or cogita-
tive) power. This last option is also the easiest to deal with. The imaginative 
power is by definition a material power, which belongs to the human sensi-
tive soul.51 Since it has already been established in book I that (at the very 
least most of) the human soul is among the objects of study of the scientia de 
anima, any material powers that this soul has will also be studied there. 
The inclusion of the possible intellect in natural philosophy is argued for 
by an appeal to the principle that every substance that is moved by something 
that exists in matter is itself an object of study for the natural philosopher. 
Given that the possible intellect is moved by the material phantasms, it ipso 
facto falls under the consideration of the natural philosopher. To argue for 
the inclusion of the habitual intellect Jandun chooses a different approach. 
This time the intellect is included, because a natural philosopher studies ev-
erything that is subject to generation and corruption. According to Jandun, 
the intelligible species that are the form of the habitual intellect are species 
that are subject to generation and corruption, since their presence or absence 
in the habitual intellect is dependent on the generation or corruption of what 
he calls the imaginative intentions. That is to say, the species will only be 
present in the habitual intellect when we have the corresponding phantasms 
at the sensitive level.52 If the corresponding phantasms are not present in the 
imaginative power, the intelligible species will not become the form of the 
habitual intellect. 
51
 For a discussion of the imaginative power, see D. L. BLACK, 'Imagination and Estimation: 
Arabic Paradigms and Western Transformations', Topoi, 19 (2000), 59-75. 
52This limits what we can know to those things that are related to what we have experienced 
through our senses. Recall the adage nihil est m mtellectu quin pnusfuerit in sensu. 
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This leaves only the agent intellect. The study of this intellect is also as-
signed to natural philosophy, this time because it has already been argued that 
the other intellects as well as the operation of understanding are included, 
and, having included them, we should also include the cause of their opera-
tion. Since the agent intellect is an immediate principle of natural operations, 
which is dependent on something existing in matter for the exercise of these 
operations, it must also be included within natural philosophy. By this time, 
the link that connects the intellect to matter has become extremely weak. Just 
because the agent intellect is the proximate cause of the operation of under-
standing in the possible intellect, which itself is linked to matter only because 
of the relation to something existing in matter, namely the phantasms, it falls 
under the consideration of the natural philosopher. Jandun adds, in conclu-
sion, that the intellect, in all its four meanings, is not just one object of study 
among many for the natural philosopher. Quite the contrary, the consider-
ation of the intellect constitutes his highest and noblest task.53 It constitutes 
the summit of natural philosophy. 
Jandun's inclusion of a new question on the intellect in book III, next to 
the general question on the soul in book I, is understandable. The various 
meanings of the term 'intellect' alone merit a separate discussion. The focus 
in the questions in book I was on the difficulties pertaining to obtaining any 
knowledge of the intellective part of the soul, and to the question of whether 
or not the soul is complex enough to function as a subject matter of a science. 
The focus in book III, by contrast, is on the relationship between the intel-
lect(s) and matter. Since Jandun writes his commentary in the tradition of 
Averroes, the relation between the intellect(s) and the body are much looser 
than those between a form and the substance of which it is a form. Because of 
this, the inclusion of the intellect within natural philosophy needs more care-
ful argumentation. Moreover, Jandun had argued in book I that every study 
of the intellect pertains to natural philosophy, even the study of the intellect 
taken on its own. 
With Jandun's discussion in mind, a look at Oresme and Anonymus Fatar 
makes it clear immediately that their discussions are indebted to his. Both 
authors begin their questions with a more general discussion about what con-
stitutes a natural philosophical science, something that is not found in Jan-
dun. But as soon as they turn to the intellect, they structure their discussions 
5 3JOHN OF JANDUN, QaA-, 222. "Et ad hums substantiae (1 e totae animae intellectivae hu-
manae SdB) considerationem, tanquam ad ultimam, terminatur considerano philosophi nat-
uralis de formis, quarum considérât quiditates, ita quod aliam formam nobihorem non consi-
dérât quantum ad quiditatem explicite, sed solum considérât alias formas abstractas quantum 
ad esse, secundum Commentator secundo Physicorum et partim in primo libro et ultimo com-
mento eius." 
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around its same four meanings. There are only two minor differences with 
respect to Jandun's treatment. The first is that Jandun gives a bit more detail 
in his arguments. And the second is that Jandun seems concerned with relat-
ing the intellect to both matter and motion, whereas Oresme and Anonymus 
Fatar focus almost exclusively on the aspect of motion.55 As a result of their 
following Jandun, their discussions are almost completely unrelated to the rest 
of their commentaries. For neither of them actually accepts Jandun's position 
that the intellect is a unique separate substance. 
Summary 
To sum up, there was a complete consensus on the question of whether the 
soul in its embodied state is studied within natural philosophy. All the ar-
guments against this view were countered by constantly referring to the facts 
that (1) most of the soul's operations are exercised in the animated body, and 
(2) all our knowledge of the soul depends on our ability to sense these oper-
ations, which is possible precisely because they are exercised in the animated 
body. This consensus was not limited to the vegetative and sensitive souls. 
All commentators also agreed that the intellective soul belongs to natural phi-
losophy in so far as it is related to the body. It is true that they disagreed 
on the mode and the extent of this relation, but no matter how it was per-
ceived, they deemed it strong enough to maintain the unity of the scientia de 
anima. Within an Aristotelian framework, the unanimity of the commen-
tators in their assignment of the study of the soul to natural philosophy is 
understandable. 
The only real debate revolved around the question of whether or not the 
human soul in itself, in so far as it exists separately from the body, is also part 
of the subject matter of the scientia de anima. And, if the answer to this ques-
tion is negative, by which other discipline it is studied. The different answers 
to these questions turned out to be strongly motivated by doctrinal concerns 
rather than by different views on method. True, the commentators do some-
times formulate criteria for the inclusion or exclusion of the intellect in meta-
physics, but these criteria give the impression of being an ad hoc justification 
for the position they already had in mind. The doctrinal concerns, however, 
influenced the answer to the question in sometimes surprising ways. Jandun 
claims that the intellect is a separate substance with its own proper operations, 
'''There are some minor differences in terminology. Jandun's habitual intellect is called the 
intellect in act by Oresme. And whereas Jandun prefers the term 'imaginative power' (although 
he gives the synonym cogitative power in a gloss), Oresme only uses the term 'cogitative power'. 
55ZUPKO, 'Natural Philosophers on the Nature of the Intellect' discusses the positions of 
Oresme and Anonymus Fatar in more detail. 
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but still holds that even the study of this unique immortal intellect secundum se 
et absolute forms a part of natural philosophy. Brito, by contrast, leaves room 
for a scientia divina of the intellective soul, even though he ascribes all the vital 
operations, including understanding, to the soul-body composite. Moreover, 
in spite of the link between the answers to these question and the views on the 
ontological status of the intellect — that finds it clearest expression in Brito — 
, there are other concerns at play also. Anonymus Giele, whose views on the 
ontological status of the intellect closely resemble Jandun's, sides with Brito in 
leaving room for a metaphysical study of the intellect. 
Setting aside the difficult case of the study of the soul in separation from 
the body, all commentators agree that the soul is studied by natural philoso-
phy on account of its being the form of the body. But all this stress on em-
bodiment also makes it difficult to distinguish the science of the soul from 
the sciences described in the Parva naturalia, a group of natural philosophi-
cal tracts in which ensouled bodies are the object of study. Does the required 
emphasis on embodiment necessitate making the animated body the subject 
matter of the scientia de anima instead of the soul? And if so, how is the scien-
tia de anima different from the sciences described in the Parva naturaliàì This 
is the question that is at stake in the second debate related to method: what is 
the proper subject matter of the science of the soul? 
3.2 The subject matter of the scientia de anima 
At first sight, it is somewhat surprising that there even was a discussion on the 
subject matter of the scientia de anima. Not only is Aristotle's treatise called 
On the Soul, but the question of its subject matter is also raised and answered 
already in its first paragraph: 
The knowledge of the soul admittedly contributes greatly to the advance 
of truth in general, and, above all, to our understanding of Nature, for 
the soul is in some sense the principle of animal life. Our aim is to grasp 
and understand, first its essential nature, and secondly its properties; of 
these some are thought to be affections proper to the soul itself, while 
others are considered to attach to the animal owing to the presence of 
the soul.56 
The passage is strengthened by the opening passage of one of the Parva 
naturalia treatises, De sensu et sensibilibus, in which Aristotle states that the 
Aristotle, De anima 1.1, 402a5-9. 
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soul in itself and its faculties have already been considered elsewhere, that is, 
in De anima?1 
Nevertheless, it was precisely Aristotle's tentative distinction between af-
fections that are proper to the soul itself and affections that are proper to the 
living being that occasioned the debate on the subject matter of the scientia 
de anima.59 For if it is true that in this science we study the affections of the 
soul, and if it is also true that some of these affections — in fact, most of them 
— belong to the living being rather than just to the soul, should we not then 
conclude that we study the living being rather than the soul itself? Or should 
we perhaps take the middle position, and conclude that we study the whole 
living being, but only under the aspect of its being ensouled? What made 
these questions even more pressing is that Aristotle had classified the scientia 
de anima under the natural sciences. This implied — as we have seen — that 
whatever its subject matter might be, at the very least it needed to have some 
determinate relationship to material bodies; and indeed, this relationship was 
often emphasized in the commentaries. 
In this respect, the later medieval commentaries discussed here differed 
greatly from their earlier counterparts, who tried to downplay the relation of 
the soul to the body by describing the soul as a perfection {perfectio) of the 
body rather than as its form (forma). The term 'perfection' has an ambiguity 
that the term 'substantial form' does not have, which is why it could be used 
by philosophers who wanted to stress the ontologkal self-sufficiency of the 
soul. For when it is said that the soul is the perfection of the body, this might 
mean that the soul is the form of the body; but it might also merely mean that 
the soul is a substance in its own right that enters into some relation with the 
body through which it perfects the body. It is perfectly consistent to say that 
the soul is the perfection of the body and that it is a substance in itself; but this 
57ARISTOTLE, De sensu et sensibthbus, translated by J. I. Beare, in· J. Barnes (ed.), The Com-
plete Works ofAnstotle The Revised Oxford Transitori, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1984, 436al-5, p. 693: "Having now considered the soul, by itself, and its several faculties, we 
must next make a survey of animals and all living things, in order to ascertain what functions 
are peculiar, and what functions are common to them. What has been already determined 
respecting the soul must be assumed throughout " 
58I call the distinction tentative, not only because it is introduced in the passage quoted 
above by the words 'are thought to be', but also because of what Anstode says further on in the 
same chapter. ARISTOTLE, De anima, 403a3-10: "A further problem presented by the affections 
of soul is this: are they all affections of the complex of body and soul, or is there any one 
among them peculiar to the soul by itself To determine this is indispensable but difficult. If 
we consider the majority of them, there seems to be no case in which the soul can act or be 
acted upon without involving the body; e.g. anger, courage, appetite, and sensation generally. 
Thinking seems the most probable exception; but if this too proves to be a form of imagination 
or to be impossible without imagination, it too requires a body as a condition of its existence." 
69 
CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGICAL DISCUSSIONS 
is certainly not the Aristotelian position. 
As Theodor Kohler has shown in his study on philosophical anthropology 
in the thirteenth century, philosophers usually took one of three possible an-
swers to the question concerning the subject matter of the saentia de amma.60 
Some claimed that the soul its the proper subject (the most popular option), 
some that the ensouled body under the aspect of the soul was its proper sub-
ject, and some claimed that both answers were equally defensible. There is a 
fourth possible position, namely that the ensouled body is unqualifiedly the 
subject of this science. This view can be found in at least one anonymous 
commentator from the thirteenth century, who argues as follows: according 
to Aristotle, any science that considers a form should also consider its matter; 
and the way in which the natural philosopher considers matter is in respect 
to form. From this uncontroversial standpoint, he draws the conclusion that 
the ensouled body taken absolutely is the proper subject matter of the scientta 
de amma. But even according to this commentator, we are only interested in 
the animated body in so far as it is related to the soul as its matter. And in his 
repues to the counterarguments, he qualifies his position to the point where 
he says that both the soul and the ensouled body are part of the subject matter 
of the De anima; the soul principally, and the ensouled body in so far as it has 
a relation to the soul.61 
' 'BAZAN, 'The Human Soul', esp. 106-113 shows how the ambiguous ontologica! status of 
the soul was supported by this use of perfection and how this forms the background of Thomas 
Aquinas's discussion Utrum amma possit esse forma et hoc altqutd, the first question in the 
Quaestiones disputatae de anima. He also argues elsewhere that the "weakening of the Aris-
totelian notion of form" which is implied in this use of 'perfection', especially when the soul 
is also considered to be a substance composed of matter and form, is "one of the breeding 
grounds of radical Aristotehamsm"; BAZÀN, 'Radical Aristotehanism', 597-599 
'"KÖHLER, Grundlagen des philosophisch-anthropologischen Diskurses, 354-368 
61
 This anonymous question is found in MS Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vat-
icana, Vat. lat 10135, f. 88ri'"b, and is edited in J. VENNEBUSCH, Em anonymer Anstote-
leskommentar des XIII Jahrhunderts Questiones in tres hbros de anima Textedition und 
philosophisch-historische Einleitung, Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh, 1963, 26· "Sic igitur 
naturalis considérât de anima secundum quod est perfeccio corporis Manifestum est ergo, 
quod corpus animatum absolute sumptum est subiectum in hoc libro." The question is, of 
course, what exactly the author means when he uses the term 'corpus animatum'. The expres-
sion is often used to refer to the whole living being (the soul-body composite), but it can also 
be used to refer to a (metaphysical) constituent of the whole living being (the body part of the 
soul-body composite). I agree with Vennebusch that it is used in the second sense in this text 
"fur ihn ist das 'corpus animatum' nicht das lebendige Wesen selbst, sondern ein Konstituens 
des lebendigen Wesens neben der Seele." (p. 27) At one point, the author even makes this ex-
plicit: "corpus autem secundum quod est perfectibile ab anima est corpus animatum" (p. 26). 
But in spite of the strong formulation that the corpus animatum absolute sumptum is the subject 
matter of the science of the soul, the author's position seems to be more nuanced. Firstly, the 
context in which he formulates his position is how the natural philosopher considers matter 
in addition to form And moreover, in the replies to the counterarguments, we can find an 
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The disagreement about the subject matter of the scientia de anima cer-
tainly seems important. One would expect that a science that studies the soul 
and a science that studies the ensouled body — although, only qua ensouled 
— would differ greatly in emphasis at the very least. We might expect those 
philosophers who claim that the ensouled body forms the subject matter to 
pay more attention to the physiological aspects of the living being, whereas 
those who claim that the soul forms the subject matter might pay more atten-
tion to the soul in its disembodied state. To what extent this is actually the 
case will become clear in the remainder of this chapter. 
3.2.1 The soul as subject 
Philosophers as diverse as Thomas Aquinas, Anonymus Giele, John of Jan-
dun, Anonymus Fatar, and John Buridan insist that the soul is the proper 
subject matter of the scientia de anima. Aquinas simply takes the soul's status 
as subject in this science for granted. His acceptance occurs in an expositio, 
which stays close to Aristode's text.62 Since Aristotle raises no explicit doubts 
on this matter, there was apparently little reason to gloss extensively on the 
passage. Fortunately, a passage in the Summa theologiae gives some indication 
of Aquinas's position. 
Naturam autem hominis considerare pertinet ad theologum ex parte 
animae, non autem ex parte corporis, nisi secundum habitudinem 
quam habet corpus ad animam. Et ideo prima consideratie circa 
animam versabitur.63 
To consider human nature belongs to the theologian from the aspect 
of soul, not, however, from the aspect of body, unless in so far as the 
body is related to the soul. And therefore the first consideration will be 
occupied with the soul. 
If this passage is meant to distinguish a theological from a philosophi-
cal consideration of human nature, which seems plausible, then the fact that 
Aquinas accepts the soul as the proper subject matter of the De anima does 
important qualification. VENNEBUSCH, QdA, 26-2772~74: "Licet enim consideretur de anima et 
de corpore animato, tarnen secundum quod attribucionem habet ad animam. Et ideo anima 
est primum subiectum in sciencia hac, et corpus animatum per attribucionem ad animam." So 
ultimately, the author seems to defend that we look at the ensouled body under the aspect of 
soul, a position defended by other commentators as well. See section 3.2.2. 
62Although Aquinas's Quaestiones disputatele de anima contains many topics related to 
those normally discussed in De anima commentaries, it is not a commentary on Aristotle's 
text and contains no methodological questions. According to BAZAN, 'The Human Soul', 96, 
the text is probably modeled on John of la Rochelle's Summa de anima. 
" T H O M A S AQUINAS, STh, 1.75, prooemtum, 194. 
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not imply that it is considered there without the body or merely according to 
the relation (habitudo) it has to the body. For that is how the theologian con­
siders the soul.64 Presumably, then, the natural philosopher studies the soul 
precisely as form of the body, whereas the theologian studies the soul as sub­
sistent in its own right. This is confirmed by the continuation of the passage 
quoted above, in which Aquinas, quoting Ps. Dionysius, even refers to the soul 
as a spiritual substance.65 
In the same passage, Aquinas announces the order that he will follow in 
his investigation. First he will discuss the soul's essence, then its powers, and 
finally its operations. This seems, at first sight, to indicate that a theological 
consideration of the soul also follows a different method than a natural philo­
sophical consideration, because this order is the inverse of that described in 
De anima. There we are told that the proper method to proceed in natural 
philosophy is to begin with the acts (or better, the objects to which these acts 
are directed), then consider the powers, and end with the essence.66 But this 
is not what Aquinas means. The different order in investigating the soul in 
M That there is a difference between a theological and philosophical approach to the soul in 
Aquinas is argued for in M. J. SWEENEY, 'Thomas Aquinas's "Quaestiones de anima" and the 
Difference between a Philosophical and a Theological Approach to the Soul', in: J. A. AERT-
SEN and Α. SPEER (eds.), Was ist Philosophie im Mittefolter? Akten des X. Internationalen Kon­
gresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société Internationale pour l'étude de la Philosophie 
Médiévale 25. bis 30. August 1997 in Erfurt, Berlin [etc.]: Walter de Gruyter, 1998, 587-594, 
esp. 594. He compares the Quaestiones disputatae de anima and the Summa theologiae from this 
perspective, which enables him to explain why the Quaestiones disputatae are written prior to 
the Summa even though they seem to contain a more complete and sophisticated description of 
the soul. The reason for this would be that in the Summa theologiae, 1.75-89, Aquinas takes the 
theological approach to the soul, whereas in the Quaestiones disputatae he takes a philosoph-
ical approach. Note that this difference in method implies a difference in the starting point 
of the investigation (soul as substance resp. soul as form), but not a difference in conclusions 
reached about the soul. Given Aquinas's insistence that the conclusions reached by theology 
and by (properly conducted) philosophy must necessarily be in agreement, the latter would 
be impossible. I find Sweeney's analysis in terms of a distinction between philosophical and 
theological approaches more convincing when comparing the Summa with the Sentencia libri 
De anima than with the Quaestiones disputatae, given that Aquinas's disputed questions belong 
themselves to a mostly theological genre. But to be fair, Sweeney does not seem to want to take 
the distinction between philosophical and theological too strict, since at one point he calls the 
Quaestiones disputatae a "far more philosophical work than Summa cont. Cent., Quaestiones 
de spiritualibus creatuns or Summa theologiae I pars. Among these, only Q. de anima does not 
begin with a treatment of soul as spiritual substance prior to the discussion of soul as form." 
(page 591). 
6 5THOMAS AQUINAS, STh, 1.75, prooemium, 194: "Et quia, secundum Dionysium, XI cap. 
Angel. Hier., tria inveniuntur in substantiis spiritualibus, scilicet essentia, virtus et operatic, 
primo considerabimus ea quae pertinent ad essentiam animae; secundo, ea quae pertinent ad 
virtutem sive potentias eius; tertio, ea quae pertinent ad operationem eius." 
"ARISTOTLE, De anima, IIA, 415a 14-22. 
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the De anima and the Summa theologiae does not reflect a difference between 
theological and philosophical methods. Rather, it reflects a difference in the 
order of treatment of the subject. The De anima is a treatise in which a sci-
entific investigation of the soul is conducted. The Summa theologiae on the 
other hand is a didactic treatise, concerned with ordering the material in such 
a way that a student can best follow and understand the subject.67 So the dif-
ference is that between the ordo invemendi and the ordo docendi sive exponendt, 
between doing research and teaching. 
To sum up, there is a difference between the manner in which the the-
ologian looks at the soul (as a something that can subsist on its own) and the 
manner in which the natural philosopher looks at the soul (as form of the 
body). And this difference impHes that the theologian hardly needs to take the 
body into account, whereas for the natural philosopher, understanding the 
body is an important part of the scientia de anima, even though the subject 
matter of this science is the soul. But it is better to understand this more as 
a difference in emphasis than as a difference between two incompatible ap-
proaches.68 
Aquinas did not offer any arguments for his position that the soul is the 
proper subject matter of the scientia de anima. Jandun, by contrast, gives two. 
His first argument enumerates the general requirements that any possible sub-
ject matter of a science must meet. Those requirements are that: ( 1) it should 
be the first thing that is known in that science, and (2) it should be the thing 
of which the parts {partes) and attributes (passiones) are considered in that 
science.69 Jandun claims that only the soul satisfies both these requirements 
67
 As is announced in the prologue of THOMAS AQUINAS, STh, 5: "Quia cathohcae ventatis 
doctor non solum provectos debet instruere, sed ad eum pertinet etiam incipientes erudire, se-
cundum illud apostoli I ad Connth III 'tanquam parvulis in Christo, lac vobis potum dedi, non 
escam', propositum nostrae intentioms in hoc opere est, ea quae ad Christianam rehgionem 
pertinent, eo modo tradere, secundum quod congruit ad eruditionem incipientium. Consid-
eravimus namque hums doctnnae novitios, in his quae a diversis conscnpta sunt, plunmum 
impedm: partim quidem propter multiphcationem inutilium quaestionum, articulorum et ar-
gumentorum; partim etiam quia ea quae sunt necessaria talibus ad sciendum, non traduntur 
secundum ordinem disaphnae, sed secundum quod requirebat librorum expositio, vel secun-
dum quod se praebebat occasio disputandi; partim quidem quia eorundem frequens repetitio 
et fastidium et confusionem generabat in ammis auditorum. Haec igitur et alia hmusmodi 
evitare studentes, tentabimus, cum confidentia divini auxilu, ea quae ad sacram doctrinam 
pertinent, breviter ac dilucida prosequi, secundum quod materia patietur " (my emphasis). 
' 'This is why R. PASNAU, Thomas Aqmnas on Human Nature A Phihsoptucal Study of the 
Summa theologiae la 75-89, Cambridge [etc.]: Cambridge University Press, 2002 can use the 
Summa theologiae for a philosophical study of human nature, which would have been impos-
sible if the theological consideration of the soul is completely different from the philosophical 
consideration 
6 ,JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, I 3, 14. The first criterion is taken from ARISTOTLE, Analyttca 
posteriore, 1.1, 71al2-16· "It is necessary to be already aware of things m two ways: of some 
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in the case of the scientia de anima, although the only justification he gives is 
that this is clear when browsing through the De anima (patet discurrendo per 
hbrum). 
The argument that the subject matter of a science should be the first thing 
known in that science can be found in other commentators as well.70 Al­
though this criterion has some plausibility, it is not always clear what kind of 
priority and what kind of knowledge is at stake here. It cannot be a complete 
knowledge of the soul that is the first thing that is acquired in this science, be­
cause then this science would be completed before it has even started. A com­
plete knowledge of the soul would include knowledge of all its properties and 
powers. In addition, it is emphasized again and again in most commentaries, 
including Jandun's, that the proper method of proceeding in the scientia de 
anima is by studying the perceptible acts of the soul first and the essence of 
the soul last. Most likely, what Jandun had in mind is that the science of the 
soul begins with some rudimentary grasp of its subject. If we have absolutely 
no idea what we mean by the term 'soul', we will hardly be inclined to devote 
a science to its study, if only for the reason that we would have no clue where 
to begin. Jandun's second argument is that the soul must be the subject in 
question, because it is the soul that we define and divide into its (structural) 
parts in this science, and not the ensouled body. 
John Buridan also opts for the soul as the subject matter of the scientia de 
anima. But the implications ofthat choice turn out to be quite different from 
those we find in Aquinas and Jandun. Buridan's exact answer to the question 
about the subject matter is: "that the soul, that is the term 'soul', should be 
posited as the proper subject matter ofthat science."71 And the small gloss in 
his answer that equates soul with the term 'soul' implies a completely different 
perception of science in general and of the science of the soul in particular. 
things it is necessary to believe already that they are, of some one must grasp what the thing 
said is, and of others both — e.g. of the fact that everything is either affirmed or denied truly, 
one must believe that it is; of the triangle, that it signifies (Jiis; and of the unit both (both 
what it signifies and that it is)." The second is taken from ARISTOTLE, AnalyUca postertora, 
1.28, 87a37-87bl: "A science is one if it is of one genus — of whatever things are composed 
from the primitives and are parts or attributes of these in themselves. One science is different 
from another if their principles depend neither on the same thing nor the ones on the other " 
Jacobus Venetus renders the passage as follows. "Una autem scientia est que est umus generis, 
quecumque ex pnmis componuntur et partes aut passiones horum sunt per se Altera autem 
scientia est ab altera, quorumcumque principia neque ex eisdem neque altera ex aliens sunt." 
(JACOBUS VENETUS, AnalyUca Postertora, 602 '-612). 
7 0Compare Anonymus Van Steenberghen, p. 51. 
7
' J O H N BURIDAN, QdA, 1.1, f. \Λ. "quod anima, id est iste terminus 'anima', ponendus est 
subiectum proprium in ilia scientia" 
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From a science of things to a science of terms 
As is well known, in the fourteenth century a novel view on the subject mat-
ter of science arises. In the wake of William Ockham,72 several philosophers, 
including Buridan, begin to claim that science is principally about terms and 
propositions, and only derivatively about extra-mental things.73 One of the 
consequences of this shift is that it is no longer the aim of science to under-
stand the essences of things; instead its focus becomes to explain the meaning 
of propositions. In the words of Ernest Moody, which we can apply to the 
sctentia de anima as well: 
The distinctive feature of his <i.e. Buridan's Siiß> work in metaphysics 
is the use of the method now known as 'logical analysis', whereby philo-
sophical problems are formulated as questions concerning the meaning 
and reference of terms and the truth conditions of sentences.74 
72The reception and influence of Ockham in Pans is discussed in W. J. COURTENAY, 'The 
Reception of Ockham's Thought at the University of Pans', in. Ζ KALUZA and P. VICNAUX 
(eds.), Preuve et Raisons a l'Université de Paris Logique, ontologie et théologie au XIVe siècle. 
Actes de la Table Ronde internationale organisée par le Laboratoire associe au CNRS, η" 152 
du 5 au 7 novembre 1981, Paris: Vrin, 1984, 43-64 An updated version is published in W J. 
COURTENAY, Ockham and Ockhamism Studies in the Dissemination and Impact of His Thought, 
Leiden [etc.]: Brill, 2008, 127-153. 
7 3 WILLIAM OCKHAM, Exposttto in libros Physicorum Anstotelis Prologus et hbn I-III, edited 
by V. Richter and G. Leibold, St. Bonaventure, New York: St. Bonaventure University, 1985 
(Opera phdosophica, 4), 12',1_J|5. "Dicendum est quod scientia realis non est de rebus, sed est 
de intentionibus supponentibus pro rebus, quia termini propositionum scitarum supponunt 
pro rebus. Unde in ista propositione scita 'omne ignis est calefactivus' subicitur una inten-
tio communis omni igni et pro omni igne supponit, et ideo dicitur notitia et scientia realis." 
Compare WILLIAM OCKHAM, Quaesttones vanae, edited by G. I. Etzkorn, F E. Kelley and J. C 
Wey, St. Bonaventure, New York: St. Bonaventure University, 1984 (Opera theologica, 8), q 2: 
Utrum de anima tamquam de subiecto sit tantum unus habitus scientificus numero existens in 
uno intellectu numero, 4438'1"386. "Ad propositum igitur dico, accipiendo subiectum istius sci­
entiae pro eo quod supponi!, sic subiectum est quidam conceptus animae, et sic 'anima' est 
subiectum hums scientiae " But note that the position that science is principally about terms 
and propositions and only derivatively about extra-mental things does not imply a conflation 
of the science of logic and the real sciences. There remains a difference, which consists in what 
the terms supposit for. If the terms supposit for mental intentions, then we are dealing with 
logic. If they supposit for extra-mental things, then we are dealing with one of the real sciences. 
7
'Έ. A. MOODY, 'Buridan and a Dilemma of Nominalism', in: Studies in Medieval Philoso­
phy, Science, and Logic. Collected Papers (1933-1969), Berkeley [etc ]· University of California 
Press, 1975 (Originally published in 1965), 353-370, 353. For some detailed case studies doc­
umenting the increasing popularity of the application of propositional analysis in natural phi­
losophy in the fourteenth century, see J. E. MURDOCH, 'Prepositional Analysis in Fourteenth-
Century Natural Philosophy: a Case Study', Synthese, 40 (1979), 117-146 See also J. E. M U R ­
DOCH, 'Sctentia mediantibus vocibus: Metalinguistic Analysis in Late Medieval Natural Phi­
losophy', in· J. P. BECKMANN and L HONNEFELDER [E.A] (eds.), Sprache und Erkenntnis im 
Mittelalter, Akten des VI. internationalen Kongresses fiir mittelalterliche Phdosophie der So-
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This method of logical analysis can be seen at work in Buridan's commen-
tary on the De anima, where he applies a semantical analysis of terms such 
as 'whole' and 'part' when he discusses questions such as 'whether the whole 
soul is in the whole body'. On the other hand, claiming that it is not the aim 
of science to understand the essences of things — often accompanied by the 
claim that such essences do not exist in the first place — does not necessar-
ily imply the further claim that it is impossible to assign essential predicates 
to subjects. The latter claim would make science a difficult, if not impossible 
exercise, a conclusion that not many medieval philosophers were willing to 
accept.75 John Buridan, for example, is a strong defender of the possibility of 
assigning essential predicates while at the same time denying the existence of 
essences.76 Indeed, Buridan's commentary on the De anima is filli of essential 
ascriptions to the soul. 
Buridan's position is subtle. According to him, the scienfta de anima stud-
ies the quiddity (qutdttas) of the soul, just as any natural philosophical science 
studies the essence or quiddity of its objects. The reason for this is simply that 
according to Buridan there is no ontological distinction between the essence 
ciété Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Medievale, 29. August-3. September 1977 
in Bonn, Berlin [etc.]: De Gruyter, 1981, vol. 1, 73-106 and J E MURDOCH, 'The Involvement 
of Logic in Late Medieval Natural Philosophy', in: S. CAROTI (ed.). Studies m Medieval Natural 
Philosophy, Firenze. Leo S Olschki, 1989,3-28. 
75A fourteenth-century exception may have been Nicolaus of Autrecourt. But his denial of 
the possibility of demonstrative science is not so much motivated by a denial of the existence 
of essences, but instead by his conviction that nothing about such essences (including their 
existence) can be inferred from our knowledge of the perceptible accidents. For instance in 
NICHOLAS OF AUTRECOURT, Second Letter to Bernard of Arezzo, in: Idem, His Correspondence 
with Master Giles & Bernard of Arezzo A Critical Edition 8i English Translation by L. M. de 
Rijk, Leiden [etc.]: Brill, 1994, 74. "Et quod de aliqua substantia comuncta materie alia ab 
anima nostra non habeamus certitudinem apparet quia: demonstrato Ugno vel lapide, quod 
substantia sit ibi danssime deducetur ex uno credito coaccepto. Sed hoc non potest inferri 
evidenter ex uno credito coaccepto, nam. cum omnibus apparentibus ante huiusmodi discur-
sum potest esse per aliquam potentiam, utputa dividam, quod ibi substantia non sit. Igitur in 
lumine naturali non infertur evidenter ex istis apparentibus quod substantia sit ibi " Notice 
that Autrecourt seems to leave room for a non-discursive knowledge of the existence of our 
own soul. But if such knowledge can indeed be obtained, it is extremely limited. For in the 
same letter, Autrecourt denies that we can have certain knowledge of our own acts NICHOLAS 
OF AUTRECOURT, Second Letter to Bernard of Arezzo, 53: "Sed quod gravius sustinen posset 
habetis dicere quod vos non estis certus de actibus vestns, utputa quod videatis, quod audiatis, 
ymo quod non estis certus quod aliquid appareat vobis vel apparuerit vobis " 
76This is convincingly argued for by Klima, who qualifies Bundan's position as follows: 
"One of the basic aims of his <i.e. Buridan's SdB> philosophy of language and metaphysics 
is to show that he can be a staunch nominalist in denying real essences to things in the way 
realists conceive of them, yet at the same time he can attribute scientifically knowable essential 
predicates to things ", G. KLIMA, 'The Essentiahst Nominalism of John Buridan', The Revtewof 
Metaphysics, 58 (2005), 739-754, 741. 
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of a thing and that thing itself: 
Secunda conclusio: quod quiditates omnium rerum bene considérât 
naturalis (vel saltern omnium rerum quiditates, ut evitetur logica obiec-
tio), quia physica considerai homines, bruta et lapides et etiam mobilia 
tarn motu circular!, sicut sunt corpora celestia, quam motu recto, sicut 
sunt ista inferiora. Et tarnen unumquodque istorum non est aliud quam 
sua quiditas, ut suppone ad presens. Igitur quiditates rerum considerai 
naturalis. Immo dictum fuit alias quod omnia entia de mundo consi-
derai scientia naturalis; igitur quiditas rerum ipsa considerai.77 
The second thesis: that the natural philosopher indeed considers the 
quiddities of all things (or at least of all things the quiddities, to avoid 
a logical objection), because physics considers men, and brutes, and 
stones, and also mobile things both in circular motion (as the heavenly 
bodies) and in linear motion (as the inferior bodies). And yet each one 
of those is nothing else but its quiddity, as I presently suppose. Hence 
the natural philosopher considers the quiddities of things. Indeed, it 
was said elsewhere that the natural philosopher considers all beings in 
the world; therefore he considers the very quiddities of things. 
But the real point in question for Buridan is not whether the natural 
philosopher studies quiddities, but in what manner he studies them; and it 
is there that the metaphysician and the natural philosopher do differ. Only 
the metaphysician studies these quiddities qua quiddities, or, in other words, 
according to their quidditative definition. For the natural philosopher such 
a study is ruled out from the start, because he always studies these quiddities 
in relation to matter and motion, with the consequence that this relation 
must always form an element of every definition that is made in natural 
philosophy.78 We will, therefore, never be able to use a quidditative definition 
in natural philosophy. 
77JOHN BURIDAN, Questiones super duodectm hbros Metaphysice, Pans, 1518 (photomechan-
ical reprint· Frankfurt. Minerva, 1964), VI.1, 'Utrum sola metaphysica considérât quiditates 
rerum',/. 33™ .^ 
78The difference between studying a quiddity and studying it qua quiddity is the issue at 
stake when Buridan accepts that a natural philosopher can 'quidditates cognoscere', but denies 
that he can 'cognoscere quidditates'. According to Buridan, when the complement of a cog-
nitive verb follows that verb, this implies that the complement is known under the ratio from 
which it takes its name. Saying that 'cognoscere quidditates' is possible, is therefore equivalent 
to saying that 'cognoscere quidditates secundum rationes secundum quas dicuntur quidditates' 
is possible. When the complement precedes the verb there is no such implication. JOHN BURI-
DAN, QMetaph, VI. 1, ƒ. 33b: "Ex quo sequitur quarta conclusio: quod nulla scientia considérât 
quiditates rerum. Differì enim dicere 'quiditates considérât' et 'considérât quiditates', quia dic-
tum fint alias quod talia verba 'scio', 'cognosco', 'considero', etc. faciunt predicatum a parte 
post positum appellare rationem a qua sumitur tale predicatum. Et ideo de virtute sermonis 
sequitur: considérât quiditates; igitur considérât eas secundum rationes secundum quas dicun-
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The implications of the fact that the natural philosopher cannot use quid-
ditative definitions are easily misunderstood, and should not be overstated. 
First of all, the difference between nominal and quidditative definitions does 
not imply that the natural philosopher is limited to an external, superficial 
knowledge of things, whereas the metaphysician is able to penetrate to the 
essences of things, something that is very well put by Jack Zupko: 
Bundan's use of the term ' essential predicates' in connection with quid-
ditative definitions can obscure the fact that for him, the difference be-
tween nominal and quidditative definitions is formal, corresponding to 
different ways or modes we have of conceiving things, rather than to a 
difference between our names for things and their essences in any hy-
postatized, realist sense.79 
Moreover, in several places, Buridan claims that it is not the quidditative 
definition that gives the most complete knowledge of things. This status is 
reserved for the so-called causal definition. Such a causal definition not only 
indicates what a thing is (quid est), but also why it is (propter quid est).so And 
these causal definitions play a large role in natural philosophy. The defini-
tion of the soul as 'first act of the organic body having life in potency', for 
instance, is a causal definition. So the fact that Buridan denies that the natural 
philosopher can use quidditative definitions has nothing to do with the dif-
ference between having knowledge of accidents only and having knowledge of 
the essences of things. It is simply another way of saying that everything that 
is studied in natural philosophy is studied there in so far as it has a relation to 
matter. 
The new, semantical view on the subject matter of a science has an im-
portant consequence, which has to do with the unity of the saentta de antma. 
tur quiditates. Sed sic non sequitur si dico 'quiditates considérât' Et sic (cum ïam dictum sit 
in tertia conclusione quod nulla scientia specialis considérât quiditates secundum lilas rationes 
secundum quas dicuntur quiditates) sequitur simpliciter quod nulla considérât quiditates. Et 
tunc infero ultimam conciusionem quod sola metaphysica considérât quiditates rerum." Com-
pare also JOHN BURIDAN, Questtones super octo Phisicorum hbros. Pans, 1509 (photomechanical 
reprint Frankfurt: Minerva, 1964), ƒ. 4ra"b· "Prima <conclusio SiiB> est quod in physica [vel 
in metaphysical non debet assignan subiectum proprium aliquis terminus substantiahs ea ra-
tione qua terminus substantiahs, id est quod non sit connotativus, quia tales termini pertinent 
ut sic ad solam metaphysicam, quia sola habet considerare quiditates rerum simpliciter ut de-
bet viden septimo Metaphysice Unde si naturalis considérât de homme, de planta, de aqua, 
hoc non est secundum conceptum simpliciter quidditativum, sed respective ad suos motus et 
operationes." 
7 , ZUPKO, lohn Bundan, 105. For another detailed discussion of Bundan's different types of 
definition, see G. KLIMA, 'Bundan's Theory of Definitions in his Scientific Practice', in: J. M. 
M. H. THIJSSEN and J. ZUPKO (eds.), The Metaphysics and Natural Phihsophy of John Buridan, 
Brill, 2001,29^17 
80SeeZUPKO, John Bundan, 111. 
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Once the new conception of science was introduced, a new question — which 
was not limited to philosophical psychology — presented itself and had to 
be answered: if the subject matter of science is the proposition, then what 
accounts for the unity of a particular science, given that it consists of a set of 
propositions? It is by no means evident why the set of propositions that is con-
sidered in, for example, the sctentta de anima, would taken together constitute 
a single science. William Ockham, for instance, had denied that it did.81 
Buridan pays a lot of attention to the unity of the scientia de anima. In fact, 
he begins his reply to the first question in book I on the proper subject matter 
of the science of the soul by distancing himself from those 'modem' philoso-
phers who refuse to assign a single subject to a single science, but instead claim 
that there are as many subjects in any given science as there are demonstrated 
conclusions in that science.82 He refers the reader to his commentary on the 
"For example in WILLIAM OCKHAM, Physica, 723"29: "Ideo dicendum est quod metaphys-
ica non est una scientia numero, nee similiter philosophia naturalis, sed phdosophia naturalis 
est coUectio multorum habituum, sicut dictum est. Nee est aliter una, nisi sicut civitas dicitur 
una vel populus dicitur unus vel exercitus comprehendens homines et equos et cetera neces-
saria dicitur unus, vel sicut regnum dicitur unum, vel sicut universitas dicitur una, vel sicut 
mundus dicitur unus." For a brief discussion see I. MIRALBELL-GUERIN, 'Rational Science and 
Real Science in William of Ockham (An Introduction to Ockham's Philosophy of Science)', 
in R. TYORINOJA and A. INKERI LEKTINEN [E.A.] (eds.). Knowledge and the Sciences m Me-
dieval Philosophy, Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy 
(S I.E.P M). Helsinki, 24-29 August 1987. Vol. 3, Helsinki: Finnish Society for Missiology and 
Ecumenics, 1990, 134-143, 137-139. A. A. MAURER, 'The Unity of a Science: St. Thomas and 
the Nominalists', in: A A. MAURER (ed.), Si Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974 Commemorative 
Studies, vol 2, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974, 269-291, esp 271-
275, gives a detailed analysis of the problem of the unity of knowledge. In bnef, whereas for 
Aquinas the unity of science was rooted in the existence of a single habitus for each science that 
provides it with a unique ratio under which its objects are considered, later philosophers began 
to emphasize the extended meaning of habitus — also found in Aquinas — in which it can be 
applied to all that which is produced by the habitus, in this case the various demonstrations of a 
science. Although Maurer does not mention Buridan, he gives the following explanation of the 
fragmentation of science in Ockham: "Once the nominalists eliminated intelligible natures or 
essences from reality a new explanation of the unity of a science had to be found For Ockham, 
the object of science is no longer the real world but the propositions we form about it. Corre-
sponding to each demonstrated proposition there is a scientific habit in the intellect. These are 
'partial sciences', which can be integrated into a 'total science', such as physics or metaphysics, 
by the logical interconnection of the terms of the scientific propositions" (MAURER, 'The Unity 
of a Science', 291) 
82JOHN BURIDAN, QdA, ƒ. 1 , 'Utrum subiectum proprium in scientia libri De anima sit 
anima, vel ille terminus 'anima', vel corpus ammatum, vel quoddam aliud, aut nichil': "In 
ista questione dimitto opimones multorum modernorum non volentium in una totali scientia 
aggregata ex plunbus diversis condusiombus et demonstratiombus assignare ahquod unum 
subiectum pnmum, sed tot quot sunt conclusiones demonstrate in illa ex diversis terminis 
constitute, verbi gratia in totali geometria et totali metaphysica." 
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Amlytica postenora for his proofs , 8 3 but also summar izes his posit ion here: 
Nam in pr imo libro <i.e. Postenorum SdB> debet videri quod oportet 
scientiam habere unitatem ex unitate alicuius unius considerati prin-
cipaliter in ilia scientia ad quod omnia alia prout in ilia scientia con-
siderantur habent attributionem. Et hoc vocamus in proposito subiec-
tum propr ium et adequatum huius scientie, [et illud dicitur propr ium 
subiectum et adequatum illius scientie] non quia acceptum in quahbet 
conclusione determinata vel determinabili per illam scientiam, vel in 
illa scientia, vel etiam quia ilia scientia 1II1 subiecto inhereat, sed quia in 
ilia scientia nichil consideratur nisi ea ratione qua attr ibuitur ad ipsum, 
ut quia est pars, vel passio, vel principium, vel pnvat io , vel contrarium 
alicuius passionis, scilicet secundum at tr ibutionem propinquam vel re-
motam. 8 4 
For in the first book of the Posterior Analytics one should see that a 
science needs to have its unity from the unity of some single thing that 
is considered principally in that science, and to which all other things 
"The topic is discussed in question 31 of the first book: 'Utrum scientia congregata ex 
plunbus habitibus conclusionum et processuum sumat unitatem vel distinctionem a subiecto 
suo'. JOHN BURIDAN, Quaesttones m duos Itbros Artstotelis Postenorum Analyttcorum, edited by 
H. Hubien, (unpublished), 131: "Alia conclusici est quod talis scientia congregata, si debeat dici 
una, habet unitatem ex unitate sui primi subiecti, non capiendo 'subiectum' pro ilio cui scientia 
inhaeret, sed capiendo 'subiectum' correlatiue ad passionem uel passiones. Conclusio probatur 
per locum a diuisione: quia non sunt plura considerata in scientia, nisi passiones, aut principia, 
aut condusiones, aut media demonstratiua, aut subiecta passionum; ergo ab aliquo istorum 
oportet scientiam habere unitatem; sed hoc non est ab aliquo praedictorum enumeratorum; ig-
itur relmquitur quod a subiecto. Quod etiam probatur sic: quia rationabde est congregationem 
capere unitatem ab eo quod est pnmum inter caetera; sed subiectum est hums modi; igitur et 
caetera. Maior de se nota est. Et minor apparet: quia incomplexa sunt priora complexis, et 
inter incomplexa subiectum est prms passione. Et non est dubium quin in ahqua scientia 
assignetur commumter pnmum genus subiectum. Nihil enim consideratur in ilia scientia nisi 
quia pars eius subiecti, uel quia passio dims subiecti aut alicuius partis ems, aut forte passio 
passionis eius, uel quia oppositum uh subiecto aut ahcui parti eius uel passioni, aut aliquo tali 
modo attributo ad ilhus oppositum. Unde aliter non posses scire quare magis ista conclusio 
'triangulus habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis' sit de geometria quam ista 'contranorum 
eadem est disciplina'." The edition made by Hubert Hubien can be found on Peter King's web-
site. http.//individual.utoronto.ca/pking/resources/buridan/QQ_in_Post_An txt (accessed 27 
May 2008). 
M
 JOHN BURIDAN, QdA,f. lrb; compare JOHN BURIDAN, QMetaph, IV.4, 'utrum metaphysice 
sit assignandum unum subiectum proprium adequatum', f. 15rb: "Aha conclusio ponitur quod 
m metaphysica et in omni etiam scientia aha unitate ordims et aggregationis multorum pro-
cessuum et conclusionum debet assignat! subiectum sic propnum et adequatum, quod in ilia 
scientia nihil consideretur nisi ea ratione qua habet attributionem ad ipsum, scilicet vel sicut 
pars ems, vel sicut principmm, vel sicut passio ems aut passio alicuius partis ems, vel etiam 
passio passionis, aut quia est contranum vel oppositum 1II1 subiecto aut alicui parti ems vel 
passioni, et sic de aliis diversis attnbutiombus." Notice that this description corresponds al-
most verbatim to the one given in the Analyttca Postenora cited in the previous footnote. 
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are attributed in as far as these are studied in that science. And this 
we call in the present context the proper and adequate subject matter 
of that science. And this is not called the proper and adequate subject 
matter of that science because it is part of every thesis that is proved 
or can be proved by that science, or in that science, or even because 
that science inheres in that subject, but because in that science nothing 
is considered except under the aspect under which it is attributed to 
this very subject, for instance, because it is a part, or an attribute, or a 
principle, or a privation, or the contrary of some attribute, that is to say 
according to a near or distant attribution 
Buridan's central concept for explaining the unity of a science is that of 
'proper subject' ('proprium subtectum'),S5 which refers to the highest, most 
general genus considered in a science. This most general genus is called the 
proper subject first because it is coextensive with what is studied in a science. 
Second, it is called the proper subject because it is related to all propositions 
that are included in that science. More precisely, for any given proposition 
to form a part of some science, it has to refer to this proper subject, whether 
as an attribute, or as a principle, or even as a privation. In metaphysics this 
proper subject is the term 'being',86 in physics it is the term 'mobile being'87, 
and in the saentta de anima the proper subject is the term 'soul'. 
Similar positions on the unity of a science are upheld by Nicole Oresme 
and Anonymus Fatar, who also explain it in terms of its proper or adequate 
subject (subtectum proprium vel adequatum). Anonymus Fatar gives only a 
brief description of what a proper subject is, and he does so in terms that are 
closely related to Buridan's description: it is what is principally considered in 
a science, and to which all other things that are considered in that science are 
85For a much more detailed description of Buridan's views on the unity of a science and 
the role of the proprium subtectum, see J M M H THIJSSEN, 'Buridan on the Unity of a Sci­
ence Another Chapter in Ockhamism'' in: Ε Ρ Bos and Η A KROP (eds ), Ockham and 
Ockhamists, Acts of the symposium organized by the Dutch society for medieval philosophy 
Medium Aevum on the occasion of its 10,h anniversary (Leiden, 10-12 September 1986), Ni­
jmegen Ingenium, 1987, 93-105 
" J O H N BURIDAN, QMetaph, IV 5, 'Utrum metaphysice proprium subiectum sit ens', ƒ 16"· 
"Alia conclusio iste terminus 'ens' est subiectum propnum ipsius metaphysice " Buridan's 
views on the subject matter of metaphysics are discussed in detail in F J. Κοκ, 'John Bundan's 
Commentary on the Metaphysics', in. F. Amerini & G Galluzzo (eds.). The Latin Medieval 
Commentaries on Aristotle's Metaphysics, forthcoming 
8 7 JOHN BURIDAN, Physica, ƒ 4" "Secunda conclusio est quod iste terminus 'ens mobile' 
est subiectum propnum in scientia naturali assignandum, quia est terminus commumssimus 
inter considerata in scientia naturali et non transcendens limites scientie naturalis." 
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attributed.88 For the sctentta de anima, he says, this is the soul.8 Oresme's 
description is slightly different. According to him, in order for something to 
qualify as the proper subject of a science, it has to have a relation to every 
principal conclusion of a that science. But, strangely, Oresme explains that 
relation in terms of predication: the proper subject must be a term that is ei­
ther directly or indirectly predicated of the subject term of all the principal 
conclusions in that science.90 Unfortunately, Oresme gives no examples of 
how this is supposed to work.91 Of course, in order to qualify as subiectum 
adequatum, a term must not only be predicable of all the principal conclu­
sions (criterion 1), but it must also be coextensive with the conclusions ofthat 
particular science and not be predicable of conclusions of other sciences (cri­
terion 2).9 2 Oresme's own somewhat artificial example, which nevertheless 
makes it clear what he means, is a science that studies triangles. Its subiectum 
adequatum is 'triangle' and not 'figure'. For even though 'figure' satisfies the 
first requirement for being the subiectum adequatum, because it is predicable 
in some manner of all the conclusions of the science of the triangle, it fails to 
satisfy the second requirement, since it is also predicable of other sciences, for 
example, the science of squares. 
3.2.2 The ensouled body sub rattone animae as subject 
Among the defenders of the view that the ensouled body under the aspect of 
soul is the subject matter of the selenita de anima we find Anonymus Venne-
busch, Anonymus Bazin and Radulphus Brito. For Anonymus Vennebusch 
the issue is not very important. He pauses only briefly in his commentary to 
refute the opinion that it is the ensouled body unqualifiedly that is properly 
8 8ANONYMUS FATAR, QdA, Ιόβ4 - 6· "De ilio est ista scientia tamquam de subiecto primo 
et adacquato de quo pnncipahter determinatur in ista scientia, et de nullo alio nisi secundum 
attnbutionem ad ipsam." 
8 9Bundan's insistence that the proper subject must be a term is lacking in the commentary 
by Anonymus Fatar His commentary is ambiguous on the question of whether the subiec­
tum proprium should be understood as is a term, or as that which is signified by the term, or, 
perhaps, both 
""NICOLE ORESME, QdA, I 1, 977 8 8 2. "Alio modo <subiectum S<tó> capitur pro ahquo 
termino qui praedicatur de quocumque subiecto cuiushbet conclusioms principalis in ilia sci-
entia, aut in recto aut in obliquo Et illud convenienter respondetur quando quaeritur de quo 
tractatur in ilia scientia." 
"Whereas Oresme only claims that it should be possible to use the proper subject as a 
predicate in all the principal conclusions of a science, Buridan defends the position that the 
proper subject should be related to everything that is discussed within a science But because of 
Oresme's brief discussion of the proprium subiectum in his commentary on the De anima, it is 
impossible to judge to what extent Bundan's and Oresme's positions differ 
92The second criterion corresponds to what Bundan describes as being the most general 
genus. 
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speaking the subject matter of the scientia de anima. As long as that is denied, 
he considers the options that it is the soul and that it is the ensouled body 
qua ensouled to be more or less equivalent.93 But he hardly seems concerned 
about the question. Anonymus Bazân and Brito, however, are convinced that 
the subject must be the ensouled body qua ensouled, and not the soul itself.94 
They both use the same formal and persuasive argument to support their po-
sition: the relation between the subjects of two sciences should be the same 
as the relation between these two sciences themselves. Now, since the scientia 
de anima is placed under {supponete) the scientia naturalis philosophiae, the 
subject matter of the scientia de anima should also be placed under the sub-
ject matter of the scientia naturalis philosophiae. And since the latter's subject 
matter is the mobile body {corpus mobile), the subject matter of the De anima 
cannot be only the soul, but should be the animated body.95 
But this position raises questions about the operations of the intellect. Are 
these not proper to the intellective soul? And does not the fact that these oper-
ations are discussed extensively by Aristotle in his De anima imply, therefore, 
that the soul itself is the subject matter of this science? Although Anonymus 
Bazân does not raise these questions himself, it is quite clear that he considers 
all the properties that are studied in the scientia de anima — including under-
standing — as belonging to the ensouled body as their subject and not to the 
soul alone. 
. . . quia in hoc libro determinatur de intelhgere, gaudere et tnstari , quae 
93ANONYMUS VENNEBUSCH, QdA, 1.3,98-9950"5'': "Propter quod dicendum quod, licet pos-
si! dici de corpore animato, proprie tarnen debet dici de anima sive de corpore animato racione 
anime, sicut ex opposito sciencia de planus et de ammalibus dicuntur prmcipaliter de corpore 
sensibili." 
94ANONYMUS BAZÀN, QdA, 1.3,3932,~30: "Ad istam quaestionem est dicendum quod corpus 
ammatum sub ratione animae est subiectum hums libri, ita tarnen quod anima sit principalis " 
And RADULPHUS BRITO, QiiA, υ 3 3 " 3 4 : "Ad illam questionem ego dico quod subiectum in hac 
scientia est corpus ammatum sub ratione anime, vel sub ratione qua ammatum." 
9 5ANONYMUS BAZAN, QiiA, 1.3, 3932 1"2 8: "In oppositum est Philosophus et omnes ahi qui 
volunt quod corpus ammatum sit subiectum hums libri, et non anima. Cuius ratio est ista-
sicut se habet scientia ad scientiam, sic se habet subiectum ad subiectum; sed scientia de 
anima supponitur scientiae naturalis philosophiae, ergo subiectum libri De anima supponi-
tur subiecto naturalis philosophiae, sed subiectum naturalis philosophiae est corpus mobile, 
ergo non solum anima est subiectum libri De anima, sed magis corpus ammatum." See also, 
RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, I 3 1 7" 2 2 . Although Anonymus Bazân and Bnto agree on the subject 
matter of the Physica, their opinion that it is the corpus mobile was not universally accepted. 
In fact, there was much more discussion going on about the subject matter of the Physica than 
about the subject matter of the De anima. See S. DONATI, 'Una questione controversa per ι 
commentatori di Aristotele: il problema del soggetto della fisica', in: A. ZIMMERMANN (ed ), 
Die Kolner Universität im Mittelalter geistige Wurzeln und soziale Wirklichkeit, Berlin [etc.]: 
Walter de Gruyter, 1989, 111-127, for an analysis of these debates concerning the subject mat-
ter of the Physica. 
83 
C H A P T E R 3. M E T H O D O L O G I C A L D I S C U S S I O N S 
omnia passiones sunt non animae solum, sed totius coniuncti.96 
. . . for in this book understanding, rejoicing and grieving are discussed, 
all of which are not properties of the soul alone, bu t of the whole com-
posite being. 
This view that all operations of the soul must be ascribed to the ensouled 
body is also held by Brito.97 
In both Brito and Anonymus Bazan, there is a strong connection between 
their views on the subject matter of the scientia de anima and their view that 
all operations, including understanding, should be ascribed to the ensouled 
body. This can be seen clearly when they introduce the argument that the 
subject matter of a science is that of which we investigate the attributes.98 Both 
of them argue that all attributes and operations pertain to the ensouled body 
and that because of this the ensouled body is the proper subject matter. But 
although both Brito and Anonymus Bazan ascribe all operations of a living 
being to the soul-body composite, they also emphasize that in the scientia 
de anima we study this composite under the aspect of the soul, which is the 
principle of the vital operations.99 
3.2.3 Leaving the subject undecided 
Among all the philosophers considered here, Nicole Oresme is unique in that 
he does not decide on the subject matter of the scientia de anima}00 Although 
96ANONYMUS BAZAN, QiiA, I 3, 39335"37. This is not a slip of the pen, since it is repeated 
in the same question (ad rationes). "Et cum dicitur quod intelhgere et sentire hic declarantur, 
dico quod istae passiones non sunt passiones sohus animae, sed totius coniuncti, et hoc sub 
ratione animae." 
97RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, I.36'~*3: "Ad aham. Cum dicitur 'illud est hie subiectum cuius 
sunt passiones hie inquisite', concedo. Et cum dicitur quod iste sunt ipsius anime solum, fal-
sum est. Imo sunt totius coniuncti sicut subiecti, et hoc per animam, ita quod anima non 
intelligit vel sentit, sed totum compositum per animam." 
"RADULPHUS BRITO, Q<M, U35"38. "Illud est hic subiectum cuius sunt operationes et pas-
siones hic inquisite; sed passiones hic inquisite sunt totius coniuncti; unde intelligere est totius 
coniuncti. Et anima est illud quo principahter ille operationes insunt toti comuncto. Et ideo 
totum ratione anime est subiectum."; ANONYMUS BAZÀN, QdA, II.3, 39459"63 (ad rationes): "Ad 
quartum, cum dicitur: illud est subiectum hbn cuius passiones determinantur in libro, con-
cedo. Sed cum dicitur: passiones animae determinantur in hoc libro, nego. Et cum dicitur 
quod intelhgere et sentire hic declarantur, dico quod istae passiones non sunt passiones sohus 
animae, sed totius coniuncti, et hoc sub ratione animae " 
"For Brito this also explains the title of Aristotle's treatise. The fact that the soul is the 
formal principle under the aspect of which the living being is studied is enough justification for 
the tide On the Soul. RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, U5 9 - 6 0 : "Iste liber intitulatur ab anima, quia 
anima est formale ratione cuius corpus ammatum est hie subiectum." 
'""Another exception is found in the commentary by Anonymus van Steenberghen, who 
simply omits the question of the subject matter of the scientia de anima 
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he devotes a long question to the topic, and discusses both options ('soul' 
and 'ensouled body') with their respective merits and problems, he ultimately 
leaves the matter undecided, a strategy he favors in other difficult places in his 
commentary as well.101 
The subject matter of the scientia de anima is defined in terms of its proper 
subject (propium subiectum). In his discussion of what a proper subject is, 
Oresme formulates two criteria.102 The first criterion is that the term that 
functions as the proper subject must be predicable of all principal conclusions 
of that science. The second criterion is that it must be coextensive with the 
conclusions ofthat particular science and, therefore, must not be predicable of 
conclusions of other sciences. In his discussion of the two possible candidates 
for the proper subject, the soul and the ensouled body, Oresme investigates 
which of these terms is able to satisfy both criteria. But he does so by using 
a peculiar strategy. He discusses both possibilities, the soul and the ensouled 
body, without ever clearly choosing which of these is the real proper subject. 
Oresme begins by arguing in favor of 'soul' as the proper subject on the 
grounds that 'ensouled body' would violate the second criterion. Since the 
ensouled body is also studied by the sciences called the Parva naturalia, the 
term is not coextensive with the scientia de anima. 'Soul', by contrast, not only 
satisfies the second criterion, but also the first. For in the scientia de anima we 
attempt to determine the attributes of the soul.103 This seems to settle the 
question, but Oresme continues by also arguing in favor of 'ensouled body' 
as subject. This time he states that the operations that are investigated in this 
science, such as sight and nutrition, belong to the composite rather than to 
the soul.104 This implies that taking 'soul' as the proper subject would violate 
the first criterion, since now it seems that all principal conclusions are about 
the ensouled body rather than about the soul. With respect to the second 
""Especially in questions related to the unicity or plurality of forms. For example in his 
discussion of the meaning of 'first act' in Aristotle's definition of the soul. NICOLE ORESME, 
Q Ì M , II.2, ISl80-8,1: "Similiter quod sit primus patet quia: si in animato est solum una forma 
substantialis, patet statim quod ilia est actus primus. Et si sint plures, adhuc anima, quae est 
ultima generatione, est prima perfectione et dat esse actualiter complete." By showing how 
his position is compatible with both the unicity and the plurality of substantial form, Oresme 
apparently thinks he can sidestep the entire debate. 
102See above, p. 81. 
103NICOLE ORESME, Q Ì M , 981"5: "Secunda conclusio est quod anima est hie subiectum. 
Quod patet, quia de passionibus eius determinatur in hoc libro. Et competit animae primo, 
et mediante ipsa corpori <ipsi corpore ed.> animato. Et est subiectum adequatum, quia non 
alibi tractatur de ipsa anima. Et ideo convenienter dicitur quod iste liber est de anima." 
104
 NICOLE ORESME, Q Ì M , 9937J,0: "Secunda conclusio est quod anima non est subiectum in 
hoc libro. Probatur quia: per condusionem praecedentem proprietates et passiones non sibi 
competunt; et ideo anima ncque videt neque tangit neque nutrii ncque general, sed homo vel 
animai." 
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criterion, there is a way, Oresme argues, in which we can maintain that the 
ensouled body is the proper subject, namely if we make the qualification that 
in the scientia de anima the ensouled body functions as the subject for more 
general attributes that are predicated of it on account of its having a soul.105 
Other works that deal with living being, by contrast, predicate other, more 
specific attributes of the body. Oresme seems content to leave it at this, and 
never chooses between the two alternatives.106 
3.2.4 Summary 
What is already becoming clear from these debates on the subject matter of 
the scientia de anima is that the three positions: soul, ensouled body, or both 
(depending on the perspective), seem to have relatively few implications for 
the manner of proceeding in this science. Although the alternatives, especially 
those of soul and ensouled body, seem to be strongly opposed to one another, 
there seem to be few if any consequences to opting for the one view or the 
other.107 The only possible exception is the connection Brito and Anonymus 
Bazân make between the proper subject matter, the ensouled body, and the 
proper subject of thought, also the ensouled body. The methodological dis-
cussions of the subject matter seem to be almost isolated from the doctrinal 
part of the commentaries. 
I 0 5NICOLE ORESME, Q Ì M , 99'"^16: "Et ideo est tertia condusio quod corpus ammatum est 
subiectum, dearticulando tarnen quod hoc est verum quantum ad passiones communes quas 
habet ratione animae. Et hoc addito, patet quod est subiectum adaequatum, quia isto modo 
non determinatur de eo in libro De ammahbus, immo quantum ad alias passiones et magis 
speciales " 
""Zupko offers an alternative interpretation of Oresme's position in: ZUPKO, 'What is the 
Science of the Soul?>, 303· "In his own Questions on Aristotle's De anima, he observes that 
some regard soul as the proper subject matter of psychology, others animate body.. Without 
actually refuting it <i.e. that the soul is the proper subject>, however, Oresme adopts the 
second view... " The only evidence that Oresme actually adopts the second view seems to 
be the use of the construction si + the imperfect subjunctive, in the passage where Oresme 
returns to the first view (the soul as subject): "Ideo, si teneretur prima via, diceretur ad rationes 
principales." This I do not consider to be conclusive, since none of the usual indicators for an 
author's position, such as 'dico', 'sciendum', etc., can be found in his discussion of the second 
view. Be that as it may, the claim that Oresme adopts the second view (animated body), without 
actually refuting the first view, certainly understates how Oresme deals with the first view (the 
soul). For not only does Oresme not refute the first view, but he also resolves, one by one, all 
arguments formulated against this view 
107The lack of consequences is nicely illustrated by the following passage. ANONYMUS VAN 
STEENBERGHEN, QdA, U 4 3 ^ 7 : "Unde patet quod Aristoteles considérât de anima ut refertur 
ad matenam sensibilem, et omne tale est physicae consideratioms. Propter hoc, si ahquis veht 
dicere quod anima, ut refertur ad matenam sensibilem, sit corpus ammatum, non est inconve-
niens dicere quod ista scientia sit de corpore animato. Tunc enim ista duo sunt idem." 
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One of the reasons why there were few consequences is that both sides 
were willing to admit much to the other side. The commentators who claim 
that the soul is the subject matter of this science certainly do not mean to deny 
that many, if not most of the operations that are studied in this science are 
exercised through the ensouled body. They merely intend to claim that these 
operations belong to the soul principally, since the soul is their formal cause. 
On the other hand, the commentators who claim that the ensouled body is 
the subject, certainly do not mean to deny that the soul is the principal formal 
cause of these operations. On the contrary, this is precisely why they add the 
clause 'qua ensouled' when they argue that the ensouled body should be taken 
as the subject. These concessions indicate that both positions do not differ 
fundamentally, indeed they cannot, because all commentators agree on the 
fact that the sctentia de anima is a part of natural philosophy.108 The natural 
philosophical context prescribes that every study of the soul has to include the 
material component of its operations. Only once this agreement that the study 
of the soul is a natural philosophical study is abandoned, can there really be 
room for a debate on the subject matter of the saentia de anima}09 
Even the shift in subject matter from soul to the term 'soul' turns out to 
have few implications, apart from promoting the importance of semantical 
analysis as a tool in natural philosophy. When Buridan claims that the sub-
ject matter of the sctentia de anima is the term 'soul' and not the soul itself, 
this reflects a changed conception of what science is primarily about, namely 
terms. But it reflects little else, and certainly not a changed conception of 
what we can know about the soul. When it comes to the latter question, even 
Aquinas and Buridan differ little. Both emphasize that within natural philos-
ophy, the soul is studied in relation to matter. As a consequence, questions 
about the soul in its separated state after the corruption of the body do not 
belong to the scientia de anima. '10 There seems to be only one important 
loeHence, even if Oresme were to unambiguously argue that the living body is the subject 
matter of the saentia de anima, it would still not necessarily follow that there is a shift towards 
a more empirical approach. For Oresme's hesitation on the proper subject matter, see section 
3.2.3 For the description of the fourteenth-century De anima tradition as more empirical, see 
section 1 2. 
109This is one of the main reasons why the Renaissance debates on the method and subject 
matter of the sctentia de anima have much more impact than the later medieval debates. There 
is no longer a consensus that the study of the intellective soul belongs to natural philosophy. 
See A. PALADINI, La scienza ammastica di Marco Antonio Genua, Galatina: Congedo, 2006. 
""For example, when Aquinas explains Anstotle's remark that the separated soul does not 
understand, he merely says the following (THOMAS AQUINAS, SentdeA, III.4, 22322''~24,): "Et 
ideo hic dicit quod non reminiscimur, scilicet post mortem, eorum que in vita scivimus, quia 
hoc quidem inpassibile, id est ista pars anime intellective inpassibihs est, unde ipsa non est 
subiectum passionum anime, sicut sunt amor et odium et remimscentia et huiusmodi que 
cum aliqua passione corporali contingunt; passivus vero intellectus corruptibilis est, id est pars 
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difference between Buridan and Aquinas on this point, namely on the ques-
tion of whether the continued existence of the soul after the corruption of 
the body is, strictly speaking, demonstrable. Aquinas answers affirmatively, 
whereas Buridan sides with William Ockham in saying that the conclusion, 
although probable, is not demonstrable.111 
Looking at the question of the subject matter of the sctentia de anima 
yielded some important and unexpected results. What has become clear is that 
there was a difference of opinion both on how to ascribe the vital operations 
to a subject and on what conclusions we can draw from this ascription about 
the kind of science the scientia de anima was. The ascription of the operations 
studied in the saentìa de anima to their subject turned out to be controversial 
even without considering the soul in its disembodied state. On one side of the 
spectrum, we find commentators who claim that the ensouled body under the 
aspect of soul is the subject matter of the scientia de anima. They choose to 
ignore Aristotle's tentative distinction between operations that pertain to the 
composite as their subject and those that pertain to the (intellective) soul, and 
claim that all operations — including understanding — belong to the com-
posite. On the other, more popular side, we find commentators who opt for 
the soul as the subject matter of this science, and who greatly stress Aristotle's 
distinction between these operations. 
3.3 The epistemic status of the scientia de anima 
The most important of the discussions on method — both from an historical 
and from a philosophical perspective — turns out to be the discussion on the 
certainty and the difficulty of the scientia de anima.112 To demonstrate the 
anime que est subiecta predictis passiombus est corruptibilis: pertinet enim ad partem sensiti-
vam (tarnen hec pars anime dicitur intellectus, sicut et dicitur rationahs, in quantum aliqualiter 
participât rationem obediendo rationi et sequendo motum ems, ut dicitur in I Ethicorum), sine 
hac autem parte anime corruptibih, intellectus noster nichil intelhgit: non enim intelligit all-
quid sine fantasmate, ut infra dicetur, et ideo destructo corpore non remanet in anima separata 
sciencia rerum secundum eundem modum quo modo intelhgit. Set quomodo tunc intelligat, 
non est presentis intentioms discutere." It is true that Aquinas gives a bit more information 
about the separated soul in questions 15-21 of his Quaesttones dtsputae de anima. But even 
though the general topic of this series of disputed questions is the soul, it is not a natural philo-
sophical work, nor does it pretend to be. So it cannot serve to demonstrate anything about 
Aquinas's views on the limits of the natural philosophical approach. 
'"For discussion, see section 5.5.1, p. 279. 
"
2Much of this section was originally presented at the conference 'Soul and Mind: An-
cient and Medieval Perspectives on the De anima, 14-17 February, 2007; the 50'h anniversary 
celebration of the founding of the 'De Wulf-Mansion Centre' (Leuven) and the 'Centre De 
Wulf-Mansion' (Louvain-la-Neuve)' and will be published in the proceedings under the title 
'Methodological Considerations m the Later Medieval Scientia de anima' (forthcoming). 
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importance of this debate, I will describe it from a retrospective angle first, 
by considering a sixteenth-century commentary on the De anima, written by 
the famous Paduan philosopher Jacopo Zabarella (1533-1589).113 Zabarella's 
extensive discussion will provide a first outline of the development of the de-
bate in the later Middle Ages. In contextus 1 of his commentary, Zabarella 
comments on the opening lines of Aristotle's De anima, which in Moerbeke's 
translation used by Zabarella are rendered thus: 
Bonorum et honorabilium noticiam opinantes, magis autem alteram 
altera aut secundum certitudinem aut ex eo quod et meliorum quidem 
et mirabihorum est, propter utraque hec anime ystonam rationabihter 
utique in primis ponemus.114 
Holding that knowledge concerns good and honorable things, one type 
however more than the other either because of certitude or because it 
concerns better and more marvelous things, on both these accounts we 
reasonably give this science of the soul the first place. 
The point at issue in this passage is that the science of the soul occupies 
a special place in the hierarchy of the sciences. It has an excellence that puts 
it above other sciences on account of two properties, namely (1) the nobility 
of its subject matter and (2) its certainty. That its subject matter is very noble 
was accepted by all commentators and never occasioned any real debate.115 
But that the scientia de anima also has a certitude that places it above other 
sciences is an entirely different matter, which interests Zabarella greatly. Once 
his commentary reaches the point where he explains what Aristotle means by 
this certitude, he begins his (long) discussion with the following words: 
Hoc igitur coegit interprètes Aristotelis varia excogitare sensa, ita ut vix 
ullus sit apud Anstotelem locus magis dubius ac controversus."6 
This therefore forced the interpreters of Aristotle to contrive various 
meanings, so that there is hardly any place in Aristotle that is more 
doubtful and controversial. 
"
3His commentary on the De anima was left unfinished when Zabarella died It was later 
edited by his sons and published posthumously in 1605. See H. MIRICELI, An Aristotelian Re-
sponse to Renaissance Humanism Iacopo Zabaretta on the Nature of Arts and Sciences, Helsinki. 
The Finnish Historical Society, 1992, 19 
"''William of Moerbeke's translation as found in T H O M A S A Q U I N A S , SentdeA, 3. 
115
 It did so neither in the Middle Ages nor, apparently, in the Renaissance For the latter 
period, see E. KESSLER, 'Method in the Aristotelian tradition, taking a second look', in. D. A 
Di LISCIA, E. KESSLER and C. M E T H U E N (eds.), Method and Order in Renaissance Philosophy 
of Nature the Aristotle Commentary Tradition, Aldershot [etc.] Ashgate, 1997, 113-142, 119-
120 
" 'JACOPO ZABARELLA, In III Aristotelis libros De anima, Frankfurt, 1606 (photomechanical 
reprint Frankfurt. Minera, 1966), 10-11 
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This is quite a claim; and it is by no means evident why this passage in 
particular should have given rise to so much controversy. Still, Zabarella de-
votes a lot of space to his discussion of the controversy and describes and 
strongly criticizes a number of earlier interpretations, beginning with Walter 
Burley's.117 
According to Zabarella, Burley denies that the excellence of the scientia de 
anima derives from the fact that it is the most certain science, because mathe-
matics is more certain. Instead he claims that the excellence derives from the 
combination of the (slightly lesser) certainty and the (very high) nobility of 
its subject. Aristotle's criteria should not be taken separately, but jointly.118 
Zabarella, however, finds this interpretation unconvincing, and replies that 
in that case Aristotle would just have mentioned the nobility of the subject 
without the certainty, rather than mentioning both attributes. And indeed, it 
would be peculiar for Aristotle to use a phrase such as 'on both accounts' if he 
intended to claim that it is only the combination of certainty and nobility that 
sets the scientia de anima apart from the other sciences. 
An alternative interpretation by Thomas Aquinas, whom Zabarella dis-
cusses next, is also quickly dismissed. In contrast to Burley, Aquinas claims 
that the scientia de anima possesses a special certainty, which results from the 
fact that everyone experiences in himself that he has a soul, and that it is thanks 
to this soul that he is alive. Its special certainty, therefore, lies in our unique 
acquaintance with its subject.119 Zabarella objects to this view that this cer-
tainty regarding our soul is just the trivial certainty {levis certitudo) that the 
soul exists and not what it is. Moreover, Aquinas's view is simply not true, 
"
7 The whole discussion takes up 9 columns in the Venice edition (10-18) 
118
 JACOPO ZABARELLA, De anima, 11. "Burleus concedendum putat scientiam de anima non 
magnam habere certitudinem et a multis certitudine cognitioms superar), ut a mathematicis 
omnibus, attamen tantum esse ipsius excessum in subiecti nobilitate, ut absolute illis omnibus 
praestantior esse dicatur, quia maior est ems excessus ratione nobihtatis subiecti quam defec-
tus ratione certitudims. Quare putat dictum Anstotelis esse intelligendum in sensu coniuncto, 
non in disiuncto, ut utnsque simul acceptis conditiombus antecellere alns dicatur, sed non in 
utrahbet separatim." Zabarella gives an accurate description of Burley's position. Compare 
WALTER BURLEY, Exposttio libri De anima, MS Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vati-
cana, Vat. Lat. 2151 [unpublished transcription by Paul Bakker],/ . Γ" b · "Intelligendum quod 
sciencia de anima excedit omnes alias sciencias a sciencia divina in hns duobus comunctim, 
scilicet in certificacione demonstracioms et nobilitate subiecti. Set non excedit omnes alias in 
hns duobus divisi m, nam mathematica excedit illam scienciam in certitudine demonstratioms, 
set exceditur ab ista nobilitate subiecti. Unde si ahqua sciencia aha a mathematica excedit istam 
in certitudine demonstracioms, ilia exceditur ab ista in nobilitate subiecti, et si ahqua excédât 
istam in nobilitate subiecti, ilia exceditur ab ista in certitudine demonstracioms, loquendo de 
demonstracione quia, que est ab effectu ad causam." 
1
 "JACOPO ZABARELLA, De anima, 11 "Sanctus Thomas inquit scientiam de anima certam 
hic appellati, quia qudibet in seipso cognoscit se habere animam, et ab ea vivificar! Quare 
significare videtur ml aliud de anima esse notum, et certum, nisi quod anima existit." 
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since there are many things of the existence of which we are much more cer-
tain, such as the natural bodies. This last remark may strike us as odd, since 
we are so used to the certainty of Descartes's cogito.120 But Zabarella has an 
interesting argument here: what we experience in ourselves is not the (imma-
terial) soul itself, but its operations. This implies that all our knowledge of 
the soul itself is mediated by our knowledge of these operations. Natural (ma-
terial) bodies, on the other hand, we perceive directly, not just through their 
operations. And are we not the most certain of those things of which we are 
directly aware?121 
The opinions of others (quidam ahi), whose positions remain close to 
Aquinas's, are dismissed on more formal grounds.122 These philosophers also 
tie the certainty of the sctentia de anima to the fact that we are aware of the 
operations of the soul that we experience in ourselves and therefore cannot 
doubt. But in addition, they emphasize that this certainty is retained in the 
conclusions we can reach about the soul in this science, because starting from 
these operations, we can easily reach conclusions (ex quibus facile duci pos-
sumus) about the essence of the soul through an a posteriori demonstration.123 
Zabarella rejects this position on the grounds that whatever its premises are, 
an a posteriori demonstration is always less certain than an a priori demon-
stration. 
l20For Descartes, our certainty of the existence of natural bodies is ultimately secured by 
the indubitable certainty of the cogito, sum (combined with a proof of the existence of a non-
deceiving God). There can be nothing, therefore, of which we can be more certain than of the 
existence of our own soul For a discussion of the cogito argument, see, for example, E. CURLEY, 
'The Cogito and the Foundations of Knowledge', in: S. GAUKROGER (ed.), The Blackwell Guide 
to Descartes' Meditations, Maiden, MA [etc.]: Blackwell, 2006, 30-47. 
'
2
' JACOPO ZABARELLA, De anima, 11 : "Praeterea hac ratione scientia de anima non est excel-
lens, cum ab omnibus fere alns superetur. Magis enim sensiha sunt omnia naturalia corpora, 
et eorum plurima accidentia, quam anima, quae non per se, sed per suas operationes sentitur 
Quare omissis etiam al us scientus, excelhtur scientia de anima ab omnibus ferme alns partibus 
philosophiae naturalis." 
l22These quidam ahi are not identified in the edition. 
'"JACOPO ZABARELLA, De anima, 11-12: "Ahi quidam posteriores parum diversam a Sancii 
Thomae opimonem protulere, dicentes scientiam de anima excellere certitudine demonstra-
tionum non quidem a prion et per causam, quomam anima a priori declaran non potest, 
sed a posterion et per effectus. Experimur enim in nobis ipsis operationes animae, ex quibus 
facile duci possumus ad essentiam animae cognoscendam, quare haec scientia nititur principila 
certissimis quoad nos et famihanssimis nobis." For this use of the notion 'a-postenon demon-
stration', see p. 103. It is not to be confused with how Albert the Great, in line with Avicenna, 
speaks about a study of the soul a prion and a postenon. For Albert an a-pnon study of the 
soul means to study the soul as it is in itself, apart from its relations to the body, whereas an 
a postenon study of the soul includes its relations to the body. See PARK, 'Albert's Influence', 
504. 
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It will not be necessary to describe the remainder of Zabarella's critique 
of his predecessors; instead it should suffice to give a list of the other philoso-
phers he mentions. In the order in which Zabarella discusses them, they are: 
John Philoponus, Ludovicus Buccaferreus, Simpücius, Themistius and Albert 
the Great. Each of these philosophers offered a different interpretation of the 
passage from the De anima cited above. So even if Zabarella's characterization 
of the debate — as concerned with one of the most controversial passages in 
Aristotle — is somewhat exaggerated, there is no denying that Aristotle's re-
marks on this topic were very diversely interpreted and that ancient, medieval 
and Renaissance commentators had great difficulty explaining the alleged cer-
tainty of the saentia de anima. 
Much more important in this context is Zabarella's own solution. Not so 
much because he gives a new interpretation of the meaning of this certainty, 
but because he places the entire debate in a new, broader context. Perhaps 
surprisingly, Zabarella writes that Aristotle never meant to claim that the sct-
entia de anima is the most certain science, and the fact that people were un-
aware of his real intention clouded most of the earlier discussions. In fact, 
according to Zabarella, the entire debate was occasioned by a linguistic con-
fusion. The word certttudo was simply a wrong translation of the original 
Greek term ακρίβεια. A much better translation would have been exquisitudo, 
says Zabarella, since 'aknbes' means 'exquisitum exartum'.124 And Zabarella 
is right; Moerbeke's translation as certitudo is misleading, to say the least.125 
This insight ultimately leads Zabarella to conclude that Aristode must have 
meant that the scientia de anima is not the most excellent science in general, 
but only within the libri de ammalibus.126 For only within this context does it 
' " J A C O P O ZABARELLA, De anima, 15 "Excitavit me ad banc invemendam vox ilia Graeca 
'akribeia', quae mihi videtur non omnino bene verti 'certitudo', sed melius diceretur 'exquisi­
tudo'. 'Aknbes' enim significai 'exquisitum exactum'. Quare scientiam vocabimus exquisitam, 
quando non solam certitudinem habet, sed etiam perfectionem." For an analysis of the precise 
meaning and origin of the term ακρίβεια in Greek thought, see D. KURZ, Aknbeia, Das Ideal 
der Exaktheit bet den Griechen bis Aristoteles, Göppingen. Alfred Kummerle, 1970 
'
25The earlier translation by James of Venice also rendered ακρίβεια as certitudo: "Bono-
rum et honorabilium notitiam opinantes, magis autem alteram altera que est secundum certi­
tudinem aut ex eo quod mehorum que et mirabdionim, propter utraque hec anime histonam 
rationabihter utique in pnmis ponamus " (From the Aristoteles Latmus Database) The trans­
lation from the Arabic attributed to Michael Scot translated the Greek term more accurately as 
subtihtas, but was hardly used: "Quoniam de rebus honorabilibus est scire ahquid de rebus que 
differunt abinvicem, aut in subttlitate, aut quia sunt scite per res digmores et nobihores, rec­
tum est propter hec duo ponere narrationem de anima positione precedenti." (in: AVERROES, 
Commentanum magnum m DA, I, 1, 31"8). 
1 2 6 JACOPO ZABARELLA, De anima, 17: "Et quoniam, licet Aristoteles absolute consideret 
praestantiam scientiae de anima, necesse tarnen est ut ahquibus antecellat si debeat agregia 
vocari, credo Aristotelem non cum alus earn comparare, nisi cum libris de animalibus. Inter 
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satisfy both the criterion that it is concerned with the noblest subject matter 
and the criterion that it is the most exact, or precise, science. As Zabarella 
rightly points out, one of the main ways in which exactness is described in 
the Analytica posteriora is in terms of being dependent on the fewest, highest 
principles.127 Since the subject matter of the De anima is the soul, and since 
the soul is the ultimate principle of living beings, the scientia de anima is the 
most exact of all sciences that deal with living beings. All these other sciences 
need to posit additional principles. 
Irrespective of whether Zabarella's explanation of Aristotle's remark is 
completely correct, his comments clearly testify to the great variety of inter­
pretations of the alleged certainty of the scientia de anima and demonstrate 
convincingly that the debate was occasioned by an imprecise translation of 
ακρίβεια.
128
 This linguistic difficulty disappeared once philosophers also had 
access to the Greek text or to the new translation of the De anima by John 
Argyropoulos, who translated ακρίβεια by exactior.129 But even though the 
debate was occasioned by a wrong translation, it is concerned with important 
philosophical issues. Otherwise, the passage on exactness would never have 
become, in Zabarella's own words, the most controversial passage in the en-
hos enim excellet, et inter eos omnes in medio locata est tanquam rex et pnnceps a quo caeten 
pendent, cum déclarât causam primam et summam omnium quae sunt in ammalibus et in 
planus " 
'"ARISTOTLE, Analytica postenora, I, 87a30-35· "One science is more precise than another 
and prior to it both if it is at the same time of the fact and of the reason why and not of the fact 
separately from the science of the reason why; and if it is not said of an underlying subject and 
the other is said of an underlying subject (e.g. arithmetic and harmonics); and if it depends on 
fewer items and the other on an additional posit (e.g arithmetic and geometry) " 
l2eFor Zabarella's view of the status of the scientia de anima, see P. LAUTNER, 'Status and 
Method of Psychology according to the Late Neoplatomsts and their Influence during the Six-
teenth Century', in: C. LEIJENHORST, C. LUTHY and J. M. M. H. THIJSSEN (eds.), The Dynamics 
of Aristotelian Natural Philosophy from Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century, Leiden [etc.]: Bnll, 
2002, 81-108, esp 102-108. 
l29)ohn Argyropoulos's translation of the De anima gives the following rendition: "Cum 
omnem scientiam rem esse bonam arbitremur ac honorabilem, et aham aha magis ex eo talem 
esse putemus, quia vel exactior est, vel rerum est earum quae magis praestabdes magisque 
sunt admirabiles, scientiam animae mmirum ob haec utraque non iniuna ponendam in primis 
esse censemus." (in Anstotehs opera. Ex recensione Immanuehs Bekken edidit Academia Re-
gia Borussica, vol. Ill: Aristoteles Latine interpretibus varus, Berlin: Reimer, 1831, 209). The 
translation was completed about 1460, revised about 1485 and first published in 1496. For 
the details see F. E. CRANZ, 'The Renaissance Reading of the De anima', in: Pfoton et Ansiate 
à la Renaissance, Pans. Vnn, 1976, 359-376, 361. The accessibility of the Greek text and the 
new translations did not end the debates immediately, far from it. Moerbeke's translation of 
the De anima remained popular among the commentators for a long time, and was often used 
together with the new translation by Argyropoulos. See K. PARK and E. KESSLER, 'The Con-
cept of Psychology', in: The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, Cambridge [etc.]: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988, 455^163,458. 
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tire works of Aristotle. What these issues are, can be seen by looking more 
closely at the medieval commentaries. 
As soon as we look at the actual context in which the debate took place in 
the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, it becomes clear that it was not 
occasioned solely by the passage on certainty, but rather by the combination 
of this passage with a second passage found a few lines further, in which Aris-
totle claims that the scientìa de anima is concerned with the most difficult of 
subjects: 
Bonorum et honorabilium noticiam opinantes, magis autem alteram 
altera aut secundum certitudinem aut ex eo quod meliorum quidem 
et mirabiliorum est, propter utraque hec anime ystoriam rationabiliter 
utique in primis ponemus... Omnino autem et penitus difficillimorum 
est accipere aliquam fidem de ipsa.131 
Holding that knowledge concerns good and honorable things, one type 
however more than the other either because of certitude or because it 
concerns better and more marvelous things, on both these accounts we 
reasonably give this science of the soul the first place... Gaining some 
knowledge about it, however, is altogether one of the most difficult 
things. 
None of the authors I will discuss was aware that Aristotle was talking 
about exactness instead of certitude in this passage. Moerbeke's misleading 
translation resulted in a tension — which did not take long to be noticed — 
between certitude and difficulty. Although there was some discussion on the 
meaning of the certainty of the De anima in isolation from its difficulty, this 
tension is the philosophical origin of most of the debate. 
3.3.1 Unproblematic begmnings: Thomas Aquinas 
Aquinas still discusses Aristotle's remark on the excellence of the scientìa de 
anima on account of its certainty separately from the remark on its difficulty. 
He interprets the remark on the difficulty of the scientìa de anima as referring 
to another part of the first section of the De anima, where Aristotle discusses 
the following two questions: how can we reach a definition of the soul, and 
what can our knowledge of the accidents of the soul contribute to our attempt 
to obtain such a definition?132 The manner in which Aquinas relates the pas-
sage on the difficulty of the scientìa de anima to the definitional issue is by 
l10Zabarella obviously also has a hidden agenda here. Rhetorically, the extensive discussion 
serves to show what a good scholar Zabarella is in contrast to his predecessors. 
131
 William of Moerbeke's translation as found in THOMAS AQUINAS, SentdeA, 3. 
'"ARISTOTLE, De anima, 1.1, 402bl2-22: "Again, which ought we to investigate first, these 
parts or their functions, mind or thinking, the faculty or the act of sensation, and so on? If 
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explaining that there is a difficulty not only in understanding and defining the 
substance of the soul, but also in understanding and defining its accidents (ac-
cidentia seu pTopnas passiones). As a result, irrespectively of whether we begin 
with the study of the accidents or of the substance it seems to be difficult to 
obtain knowledge of the soul.133 
Aquinas argues that a perfect definition of a thing will reveal not only its 
essential principles, but also its accidents. But at the same time, knowledge 
of the accidents helps guide us towards knowledge of the essence. He has the 
accidentia propria in mind, that is, those accidents that flow necessarily from 
the essence of a thing and therefore give us an indication of the sort of essence 
we are dealing with.134 One of the defining characteristics of propria is that 
they are not included in the definition of an essence, but at the same time they 
always and necessarily accompany the essence. An example in mathematics 
would be the property of a triangle that the sum of its angles is equal to the 
sum of two right angles. In natural philosophy one of the most common 
examples is the property of human beings of being able to laugh. But most 
the investigation of the functions precedes that of the parts, the further question suggests itself, 
ought we not before either to consider the correlative objects, e.g. of sense or thought' It 
seems not only useful for the discovery of the causes of the incidental properties of substances 
to be acquainted with the essential nature of those substances... but also conversely, for the 
knowledge of the essential nature of a substance is largely promoted by an acquaintance with 
its properties." 
' "THOMAS AQUINAS, SentdeA, y260-26·. "Et ideo diffìcile est, quia oportet nos cognoscere 
quod quid est anime ad cognoscendum facilius accidencia anime, sicut in mathematicis valde 
utile est preaccipere quod quid erat esse recti et curui et plani ad cognoscendum quot rectis 
trianguh anguli sint equales. E converso etiam accidencia si preaccipiantur, multum conferunt 
ad cognoscendum quod quid erat esse, ut dictum est " 
m
 A clear description of what accidentia propria are is given in: THOMAS AQUINAS, Quaestio 
disputata de spintualibus creatuns, edited by J. Cos, Roma. Commissio Leonina [etc ], 2000 
(Opera omnia, 24.2), a. 11, 120272 2e ': "Sic igitur accipiendo accidens est aliquid medium inter 
substantiam et accidens, id est inter substantiate predicatum et accidentale- et hoc est pro-
prium. Quod quidem convenu cum substantiell predicato, in quantum causatur ex pnncipns 
essentialibus speciei: et ideo per diffinitionem significantem essentiam demonstratur propn-
etas de subiecto. Cum accidentali vero predicato convenu in hoc quod nee est essentia rei 
nee pars essentie, set aliquid prêter ipsam; differì autem ab accidentali predicato, quia acci-
dentale predicatum non causatur ex pnncipns essentialibus speciei, set accidit individuo sicut 
proprium speciei, quandoque tarnen separabiliter quandoque inseparabihter." For the differ-
ence between propria and both separable and inseparable accidents, see THOMAS AQUINAS, 
Quaesiiones diputatae de anima, edited by B.-C. Bazin, Roma: Commissio Leonina [etc.], 1996 
(Opera omnia, 24:1), q. 12, ad 7, 111265-277· "Ad septimum dicendum quod tria sunt genera ac-
cidentium. quedam enim causantur ex pnncipns speciei, et dicuntur propria, sicut risibile ho-
mini; quedam vero causantur ex pnncipns individui, et hoc duphciter quia: vel habent causam 
permanentem in subiecto, et hec sunt accidentia mseparabiha, sicut masculinum et femininum 
et aha huiusmodi; quedam vero habent causam non semper permanentem m subiecto, et hec 
sunt accidentia separabiha, ut sedere et ambulare. Est autem commune omni accidenti quod 
non su de essentia rei; et ita non cadit in diffinitione rei." 
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importantly, Aquinas also considers the various potencies — or powers — of 
the soul, such as sight and hearing, to be propria.135 
Because our understanding of an essence, on the one hand, and of its 
proper accidents, on the other, are mutually dependent, there is a difficulty 
inherent in the process of defining any essence. As long as we do not clearly 
know what the proper accidents of the soul are, we have a hard time under-
standing its essence. And as long we do not grasp the essence of the soul, we 
have a hard time understanding its accidents. Now these are certainly sensible 
remarks. But they do not seem to apply solely to the definitions we search for 
in the scientia de anima. And indeed, Aquinas explicitly acknowledges this at 
the beginning of his discussion.136 The scientia de anima is a difficult science 
indeed, but in this respect no more difficult than most of the other sciences; 
at least not in any strong sense of the word. And even this difficulty that the 
scientia de anima shares with many other sciences should not be overstated. 
What makes the interdependence of our knowledge of an essence and our 
knowledge of its accidents manageable is that one thing is clear from the very 
outset, namely that there is a difference between the living and the non-Uving. 
And 'soul' is introduced as the name for the principle by which the living and 
non-living differ. Although the nature of the soul may be unknown and diffi-
cult to grasp, we already know that there are certain operations that can only 
pertain to living things.137 
' " T H O M A S AQUINAS, STh, I, q. 77, a. 1, 237 (ad rationes): "Si vero accipiatur accidens se-
cundum quod ponitur unum quinque universalium, sic aliquid est medium inter substantiam 
et accidens. Quia ad substantiam pertinet quidquid est essentiale rei: non autem quidquid est 
extra essentiam, potest sic dici accidens, sed solum id quod non causatur ex principiis essen-
tialibus speciei. Proprium enim non est de essentia rei, sed ex principiis essentialibus speciei 
causatur: unde medium est inter essentiam et accidens sic dictum. Et hoc modo potentiae ani-
mae possunt dici mediae inter substantiam et accidens, quasi proprietates animae naturales." 
See also THOMAS AQUINAS, QdSpir, q. II, ad 11, 103:'''3"3',7. 
136THOMAS AQUINAS, SentdeA, lib. I, c. 1, 6'52"15é: "Dicit ergo quod, quamvis sit utilis sci-
encia de anima, tarnen diffìcile est scire de anima quid est; et hec difficultas est in qualibet re, 
cum sit una communis questio multis aliis, circa substanciam eorum, et circa quid est." Robert 
Pasnau also seems to interpret the passage in question as expressing a difficulty in knowing any 
essence; PASNAU, Thomas Aquinas, 165. 
'"Aquinas mentions sensation and movement, but omits the vegetative functions. THOMAS 
AQUINAS, SentdeA, I, c. 3, 1435"37: "Nam animata videntur differre ab inanimatis maxime, et 
motu, ut scilicet moveant se ipsa, et sensu, seu cognitione." Similarly, he only mentions in-
tellection and movement in THOMAS AQUINAS, STTI, I, 75, a. 1, 194: "Respondeo dicendum 
quod ad inquirendum de natura animae, oportet praesupponere quod anima dicitur esse pri-
mum principium vitae in his quae apud nos vivunt. Animata enim viventia dicimus, res vero 
inanimatas vita carentes. Vita autem maxime manifestatur duplici opere, scilicet cognitionis 
et motus." Doig makes some interesting comments on Aquinas's lack of focus on the vegeta-
tive function in an article on the difference between Aquinas's and Averroes's definition of the 
soul. According to him Aquinas and Averroes have a different conception of the ratio vitae. For 
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Aquinas also mentions a second difficulty, which is related specifically to 
the sdentici de anima.138 This time he connects Aristotle's remark on difficulty 
to the passage in which Aristotle states that all attributes of the soul seem to 
belong to the soul-body composite.139 Even understanding seems to belong 
to the composite rather than to the soul, because understanding is dependent 
on the presence of phantasms. Aquinas argues that Aristotle will resolve this 
difficulty in book HI, but he already presents the most important element of 
the solution here. Understanding, Aquinas argues, has the soul as its proper 
subject, but it needs the body, i.e., the phantasms, as its object.140 This is why 
understanding seems, at first sight, to belong to the composite, whereas in 
truth its proper subject is the soul. 
Given that the particular difficulty of the saentia de anima appears to be 
limited to the fact that on first sight all operations seem to belong to the com­
posite, whereas this turns out to be untrue, what does Aquinas have to say 
about its certainty? On this topic he is very clear: 
Hec a u t e m sciencia, scilicet de anima, u t r u m q u e habet <i.e. nobihtatem 
et cert i tudinem SdB>, quia et certa est (hoc enim quilibet expentur in 
Averroes it is to have the principle of plant life, whereas for Aquinas it is to have the principle 
of motion in a broad sense. Averroes's ratio vitae leads him to conclude that the term 'soul' is 
already equivocal when applied to the vegetative and sensitive functions, since the vegetative 
functions are always in act, that is, are always in second perfection. Although Aquinas agrees 
that the vegetative functions are always actually exercised, his focus on life as motion in a broad 
sense enables him to treat the definition as univoca!. See J. C DOIG, 'Towards Understanding 
Aquinas' Commentanum in de anima A Comparative Study of Aquinas and Averroes on the 
Definition of Soul (De Anima Β, 1-2)', Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica, 66 (1974), 436-474, 
especially 455—457. 
1181 would like to thank Jack Zupko for pointing this out to me. 
'•"This is why Zupko argues that the difficulty in obtaining an essential definition is more 
acute in the sctentia de anima than in other sciences. See ZUPKO, 'What is the Science of the 
Soul?', 304-305, and J. ZUPKO, 'Substance and Soul: the Late Medieval Origins of Early Modern 
Psychology', in: S. F. BROWN (ed.), Meeting of the Minds The Rehtions between Medieval and 
Classical Modem European Philosophy, Acts of the International Colloquium held at Boston 
College, June 14-16, 1996; organized by the Société Internationale pour l'étude de la Philoso-
phie Medievale, Turnhout: Brepols, 1998, 121-139, 123-124. 
'•""THOMAS AQUINAS, SentdeA, 9-1058-69: "Aliqua autem operatio est que indiget corpore, 
non tarnen sicut mstrumento, set sicut obiecto tantum. Intelligere enim non est per Organum 
corporale, set indiget obiecto corporali· sicut emm Philosophas dicut in III hutus, hoc modo 
fantasmata se habent ad intellectum sicut colores ad visum. Colores autem se habent ad visum 
sicut obiecta, fantasmata ergo se habent ad intellectum sicut obiecta. Cum ergo fantasmata 
non sint sine corpore, inde est quod intelligere non est sine corpore, ita tarnen quod sit sicut 
obiectum, non sicut instrumentum " The passage continues with the claim that once we know 
that understanding inheres in the soul and not in the soul-body composite, we can conclude 
that the human soul is subsistent on account of its having this proper operation. Hence it not 
corrupt when the body corrupts, but is instead immortal (p. IO69"81 ). 
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se ipso, quod scilicet habeat animam et quod anima vivificet) et quia est 
nobiliorum (anima emm est nobilior inter inferiores creaturas).141 
This science however, i.e., the science of the soul, has both <that is, 
nobility and certitude SdB>, because it is both certain (for everyone 
experiences in himself that he has a soul and that the soul gives life) 
and because it is of the most noble things (for the soul is the noblest 
amongst the inferior creatures). 
The scientta de anima is the most excellent of the natural philosophical 
disciplines not only because it studies the noblest thing, the soul, but also 
because it has a special kind of certainty. This certainty is the result of our 
intimate familiarity with its subject matter. We all experience that we have a 
soul, and know that it is this soul that makes us alive. Aquinas is not making 
the rather implausible claim here that our everyday inner experience gives us 
a scientific grasp of the soul that would enable us to define it as the first act 
of the body and enumerate its essential operations. His claim is much more 
modest. We have a pre-scientific grasp of the difference between living and 
non-hving things, and we classify ourselves among the living things. As long 
as we understand the soul to be the principle of life, that by which the living 
differs from the non-living, the claim that everyone experiences that he has a 
soul is perfectly acceptable. Aquinas gives no indication whatsoever that he 
might be concerned about a possible incompatibility between the certainty 
and the difficulty of this science.142 
But although a pre-scientific grasp of the difference between living and 
non-living things can hardly be denied, it is debatable whether such a grasp of 
'•"THOMAS AQUINAS, SentdeA, lib. I, c. 1, 592"97. Giles of Rome gives a similar explana­
tion in his exposition on the De anima GILES OF ROME, Super hbros De anima, Venezia, 
1500 (Photomechanical reprint Frankfurt: Minerva, 1982), 2va: "Rursum huiusmodi notitia 
est quodammodo certior, quia quihbet certificatur et experitur in seipso quod est et vivit et 
habet animam." 
'"The brevity of Aquinas's remarks here is surprising In his later commentary on the 
Metaphysica, composed c. 1271-1273, he gives a more elaborate analysis of the meaning of 
the term 'certainty' as applied to the science of metaphysics (THOMAS AQUINAS, In duodeam 
hbros Metaphysicorum Anstotehs expositie, edited by M.-R. Cathala and R. M. Spiazzi, Taurini 
[etc.]· Marietti, 1950, I, lect 2, p. 14). There, he understands the certainty of metaphysics as 
stemming from the fact that it depends on the smallest amount of principles {ad sui subiecti con-
stderationem pauaora actu constderanda reqmruntur), which is indeed what Aristotle claimed; 
ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, 1,982a24-29. "And these things, the most universal, are on the whole 
the hardest for men to know; for they are furthest from the senses. And the most exact of the 
sciences are those which deal most with first principles; for those which involve fewer principles 
are more exact than those which involve additional principles, e.g. arithmetic than geometry " 
Having few principles is one of the distinguishing marks of a certain (or better· exact) sci­
ence that Aristotle listed in his most extensive treatment of ακρίβεια in ARISTOTLE, Analytica 
posteriora, I, 87a30-37 
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our being alive and having a soul would help make the scientia de anima any 
more certain. For the only thing we are certain of in the sense used by Aquinas 
is the mere existence of soul. There is no reason so suppose that this certainty 
would extend to any of the scientific conclusions that are drawn in De anima. 
Strangely, Aquinas seems to fail to notice this in his commentary. And even in 
other texts, where he is much more precise in distinguishing scientific knowl-
edge of the soul from our everyday experience that we are alive, he never — as 
far I know — connects Aristotle's remarks on certainty and difficulty.143 
3.3.2 Certitude and nobility combined: Anonymus Van 
Steenberghen and Walter Burley 
Another way of looking at the certainty of the scientia de anima takes its cue 
from Averroes's commentary on the De anima. According to Averroes, at 
least as he was interpreted in the Middle Ages, it is the combination of an 
honorable object and the certainty of its conclusions that makes this science 
the most excellent of the natural sciences.144 Zabarella ascribed this view to 
Walter Burley, but it is also found in the Anonymus Van Steenberghen: 
'
4 3THOMAS AQUINAS, Quaestiones dtsputatae de ventate, Roma: Commissio Leonina [etc.], 
1972-1976 (Opera omnia, 22:1-3), 10.8, 321207-216· "Ilia igitur cogmtio quae commumter de 
omni anima habetur, est qua cognoscitur ammae natura; cognitio vero quam quis habet de 
anima quantum ad id quod est sibi proprium, est cognitio de anima secundum quod esse ha-
bet in tali individuo. Unde per hanc cogmtionem cognoscitur an est anima, sicut cum ahquis 
percipit se animam habere, per aliam vero cogmtionem scitur quid est anima et quae sunt per 
se accidentia ems." See also THOMAS AQUINAS, STh, I, 87, a. 1, 356: "Nam ad pnmam cogm-
tionem de mente habendam, sufficit ipsa mentis praesentia, quae est principium actus ex quo 
mens percipit seipsam. Et ideo dicitur se cognoscere per suam praesentiam. Sed ad secundam 
cogmtionem de mente habendam, non sufficit eius praesentia, sed requintur dihgens et subtilis 
inquisitio. Unde et multi naturam ammae ignorant, et multi etiam circa naturam animae er-
raverunt." Interestingly, Cajetan, whose commentary is included in the edition of the Summa, 
does make the connection with Aristotle's remark on the difficulty of the saentta de anima 
when he comments on this passage. "Tertio, pro declaratione quoque doctnnae Augustim, ad-
dii differentias inter has cogmtiones, ad propositunr quod ad pnmam sufficit anima praesens 
suo actui; ad secundam exigitur valde diligens inquisitio, quoniam, ut in I De anima dicitur, 
ommno et penitus difficillimorum est ahquam de ea fidem accipere" (p 359). 
144AVERROES, Commentarmm magnum m DA, I, 1, 427"34. "Et quasi dicit: et quia nos 
opinamur quod cogmtio est de rebus honorabilibus et delectabihbus, et quod superant se 
adinvicem aut propter confirmationem demonstratioms aut propter nobilitatem subiecti aut 
propter utrunque, sicut invemmus in scientia de anima, scilicet quia superai in his duobus 
alias scientias, prêter scientiam Divinam, necessanum est opinari quod scientia anime ante-
ceda alias scientias." Although strictly speaking Averroes does not claim that the scientia de 
anima is more honorable only when the nobility of the subject and the certainty of its demon-
strations are combined, the commentators probably got this impression because a few lines 
earlier Averroes compares geometry and astrology, claiming that each exceeds the other in 
terms of its certainty or the nobility of its subject respectively. 
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Nunc autem scientia habitus est, et ideo altero istorum modorum ent 
nobilior una scienta alia, aut propter obiectum, aut propter modum 
demonstrandi. Propter autem haec duo comuncta, scientia de anima 
excellit omnes alias, praeter divmam.145 
Now, however, science is a disposition, and therefore one science will be 
nobler than another in one of these two manners: either on account of 
their object, or on account of their way of demonstrating. On account 
of both of these conjoined, however, the science of the soul excels all 
others besides the divine science 
This interpretation allows for an easy reply to most of the objections that 
refer to the excellence of one of the other sciences. For example, Anonymus 
Van Steenberghen grants that if we only consider the certainty of a science, 
then mathematics will be more excellent. And if we only look at the nobility 
of the subject matter, then perhaps ethics (morahs) will be more excellent. But 
if we take the two characteristics jointly, then the scientia de anima is more 
excellent than both of these sciences. There is, however, one science that is 
even more excellent — as all commentators agree —, and this is the divine 
science. It needs no arguing that the latter science considers the noblest sub­
ject. But it also possesses the highest certainty, given that its demonstrations 
proceed from the first causes.146 The interpretation of certitudo that Anony­
mus Van Steenberghen gives here agrees with Aristotle's general explanation 
of ακρίβεια in the Analyttca postenora.147 The problem with his strategy, how­
ever, as Zabarella also indicated, is that it fails to explain the exact formula­
tion of the relevant passage in the De anima, that 'on both accounts we should 
naturally be led to place in the front rank the study of the soul' (402a4-5). 
Presumably, if Aristotle had meant that the nobility of the subject and the cer­
tainty of the demonstrations must be taken jointly, he would have phrased the 
passage differently. 
Just like Aquinas, Anonymus Van Steenberghen makes no connection be­
tween the certainty and difficulty of the scientia de anima. He treats the dif­
ficulty in a separate question, in which he takes care to exclude one possible 
'^Anonymous Van Steenberghen, I 5, 150" 23 For Burley, see above, ρ 90, footnote 118 
An similar interpretation can also be found in NICOLE ORESME, Expositw m Anstotehs De 
anima, in Β Fatar, Expositw et quaestiones in Anstotehs De anima, etudes doctrinales en col­
laboration avec C Gagnon, Louvain [etc ] Peeters, 1995, ó36"^0. "Iterum sciendum quod forte 
ahqua pars scientiae naturalis est certior, sicut forte quae traditur in scientia physicorum, sed 
tarnen nulla simul cum tanta certitudine habet subiectum ita nobile vel est de re ita nobili, et 
ideo praecedit alias propter utraque simul et non divisim " But in his Quaestwnes on the De 
anima Oresme gives a completely different interpretation of the certainty See below, p. 114 
'"ANONYMUS VAN STEENBERGHEN, QdA, I 5,15127"28 "Sed scientia divina habet subiectum 
nobihssimum; item habet certissimas demonstrationes, quia procedit per causas primas." 
''"ARISTOTLE, Analytica posterwra, I, 87a30-37 
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source of difficulty. Some things are difficult to know on their own account, 
but the soul, given that it is a form and an ens per se, is not one of them. 
Instead, the difficulty of this science is caused by the fact that the soul is the 
principle of many operations. And since these diverse operations are the start-
ing point for our knowledge of the soul, it is very difficult to obtain an accu-
rate knowledge of the soul.148 This explains why Aristotle's predecessors were 
unable to obtain accurate knowledge of the soul: they neglected some of its 
operations in favor of others. 
In contrast to Anonymus van Steenberghen, Burley does make the con-
nection between the certitude of the scientia de anima and its difficulty.149 The 
tension between having demonstrations that are certain and being concerned 
with very difficult things did not escape him. To solve this tension, he distin-
guished between two manners of proceeding in the science of the soul. In the 
first manner, we begin with the manifest operations of the soul and proceed 
from there to its essence. This manner is easy, because the soul's operations 
are certain and manifest. In the second manner, we begin with the soul itself 
and proceed from there to its operations. This manner is difficult, because it 
is difficult to know the essence of the soul. So in one way the scientia de anima 
is easy, in another it is difficult.150 
1
'
,eANONYMUS VAN STEENBERGHEN, QdA, 1.7, 15634"38: "Ex parte tarnen nostra est difficul-
tas, quia in cognitionem substantiae animae non devenimus nisi ex cognitione operationum 
et passionum; anima autem multarum operationum est principium, propter quarum diversi-
tatem accipit difficultas." 
'""WALTER BURLEY, ExpdA [unpublished transcription by Paul Bakker], ra~b: "Dubitatur 
adhuc quia Philosophus dicit postea quod difficile est habere scienciam de anima — dicit emm 
quod penitus difficilimorum est accipere aliquam fidem de ipsa anima; quod non esset, si hic 
essent alique certe demonstraciones. Dicendum quod duplex est modus procedendi in hac sci-
encia. Nam aliquando proceditur ab effectu ad causam, ut ab operacionibus anime ad ipsam 
animam, et aliquando e converso a causa ad effectum. Quantum ad primum processum est 
ipsa sciencia facilis et certa, quia operaciones anime sunt certe et manifeste. Set quantum ad 
secundum processum, in quo proceditur a causa ad effectum, est illa sciencia difficilis. Illa 
ergo sciencia est uno modo facilis et alio modo difficilis. Vel aliter dicitur quod hic inquiritur 
de substancia anime et eciam de operacionibus anime. Quantum ad consideracionem de op-
eracionibus anime est ista sciencia facilis; set quantum ad consideracionem <de substancia> 
anime est difficilis. 
I50lnterestingly, Anonymus Van Steenberghen also introduces the argument that the at-
tributes (passiones) and operations (operationes) of the soul are manifest (manifestae). His 
examples are sensing and understanding. But in contrast to Burley, he uses the argument to 
affirm the difficulty of the scientia de anima. For in his reply, he states that manifest operations 
only make their substance easy to understand when there are only few of these operations. But 
in the case of the soul, there are so many different operations that this will not apply. No mat-
ter how manifest these operations are, the sheer number of them makes it difficult to obtain 
knowledge about the soul. ANONYMUS VAN STEENBERGHEN, QdA, 1.7, ISO4*"53: "Ad aliud di-
cendum est ut sic et ut non: illud enim cuius operationes sunt manifestae, quia paucae sunt, 
illud non difficile est cognoscere: unde astrologia certior est quam geometria, ut dicitur primo 
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3.3.3 Increasing difficulties: Anonymus Bazàn, Radulphus Brito 
and John of Jandun 
The fact that Aquinas and Anonymus Van Steenberghen did not connect the 
certainty of the De anima with its difficulty makes them the exception in this 
narrative, as virtually all later authors tend to connect these two predicates. 
When Anonymus Bazan discusses the question 'Whether the science of the 
soul concerns a category of difficult things',151 he includes the argument that 
a science that proceeds by using a method that is certain cannot be difficult.152 
Also, the argument that Aquinas introduced to support the certainty of this 
science, namely that it concerns things that we experience in ourselves, is now 
used to deny its difficulty. By doing so, the discussions about certainty and 
about difficulty become intertwined. The introduction of these arguments — 
also found in the later commentary by Walter Burley — have far-reaching 
consequences, as will become clear in the remainder of this chapter. 
In his determination of the question Anonymous Bazan interprets the dif-
ficulty in two ways.153 First he relates the difficulty to the soul insofar as it is 
a possible object of science (sit tntelltgibtlts); as such, the difficulty points to 
the fact that the soul is a being in potency, whereas it must be a being in act 
in order to be understood. Second he relates the difficulty to the soul inso-
far as it is a knowing subject; as such, the difficulty points to the fact that all 
our cognition depends on our external senses and our imagination.154 Given 
that our intellective soul can be an object of neither sense nor of imagination, 
Metaphysicae, sed dico quod multae et diversae sunt operationes ammae, propter quod accidit 
difficultas in cogmtione ems." This argument concerning the manifest nature of the operations 
of the soul will play a crucial role in subsequent discussions on the difficulty of the saentia de 
anima 
'
5IANONYMUS BAZAN, QdA, I 5, 396-399: 'Utrum scientia de anima sit de numero difficil-
limorum.' 
'"ANONYMUS BAZAN, QdA, 1.5, 3975""6. "Ratio: ista scientia non est difficillima quae habet 
certum modum procedendi." 
'"ANONYMUS BAZAN, QdA, I 5, 3972β"^0: "Ad istam quaestionem dico quod scientia libri 
De anima est de numero difficilhmorum Et hoc probatur duphciter. Primo potest proban de 
anima in quantum est intelhgibilis, secundo in quantum est intelligens. Quod autem scientia de 
anima in quantum anima est intelhgibihs est difficillima, probatur: omne quod est intelligibile, 
maxime debet esse ens in actu; sed anima intellectiva est ens in potentia; ergo etc Tunc 
declaratur secundum, scilicet quod ammae scientia in quantum ipsa anima est intelhgens, quod 
etiam sit difficillima. Ratio omnis cogmtio nostra est ex sensatis et imaginatis, sed anima 
intellectiva non est sensualis nee imaginabihs; ergo etc." 
'^The imagination is one of the internal senses The internal senses are a set of faculties 
that are responsible for the combining, comparing and storing of what is obtained through 
the different external senses. For a description of the internal senses, the seminal article, and 
still the best place to start is H A WOLFSON, 'The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and He­
brew Philosophic Texts', The Harvard Theological Review, 28:2 (1935), 69-133 For the fac­
ulties of estimation and imagination it should be supplemented by BLACK, 'Imagination and 
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the difficulty in understanding it is clear. This much has already been seen in 
the discussions about the possibility of a natural philosophical science of the 
soul. But Anonymus Bazân's explanation of this second route also introduces 
a new theme, namely a twofold manner in which we can acquire knowledge. 
The explanation is similar to that of Walter Burley (given above). 
We can either acquire knowledge of the soul in an a-priori or in an a-
posteriori manner.155 The a-priori manner takes the soul itself as its starting 
point, and from there we begin to inquire into its potencies. Having inquired 
into its potencies we can subsequently proceed to inquire into the soul's oper-
ations, and, finally, from these operations we begin to inquire into the objects 
of these operations. This manner of acquiring knowledge is called 'difficult'. 
The alternative, a-posteriori manner of acquiring knowledge follows the ex-
act opposite direction. Beginning with the objects to which the operations of 
the soul are directed, we then take a step back to consider these operations 
of the soul themselves, then the powers that are presupposed by the existence 
of these operations, until finally we are in a position to make some claims 
about the essence of the soul as the ultimate source of these powers and op-
erations. This second manner is considered not difficult. At first sight this 
distinction between two methods might look confused. Should not the (de-
ductive) method, where we start from the essence, be called 'more certain', 
and the (inductive) method, where we start from the operations, be called 
'less certain'? Because Anonymus Bazan does not elaborate on the details of 
these two methods, we can only try to reconstruct the argument. What he calls 
the certain method is the normal method of proceeding in natural philosophy, 
where we start with what is best known to us, namely the perceptible opera-
tions of the soul and the objects to which they are directed, and proceed from 
there to what is less known to us (the essence of the soul). This method gives 
as much certainty as is possible in natural philosophy. The other method, 
where we start from the essence and reason forwards to its operations, would 
Estimation'. In addition, Klubertanz's study on the vis cogitativa is still valuable. G. P. KLUBER-
TANZ, The Discursive Power Sources and Doctrine of the Vis Cogitativa According to St Thomas 
Aquinas, St. Louis, Missouri: The Modern Schoolman, 1952 C. Di MARTINO, Ratio partic-
ulans. Doctrines des sens internes d'Avicenne à Thomas d'Aquin Contribution à l'étude de /α 
tradition arabo-latine de la psychologie d'Anstote, Pans: Vnn, 2008 is the most recent compre­
hensive study of this topic. 
1 5 5ANONYMUS BAZÄN, QdA, 39839^19: "Ad evidentiam hums nota quod duplex est modus ac-
quirendi scientiam. Unus a prion, ut quando volumus incipere ab anima inquirere potentias, 
et de potentns operationes, et de operatiombus obiecta. Et ita inquinmus animae scientiam 
a prion, quae est de Ulis quae sunt expenmenta in nobis Et iste modus inquirendi scientiam 
animae satis non est facilis. Alius est inquirendi scientiam a posteriori, ut quando inquirendo 
scientiam de anima incipimus ab obiectis, eundo ad operationes, et de operatiombus ad poten-
tias, et de potentns ad ipsam animam Et iste modus procedendi sive inquirendi est a postenon, 
et non est difficilis." 
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only produce more certain results if the essence were better known to us than 
these operations, to begin with, but this is not the case.156 
Given this twofold manner of proceeding, Anonymus Bazân replies to the 
arguments against his position as follows: that a science that has a certain 
method cannot be difficult is certainly true, but only one of the methods used 
in the sctentia de anima is certain. Therefore, when Aristotle referred to the 
certainty of this science, he was only speaking about the a-posteriori manner 
of proceeding. And when he referred to its difficulty, Aristotle was only talking 
about the a-priori manner of proceeding. This resolves the tension between 
the passage on certainty and the passage of difficulty. It is even possible to 
appeal to Aristotle's remark on the difference between going from accident to 
substance and vice versa to support this solution.157 
To another argument that claims that each science that concerns the 
things we experience in ourselves is certain, the author replies by saying that 
this is only true when these experiences are proportionate to our cognitive 
capacities, which they are in the case of the vegetative and sensitive operations 
of the soul, because we experience these through our senses (senstbihter).158 
But the operations of the intellective soul, on the other hand, we only 
experience in an intellectual manner (intelltgtbiltter), in which the connection 
with our senses is lacking. Here, we see for the first time in the discussions 
on the certainty of the sctentia de anima a distinction between our knowledge 
of our intellectual operations and our knowledge of the operations of our 
vegetative and sensitive souls. The discussion is now linked to that of the 
possibility of a science of the soul in which the imperceptibility of the 
intellect's operations has always played an important role.159 
Beginning with the commentary by Anonymus Bazân, the question on the 
difficulty of the sctentia de anima begins to change its character. The purpose 
of this question now shifts from explaining a rather incidental comment by 
Aristotle to explaining how anything can be certain and difficult at the same 
time. This change can clearly be seen in Radulphus Brito's commentary on 
l56This reconstruction can be supported by looking at Walter Burley's comments on the 
difficulty of the sctentia de anima-, where he applies the same distinction as Anonymus Bazin. 
It is clear that Burley thinks that the certainty stems from the mamfestness of the starting point 
of the method which proceeds from the perceptible operations of the soul and reasons toward 
to soul itself. See p. 101, footnote 149. 
'"ARISTOTLE, De anima, I 1, 402bl7-22· "It seems not only useful for the discovery of the 
causes of the incidental properties of substances to be acquainted with the essential nature of 
those substances . but also conversely, for the knowledge of the essential nature of a substance 
is largely promoted by an acquaintance with its properties " 
l5eRecall the adage that all our cognition has its ultimate origin in the senses, 'nihil est in 
intellectu quin prius fuent in sensu'. 
'
59See section 3.1 1. 
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the De anima. Although at first glance he seems to stay close to Aquinas's in-
terpretation of the certainty of the scientia de anima in terms of our intimate 
familiarity with its subject, there is one crucial difference, which will set the 
agenda for the debates in the fourteenth century. Brito radicalizes the dis-
tinction that was introduced by Anonymus Bazân between our knowledge of 
the sensitive and vegetative souls, on the one hand, and our knowledge of the 
intellective soul, on the other: 
Ergo anima intellectiva difficilis est ad cognoscendum ex parte 
cognoscentis. Sed anima vegetativa et sensitiva non sunt ita difficiles ad 
cognoscendum, quia unusquisque experitur se nutriri et augmentari et 
sentire. Item: ad sensum apparent operationes earum, scilicet nutrire 
et sentire.1 6 0 
Therefore the intellective soul is difficult to understand from the part of 
the knower. But the vegetative and sensitive souls are not that difficult 
to unders tand, because everyone experiences that he feeds and grows 
and perceives. Also, their operations appear to the senses, that is, feed-
ing and perceiving. 
The parallels between Anonymus Bazân's question and Brito's are strik-
ing.161 Both of them introduce the twofold method, a-priori and a-posteriori, 
as well as a distinction between the manner in which we experience the opera-
tions of our vegetative and sensitive souls as opposed to the manner in which 
we experience the operations of our intellective soul.162 In addition, both 
of them introduce a twofold manner of looking at the difficulty in question, 
by taking the soul either as subject or as object of understanding. But Brito 
pushes these distinctions further than Anonymus Bazân had done by making 
the following claim: whereas we are immediately aware of the operations of 
the vegetative and sensitive souls (which explains why our knowledge of these 
souls is certain), our knowledge of the intellective soul, by contrast, is always 
mediated. 
The main reason why knowledge of our intellective soul is always medi-
ated is that our intellect is in pure potentiality before it knows something. And 
160RADULPHUS BRITO, Q Ì M , I.S58-61. 
16lThe parallels are not limited to this particular question, but exist in other places also. 
Compare the similarities between the two commentaries in the question on the subject matter 
of the science of the soul discussed on p. 84. 
162Anonymus Bazin phrases the difference between our experience of the intellective and 
our experience of the other two souls as follows: ANONYMUS ΒΛΖΑΝ, Q Ì M , 1.5, 398-3997',"7β: 
"Tunc ad tertium. Cum dicitur 'ilia scientia non est difficillima quae est de Ulis quae sunt 
experimentata nobis', verum est secundum proportionem. Et cum dicis quod scientia de anima 
sit huiusmodi, verum est de anima vegetativa et sensitiva, sed de anima intellectiva non, quia 
ilia non est experimentata sensibiliter, sed intelligibiliter." 
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according to Aristode, a thing can only be known insofar as it has actuality. 
This implies that, as long as the intellect remains in this pure potentiahty, it 
cannot be known, at least not directly. Only once the intellect has been ac-
tualized by the knowledge of something other than itself, can it turn itself 
into an object of cognition. A peculiar consequence of this emphasis on the 
necessity of the actuality of any object of cognition is that our knowledge of 
the operations of the vegetative and sensitive souls is given an equal status. 
For the operations of the sensitive soul have the same degree of actuality as 
the operations of the vegetative soul, and both these sets of operations oc-
cur within us. Thus Brito claims that we experience both types of operations 
within ourselves. This idea is not just found in Brito, but also in many other 
late-thirteenth and fourteenth-century philosophers. But whereas it is cer-
tainly true that I am aware of many operations of my sensitive soul, I seem to 
be quite unaware of the operations of my vegetative soul, at least when aware-
ness is understood as experiencing something within myself.164 But also the 
external senses provide little to no immediate experience when it comes to 
the typical vegetative operations of growth and nourishing. Of course we can 
measure and document these processes, but in that case our scientific knowl-
edge of them is no more certain or privileged than any other type of knowledge 
obtained by similar scientific observation. 
Having made a distinction between our mediated knowledge of the in-
tellective soul and our immediate knowledge of the other souls, Brito conse-
quently connects it to the difficulty of the scientia de anima. As a consequence 
of our direct knowledge of our vegetative and sensitive souls, it is impossible 
that we should encounter any real difficulties in trying to understand them. 
Accordingly, the difficulty that Aristotle mentioned only applies to our knowl-
edge of the intellective soul (a restriction not found in Aristotle or Averroes). 
The difficulty in understanding the intellective soul, Brito continues, has 
two different reasons. The first reason lies in the knower, the second in the 
thing known.165 To explain this distinction, Brito invokes the paradigmatic 
examples of such difficulties. Prime matter exemplifies a difficulty on the side 
of the thing known. Since prime matter considered in itself is just a pure 
163ARISTOTLE, Metaphyska, IX, 1051a29-31; ANONYMUS, Auctoritates Aristotelis, in: J. 
Hamesse, Les Auctoritates Aristotelis. Un florilège médiéval, étude historique et édition critique, 
Louvain: Publications universitaires [etc.], 1974, 1:234. 
'
wThe objection might have entered the medieval debates, were it not for the fact that the 
vegetative soul is hardly discussed in the commentaries on the De anima. 
l65This distinction goes back to Metaphysica II where Aristotle discusses the investigation of 
truth in general; ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, II.1, 993b9-ll: "Perhaps, as difficulties are of two 
kinds, the cause of the present difficulty is not in the facts but in us. For as the eyes of the 
bats are to the blaze of day, so is the reason in our soul to the things which are by nature most 
evident of all." 
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potentiality towards all substantial forms and has no actuality whatsoever, it 
is very difficult — if not impossible — to know. On the side of the knower, the 
standard example is the following: because humans are so dependent on their 
senses for the acquisition of knowledge, everything that cannot be sensed is 
very difficult for us to know, though in themselves these inperceptible things 
might be fully knowable when cognized by a subject that is not dependent on 
the senses, for example, by an angel or by God. 
Applying this distinction between the two sources of difficulty to our 
knowledge of the intellective soul, Brito gives the following analysis: on 
the side of the thing known, the source of the difficulty is the ontological 
status of our intellect. Just as prime matter is in potency with respect to all 
substantial forms, our intellect considered in itself is also just in potency, 
namely in potency with respect to all knowledge. The more important source 
of difficulty, however, lies on the side of the one who knows, since we are 
dependent on our senses for the acquisition of knowledge, and the intellect 
cannot be sensed. Even worse, not only is the intellect itself not perceptible, 
neither are its operations, namely thinking and willing. 
Brito is quick to point out that the difficulties inherent in trying to under-
stand our intellect are even greater than in the case of trying to understand 
prime matter. Prime matter we can, at least, sense in some indirect way. For 
we can perceive substantial changes, which Brito calls the operations of prime 
matter, and the perception of these substantial changes leads us to knowledge 
of prime matter itself. But we do not, says Brito, sense thinking or willing. 
The ultimate explanation for these extreme difficulties within the science of 
the soul lies therefore in the unique ontological status of the intellective soul: 
Modo anima intellectiva inter formas naturales remotior est a sensu, 
quia est quedam forma media inter substantias separatas et immateri-
ales, et substantias sensibiles et materiales.166 
Of all natural forms, the intellective soul is farthest removed from the 
senses, because it is a form that falls between the separate and immate-
rial substances and the perceptible and material substances. 
The fact that, of all natural forms, the intellective soul is farthest removed 
from the senses, renders the science that studies it the most difficult of all 
natural sciences. 
166RADULPHUS BRITO, Q Î M , 1.5. The description of the soul as something that falls between 
the natural and the separate forms probably entered the Latin commentaries through Averroes; 
AVERROES, In libros Physicorum Aristotelis, in: Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois commentariis, 
vol. IV, Venezia: Apud Junctas, 1562-74 (photomechical reprint Frankfurt: Minerva, 1962), 
II, comm. 26, 59r C-D (ANONYMUS, AA, 2:93). 
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Recall that Aquinas thought that the scientia de anima had no special dif-
ficulties, but only a special certainty coming from our intimate acquaintance 
with its subject. Brito on the other hand is convinced that there is a special 
difficulty on account of the imperceptibility and potentiality of the intellec-
tive soul. This, in turn, leads him to limit the certainty of this science to the 
vegetative and sensitive souls only. 
Just like Anonymus Bazân had done before him, Brito suggests that 
there are two methods of proceeding in the scientia de anima: the certain 
a-posteriori method, where we begin with the operations of something, and 
from there reason to the subject that is the source of these operations, and the 
a-priori, uncertain method, where we begin with the subject (or essence) and 
from there reason to its operations.167 But Brito introduces a new element 
by implying that we only use one of these methods, namely the uncertain 
a-priori method, when studying the intellect, whereas in the case of the 
vegetative and sensitive souls, we can and do also use the certain a-posteriori 
method.168 
Why does Brito imply that we only use the a-priori method in the case of 
the intellect, given that he considers it to be such an uncertain method? The 
answer can, I think, be found in Brito's emphasis on the imperceptibUity of 
the operations of our intellect. For since we cannot perceive the intellect's op-
erations through our senses, the more certain method, which has these opera-
tions as its starting point, is simply unavailable for the study of the intellective 
soul. In other words, if we really have no sensory access to these operations, 
then the normal procedure of natural philosophy is barred, and as a conse-
quence, we are limited to the uncertain method. Starting with operations that 
are better known than the essence is (unfortunately) not an option. The alter-
native that Brito seems to have in mind is that we have to start with an unclear 
and imprecise grasp of the intellect itself and do our best to continue from 
I67RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, I.566"72 (ad rationes): "Et cum dicitur 'Philosophus dicit quod 
ista scientia est certissima', dico quod duplex est modus procedendi in ilia scientia. Unus est 
modus procedendi qui est a priori procedendo a subiecto ad eius operationes. Et alia investiga-
tio est a posteriori ex operationibus investigando animam sive subiectum anime. Et quantum 
ad istum modum intelligit quod certo modo procedit, et sic non est difficillima. Sed quantum 
ad primum processum non est certa, et quantum ad illum est difficillima." 
'^That only the uncertain method can be used in studying the intellect remains implicit in 
the passage where Brito explains the two methods. But it becomes evident when we look at 
Brito's response to another argument in which he returns to the certain method that proceeds 
from effect to subject; RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, I.592"97: "Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'ilia scientia 
non est difficillima que procedit ex eis que experimur in nobis,' verum est quantum ad istud. 
Et cum dicitur 'ista scientia est huiusmodi,' verum est procedendo ex operationibus ad subiec-
tum anime, et etiam quantum ad operationes anime vegetative et sensitive. Operationes enim 
istarum experimur in nobis. Sed quantum ad operationes anime intellective non est verum. Et 
ideo quantum ad hoc est difficillima." 
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there. This procedure will be very uncertain, because we do not have a clear 
understanding of our starting point, but it is the best we can do under the 
circumstances. 
It is worth pausing for a moment to look at the implications of Brito's 
solution. Its advantage is that he has found a convincing way of combining 
the notions of certainty and difficulty in his description of the method of the 
saentia de anima. And armed with this combination he is now able to give 
a coherent interpretation of Aristotle's text. But the disadvantage is that the 
result seems to be a split right through the middle of the subject matter of this 
science. Instead of one science, with one subject and method, we are left with 
two half subjects, each with partly different methods, and with one half being 
the most certain of all subjects in the natural sciences and the other half being 
the most difficult and uncertain. Can we really still speak of one saentia de 
anima7. 
In any case, from this moment onwards, the connection of the intellective 
soul with the notion of difficulty, and of the vegetative/sensitive souls with 
the notion of certainty, will become commonplace. It is implied by Nicole 
Oresme; and it is found explicitly, for example, in John of Jandun and John 
Buridan. 
John of Jandun's position closely parallels Brito's. He also applies the 
predicate 'not difficult' to our knowledge of the vegetative and sensitive souls, 
and the predicate 'difficult' to our knowledge of the intellective soul.169 He 
even agrees with Brito that the difficulty of our knowledge of the intellective 
soul stems from both the knower and the thing known. In fact, he seems 
to disagree with Brito on only one point, and that is his distinction between 
the two methods of proceeding in the saentia de anima. Brito implied that 
when studying the intellect, we can only use an uncertain method by which 
we proceed from the essence to its operations. But according to Jandun, this 
uncertain method is in fact never used in the saentia de anima.170 And if a 
method is never used, it cannot be invoked to explain a difference in difficulty 
between our knowledge of the vegetative and sensitive soul, on the one hand, 
169JOHN OF JANDUN, Q Ì M , 1.6, 23 "Tunc dico duo ad quaestionem. primo quod saentia de 
anima vegetativa et sensitiva non est difficdliina; secundo quod scientia de anima intellectiva 
est difficillima." 
l70The terminology is slightly different from that of Brito's question. Jandun speaks of a 
method 'a prion m esse ad postenora' and a method 'a postertonbus m esse ad priora'; JOHN 
OF JANDUN, Q Ì M , 1.6, 24-25. "Quidam dicunt quod duplex potest esse processus in saentia. 
Unus enim est a pnonbus in esse ad postenora in esse, alius est a postenonbus ad priora, ut 
dicit Commentator in isto prooemio... Sed istud non valet, quia quantum ad ilium modum 
procedendi qui non est usitatus in ista saentia, ista saentia non debet ludican difficilhma Sed 
modus procedendi a pnonbus ad postenora est huiusmodi. Quare etc." 
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and our knowledge of the intellective soul, on the other. 171 
3.3.4 The final stages: John Buridan and Nicole Oresme 
The next important stage in the development of the discussion about the cer-
tainty and difficulty of the scientia de anima is found in John Buridan, who 
proceeds in a somewhat different manner in the so-called ultima lectura of his 
Quaestiones De anima. Although he fully agrees with Brito and Jandun that 
a distinction between a difficulty on the side of the thing known and on the 
side of the knower is legitimate, he denies that the difficulty in knowing the 
soul stems from both sides. Instead, our difficulty in knowing the soul comes 
solely from the side of the knower, who (unfortunately) is dependent on the 
senses in acquiring knowledge. The core of his solution is contained in the 
following fragment: 
Tunc ponuntur due conclusiones. Prima est quod scientia de anima 
est nobis difficillima et per consequens incertissima quantum ex parte 
cognoscentis inter cetera naturalia, scilicet circumscriptis Deo et intel-
ligentiis, quia intellectus noster est insensibilis... Secunda conclusio est 
quod ex parte rei cognoscende et intelligende, scientia de anima est cer-
tissima et facillima, quia inter cetera naturalia anima est altioris entitatis 
et maioris cognoscibilitatis.172 
Then we posit two theses. The first is that the science of the soul is for us 
the most difficult and as a result the most uncertain from the side of the 
knower among the remaining natural things, namely leaving aside God 
and the intelligences, because our intellect is imperceptible... The sec-
ond thesis is that from the side of the thing known and understood, the 
science of the soul is the most certain and the easiest, because among the 
remaining natural things the soul has higher being and greater knowa-
bility. 
17
'lt would have been interesting to know why exactly Jandun rejects the division into two 
methods. Is it because he considers it impossible, even in principle, to use Brito's uncertain 
method, or because he considers it just simply not used by Aristotle? Unfortunately Jandun's 
only argument, that the uncertain method is never used in the scientia de anima, is that Aristotle 
and Averroes say so. ARISTOTLE, De anima, II.2, 413al 1-13: "Since what is clear and more 
familiar in account emerges from what in itself is confused but more observable by us, we must 
reconsider our results from this point of view." AVERROES, Commentarium magnum in DA, 
II, 12, 149: "Idest, et quia via naturalis in cognitione causarum propinquarum rebus est ire de 
latentibus apud Naturam apparentibus apud nos, et est ire de posterioribus in esse ad priora, ut 
dictum est in Posterioribus, oportet nos ire in cognitione diffinitionum propriarum unicuique 
partium anime per istam viam. Et nulla via est in cognitione talium diffinitionum, scilicet que 
componuntur ex propinquis causis propriis rei, cum fuerint ignote, nisi a posterioribus apud 
nos." 
"
2 J O H N BURIDAN, Q Î M , 1.4, ƒ. 3va: 'Utrum scientia de anima sit scientia de numero difficil-
limorum'. 
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Here the connections between difficulty and uncertainty and between cer-
tainty and ease have become fiilly explicit: difficulty implies uncertainty, and 
certainty implies ease. The scientia de anima is the most difficult of the nat-
ural sciences for us; but when we describe the object of this science in itself 
instead of in relation to our cognitive powers, it is the most certain and easy 
science there is. The result of this approach is that difficulty and certainty no 
longer need to be ascribed to different parts of the soul. For the difficulty now 
lies completely on the side of the knower, whereas the certainty now lies com-
pletely on the side of the thing known. There seems no longer to be any need 
for such a peculiar split between the vegetative and sensitive souls, on the one 
hand, and the intellective soul, on the other. This would give Buridan's solu-
tion a large advantage over Brito's and Jandun's solutions. But surprisingly, 
this is not the final conclusion that is drawn in Buridan's text. 
In spite of the fact that the intellective soul itself is no longer described as 
the source of the difficulty of the scientia de anima, we ultimately end up with a 
similar division within its subject matter. For Buridan returns to the difficulty 
of this science a second time. The first time he had attributed the certainty 
solely to the thing it itself. This time he tries to relate the certainty to the 
human knower as well, by using the following, surprising argument: not all 
knowledge acquired in this science is the most difficult compared to the other 
natural philosophical disciplines. On the contrary, some of the knowledge 
we can obtain in this science is amongst the easiest to obtain, and therefore 
amongst the most certain we can have: 
Quod quantum ad aliqua scientia de anima est nobis facilior quam de 
aliis formis naturalibus et certior, scilicet quantum ad ea que experimur 
in nobis de operationibus et potentiis anime et quantum ad ea que sunt 
faciliter ex illis deducibilia.173 
With respect to some things, the science of the soul is easier for us than 
the sciences of the other natural forms, and more certain, namely with 
respect to those things that we experience in ourselves of the operations 
and powers of the soul and with respect to those things that are easily 
deducible from them. 
We can easily obtain knowledge of the operations and powers of the soul 
that we experience in ourselves, which makes this knowledge certain; and this 
certainty also applies to the conclusions we can easily draw from these oper-
ations and powers. Unfortunately, Buridan gives no examples of such easily 
drawn conclusions, but his reference to our inner experience of operations 
as the starting point to explain this certainty should at this point no longer 
I 7 3 JOHN B U R I D A N , QifA, 1.4,/. 3v b . The manuscript gives cum instead of ex. 
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surprise us. It is the same reference that was already so important in Thomas 
Aquinas. 
Buridan is not willing to go as far as Aquinas, Brito and Jandun in his 
attribution of certainty and being easily knowable to our understanding of the 
vegetative and sensitive operations. For he also points out that the vegetative 
and especially the sensitive powers that we experience in ourselves need very 
complex material dispositions in their respective organs in order to function 
properly. And understanding these dispositions and their necessity is also a 
part of the scientta de anima. Therefore, our knowledge of the vegetative and 
sensitive souls can still be called difficult compared to knowledge obtained 
in the other natural sciences, where the material dispositions of the subject 
are less complex. Our knowledge is called easy, however, compared to the 
knowledge of the intellective soul. 
As a consequence, Buridan ultimately arrives at a division similar to that 
found in Brito and Jandun: between the certain knowledge of the vegetative 
and the sensitive souls, on the one hand, and the difficult knowledge of the 
intellective soul, on the other. And m spite of the nuances that Buridan intro­
duces concerning the certainty we have of the vegetative and sensitive souls, 
he ends up with much greater difficulties than his predecessors. If we accept 
Buridan's position, then the difficulty in studying the intellective soul has now 
even increased to the point where we can no longer give an adequate explana­
tion of the intellective soul in natural philosophy, as can be inferred from the 
remainder of the passage that was just described: 
Sed ilia <i.e. scientia de anima> est incertior et difficilior simphciter 
quantum ad animam mtellectivanr quomodo ista se habeat ad corpus 
et ad matenam, propter quod inextensa est et non educta de potentia 
materie, sed modo supernaturali adveniens et inherens corpon'174 
But this science <of the soul> is less certain and in an absolute sense 
more difficult as far as the intellective soul is concerned: how is it related 
to the body and to matter, as it is not extended and not educed from 
the potency of matter, but comes to the body, and inheres in it, in a 
supernatural manner? 
Buridan's description, in this question, of a supernatural inherence of the 
intellective soul is not an isolated remark. It can also be found, for example 
— and in an even stronger formulation — in his question on 'whether sense 
' ^ J O H N BURIDAN, QdA,f 3 v b Zupko's interpretation of the implications of this supernat­
ural inherence of the intellective soul is very accurate· ZUPKO, John Bundan-, 180 "Buridan is 
not suggesting here that the inherence of the human soul is utterly inexplicable, only that it 
cannot be explained naturahstically, ι e with demonstrative or persuasive arguments based on 
premises whose truth is apparent to our senses " 
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is a passive power'.175 Although Buridan does not explicitly answer the ques-
tion as to which other science, if any, could (partly) explain the inherence of 
the intellectual soul in the body, it is dear that this can only be theology.176 
For when Buridan in book III of his commentary discusses the question of 
whether the human intellect is a form that inheres in the human body, he re-
sorts to theological examples such as the Eucharist in his explanation, some-
thing which he generally tries to avoid in his commentary on the De anima.177 
When Buridan spoke of the certainty related to the operations of the soul 
that we experience in ourselves, he only intended the operations of the vegeta-
tive and sensitive souls. Studying the human soul within natural philosophy is 
so difficult precisely because there we study the soul as embodied. The vegeta-
tive and sensitive operations seem to be relatively easy to understand, because 
their relations to the body seem relatively clear. Studying the unextended in-
tellective soul, by contrast, is exceptionally difficult because its relation to the 
body is such that we ultimately cannot even explain it in philosophy, for it in-
heres modo supernaturalt. But as soon as we now consider the implications of 
this supernatural inherence of the intellective soul, Buridan's adherence to the 
view that we are certain of the vegetative and the sensitive operations of our 
soul, because we experience them in ourselves, becomes baffling. For Buridan 
is convinced that each human being has only one single soul, and when it be-
I75)OHN BURIDAN, QdA, 11.9· "Verum est quod certe magna est dubitano si ponamus in 
homme solam <unam SiiS> ammani. Oportet enim istam esse intellectivam et indivisibilem, 
non extensam ahquo modo extensione materie vel subiecti. Et tunc ista anima inextensa est 
anima sensitiva et vegetativa. Quomodo igitur, cum sensatio ponitur extensa extensione or-
gani et materie, potent ipsa esse in subiecto indivisibili inherente et tamquam educta de po-
tentia istius? Hoc videtur mirabile, cum forma non habeat extensionem nisi extensionem sui 
subiecti. Et quomodo divisibile et extensum potent mherere indivisibili et inextenso? Hoc 
videtur mirabile Et certe ego respondeo quod hoc est mirabile, quia mirabili et supernatural! 
modo anima humana inheret corpon humano non extensa nec educta de potentia subiecti cui 
inheret, et tarnen etiam loti corpon inhereat et cuilibet parti eius. Hoc vere est mirabile et 
super naturam." 
176See ZUPKO, John Buridan, 181 
177JOHN BURIDAN, Q<M, III.4, 'Utrum intellectus humanus sit forma inhaerens corpon hu-
mano': "Et non est inconvemens idem esse non commensurabihter in diversis locis ab invicem 
distantibus et secundum se totum, licet hoc sit modo supernaturali, ut corpus Chnsti simul 
est in paradiso et super altari (non enim corpus Chnsti in hostia super altari commensuratur 
magnitudine hostiae, sed est in quahbet parte hostiae, licet partes distent ab invicem, et non ob 
hoc distai a se). Et ideo consimüiter quodammodo intellectus est in manu et pede, et in neutro 
commensurative, cum non sit extensus in aliquo illorum membrorum." Although Buridan 
usually avoids theological arguments, there are exceptions. E. SYLLA, 'Ideo quasi mendicare 
oportet tntellectum humanuni: the Role of Theology in John Buridan's Natural Philosophy', in: 
J. M M H. THIJSSEN and J ZUPKO (eds.), The Metaphysics and Natural Phibsophy of John 
Buridan, Brill, 2001, 221-245 analyses some examples found in his commentary on the Phys-
ica in the questions on the eternity of the world and the possibility of a vacuum. For more 
examples, see ZUPKO, John Bundan, 144. 
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comes clear that in that case the vegetative and sensitive powers must inhere 
in the body in an unextended and supernatural mode as well, he just accepts 
this baffling consequence. All the vegetative and sensitive powers in a human 
being inhere in the body on account of an indivisible and unextended soul, 
which makes them radically different from similar powers found in plants in 
animals. In fact, in what Jack Zupko calls 'the most dramatic moment in the 
25 questions of book II of his commentary', Buridan admits that the sensi­
tive and vegetative operations in human beings are miraculous on account of 
their relation to an indivisible soul.178 But if that is the case, then what can 
this certainty of the operations we experience in ourselves still mean? 
To round up this discussion, I will offer one final example. Nicole Oresme 
introduces even more nuances into the debate in his Quaesttones De anima 
than Buridan had done, and devotes a lot of space to discussing the various 
meanings of the terms 'difficulty' and 'certainty'. He also discusses more gen­
erally the conditions under which something can be called difficult. And when 
he goes as far as denying the opposition between certainty and difficulty by 
claiming that the certainty of knowledge need not imply that its acquisition 
is easy, it almost looks as if he had found a way out of the debate.179 But in 
the end, just as his predecessors, Oresme remains convinced that the certainty 
of the scxentta de anima must be a special certainty. He denies, as Buridan 
had done, that there can be a difficulty on the side of the thing known. Nei­
ther can a difficulty lie in the capacities of our intellect. What remains is that 
whenever we have difficulties cognizing something, the problem must lie in 
our senses, more precisely in our internal senses.180 Oresme even approvingly 
cites Plato's Phaedo 'that the intellect is hindered because of the oppression 
of the flesh'.181 The remainder of Oresme's analysis of the certainty of the 
saentta de anima for the most part parallels Buridan's, with certain empirical 
principles {acquisita per experienttam) as a starting point and a certainty that 
is retained in those conclusions that are easily deduced from them {faciliter 
'
78See J. ZUPKO, 'Horse Sense and Human Sense: The Heterogeneity of Sense Perception 
in Bundan's Philosophical Psychology', in· S KNUUTTILA and Ρ KARKKAINEN (eds.), Theories 
of Perception in Medieval and Early Modem Philosophy, Berlin [etc.]. Springer, 2008, 171-186, 
179-180. 
1 7 9The same claim that a difficulty in acquisition can be compatible with the certainty of the 
acquired knowledge is also made in NICOLE ORESME, ExpdA, y 8 8 - 9 0: "Respondetur quod non 
répugnât quod aliqua scientia sit difficihs et incerta ante ems notitiam et post acquisitionem sit 
certa, sicut scientiae mathematicae sunt difficiles et certissimae." 
I 8 0NICOLE ORESME, Q Î M , 1.3, 112 "Unde propter quandam indispositionem est quaedam 
resistente et quaedam difficultas in operatiombus sensuum intenorum, maxime quae re-
quiruntur ad intellectionem." 
181
 NICOLE ORESME, QdA, 11236"37: "Et ideo dicebat Plato in Phaedone quod intellectus im-
peditur propter oppressionem carnis." 
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concluduntur ex Ulis). 
3.4 Conclusions 
The common element in the three debates on method turns out to be the 
unique ontological status of the human intellect. In all three contexts, the 
commentators tried to find ways of maintaining the fragile unity of the scientia 
de anima, with varying success. When it came to the question of whether a 
science of the soul is possible, and if so, whether this science forms a part of 
natural philosophy, there was complete consensus. All commentators agreed 
that this science is possible and that it forms a part of natural philosophy. The 
most important arguments against the possibility of a science of the soul were 
related to the intellective part. They targeted its simplicity, imperceptibility, 
and potentiality. But, in different ways, all commentators were able to secure a 
natural philosophical study of intellect by arguing for a structural complexity 
within the soul, linking it to those things we can perceive, and arguing that the 
potential intellect becomes intelligible once it understands something else. In 
the period under discussion, the conclusion that we should include the study 
of the soul as a whole within natural philosophy was not reached after careful 
examination of the matter. It was a given. It is somewhat strange that these 
questions begin to disappear in the commentaries after Jandun. All the more 
so, since the fourteenth-century commentators become increasingly aware of 
how difficult it really is to include the intellective soul and the vegetative / 
sensitive soul in one single science. 
The subject matter of the scientia de anima occasioned more debate. The 
majority of the commentators opted for the soul, but some, including Brito 
and Anonymus Bazän opted for the ensouled body, qua ensouled, instead. 
One of the main reasons for their choice turned out to be their ascription of 
all vital operations, including understanding, to the ensouled body rather than 
to the soul. Most other commentators argued that understanding is one of 
the very few operations that pertain to the soul alone and not to the ensouled 
body. But surprisingly, the choice for the one or the other option turned out 
to have few, if any, consequences. Again the explanation is that there was 
no real debate on the question of whether the soul, including the intellect, is 
studied in natural philosophy. Because the natural philosophical context pre-
scribes that every study of the soul must include the material component of 
its operations, it matters little which of the two options for the subject mat-
'
82The two main differences are that Buridan's interesting remarks on the complexity of the 
material disposition of the organs are not found in Oresme and that the distinction in certainty 
between knowledge of the vegetative/sensitive and intellective souls is only implicit in Oresme. 
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ter was chosen. Somewhat unexpectedly, even the fourteenth-century shift 
in what science is primarily about, from thing to terms, had few implications 
other than promoting semantical analysis as an important tool in natural phi­
losophy. The methodological questions are isolated from the doctrinal part 
of the commentaries, in the sense that the answers to them have little or no 
impact on the what a commentator will defend in the doctrinal parts of his 
commentary. But at the same time, these methodological questions turn out 
to be a focal point for the problem of the unity of the scientia de anima. As 
such, they fulfill an important role in the commentaries as a whole. 
The most important debates took place in the context of the alleged cer­
tainty and the difficulty of the scientia de anima. What would be an accurate 
characterization of the developments of this debate? One way of looking at it 
would be that the entire debate is just confused, and that this fact rules out 
any possible philosophical importance. It is clear that the proximate occasion 
of the debate was the misleading translation of ακρίβεια as certitudo. Had 
the translation been exactitudo, or something similar, it would probably never 
have started. And indeed, the debate is, in this respect, mainly a late thir­
teenth and fourteenth-century affair. Many Renaissance commentators lost 
interest in this discussion when they realized its origin, and the question of 
the place of the scientia de anima in the framework of the sciences becomes 
much more important than the question of the combination of certainty (or 
exactness) and difficulty. That the discussion had indeed more or less ended 
in the Renaissance is also evident in Zabarella. Even though he devotes several 
pages to the discussion, and refers to the solutions of a considerable number 
of philosophers, his motivation seems to be mainly historical curiosity and 
rhetorical effect. 
Still, this description of the debate as occasioned by a peculiar translation 
and effectively concluded by a new and more accurate translation is only half 
of the story. For I hope to have shown that even if the debate was triggered 
by a linguistic issue, it quickly became a doctrinal controversy rooted in the 
difficult ontological status of the intellective soul as both embodied and at the 
same time somehow immaterial. 
That we should regard it as a doctrinal controversy is also indirectly sup­
ported by the fact that none of the philosophers found the easy and obvious 
way out satisfactory, namely that of claiming that 'certainty' and 'difficulty' 
are not necessarily contradictory terms when applied to a science. A science 
may, for example, be very difficult to acquire, but once acquired its conclu­
sions may be certain. Even when they mentioned this easy way out, as notably 
Oresme did, they were not satisfied with it. They keep explaining the term 
'certainty' by reference to our intimate relation to the subject matter of the 
scientia de anima. As a result, they underestimate the difficulties in studying 
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the vegetative soul and overemphasize the difficulties in studying the intellec-
tive soul. 
What happened in this debate from a doctrinal viewpoint is the mutual 
reinforcement of two tendencies. On the one hand, there is an increasing em-
phasis on the role of the perceptibility of the soul's operations when it comes 
to acquiring certain knowledge of the soul, while on the other hand, there is 
a growing emphasis on the necessity of embodiment for the soul to exercise 
its functions. The combination of these two tendencies resulted in a double 
breach in the fragile unity of the scientia de anima. The more familiar breach 
took place when the study of the soul as immortal and disembodied was trans-
ferred to the domain of metaphysics and theology, and the scientta de anima 
ended up concerning itself exclusively with the soul as embodied. The other, 
and more unfamiliar breach goes straight through the scientta de anima itself 
and considers — again in terms of material and immaterial — one part of its 
subject the most certain, and one part the most difficult, of all that is studied 
in natural philosophy. 
Maintaining the unity of the scientia de anima was not an easy task for the 
medieval commentators, as can be clearly seen in this debate on the difficulty 
and certainty of this science. To be sure, none of the authors I discussed ex-
plicitly acknowledges that the scientia de anima was now no longer strictly to 
be regarded as one science, but as a science with two formal objects to which 
the two incompatible predicates of certainty and difficulty applied. The con-
nection between method and the pursuit of science was not that strong in the 
Middle Ages. But although no such explicit conclusions were drawn, the de-
bate did have its effect; and it was just a matter of time before a conclusion 
along these lines was actually drawn, as becomes amply clear when we look 
at the Renaissance commentators struggling to place the study of the to soul 
within the hierarchy of the sciences.183 
3See BAKKER, 'Natural Philosophy, Metaphysics, or Something in Between?'. 
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soul 
Haml. What man dost thou dig it for? 
I.Clo. For no man, sir. 
Haml. What woman, then? 
I.Clo. For none, neither. 
Haml. Who is to be buried in 't? 
I.Clo. One that was a woman, sir, but, rest her soul, she's dead. 
Haml. How absolute the knave is! We must speak by the card, or 
equivocation will undo us. 
Hamlet, act 5, scene 1. (as cited in: J.-L. SOLÉRE, 'Was the Eye in the 
Tomb? On the Metaphysical and Historical Interest of Some Strange 
Quodlibetal Questions', in: C. SCHABEL (ed.), Theological Quodlibeta in 
the Middle Ages. The Thirteenth Century, Leiden [etc.]: Brill, 2006, 
507-558) 
The first doctrinal aspect of Aristotle's De anima that any commentator has to 
come to grips with is Aristotle's famous definition of the soul: 'the soul is the 
first act of a natural organic body having life in potency',1 which was rendered 
into Latin as 'anima est actus primus corporis physici organici vitam habentis 
in potentia.'2 Most commentators devoted several questions to the discus-
1
 ARISTOTLE, De anima, 11.1,412a27-28. 
2The translators rendered the Aristotelian text as follows: Jacobus Venetus: "Unde anima 
est actus primus corporis phisici potentia vitam habentis. Huiusmodi autem est quodcumque 
organicum."; William of Moerbeke: "Unde anima est primus actus corporis phisici potencia 
vitam habentis. Tale autem quodcunque organicum."; Michael Scotus: "Et ideo anima est 
prima perfectio corporis naturalis habentis vitam in potentia. Et est secundum quod est or-
ganicum." In the ANONYMUS, AA, 6:41 it is rendered as: "Anima est actus corporis organici 
physici vitam habentis in potentia, scilicet ad opera vitae." In the late-twelfth and first half of 
the thirteenth century, several variants of the definition are employed. The most important of 
these substitute 'perfectio' for 'actus', similar to Michael Scotus's translation. This use of the 
term 'perfectio' allowed body and soul to have a large degree of independence, even if they are 
intimately related. See section 2.2.1 for discussion. A convenient list of the variations of the 
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sion of this definition, beginning with its most general aspects and working 
towards the details. In Brito, for example, the discussion takes up the first 
five questions of his commentary on book II, beginning with the question of 
whether the soul is a substance and concluding with the question of whether 
the Aristotelian definition of the soul is correct.3 
In order to understand better the medieval discussions of Aristotle's def-
inition, however, it will be worth the effort to begin by looking at Aristotle's 
own words, with the help of some modem commentators. This will serve to 
introduce some of the difficulties that arose when the medieval commentators 
tried to explicate the definition. 
4.1 Aristotle's definition of the soul 
One of the first things that becomes clear when reading De anima ILI is that, 
contrary to the impression given above, Aristotle does not give a single defi-
nition of the soul. Rather, he gives three variations. Although these variants 
were combined into one single definition in the Latin commentary tradition, 
it is useful to keep them separated for now: 
1. The soul must, then, be substance, qua form of a natural body which has life 
potentially (412al8-19) 
2. The soul is the first actuality of a natural body which has life potentially 
(412a27) 
3. It is the first actuality of a natural body which has organs (412b4-5) 
Apart from the occurrence of these three variants of the definition of the 
soul, a second aspect that quickly becomes clear when reading De anima IL 1 
is that their status is ambiguous. Aristotle introduces the final variant of his 
definition (412b4-5) with the conditional statement: "If then we are to speak 
of something common to every soul, it will be... ," which already may express 
some doubt about the adequacy of the definition,4 but more importantly, he 
definition can be found in CALLUS, 'The Treatise of John Blund', 490—491 
3RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, II.1-5· Utrum anima sit substantia; Utrum anima sit matena 
vel compositum; Utrum anima sit forma substantiahs; Utrum ex anima et corpore fiat unum 
essentialiter, Quentur circa diffinitionem anime qua dicitur anima est actus corporis organici 
physici potentia vitam habentis, utrum sit bene data. 
''Walter Burley, for instance, refers to Aristotle's hesitant manner of speaking about the 
commonality of the definition again and again in his commentary, in order to argue that Aver-
roes's interpretation of Anstotle is at least a consistent reading of Aristotle's text, regardless of 
whether the interpretation is correct or not. For example. WALTER BURLEY, ExpdA [unpub-
lished transcription by Paul Bakker], 21vb· "Pro primo sciendum quod Anstoteles non assere-
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ends the first chapter of book II with the remark that: "This must suffice as 
our sketch or outline of the nature of the soul." 
At this point in the De anima, the definition of soul is indeed sketchy at 
best. So sketchy, in fact, that Aristotle chooses to begin anew in book II.2 by 
taking the soul as the principle of life in its various manifestations, making it 
clear that life covers a broad range of phenomena. If any one of these is present 
we can call a thing 'alive'. Aristode gives the following list: thinking, percep-
tion, local movement and rest, the movement involved in nutrition and, fi-
nally, decay and growth.5 The remainder of the De anima is largely devoted to 
an analysis and description of these various manifestations of life in order to 
flesh out the initial definitions of the soul. This procedure of beginning with a 
general, sketchy definition and working out its details in the rest of the treatise 
is not particular to the De amma, but common to many of Aristode's works.6 
Returning to the three variants of the definition, we find two sets of terms 
that seem to be used interchangeably. The first is 'substance qua form' and 
'first actuality', the second is 'a natural body which has life potentially' and 
'a natural body which has organs'. Equating the terms of the first set is fairly 
easy, at least, as long as we hold that there is a single substantial form which 
gives the natural body its full actuality.7 For in that case, being a substance 
qua form already implies being the first actuaHty, since the substantial form 
is by definition that which gives the first actuality to a substance. Within the 
framework of a plurality of substantial forms, the equation of these terms is 
slightly more complicated.8 If we accept a plurality of substantial forms in 
a substance, the soul — being the final substantial form of a living being — 
would inform a subject that already has some actuality. Since in that case there 
are other substantial forms present in the living being prior to the advent of 
the soul (which also remain present after the advent of the soul), it must be 
bat quod ilia <i.e. diffimtio SdB> est communis omni anime, sed dixit quod, si esset ahqua 
diffimtio communis omni anime, esset ista. 'anima est actus corporis' etc." 
5ARISTOTLE, De amma, II.2, 413a21-5. Presumably the list is not meant to be exhaustive, 
since the power to procreate is surprisingly absent. 
6As Helen Lang pointed out, this method of proceeding from a sketchy definition to a 
more detailed discussion of its elements can be viewed an application of Aristotle's teleologica! 
views to the structure of his texts; H. S. LANG, 'Aristotelian Physics: Teleologica! Procedure in 
Aristotle, Thomas, and Buridan', Review of Metaphysics, 42 (1989), 569-591 and H. S. LANG, 
'Aristotle's Physics: Teleologica! Method and Its Medieval Half-Life', in: R. TYÓRINOJA and A. 
INKERI LEKTINEN [E.A.] (eds.), Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy, Proceed-
ings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy (S.I.E.P.M). Helsinki, 24-29 
August 1987. Vol. 3, Helsinki. Finnish Society for Missiology and Ecumenics, 1990, 103-110. 
For discussion, see below footnote 4, 204 
7For an introduction to the unicity of substantial form position, see section 2.3.2. 
"For an introduction to the plurality of substantial form position, see section 2.3 3. 
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explained how the soul can still be called the^ïrif actuality.9 
Equating the second set of terms, however, turns out to be more difficult 
both within the unicity and the plurality frameworks. Given Aristotle's in-
sistence that we can only call something an organ as long as it is capable of 
exercising its proper function, being potentially alive and having organs seem 
to be contradictory descriptions.10 If something is merely potentially alive, 
how can it have organs, since it has no actual life functions that it can exer-
cise? And if something has organs, it is by definition capable of exercising 
certain life functions. But then, how can it be anything but actually alive? One 
possible (and popular) manner of harmonizing these descriptions is to distin-
guish between a first and a second potency. A first potency is the potency to 
acquire a particular power, whereas a second potency is the potency to exer-
cise that acquired power. Taking the term 'potency' in the definition of the 
soul as a second potency, having organs and being in potency to life seem per-
fectly compatible, at least, if the potencies in question are not continuously 
exercised. 
Although it is relatively easy to combine Aristotle's three variants of the 
definition, at least at first sight, the elements of the definition were debated in 
much detail in the medieval commentary tradition. One of the main reasons 
for these detailed discussions is that there is another difficulty in interpreting 
the definition of the soul, one which goes to the heart of Aristotelian meta-
physics. Aristode's definition is formulated in terms of 'act' and 'substance 
qua form'. Since both these terms are relative, referring to something in po-
tency to this act or a substance qua matter respectively, what exactly would be 
the counterpart of the act and substantial form in question? In other words, 
if the soul is a substantial form, then what counts as the matter of which it 
is the form? Suppose we say that this matter is just the body with all its or-
gans. In that case, the peculiar consequence arises that the form (having a 
soul) is already implied in the definition of the matter (a body with organs). 
O n e possible solution, which was quite popular, is shitting the interpretation of 'first' 
from a temporal sense to a hierarchical sense. The soul can then be called the first actuality 
in the sense that it is the most important and most determining actuality of the living being. 
It is what completes the living being. This solution is mentioned, for example, in NICOLE 
ORESME, QdA, 11.2, 131e0"84: "Similiter quod sit primus patet quia: si in animato est solum 
una forma substantialis, patet statim quod ilia est actus primus. Et si sint plures, adhuc anima, 
quae est ultima generatione, est prima perfectione et dat esse actualiter complete." It is also 
mentioned as a possible solution in JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, 11.3,82: "Vel potest dici aliter et 
satis rationabiliter quod, quamvis alique alie forme substantiales precedunt animam via gener-
ationis, tarnen anima est prior aliis via perfectionis et nobilitatis. Et ideo dicitur actus primus 
simpliciter." 
'"ARISTOTLE, De anima, II.1, 412b20-2: "When seeing is removed the eye is no longer an 
eye, except in name — no more than the eye of a statue or of a painted figure." 
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For according to Aristotle, unless something is actually alive (i.e., has a soul), 
it neither is a body nor has organs, except equivocally. But if the soul is already 
implied in the definition of its matter, then in what sense can this matter be in 
potency to the soul? If, however, we want to avoid the consequence that the 
soul is already implied in the definition of its matter, and take as the matter 
of the soul something which could be described as 'having life in potency but 
not actually', it is not very clear what would satisfy this criterion. And it is cer-
tainly not clear how whatever which might satisfy it, could also be described 
as a 'natural body which has organs'. On the other hand, if what functions as 
the matter of the soul cannot be described in either of these manners — as the 
organic body or as matter having life in potency but not actually—we seem to 
be left with an obscure definition of the soul that depends on the matter-form 
framework, but at the same time fails to provide the proper matter to which 
the soul is related as its substantial form. 
That there is a difficulty in Aristotle's definition of describing the matter of 
which the soul is the form is well known and has been convincingly analyzed 
in a seminal article by John Ackrill. ' l He rightly argues that it is not fully clear 
how the notions of matter and form are to be understood when considering 
the definition of the soul. Given that most of the things we might be willing to 
call a substance are in fact alive, if there really is a problem it is a fundamental 
one. 
As Ackrill points out, the difficulty in understanding the meaning of 
'form' and 'matter' in the definition of the soul arises because of a discrepancy 
in Aristotle's works between the kinds of things he uses as examples to show 
the meaning of the notions 'matter' and 'form' and the kinds of things he 
wants to apply these notions to.12 In Aristotle's examples we are normally 
able to single out the matter apart from its form, as we can, for instance, in 
a statue.13 The material out of which the statue is made, let's say bronze, is 
its matter, whereas its current shape, let's say its resemblance to the body of 
Socrates, is its form. The matter in question was already bronze before it 
was made into a statue, and it equally remains bronze while being a statue, 
albeit under another form. This example serves its purpose by demonstrating 
two important aspects of the matter-form relation. The first is that form 
" j . L. ACKRILL, 'Aristotle's Definitions of psuchê', in: J. BARNES, M. SCHOFIELD and R. 
SORABJI (eds.), Articles on Anstotle Vol 4· Psychology and Aesthetics, London. Duckworth, 
1979, 65-75 (originally published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 73 [1972-3], 119-
133) 
'
2ACKRILL, 'Aristotle's Definitions', 74. 
1
 ' For example in the elaborate discussion on the meaning of substance in ARISTOTLE, Meta-
physica, VII 3, 1029a3-6. Compare also ARISTOTLE, Phystca, 1.7, 191a9-12, where the relation 
between substance and nature is explained by reference to a statue and a bed. 
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is always something realized in matter, which is an important step away 
from Plato's description of self-subsisting forms.14 The second, perhaps 
most important aspect is that matter is what functions as the underlying 
substrate (ύποκεΐμενον) of change and endures even through generation and 
corruption.15 The bronze qualifies as the matter in this example, precisely 
because it is that which remains identical before, during and after the 
realization of the statue of Socrates. 
However, as Ackrill rightly argues, we are unable to single out some matter 
which has a soul as its formal complement in a similar manner as we could 
in the case of the bronze statue. For "the body we are told to pick out as 
the material 'constituent' of the animal depends for its very identity on its 
being alive, in-formed by psuchê."16 In other words, it is impossible for a 
body to be potentially alive, without by that very fact being also actually alive. 
If this analysis is correct, as I think it is, it does not necessarily imply that the 
application of the terms 'form' and 'matter' to natural substances is mistaken 
or useless. It does imply, however, that we should at least be mindful of a shift 
in the meaning of the matter-form correlation when we move from artifacts 
to natural substances. One should be very careful when referring to the body 
of a living being in abstraction from that living being as a whole.17 
'
4The exact ontologica! status of Plato's forms has been, and still is, the subject of much 
scholarly debate. But that these forms are in some way ontologically independent of their ma-
terial realizations is agreed upon by almost all scholars. For a summary of Plato's position and 
an introduction to the relevant literature, see for example: Allan Silverman, 'Plato's Middle 
Period Metaphysics and Epistemology', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2008 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/plato-
metaphysics/> (accessed on 8 February 2010): "To the extent that Plato recognizes the notion 
of existence, since being an essence seems, by Plato's lights, to be the superlative way to be, it is 
likely that Forms are both definitionally and existentially separate." 
15ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, VIII.1, 1042a33-b4: "But clearly matter is also substance; for 
in all the opposite changes that occur there is something which underlies the changes, e.g. 
in respect of place that which is now here and again elsewhere... and similarly in respect of 
substance there is something that is now being generated and again being destroyed, and now 
underlies the process as a 'this' and again underlies it as the privation of positive character." 
That something endures even through generation and corruption is extremely important to 
Aristotle. It is the only way to avoid that generation is the coming into being of something 
out of nothing. The absurdity of such a generation was captured in the adage ex nihilo nihil fit 
(ARISTOTLE, Physica, 1.4, 187a27-29). 
'
6ACKRILL, 'Aristotle's Definitions', 70. 
'
7The seeming impossibility of taking the body as matter in the same way as the bronze 
is matter for the statue is often expressed by the phrase that the body is 'essentially ensouled 
matter', meaning that it is impossible to refer to a body apart from its being ensouled. Aris-
totle's alleged commitment to such essentially ensouled matter is also at the root of the recent 
controversy on whether or not Aristotle is a functionalist (for an introduction to this debate see 
especially the articles by M. Burnyeat, J. Whiting and M. C. Nussbaum S( H. Putnam in the vol-
ume M. C. NUSSBAUM and A. OKSENBERG RORTY (eds.), Essays on Aristotle's De anima, Oxford: 
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It could be the case that the difficulties described above are only appar­
ent. There may very well be an interpretation of the relevant passages that will 
be able to pinpoint some matter for the soul that would meet all the require­
ments. In fact, Jennifer Whiting carefully argues for such an interpretation in 
an article entitled Living Bodies, claiming that "there are two distinct things 
Aristotle calls the 'matter' (ϋλη) of an animal: one (the organic body) is es­
sentially ensouled, while the other (the mixture of elements constituting the 
organic body) is only accidentally ensouled."18 Because Whiting's interpreta­
tion tries to solve the problems pointed out by Ackrill, her solution is (nec­
essarily) complex. It rehes on a sophisticated distinction between functional 
and compositional matter that play different roles in Aristotle's accounts. The 
functional matter is essentially ensouled, because it is defined by the life func­
tions it can perform. The compositional matter, by contrast, is not defined 
in a functional manner, but in terms of the mixture of the four elements of 
which it is composed. This enables it to perform the role of enduring sub­
strate in generation and corruption. In this second, compositional sense, the 
matter of the living body and that of the corpse can remain numerically iden­
tical, at least for some time.19 So when Aristotle says that a body is essentially 
Clarendon Press, 1992.) It is also the main reason why any comparison between Aristotle and 
post-Cartesian thinkers on the mind-body problem is so difficult, given that the term 'body' 
in Aristotle must make sense apart from the reference to a soul in order to make such a com­
parison. Miles Bumyeat, who is convinced that Aristotle is committed to essentially ensouled 
matter, draws the following conclusion from this: "Hence all we can do with the Aristotelian 
philosophy of mind and its theory of perception as the receiving of perceptible forms without 
matter is what the seventeenth century did: junk it." (M. BURNYEAT, 'IS An Aristotelian Philos­
ophy of Mind still Credible? A Draft', in: M. C. NUSSBAUM and A. OKSENBERG RORTY (eds.), 
Essays on Aristotle's De anima, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, 15-26, 26). 
18J. WHITING, 'Living Bodies', in: M. C. NUSSBAUM and A. OKSENBERG RORTY (eds.), Es­
says on Aristotle's De anima, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, 75-91, 76. Compare also the 
extensive discussion of this problem by Christopher Shields, who discusses the homonymie 
character of the word 'body' in C. SHIELDS, Order in Multiplicity. Homonymy in the Philosophy 
ofAnstotle, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999, 131-54. With Whiting and contra Ackrill, Shields 
distinguishes between two kinds of bodies, an organic and a non-organic body, albeit not pre­
cisely in the same sense as Whiting (SHIELDS, Order in Multiplicity, esp. 136-7, 152-3). In 
addition, and in striking contrast to Burnyeat, Shields argues that the fact that the word 'body' 
in Aristotle is used as a homonym is actually an argument in favor of a functionalist interpre­
tation of Aristotle (SHIELDS, Order in Multiplicity, esp. 134, 150-151, and 174). But in later 
articles, he no longer seems to view Aristotle in fiinctionalistic terms, for example, SHIELDS, 
'The Priority of Soul'. Sheldon Cohen also distinguishes between two kinds of bodies, the body 
and the BODY, and, like Shields, uses this distinction between the two kinds as an argument to 
refute Burnyeat's interpretation of Aristotle. See S. M. COHEN, 'Hylomorphism and Function-
alism', in: M. C NUSSBAUM and A. OKSENBERG RORTY (eds.). Essays on Aristotle's De anima, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, 57-73, esp. 69-70. 
"The matter of the living body and that of the corpse as a whole will only remain identical 
for some time, since much of the corpse's matter will decompose. But those material parts that 
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ensouled, since being a body is defined in terms of being able to exercise vital 
operations, he is talking about body in the functional, but not in the compo-
sitional sense.20 I will return to Whiting's interpretation later in this chapter, 
when I discuss Buridan.21 
The positions of Ackrill and Whiting clearly show some of the difficul-
ties in interpreting Aristotle's definition (which is one of the reasons why I 
presented their views before turning to late-medieval commentators). Given 
the difficulties that these modem commentators have in fully explaining Aris-
totle's definition of the soul even when they are sympathetic to it, it should 
not come as a surprise that we find the late-medieval commentators trying to 
come to terms with similar difficulties. But there is also a second reason for 
discussing precisely these two interpretations here. The respective positions 
of Ackrill and Whiting, and the difficulties and solutions they point to, have 
to a large extent already been formulated by late-thirteenth- and fourteenth-
century commentators.22 It will therefore be well worth the effort to look 
more closely at some of the later medieval interpretations, not only from an 
historical, but also from a philosophical standpoint. 
4.1.1 Thomas Aquinas's views on the matter of the soul 
In the discussions on method presented in chapter 3, it became clear that one 
of the consequences of the fact that Aquinas only composed an exposition type 
commentary on the De anima was that he wrote very little on aspects related 
to the method of the scientia de anima. This may even have given the im-
pression that his commentary is somewhat slavish, given that Aquinas seems 
not to have entered into these discussions precisely because he was explain-
ing Aristotle, who did not raise much doubt on these issues. Should such an 
impression have arisen, however, it will become clear in this chapter that it 
needs correcting, for Aquinas has much to say about Aristotle's definition of 
remain are, in this compositional sense, numerically identical to the matter of the living being. 
2 0 WHITING, 'Living Bodies', 84: "We are now in a position to see how Aristotle can con-
sistently claim both that the matter of an animal is essentially ensouled and that the matter of 
an animal is only accidentally ensouled. For Aristotle is talking about different things, each 
with different criteria of identity and persistence — one, the organic body and its function-
ally defined parts (including the homoiomerous ones); the other, the elements constituting 
homoiomerous parts." 
2
' ln section 4.3 on the identity of accidents. 
22Not surprisingly, this has (at least to my knowledge) not been noticed in the contem-
porary debates. Although Aristotle has become increasingly popular as an alternative to the 
Cartesian mind-body dualism, his medieval commentators are still almost completely ignored. 
A noteworthy exception is the excellent PASNAU, Thomas Aquinas. 
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the soul in his commentary on the De animaP 
When Aquinas comments on Aristotle's definition of the soul in De anima 
ILI, he begins by making some remarks on definitions in general. The most 
important of these are his remarks on the difference between the definition of 
an accident and the definition of a substance, for which he refers to Aristotle's 
Metaphysics: 
Sciendum est autem quod, sicut docet Philosophus in VII Methaphisice, 
hec est différencia inter diffinitionem substancie et accidentis quod 
in diffinitione substancie nichil ponitur quod sit extra substanciam 
diffiniti; diffinitur enim unaqueque substancia per sua principia 
materialia et formalia. In diffinitione autem accidentis ponitur aliquid 
quod est extra essenciam diffiniti, scilicet subiectum.24 
It must be known, however, as the Philosopher teaches in book VII of 
the Metaphysics, that there is the following difference between the def-
inition of a substance and that of an accident: in the definition of a 
substance, nothing is included which falls outside of the essence of the 
defined thing; for each and every substance is defined by its material 
and formal principles. In the definition of an accident, however, some-
thing is included which falls outside of the essence of the defined thing, 
namely a subject. 
Although Aquinas gives no example of a definition of a substance at this 
point, he does provide one definition of an accident: snubness (simitas) is a 
curvature of the nose.25 
It certainly seems clear that the accident in question (snubness) cannot be 
defined without reference to its subject (a nose) of which it is a certain shape. 
But it is not immediately obvious that the conclusions we can draw from this 
23
 For several other examples of how Aquinas incorporated his own philosophical views in 
his commentary, see BAZÂN, '13' Century Commentaries on De anima', 176-177, footnotes 
159 and 160. 
"T H O MA S AQUINAS, SentdeA, II.l, OS59"67. 
25The example is taken straight out of ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, VII.5, 1030bl4-34. Snub-
ness is also introduced in ARISTOTLE, Physica, 11.2, where it is used as an example in the context 
of an argument designed to show that natural philosophers should not only consider matter, 
but also form, at least up to a certain point; ARISTOTLE, Physica, II.2, 194a4-5: "Odd and even, 
straight and curved, and likewise number, line, and figure, do not involve motion; not so flesh 
and bone and man — these are defined like snub nose, not like curved." The argument ends in 
the well known distinction between the natural philosopher and the metaphysician that is so 
important for the methodology of the scientia de anima: ARISTOTLE, Physica, II.2, 194bl2-15: 
"And the student of nature is concerned only with things whose forms are separable indeed, 
but do not exist apart from matter. Man is begotten by man and by the sun as well. The mode 
of existence and essence of the separable it is the business of first philosophy to define." 
127 
CHAPTER 4. THE ARISTOTELIAN DEFINITION OF THE SOUL 
example could be extended to the definitions of accidents in general. Snub-
ness may just be a rather unique example, given that it can (by definition) 
only be found in a very specific type of subject, a nose, which is precisely the 
reason why it cannot be defined without reference to that particular subject.26 
But what about an accident that is not restricted to such a particular type of 
subject? Take for example whiteness. Following Aristotle, we could roughly 
define this property as being a certain color, thus avoiding a reference to any 
subject.27 But then, what is a color? It seems impossible to answer this ques­
tion without ultimately referring to some surface or volume of which color is 
a property, in which case the definition again involves a reference to a subject 
outside of the thing defined.28 Although Aquinas does not discuss another 
example than snubness in this context, he would certainly have defined the 
color white, or any other accident, along these lines; for he is convinced that 
no accident can ever be defined without reference to its subject. The fact that 
snubness can only be found in a very specific subject is ultimately irrelevant to 
the example. 
The main reason why an accident cannot be defined without reference to 
a subject is that an accident cannot exist without a subject. Taken by itself, an 
accident does not have a complete being, as Aquinas calls it, which means that 
2 6The close links between the definition of accidents and their ontological status in the late 
thirteenth-century debates is discussed in detail in S. EBBESEN, 'Concrete Accidental Terms. 
Late Thirteenth-Century Debates about Problems Relating to Such Terms as 'album", in: Ν 
KRETZMANN (ed.), Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy, Dordrecht [etc.]. Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1988, 107-174. 
2 7ARISTOTLE, Topica, translated by W. A Pickard-Cambndge, in: J. Barnes (ed.), The Com­
plete Works of Aristotle The Revised Oxford Translation, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1984, IV.l, 121a5-8, p. 203 refers to white as a species of color "To speak generally, the genus 
ought to fall under the same division as the species; for if the species is a substance, so too 
should be the genus, and if the species is a quality, so too the genus should be a quality, e g. 
if white is a quality, so too should color be." Aristotle employs a different description of color 
in ARISTOTLE, De anima, II.7, 418a28-b2: "Whatever is visible is color and color is what lies 
upon what is in itself visible; 'in itself here means not that visibility is involved in the definition 
of what thus underlies color, but that that substratum contains in itself the cause of visibility 
Every color has in it the power to set in movement what is actually transparent; that power 
constitutes its very nature. That is why it is not actually visible except with the help of light; it 
is only in light that the color of a thing is seen." That is, he defines color in terms of its effect 
on the surrounding medium. 
2 8
 At least on the traditional understanding of color as a property of the colored thing But 
the precise nature of color makes little difference for its status as example Either it will be a 
property of something, in which case it will refer to its subject in its definition, or it is some­
thing self-subsistent, in which case it would ipso facto be considered a substance within the 
substance-accident framework, and in which case it cannot be used as a counter-example to 
the required reference to a subject in the definition of any accident. Any exception to this could 
only be a miracle (and indeed, the discussions surrounding the Eucharist make liberal use of 
accidents not inhering in any substance while retaining their status as accidents). 
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it lacks something that is essential in order for it to exist.29 It is precisely be-
cause the subject is this essential element, that it forms a part of the definition 
of the accident.30 Such a definition of an accident was often called a defini-
tio per additamentum in contrast to a definitio essentialis which only applies to 
substances.31 It is now also clear why the essential definition of a substance 
includes no elements outside of the substance itself. Because a substance can 
exist on its own, it can also be defined on its own. 
Having established this distinction between the definition of a substance 
and the definition of an accident, Aquinas moves on to a discussion of the def-
inition of a substantial form. The reason for discussing accidents is, first, to 
show that the definitions of substantial and accidental forms have something 
in common. Both accidental and substantial forms have no complete essence, 
since they exist only as part of a composite substance. In line with Aquinas's 
reasoning on the definitions of accidents described above, this lack of a com-
plete essence implies that a substantial form can also not be defined without 
reference to something else that is essential for its existence, namely its proper 
subject or matter (proprium subiectum sive materia).32 If, in fact, the soul is 
a substantial form, then its definition must necessarily include a reference to 
its matter or subject. This last conclusion raises the question of what precisely 
the matter or subject of the soul is, which will turn out to be a rather difficult 
question. This difficulty is caused by a difference in the kind of subject that is 
required for an accidental form and the kind of subject that is required for a 
substantial form. 
29THOMAS AQUINAS, SentdeA, II. 1, 6867"73: "Oportet enim subiectum poni in diffinitione 
accidentis, sicut cum dicitur: 'Simitas est curuitas nasi'; et hoc ideo est quia diffinitio significai 
quod quid est res. Substancia autem est quid completum in suo esse et in sua specie. Accidens 
autem non habet esse completum, set dependens a substancia." 
30It should be noted that the existence of a subject is necessary only within the natural 
order. To be able to employ the notion of accident while discussing miracles, in particular the 
Eucharist, Aquinas has to redefine the relation between an accident and its subject. Given that, 
according to Aquinas, the accidents of the consecrated bread do not inhere in a substance, he 
redefines the notion 'accident' by reducing the actual inherence in a substance to a mode of 
being instead of the essence of an accident; for a detailed analysis of Aquinas's position on the 
status of accidents in the Eucharist, see P. J. J. M. BAKKER, La raison et le miracle. Les doctrines 
eucharistiques (e 1250 - e. 1400), PhD Thesis, 2 vols, Nijmegen, 1999, esp. vol. 1, 294-302. 
See also E. GILSON, 'Quasi Definitio Substantiae', in: A. A. MAURER [E.A.] (ed.), Sf. Thomas 
Aquinas 1274-1974. Commemorative Studies, vol. 1, Toronto: Pontifcal Institute of Mediaeval 
Studies, 1974, 111-129, esp. 121-125. 
31
 For the distinction between an essential definition and a definition by addition, see ARIS-
TOTLE, Metaphysica, VII.5, 1031al-13. Compare AA 1:164 and 165. 
32THOMAS AQUINAS, SentdeA, ILI, 69el"83: "Unde, cum anima sit forma, oportet quod in 
diffinitione ipsius ponatur materia siue subiectum eius." 
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Per animam enim intelligimus id quo Habens vitam vivit. Unde oportet 
quod intelligatur sicut aliquid in subiecto existens (ut accipiatur hie 
large subiectum, non solum prout subiectum dicitur aliquid ens in actu, 
per quem modum accidens dicitur esse in subiecto, set etiam secun-
dum quod materia prima, que est ens in potencia, dicitur subiectum). 
Corpus autem quod recipit vitam magis est sicut subiectum et materia 
quam sicut aliquid in subiecto existens.33 
For by soul we understand that by which something having life lives. 
Therefore it is necessary that it be understood as something existing in 
a subject. 'Subject' here is taken in a broad sense, not only as a subject 
is said to be a being in act (in which manner we say an accident is in 
a subject), but also according to which we call prime matter (which is 
a being in potency) a subject. The body, however, that receives life is 
more like a subject and matter than like something existing in a subject. 
In this passage we find the same similarity between accidents and substan-
tial forms that Aquinas had introduced in the previous passage on definitions. 
Both accidents and substantial forms are not self-subsistent, but exist in some 
subject, which was the reason why they could not be defined without refer-
ence to this subject. This time, however, the difference between them is artic-
ulated more precisely. Although both accidents and substantial forms exist in 
a subject, accidents always exist in some actual subject — that is to say, some 
particular existing thing —, whereas substantial forms exist in a different kind 
of subject.34 This subject of a substantial form can be called a subject only in 
a broad sense. 
Unfortunately, the passage quoted above is not fiilly clear on the details 
about this subject of a substantial form. Prime matter, which is a being in 
potency, is introduced as an example of a broader application of the notion 
'subject'. But is the implication of this passage that prime matter is in fact 
the subject of the soul? Or is the example of prime matter only invoked to 
draw attention to the necessary potentiality of whatever is the subject of the 
soul? To answer this question, it is necessary to look more closely at the man-
ner in which Aquinas analyzes composite substances in general. Conveniently 
enough, Aquinas himself makes this digression — not found in Aristotle — 
immediately after this description of the subject of the soul. 
As is well known, one of the central tenets of Aquinas's thought is the strict 
distinction he maintains between accidental and substantial forms. Whereas 
accidental forms make something be in some qualified sense, for example 
" T H O M A S AQUINAS, SentdeA, II.l, 70207-2'6. 
34
 For some alternative medieval attempts to formulate the difference between substantial 
and accidental forms, see R. PASNAU, 'Form, Substance, and Mechanism', The Philosophical 
Review, 113:1 (2004), 31-88, 32-33. 
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blue, or two meters tall, substantial forms make something be unqualifiedly 
and per se, for example a man, or a horse.35 The accidental form makes some-
thing be in a qualified manner, because it always qualifies some already exist-
ing subject. The term 'already existing' should be taken in the ontological and 
not in the strictly temporal sense. For it is, of course, impossible for a sub-
stance to come into existence without any accidents whatsoever. Aquinas's 
point here is only that there is a strict ontological dependence of accidents on 
their substance.36 
The substantial form, on the other hand, cannot be ontologically depen-
dent on a prior existing subject, since it makes something to be in an unqual-
ified manner. If a substantial form were ontologically dependent on a prior 
existing subject, this subject would only be modified in some qualified sense 
by the substantial form, in which case the strict distinction between substan-
tial and accidental forms collapses. At the same time, the substantial form 
must inform something, since that is precisely the function of any form, be it 
substantial or accidental. Since this "something" that is informed by the sub-
stantial form cannot be something existing in actuality, it must be something 
existing in mere potentiality, that is, it must be prime matter.37 Prime matter 
is the ultimate substrate of change, and is that which is informed by substan-
tial form. Here we encounter, once more, Aquinas's famous position of the 
unicity of substantial form. 
One of the main reasons for Aquinas to accept Aristode's definition of the 
soul is its ability to account for the fundamental unity of any living being in 
general, and of man in particular. The soul is not just any act of a living being, 
it is its first and substantial act, the very act that makes a thing to be what it is. 
By implication, the unity of soul and body is not just any (accidental) unity, 
but it is the most fundamental unity there is: the unity of a substance. Soul and 
body are not two different things, temporarily joined together. Rather they 
constitute one single substance. Even though this description becomes more 
complicated when the immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the body 
is accounted for, it is important to keep in mind that all these complications 
are consistently resolved by Aquinas within the framework of a fundamental 
substantial unity of man — and of any substance for that matter —, which is 
"THOMAS AQUINAS, SentdeA, II. 1, 7\2A2-247: "Sciendum est autem quod hec est differentia 
inter fomiam accidentalem et substancialem, quod forma accidentalis non facit ens actu sim-
pliciter, set ens actu tale vel tantum, ut puta magnum vel album vel aliquid aliud huiusmodi, 
forma autem substancialis facit esse actu simpliciter." 
36That is, the existence of a particular accident implies the existence of the particular sub-
stance it is an accident of, but not vice versa. 
37THOMAS AQUINAS, SentdeA, II.1, 712 '""2 5 ' : "Forma autem substancialis non aduenit 
subiecto iam preexistenti in actu, set existenti in potencia tantum, scilicet materie prime." 
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guaranteed by the fact that (1) every substantial form informs prime matter 
directly, and its counterpart that (2) every substance has one substantial form 
only. 
But seen from this perspective, Aquinas's remarks on definitions in his 
commentary on the De anima start to seem puzzling. Recall that he argued 
that when defining accidental as well as substantial forms, we need to posit 
their subject in their definition. But the subject posited in the definition of the 
soul is 'a natural organic body having life in potency', whereas he just argued 
that the subject of the soul is the same as the subject of any other substantial 
form, that is, prime matter. And it seems impossible to uphold both these po-
sitions at the same time. So either the subject of the soul is not prime matter, 
or the soul is a very peculiar substantial form in the sense that in its definition 
we need to posit something outside of it that is not its subject, but something 
else. 
After explaining the difference between accidental and substantial forms 
in his lecture on De anima II. 1, Aquinas claims that this distinction invalidates 
the hierarchical plurality of substantial forms in substances — where matter 
receives a succession of increasingly complex substantial forms — defended 
by Avicebron in his Pons vitae.38 When Aquinas gives his brief description of 
this position, he makes it very clear why he considers it false. The passage is 
worth quoting at length. 
Oportet enim secundum premissa dicere quod una et eadem forma 
substancialis sit per quam hoc Individuum est hoc aliquid sive substan-
cia et per quam est corpus et animatum corpus et sic de aliis; forma 
enim perfectior dat materie et hoc quod dat forma minus perfecta et 
adhuc amplius. Unde anima non solum facit esse substanciam et cor-
pus, quod etiam facit forma lapidis, set etiam facit esse animatum cor-
pus. Non est ergo sic intelligendum quod anima sit actus corporis et 
quod corpus sit eius materia et subiectum, quasi corpus sit constitutum 
per unam formam que facial eum esse corpus et superveniat ei anima 
faciens ipsum esse vivum corpus, set quia ab anima est et quod sit et 
quod corpus sit et quod sit corpus vivum. Set hoc quod est esse corpus, 
quod est inperfectius, est quasi materiale respectu vite.39 
"For Avicebron as the source for the theory of the plurality of forms (mediated by Do-
minicus Gundissalinus), see above, p. 38, footnote 82. 
3
'THOMAS AQUINAS, SentdeA, II.I, 71265-282; compare THOMAS AQUINAS, STA, 1.76, a. 4, 
224 (ad rationes): "Ad tertium dicendum quod in materia considerantur diversi gradus per-
fectionis, sicut esse, vivere, sentire et intelligere. Semper autem secundum superveniens priori 
perfectius est. Forma ergo quae dat solum primum gradum perfectionis materiae est imperfec-
tissima. Sed forma quae dat primum et secundum et tertium et sic deinceps est perfectissima; 
et tarnen materiae immediata." 
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For according to what was said previously, it is necessary to say that it 
is one and the same substantial form by which this individual thing is a 
particular or substance, and by which it is a body and an animated body, 
and so on. For the more perfect form gives to matter both that which 
the less perfect form gives and something more. Therefore the soul not 
only brings about being substance and being body — something which 
the form of a stone does as well — but also being animated body. It 
should not be understood, therefore, as if the soul were the act of a body 
and that body were its matter and subject, as if body were constituted by 
one form that makes it be a body and the soul supervenes on it, making 
it a living body. But rather it should be understood that it is by the soul 
that it exists, that it is a body, and that it is a living body. But being a 
body, which is less perfect, is as it were matter with respect to life. 
This passage leaves no doubt that the soul informs prime matter just as 
any other substantial form does. In addition, the passage also shows one of 
Aquinas's metaphysical principles — that the higher can do everything the 
lower can do and something more in addition —, as applied to substantial 
forms. Let us call this the hierarchy principle, as we will encounter it several 
times more. In the context of substantial forms it means that one single sub-
stantial form gives the whole range of perfections that are proper to a given 
substance; the soul not merely animates a living being, but it also gives it its 
corporeality, and, indeed, its substantiality. Most importantly for our present 
purposes, the final sentence of the passage provides a clue for the interpre-
tation of Aquinas's definition of the soul: being a body, although it is less 
perfect, is in a manner of speaking matter with respect to life. The body is not 
strictly speaking the matter of the soul, but functions in the definition as if it 
were the matter of soul.40 It is clear, however, that the matter that is informed 
by the soul cannot in the strict sense be a part of the definition of the soul in 
the same manner as the subject of an accident is included in the definition of 
that accident, because the soul informs prime matter, which, taken in itself, 
has no properties whatsoever; it is just pure potency. Prime matter cannot 
be a part of the definition of the soul, because it cannot even be described 
in itself, apart from its relation to substantial form. However, it is still nec-
essary to posit something outside of the soul in the definition of soul, since 
the soul (as a substantial form) is dependent on a subject for its very being. 
Aquinas's solution then is to say that there is indeed something other than the 
soul posited in the soul's definition, which in this definition functions seman-
tically as its matter or subject, although it is not its matter or subject in the 
strict metaphysical sense. 
•"Oompare also the passage quoted on p. 129 where the body was referred to as being 'magis 
sicut subiectum et materia quam sicut aliquid in subiecto existens.' 
133 
CHAPTER 4. THE ARISTOTELIAN DEFINITION OF THE SOUL 
But then, in exactly what sense does the natural organic body having life in 
potency function as a quast subject in the definition of the soul? To answer this 
question, we should first determine the meaning of the potency in question, 
something which Aristotle himself had also done: 
We must not understand by that which is potentially capable of living 
what has lost the soul it has, but only what still retains it; but seeds 
and fruits are bodies which are potentially of that sort. Consequently, 
while waking is actuality in a sense corresponding to the cutting and the 
seeing, the soul is actuality in the sense corresponding to sight and the 
power in the tool; the body corresponds to what is in potentiality; as 
the pupil plus the power of sight constitutes the eye, so the soul plus the 
body constitutes the animal.41 
In his interpretation of this passage, Aquinas distinguishes between two 
senses of potency. In the first sense, being in potency to something means 
lacking the power to do that thing. In the second sense, being in potency to 
something means having the power to do that thing, while not doing it at the 
moment.4 2 This second sense is intended in the definition of the soul accord­
ing to Aquinas. This means that the body having life in potency is not a body 
that lacks a soul, which would correspond to the first sense of being in po­
tency, but rather a body that has a soul although it does not actually exercise 
all its powers. In a similar way, the eye is in potency to seeing not in the sense 
that it lacks sight, but in the sense that it has the power of sight even when it 
does not actually see something. This makes it clear that the body having life 
in potency is a body that already has a soul. I think it is accurate to summa­
rize Aquinas's position as follows: the very notion of a 'natural organic body 
having life in potency' is unintelligible if we try to understand it without refer­
ence to the soul, since soul is precisely the formal principle which constitutes 
this 'natural organic body having life in potency.'43 Aquinas reads the passage 
in Aristotle quoted above carefully and points out that the seeds and fruits 
that Aristotle mentions are not themselves the bodies that are mentioned in 
the definition of the soul. Rather, they are capable of becoming such bod­
ies. Fruits and seeds are in potency to becoming such 'natural organic bodies 
having life in potency'.44 
•"ARISTOTLE, De anima, ILI, 412b25-413a3. 
" T H O M A S AQUINAS, SentdeA, II 2, 75 1 0 β -" 2 
'''Recall that this was AcknU's claim also. See above, section 4.1 
""THOMAS AQUINAS, SentdeA, 11.2, 75120"24· "Set verum est quod semen et fiructus, in quo 
conservatur semen plante, est in potencia ad huiusmodi corpus vivum quod habet ammanr 
nondum enim semen habet animam, set est in potencia ad animam." In other places Aristotle 
hesitates when it comes to the question of whether we should say that seed is potentially a man; 
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Most of the elements of Aquinas's interpretation have now been discussed. 
But it might be useful to return one more time to the quasi material role the 
natural organic body having life in potency fulfills in the definition of the soul. 
The clearest expression of the precise meaning of quasi material is, however, 
not found in the Sentencia libri De anima, but in the Quaestiones disputatae de 
spiritualibus creaturis: 
Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum forma perfectissima det omnia que 
dent forme imperfectiores et adhuc amplius, materia, prout ab ea per-
ficitur eo modo perfectionis quo perficitur a formis imperfectioribus, 
consideratur ut materia propria respectu illius modi perfectionis quern 
addit perfectior forma super alias, ita tarnen quod non intelligatur hec 
distinctio in formis secundum essentiam set solum secundum intelli-
gibilem rationem. Sic ergo ipsa materia secundum quod intelligitur 
ut perfecta in esse corporeo susceptivo vite est proprium subiectum 
anime.45 (my emphasis SdB) 
As to the second <objection>, it must be said that the most perfect form 
imparts everything that the more imperfect forms impart and some-
thing more. Therefore matter, according as it is perfected by this form 
<i.e. the soul> in the same kind of perfection wherein it is perfected 
by more imperfect forms, is considered to be proper matter in relation 
to that kind of perfection which the more perfect form adds over and 
above the others. But it is so in such a way that this distinction among 
forms is not understood as something based on their essence, but only 
as something based on their intelligible concept. Thus, therefore, mat-
ter itself according as it is understood to be perfect in corporeal being 
capable of receiving life, is the proper subject of the soul. 
This passage confirms the interpretation of Aquinas as given so far. The 
body to which Aristotle refers in his definition is not really the matter for the 
soul (for this can only be prime matter), but is considered by us to be proper 
matter for the soul, insofar as it exemphfies the perfections that were imparted 
by the previous, less perfect substantial forms.46 But strictly speaking, even 
these perfections are in reahty given by the soul, because it imparts all that the 
perhaps what is potentially a man has a slightly more complex structure than seed. ARISTOTLE, 
Metaphysica, IX.7, 1048b36-1049a3: "But we must distinguish when a thing is potentially and 
when it is not; for it is not at any and every time. E.g. is earth potentially a man? No — but 
rather when it has already become seed, and perhaps not even then." 
"THOMAS AQUINAS, QdSpir, a. 3, ad. 2,4543IM8». 
•""'Previous' should be taken here in the temporal sense. Although at any one point in time 
a substance can have only one substantial form, in the order of generation there is a succession 
of substantial forms. In this succession, the next, more perfect substantial form corrupts the 
previous one, and imparts all the perfections of the previous form and something more to the 
substance. 
135 
CHAPTER 4. THE ARISTOTELIAN DEFINITION OF THE SOUL 
lower forms imparted and something more. This passage thus finally makes 
clear the precise sense in which the natural body having life in potency is quast 
material in the definition of the soul. For although it is true that every sub-
stantial form informs prime matter, and in a sense, therefore, all substantial 
forms inform the same (i.e. prime) matter, it is usually more informative to 
refer to matter as already having some form. When we speak about matter 
in this latter sense, we must say that only specific types of matter-form com-
posites are capable of turning into specific types of substances. In the case 
of living beings, what serves as matter are semen, seeds and fruits. These are 
not living substances, but they are capable of becoming living substances. The 
reason that they are not living substances is that they lack an actual soul.47 In 
Aquinas's terms, this means that they are capable of turning into substances 
of such complexity that they become properly disposed to being alive. 
To sum up, as Aquinas understands the definition of the soul, the 'nat-
ural organic body having life in potency' is not really the matter of the soul, 
although it functions in the definition as if it were the matter of the soul. In-
stead, when the soul informs prime matter, this natural organic body is the 
result, which has prime matter as its material principle, and soul as its formal 
principle. The quasi matter which is included in the definition of the soul does 
not exist as such before the body is actually ensouled.48 As a result, the terms 
'having life in potency' and 'organic' are interchangeable, since both point to 
the fact that a living body can perform a variety of operations even when it 
does not actually perform them, for instance, when it is asleep.49 
Aquinas's interpretation of the definition of the soul corresponds closely 
to the interpretation given by Ackrill.50 Ackrill pointed out that in the defi-
nition of living beings in particular, but also in natural substances in general, 
we are not able to single out the matter apart from the form. For "the body 
we are told to pick out as the material 'constituent' of the animal depends 
47ARISTOTLE, De generatione ammahum, translated by A. Piatt, in: J Barnes (ed ), The 
Complete Worfcs of Anstotle The Revised Oxford Translation, Princeton Princeton University 
Press, 1984, 737al7-18, p. 1144: "It has been settled, then, in what sense the embryo and the 
semen have soul, and in what sense they have not; they have it potentially but not actually." 
•"Compare THOMAS AQUINAS, QdA, q. 1, I2',53"'<il (ad rationes): "Ad quintum decimum 
dicendum quod in diffimtiombus formarum ahquando ponitur subiectum ut informe, sicut 
cum dicitur: 'motus est actus existentis in potentia'. Ahquando autem ponitur subiectum 
formatum, ut cum dicitur 'motus est actus mobilis' et 'lumen est actus lucidi' Et hoc modo 
dicitur anima actus corporis organici physici, quia anima facit ipsum esse corpus orgamcum 
sicut lumen facit aliquid esse lucidum " 
4 , THOMAS AQUINAS, SentdeA, ILI, 723*0"365: "Et dicit quod si aliqua diffinitio communis 
debeat assignan que conveniat omni anime, ent hec: Anima est actus primus corporis phisici 
organici Non autem oportet addere: 'potentia vitam habentis'. Loco enim hums ponitur 
orgamcum, ut ex dictis patet." 
^See above, p. 123 
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for its very identity on its being alive, in-formed by psuchê."51 This is what 
Aquinas claims as well. The body only functions quasi materially in the def-
inition, but is not the soul's matter in the sense in which the bronze is the 
matter of a statue. The important difference between Ackrill and Aquinas, 
however, lies in how they judge the impossibility of pointing out the matter 
of the soul. Ackrill thinks that the application of the matter-form correlation 
to natural substances is very problematic. Since the meaning of the matter-
form distinction is grounded in the context of artifacts, the distinction is ill 
suited to be applied to natural substances and their powers. Aquinas, on the 
other hand, is not only untroubled by our inabUity to point out the matter of 
the soul, but even considers this to be fundamental for the matter-substantial 
form relation. Precisely because a living body is not an artifact it is impossible 
to single out its matter apart from its form.52 The consequence of this is that 
it is also impossible to define properly the form apart from its matter. Any 
adequate definition of the substantial form of a natural substance necessarily 
includes a description of the proper matter in which it is realized. Only in 
artifacts, where the form is accidental and not substantial, can we identify the 
matter apart from the form, which is precisely why we do not count artifacts 
as real substances.53 
4.1.2 The Anonymi 
Aquinas's discussion of the definition of the soul is exceptionally detailed. No 
such detailed exposition can be found in any of the anonymous commentaries 
of the 1270s. The treatment by Anonymus Bazin in particular is extremely 
brief. But even brief treatments can give us insight into what elements of 
51
 ACKRILL, 'Aristotle's Definitions', 70. 
"THOMAS AQUINAS, SentdeA, II. 1, 68-6976"83: "Unde substancia composita sic diffinitur 
quod in eius diffinitione non ponitur aliquid quod sit extra essenciam eius. In omni autem 
diffinitione forme ponitur aliquid quod est extra essenciam forme, scilicet proprium subiectum 
eius sive materia. Unde, cum anima sit forma, oportet quod in diffinitione ipsius ponatur 
materia sive subiectum eius." 
51
 Aquinas was fully aware of the difference between Aristotle's examples of the matter-
form relation (in which he keeps referring to artifacts) and the real relation between matter 
and substantial form (where matter cannot be pointed out apart from the form). But instead 
of thinking that the use of artifacts makes the real relation difficult (or even impossibile) to 
interpret, he describes the use of such examples as a proper didactic tool. THOMAS AQUINAS, 
SentdeA, II.2, 74, 14-25: "Quia enim forme artificiales accidencia sunt que sunt magis nota 
quo ad nos quam forme substanciales, utpote sensui propinquiora, ideo convenienter rationem 
anime, que est forma substancialis, per comparationem ad formas accidentales manifestât <i.e. 
Aristoteles SdB>. Similiter etiam partes anime sive potencie eius manifestiores sunt quo ad 
nos quam ipsa anima (procedimus enim in cognitione anime ab obiectis in actus, ab actibus 
in potencias, per quas anima ipsa nobis innotescit), unde convenienter etiam per partes ratio 
anime manifestatur." 
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the definition were being singled out as standing in need of an explanation. 
The discussions by the Anonymi can be grouped into three themes, the first 
of which is the characterization of the soul as form with its connotation of 
actuality. This is followed by the discussions on the phrase 'having life in 
potency'. The final theme concerns the subject of the soul. 
The soul: matter or form? 
The problem with the characterization of the soul as form (as it appears in the 
anonymous commentaries) is that there are several similarities between the 
soul and matter; all of these seem to indicate that the soul is matter rather than 
form. Three properties in particular seem to point to such an identification 
of the soul with matter: its potentiality (est in potentta), its passivity (patttur) 
and its receptivity (est receptivum). Since form was considered to be the active, 
determining principle of a substance, an explanation of the existence of these 
properties was needed. Anonymus Bazân and Anonymus Van Steenberghen 
both discuss this topic. It is dear, however, from the length and style of their 
treatment that it was not considered to be a serious philosophical problem; for 
that, the intuition that the soul is the active principle of the vital operations was 
much too strong. Their repUes are almost identical, both of them pointing out 
that the soul's likeness to matter is only superficial, for although both matter 
and soul are receptive, passive and potential, they are so in respect of different 
things, and, more importantly, in different ways: 
Sed intelligendum propter dissolutionem ratioms, quod receptio am-
mae et materiae primae non sunt unius ratioms receptiones, quia re-
ceptiones differunt secundum diversitatem receptorum et secundum 
modum recipiendi.54 
But in order to dissolve the argument (according to which the soul is 
matter SdB), one should realize that the receptivity of the soul and of 
prime matter are different kinds of receptivity, because receptivities dif-
fer according to a difference of the received things and according to the 
manner of receiving. 
Whereas matter is in potency to real forms (formas reales), the soul is in 
potency to intentional forms (formas intelhgtbiles et intenttonales).55 To un-
5 4 A N O N Y M U S V A N STEENBERGHEN, QdA, II.2, 199-2003a~33 See also ANONYMUS B A Z A N , 
QiM.II . l^OS-MM 3 5 -" . 
55The difference between real and intentional forms is surprisingly difficult to formulate. 
A formulation solely in terms of cognitive capacities (or the lack thereof) is insufficient, since 
forms can also exist intentionally in a medium, such as air or water (the so-called species m 
medio). This difficulty in formulating what the difference consists in is one of the main reasons 
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derstand this argument, one must be aware of the outlines of medieval Aris-
totehan theories of cognition. Cognition (both intellectual and perceptual) 
was characterized as a certain kind of change in the living being, analogous to 
the various non-cognitive changes found in nature. Within this model, every 
change, whether cognitive or non-cognitive, is described as the reception of 
a particular form by a particular subject. Once a cognitive theory is phrased 
in terms of a reception of forms, some sort of difference is required between 
those forms taken on in cognition and those forms taken on in non-cognitive 
changes. For it must be possible to distinguish between taking on the form of 
blue by becoming blue, and taking on the form of blue by seeing or under-
standing blue; otherwise we would not have a theory of cognition. One of the 
ways of accomplishing such a separation is by distinguishing between two dif-
ferent kinds of forms, real forms (that make something blue) and intentional 
forms (that makes one cognizant of blue).56 
This difference between real and intentional forms corresponds to a dif-
ference in the manner in which these forms are received. Characteristic of 
the reception of a real form in matter is that the reception is always accom-
panied by a corruption of a contrary form, which is expressed in the adage 
'the generation of one thing is the corruption of another' {generano unius est 
why the discussions about Aquinas's theory of perception — that often focus on the question 
'what is the intentional reception of a form?' — are so difficult to decide. For an interesting ex-
ample of this, see the influential article by S. M. COHEN, 'St. Thomas Aquinas on the Immaterial 
Reception of Sensible Forms', The Philosophical Review, 91:2 (1982), 193-209, and the replies 
by P. HOFFMAN, 'St. Thomas Aquinas on the Halfway State of Sensible Being', The Philosoph-
ical Review, 99.1 (1990), 73-92, and M. M. TWEEDALE, 'Origins of the Medieval Theory that 
Sensation Is an Immaterial Reception of a Form', Philosophical Topics, 2 (1992), 215-231 The 
most promising route for formulating the difference between intentional and real reception 
is, I think, not in terms of cognitive-non-cognitive, but in terms of efficient causality, some-
thing which also brings to the fore that intentional reception is always contrasted with natural 
reception. When a subject has a form merely intentionally, that subject will not display the 
normal causal powers associated with that form. For example, if a subject has the form of heat 
only intentionally, that subject is unable to warm something else through that form. Of course 
this still leaves open the difficult task of giving an account of the difference between having and 
not-having a form intentionally. Several medieval attempts are analyzed in detail in D. PERLER, 
Theorien der Intenttonalitat im Mittelalter, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002. 
' 'The difference between the two kinds of forms is formulated in terms of their existence, 
and not in terms of their essence. The same form 'blue', to stick with the example, can exist 
in two different ways, either real, or intentional. Also, the intentional reception of a form 
only results in cognition if that in what the form is received is a knower. Air, for example, 
is also able to receive forms intentionally. For an introduction to late-medieval theories of 
cognition, see especially R. PASNAU, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages, Cambridge 
[etc.]: Cambridge University Press, 1997 and K. H. TACHAU, Vision and Certitude in the Age of 
Ockham Optics, Epistemology, and the Foundations of Semantics 1250-1345, Leiden [etc ]: Brill, 
1988. 
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corruptio altenus).57 For example, when the form of heat is received in water, 
the contrary form of cold that the water previously had will be corrupted. The 
reception of an intentional form, however, is not accompanied by the cor-
ruption of a contrary form, which is why such a reception is more properly 
described as a perfection than as a change.58 This difference was considered 
to give enough grounds to distinguish between the soul and prime matter. 
Having life in potency 
A more important (and more controversial) aspect of the definition, which is 
discussed in the commentaries of Anonymus Giele and Anonymus Van Steen-
berghen, is its final part, the 'having life in potency' of the organic body. The 
question of how this should be interpreted is closely linked to the question of 
what kind of body functions as the subject of the soul. The problem with this 
part of the definition — that Anonymus Giele focuses on and which also occu-
pied much of Aquinas's attention — is that it refers to life as potential whereas 
one would expect a reference to life as actual. For if the soul is the principle 
of life, then whatever has a soul must be actually living and not merely po-
tentially.59 Aquinas had solved this problem by appealing to the distinction 
between first and second potencies. 'Having life in potency' refers to the fact 
that the vital operations of a living being are not continuously active (that is, 
they are always in second potency, but not always in second act). But even 
when they are not active, as, for example, sight is inactive during sleep, the 
living being is still alive. Hence the soul is the act of what has life in (second) 
potency, and the vital operations are the actualizations of that potency. The 
Anonymi take the same approach. For instance, in the words of Anonymus 
Van Steenberghen: 
"ARISTOTLE, De generattone et corrupttone, translated by H. H. Joachim, in J. Barnes (ed.), 
The Complete Works ofAnstotle The Revised Oxford Translatton, Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1984,1.3, 318a23-25, p. 520; ANONYMUS, AA, 4:7. 
58ANONYMUS BAZÀN, Q<M, ILI, 404',3^,8. "Dico quod duplex est passio. Quaedam est pas-
sio proprie dieta, quaedam improprie. Propria autem passio est ilia quae fit cum abiectione 
alicuius, ut quando homo est in bona disposinone et tunc, malo sibi advemente, dia disposino 
abicitur et iste patitur. Alia est passio improprie dicta, quae idem est quod salus et perfectie, et 
hoc cum addinone, et non patitur proprie " Alternatively, one could also deny that the soul is, 
properly speaking, a being in potency. This approach was favored by JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, 
ILI, 68-69: "Et cum dicitur quod anima non est ens in actu dico quod immo, licet istud com-
mumter non dicatur. Et probo quia: sicut materia se habet ad potentia, sic forma ad actum, 
sed vere et proprie potest dici quod materia est ens in potentia, ergo vere et proprie potest dici 
quod forma substantiahs est ens in actu " 
5,The problem is formulated explicitly in one of the arguments given in ANONYMUS GIELE, 
QdA, II.3, 6627"29: "Videtur quod non, quia vita et anima sunt idem; ergo anima in actu, vita 
in actu; ergo habens ammam in actu, vitam in actu est habens; ergo anima est actus habentis 
vitam in actu, non in potentia." 
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Unde attendens Aristoteles ad huiusmodi operationes in actu dicit quod 
anima est actus corporis habentis vitam in potentia. Unde dicit Aris-
toteles quod haec potentia non abicit animam. Aliquid enim potest 
esse in potentia ad huiusmodi operationes et tarnen habet principium 
huismodi operationum, ut animam.60 
Whence Aristotle — paying close attention to such operations <that is, 
sensing or understanding Siiß> in act — says that the soul is the act of 
a body having life in potency. Whence Aristotle says that this potency 
does not exclude the soul. For something can be in potency to such 
operations and nevertheless have the principle of such operations, as 
the soul. 
Although the passage does not employ the terminology of first and sec-
ond potencies, it is clear that the same distinction to which these terms are 
normally applied is also made here. The potency of which Aristotle speaks in 
his definition of the soul is the potency to actually exercising the various op-
erations (second potency) and not the potency to being able to exercise these 
operations (first potency). In Anonymus van Steenberghen's terms: the body 
potentially alive has the soul as the principle of the vital operations, whether 
it exercises these operations or not. 
Anonymus Giele is even more clear on what kind of body the definition 
of the soul refers to: 
Unde quoniam corpus est habens animam secundum modum, secun-
dum quern non semper est in postremo actu, ideo dicitur actus viventis 
in potentia, ita quod corpus habens animam non est vitam habens in 
potentia sicut semen vel fructus, nee in postrema perfectione vitae, sed 
medio modo: ut sicut habens scientiam in habitu, non sicut penitus 
ignorane, nee tarnen sicut actu considerans.61 
Hence because the body is something which has a soul in the second 
manner, according to which it is not always in the final act, <the soul> 
is called the act of what is alive in potency, in such a way that the body 
that has a soul is not something which has life in potency in the manner 
of seeds or fruit, nor which is in the final perfection of life, but in an 
intermediate way: as that which has knowledge habitually, not as that 
which is fully ignorant, nor as that which is actually considering the 
knowledge. 
^ANONYMUS VAN STEENBERGHEN, QciA, II.4, 20217"21. The proximate source for this was 
most likely Averroes who likewise interprets the part 'having life in potency' as meaning that 
the soul is a power that is the source of the various manifestations of life. AVERROES, Commen-
tanum magnum in DA, IIA, 13444^β: "Et dixit 'habens vitam in potentia'. Idest, et necesse est ut 
in anima sit substantia secundum quod est forma corporis naturalis habentis vitam secundum 
quod dicitur habere illam formam in potentia, ut agat actiones vite per Ulam fonmam." 
6 1
 ANONYMUS GIELE, QdA, 11.3,66-67^^°. 
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In close correspondence to Aquinas, Anonymus Giele is careful not only to 
distinguish the body having life m potency (in the definition of the soul) from 
a hypothetical body that would exercise all of its vital operations continuously, 
but also from bodies that are potentially alive, in the manner in which seeds 
and semen are. He compares the latter type of bodies to the state of being 
ignorant, that is, the state in which we simply lack knowledge. The living body, 
by contrast, he compares to the habitual state of having knowledge, that is, 
the state in which knowledge has been acquired but is not actively used at the 
moment.62 Yet in contrast to Aquinas and Aristotle who mention seeds and 
semen only briefly in the context of the De anima, and then only to exclude 
them from the definition of the soul, Anonymus Giele raises two questions 
(II.7-8) on whether the semen has a soul and if so in what manner, something 
which is very uncommon in commentaries on the De anima. Interestingly, the 
reason why he asks these questions in such detail is not so much the passage 
from the De anima where Aristotle calls seeds and semen potentially bodies of 
the kind that the definition of the soul refers to (De anima II. 1, 412b25-27)> 
but instead the following passage from De generatione ammalium: 
It is not only necessary to decide whether what is forming in the female 
receives anything material, or not, from that which has entered her, 
but also concerning the soul in virtue of which an animal is so called 
(and this is in virtue of the sensitive part of the soul)— does this exist 
originally in the semen and in the embryo or not, and if it does whence 
does it come? For nobody would put down the embryo as soulless or 
in every sense bereft of life (since both the semen and the embryo of an 
animal have every bit as much of life as a plant), and it is productive up 
to a certain point 63 
The use of this passage from Aristotle's De generatione ammalium is sur-
prising, for it is not normally introduced in this context in medieval commen-
taries on De anima. But it is also fortunate, since Anonymus Giele's descrip-
tion of the status of semen clearly shows how he perceives the exact difference 
between the organic body in potency to life, which occurs in the definition of 
soul, and the semen. 
What makes semen and seeds and the like so interesting as a contrast to 
the body to which Aristotle's definition of the soul refers is that, although they 
62The comparison to knowledge is suggested in ARISTOTLE, De anima, II 1, 412a9-ll 
"Now matter is potentiality, form actuality; and actuality is of two kinds, one as e g knowl-
edge, the other as e g reflecting." 
"ARISTOTLE, De generatione ammalium, II 3, 736a27-35 The answer is summarized in 
737al7-18 "It has been settled, then, in what sense the embryo and the semen have soul, and 
in what sense they have not, they have it potentially but not actually." 
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are not living bodies in the sense of having organs, they do seem to have a cer-
tain innate capacity to develop into such a body as the passage quoted above 
indicates. This is why Anonymus Giele wants to call semen and seeds 'en-
souled' in some sense of the word, while at the same time he wants to uphold 
the fundamental difference between what has a capacity for becoming a living 
thing and what actually is a living thing. He tries to do justice to both these 
considerations by claiming that seeds and semen do not have a soul secundum 
substantiam but they do have a soul in virtute. The technical term 'in virtute' 
derives its meaning from the contrast with having something substantially. If 
something has a soul substantially, that soul is part of its essence and of its def-
inition. If something has a soul only in virtute, it displays some of the powers 
that something substantially ensouled would display, without the soul actually 
being part of its essence and definition.64 
Anonymus Giele's description of the presence of the soul according to its 
powers in seeds and semen gives rise to the further question concerning the 
cause of these powers. It cannot be the soul because the presence of the soul 
according to its powers was introduced in contrast to a real substantial pres-
ence of the soul. His reply is that the efficient cause of the existence of the soul 
in virtute in the semen is the father's soul. But this is easily misunderstood. It 
means much more than just that the father is the efficient cause of the semen. 
Rather, it means that the power that is present in the semen is an accident of 
the soul of the father even though its subject is the semen. Taken on its own, 
the semen has no formative power. All this power derives from the father's 
soul, even when the semen is no longer present in the father's body.65 This is 
counter-intuitive, to say the least. But it makes it very clear that Anonymus 
Giele wants to avoid at all costs turning the semen into something which can 
be called alive. The semen has no soul. And even though it has formative 
MThis is why it is often better to translate the terms 'in virtute'/'virtualiter' and (in those 
cases where it is used as its synonym) 'in potentia'/'potentialiter' by 'according to its/their pow-
ers' (potentiae/vtrtutes) rather than the possibly misleading translations 'potentially/vntually' 
65ANONYMUS GIELE, QdA, II.8, 8271"77 (ad rationes): "Tunc dico quod virtus animae effec-
tive sit a substantia animae patns Tarnen est tale accidens quod non est in substantia animae 
sicut in subiecto, sed recipitur istud accidens in alio, ita quod dicatur esse virtus animae, non 
quia sit ems ut subiecti, sed quia effective est a substantia animae, ut dicit Commentator quod 
formae immatenales générant formas materiales per virtutes quas dederunt generantia semi-
nibus." Strange as this may sound, grounding the formative power of the semen in the soul of 
the father is in fact a very plausible interpretation of Aristotle's biology of generation, in spite 
of the philosophically peculiar situation that arises, according to this account, when the father 
dies after copulation but before conception. For in that case, according to this theory, the se-
men would have to lose its formative powers as soon as the father dies, making conception 
impossible. For a clear analysis of Aristotle's account of generation along these lines see H J. 
FOSSHEIM, Nature and Habituation in Aristotle's Theory of Human Development, PhD Thesis, 
University of Oslo, 2003, esp 35-39. 
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powers, these powers are ontologically grounded in the father's soul and not 
in the semen itself. 
Returning to the interpretation of 'having life in potency' in Aristotle's 
definition of the soul, we have seen that Aquinas and the Anonymi Van Steen-
berghen and Giele agree that the body having life in potency must be a body 
which is in first actuality to life, but not, or at least not constantly, in second 
actuality. But it turns out that there is a difficulty with their interpretation 
when we apply it to the vegetative soul. Aristotle had implied — and Averroes 
had emphasized — that the vegetative soul is continuously in second act to its 
nutritive operations.66 If this is truly the case, and it seems reasonable enough 
to suppose, then it means that the body is never in second potency to these 
operations of the vegetative soul. That, in turn, would imply that the defi­
nition of the soul is not applicable to the vegetative soul, since the required 
kind of second potency (one that is sometimes in second act and sometimes 
not) that the definition of soul (habentis vttam in potentia) requires is lacking 
there. The oversight is peculiar, for the difficulty that the interpretation of 
Aristotle's definition in terms of first and second potency raised for the vege­
tative soul must have been known. Especially since Averroes himself had used 
precisely this continuous activity of the vegetative soul to point out that the 
term 'perfection' is already used equivocally when apphed to the vegetative 
and sensitive souls, since one of them is always in its second perfection (the 
vegetative soul), whereas the other is always in its first but only sometimes 
in its second perfection (the sensitive soul).67 Averroes employs the resulting 
equivocity of the definition as apphed to the vegetative and sensitive souls as 
an argument to downplay the importance of a universally applicable defini­
tion of soul.68 For if there cannot even be a univocal definition applicable to 
both the vegetative and sensitive souls, trying to find one that is applicable to 
all three souls is obviously a futile exercise. 
It is particularly surprising that Anonymus Giele does not see the diffi­
culty with the vegetative soul in this solution, since he explicitly introduces 
the continuous activity of the vegetative soul (citing Averroes) in the context 
6 6ARISTOTLE, De anima, ΠΑ, 416bl2-14; AVERROES, Commentanum magnum in DA, II 5, 
136''6"52: "Anima autem nutritiva nunquam invemtur in ammahbus nisi secundum postremam 
perfectionem, nisi aliquis ponat quod sit quidam modus ammahum qui non nutntur in aliquo 
tempore, scilicet in tempore in quo manet in lapidibus, ut rane magne, que nichil thesaunzant 
et manent tota hyeme in lapidibus, et similiter plures serpentes " 
67Michael Scotus's Latin translation of Averroes's commentary uses the term perfectto in­
stead of actus when rendering Aristotle's definition. Averroes discusses the equivocation of the 
definition in AVERROES, Commentanum magnum m DA, II.5. 
6 8
 See DoiG, 'Towards Understanding Aquinas' Commentanum in de anima', 440—441 
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of the definition of the soul.69 In addition, he mentions that the presence of 
the principle of an operation will always result in the exercise ofthat operation 
unless there is some impediment.70 But in his reply to these arguments he ig­
nores the vegetative soul completely and discusses the case of a sleeping man 
instead, thus switching to the sensitive soul where the problem of continuous 
activity does not exist. A man who sleeps does not perceive although he has 
a soul: this is something that can, indeed, be explained by distinguishing be­
tween first and second potencies. But such a reply does not address, let alone 
solve, the difficulty concerning the vegetative soul, since there the problem is 
that the soul is never in second potency, but always in second actuality. 
That their interpretation of Aristotle's definition would seem to exclude 
the vegetative soul from the definition seems to have escaped these commen­
tators. In fact, most commentators either fail to see or ignore this problem. 
And even when the problem was noticed, as is the case in Brito's commentary, 
the solution is not very convincing.71 Almost all the focus in the commen­
taries on the De anima is on the sensitive and intellective souls. Although the 
vegetative soul is mentioned often enough, it receives little discussion. 
6 9ANONYMUS GIELE, QdA, 112, 6620"21 (rationes)· "Praeterea, nutritiva semper est in 
postrema perfectione, ut dicit Commentator; ergo et sensitiva." 
7 0ANONYMUS GIELE, QdA, II.2,6614~19. Walter Burley also refers to the continuous activity 
of the vegetative soul by quoting Averroes: WALTER BURLEY, ExpdA [unpublished transcrip­
tion by Paul Bakker], II.3, f 2Γ 3 "Contra- si diffinitio esset sic intelligenda, non conveniret 
omni anime. Nam anima nutritiva nunquam est m potentia ad operationes vite, quia, per 
Commentatorem secundo hutus, anima nutritiva nunquam invenitur cum animalibus nisi se­
cundum postremam perfectionem " However, Burley does not follow Averroes in calling the 
definition of the soul equivocal on account of this. Instead, he claims that the term 'in po­
tency' is used in a meaning that is common to the vegetative and other souls without specifying 
what sort of commonality this is. WALTER BURLEY, ExpdA [unpublished transcription by Paul 
Bakker], II.3, f. 23 v t ,: "Ad aliud dicendum quod 'potentia' accepta in diffinitione anime non 
accipitur precise pro potentia ante actum nee pro potentia in actu, sed accipitur secundum 
quod est communis ad potentiam cum actu et ad potentiam ante actum etc." 
7 1 RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, I I . 5 1 0 0 " " 6 . "Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'quod habet vitam in actu', 
verum est, non habet vitam in potentia remota ab actu, sed bene potest habere vitam in potentia 
comuneta actui. Vel aliter, sicut dictum est in posinone: verum est quod non est in potentia 
ad actum pnmum vite, sed bene est in potentia ad actum secundum, qui est operan quantum 
ad ammam sensitivam et intellectivam. Et quantum ad vegetativam est in potentia comuneta 
actui ad actum secundum, quia ilia numquam cessât a sua operatione." If we can stretch the 
meaning of the 'having life in potency' this far, then why should 'in potency' be included as a 
part of the definition' Especially since all living bodies have at least a vegetative soul and are 
therefore continuously in second actuality for at least part of their vital operations. Or, to put 
it another way, if 'having life in potency' merely refers to the fact that a living being is able to 
excersise its vital operations, the definition of every substantial form should include the phrase 
'having Ρ in potency', where Ρ is some description referring to whatever activity is essential for 
that substance. 
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Substantial or accidental act? 
Apart from the similarities between the soul and matter and the meaning of 
the phrase 'having life in potency' in the definition of the soul — with its 
connections to the question of the subject of the soul — there is a third theme 
that is clearly identifiable in these anonymous commentaries: the question of 
whether the soul can be a substantial act when the body it informs needs a 
variety of dispositions to make it suitable for the presence of life. Given that 
the soul does not inform random pieces of matter, but only those, such as an 
embryo, which already have a great variety of dispositions that enable them 
to function as matter for the soul, how can we explain that these dispositions 
must necessarily be present prior to the advent of the soul? This may seem 
like an odd question. Of course these dispositions must be present prior to 
the advent of the soul: how else could we explain that the generation of a 
living being is a process in which the body becomes gradually more complex 
until it is able to perform the full range of vital functions that are connected 
to the type of living being it is? But from the perspective of a matter-form 
metaphysics, which holds that each substance can have only one substantial 
form, the question is not easy to answer. 
If one holds that there can be only one substantial form in any substance 
— which immediately informs prime matter — then either these dispositions 
seem to be unnecessary, or the soul seems to be an accidental form. Suppose 
these dispositions remain: then the soul informs a subject that already has 
some degree of actuality. But given the basic principles of the unicity position, 
every form that informs something having actuality, no matter how small the 
degree, is ipso facto an accidental form. As a matter of fact, those philosophers 
who were convinced of the existence of a plurality of substantial forms in a 
substance often referred to these necessary dispositions to support their posi-
tion.72 This is sound philosophical strategy on their part, since the necessity 
of prior dispositions is a powerful natural-philosophical argument in favor of 
a plurality of substantial forms. If, on the other hand, these dispositions are all 
corrupted at the moment the soul is introduced, then the question arises why 
they were needed in the first place. This might not strike us as a pressing ques-
tion, but one of the fundamental axioms in Aristotelian natural philosophy is 
72For example WILLIAM DE LA MARE, Correctonum, In pnmam partem Summae, art. 32, 
145: "Praeterea. Nunquam corrumpitur unum similium ad inducendum aha simiha; hoc enim 
otiosum esset. Ergo natura non corrumpit accidentia praecedentia infusionem ad inducendum 
aha penitus simiha post infusionem. Restât ergo quod sunt eadem accidentia permanentia. 
Sed praecedentia praecedebant animam rationalem in materia, ergo et ilia quae constat ibi esse 
post infiisionem. Et ideo media sunt inter animam et corpus, sive inter animam rationalem et 
materiam." 
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that nature does nothing in vain (natura nihil facit frustra).73 So if a theory 
referred to an action on the part of nature, of which the relevance could not 
be explained, this was perceived as a sure sign that the theory was false. 
Although all three Anonymi, and in fact practically all late medieval com-
mentators, deny that the necessity of prior dispositions turns the soul into an 
accidental form, they vary greatly in both their ability to explain the situation 
and the extent to which they are aware of the potential problems. Anonymus 
Giele, for instance, understands that the necessity of a properly disposed body 
(or, strictly speaking, a properly disposed piece of matter) prior to the soul 
could be a problem for the substantiality of the soul and tries to solve it. But 
his solution raises many more questions than it answers. Claiming that the 
consequence that the soul would be an accidental form only arises when the 
soul informs something that is already informed by another substantial form, 
he denies the presence of a substantial form in the disposed body in question. 
Since the dispositions are merely accidents, which according to his view are 
not grounded in an already present substantial form, their presence is per-
fectly consistent with the substantiality of the soul.74 What happens when the 
soul is introduced, is that this piece of matter with all its accidental disposi-
tions finally receives a substantial form, something which it lacked before. But 
although this reply is logically coherent, it is difficult to be satisfied with the 
answer. For how can accidents be present without a substantial form being 
present simultaneously? And what substance do they inhere in prior to the 
advent of the soul, if any? Anonymus Giele neither raises nor answers these 
metaphysical questions. 
Anonymus Van Steenberghen is more aware of the difficulties that can 
arise when we call dispositions necessary. Since he is equally strict as Aquinas 
in his views of what a substantial form is (namely that through which the 
substance receives all of its actuality), he denies that some other act exists in 
the animated body prior to the advent of the soul. 
Et cum assumitur quod animae in corpore animato praeexistit alius ac-
tus, dico quod falsum est, quia nee praeexistit corpus in actu, nee sub-
stantia in actu, nee corpus organicum : imo ista omnia rationem habent 
ex anima et causantur per animam.75 
7 3 ARISTOTLE, Deanima, 111.9, 432b21-23; A N O N Y M U S , AA, 6:168. 
' ' 'ANONYMUS GIELE, QdA, II. 1, óS23"99 (ad rationes): "Item, cum dkis: est actus corporis 
sicut materiae et hoc est ens in actu, dico quod nihil prohibe! formam substantialem esse actum 
alieuius entis in actu, non per formam substantialem, sed per aliquod aeeidens. Sed quod 
forma substantialis sit actus alieuius entis in actu per formam substantialem prius dantem esse 
Uli suae materiae, hoc est impossibile; sed quod sint aliquae dispositiones bene est necessarium, 
ut organicum, physicum etc." 
7 5 A N O N Y M U S V A N STEENBERGHEN, QdA, II.3, ZOl35"39. Compare also A N O N Y M U S V A N 
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And when it is assumed that some other act preexists in the animated 
body prior to the soul, I say that this is false. For there neither preexists 
a body in act, nor a substance in act, nor an organic body in act. On the 
contrary, all these have their ratto from the soul and are caused by it. 
While strongly endorsing the unicity of substantial form, with its impli-
cation that even the actuality of the body qua body must necessarily be the 
result of the soul, Anonymus Van Steenberghen denies the existence of an 
organic body prior to the soul. He ascribes the alternative position of the plu-
rality of forms to the ancient philosophers {Antiqui).76 But the manner in 
which he tries to explain the status of the required dispositions is not com-
pletely satisfactory. For although it is true, within the unicity framework, that 
the substantial form is the formal cause of all perfections of the body, even of 
the body's being a body, the soul is, as was said, not introduced into random 
bits of matter. Only certain things, such as seeds and semen, are capable of 
becoming living things through a gradual acquisition of the required disposi-
tions. But the question why certain dispositions are necessary for an organic 
body to come into being — let alone what happens to them — is not raised 
by Anonymus Van Steenberghen. 
Even when in one of the questions in his commentary ('Whether the soul 
is immediately united to the body') the necessary existence of such disposi-
tions is introduced as an argument against an immediate unity of soul and 
body, Anonymus van Steenberghen merely replies by reiterating his position 
that no perfections, including dispositions, can precede the soul when the soul 
is the substantial form of the body.77 Although he is completely justified in 
saying this, given his conviction that there can only be one substantial form 
in a substance, the problematic questions of why these dispositions must be 
present and what happens to them during and after the advent of the soul 
still remain unanswered. Indeed, it almost seems as if Anonymus Van Steen-
berghen ignores their role by placing all emphasis on the soul as the formal 
cause of all perfections of the living body. 
Anonymus Bazàn, who incidentally has the shortest section on the defini-
tion of the soul of all these three authors, is the first commentator to formulate 
STEENBERGHEN, QdA, II 5, 20433"37: "Nonne corpus est naturale et physicum? Dico quod om-
nia isla habet corpus ab anima secundum diversas rationes et operationes ems: unde con-
siderando corpus praeter animam, non ent corpus in actu, sed solum in potentia; item, nee 
substantia in actu sine anima, sed solum m potentia." 
^ANONYMUS VAN STEENBERGHEN, Q Î M , II.3, 20248. 
77ANONYMUS VAN STEENBERGHEN, Q Î M , II.5, 2043β"'2 (ad rationes). "Ad aliud dicendum 
quod actus pnmus immediate unitur matenae; et omnes dispositiones, sive sint ipsius formae 
vel matenae, omnes sequuntur umonem formae cum materia, sive ipsum aggregatum: unde 
anima non praeexigit corpus orgamcum, sed per animam est corpus orgamcum." 
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the beginnings of a more satisfactory position. He tries to do justice to both 
aspects that are found in Anonymi Giele and Van Steenberghen: the necessity 
of properly disposed matter prior to the advent of the soul, on the one hand, 
and the soul as the formal cause of all the perfections of the body, including 
its being a body, on the other. His answer will turn out to be so important for 
the later tradition that is worth citing in full: 
Per hoc ad argumenta. Ad primum, cum dicitur: 'quidquid advenit enti 
in actu est accidens et forma accidentalis', verum est si illud ens in actu 
manet ens in actu. Et dicis in minore quod anima advenit enti in actu. 
Dico quod, anima adveniente, dispositiones omnes quae sunt in mate-
ria destruuntur et reducuntur ad animam. luxta quod notandum quod 
quando puer est in utero matris non habet animam, sed ibi tantum sunt 
quaedam dispositiones; et quia, quando anima advenit, tunc illae dis-
positiones corrumpuntur et anima introducitur, et omnes dispositiones 
ad animam reducuntur, ergo illae dispositiones ad animam reducuntur; 
ergo illae dispositiones non manent ens in actu, sed corrumpuntur. Et 
ita in instanti anima introducitur.78 
By this I reply to the arguments. To the first, in which it is said 'what-
ever comes to a being in act is an accident and an accidental form', this 
is true if that being in act remains a being in act. And you say in the 
minor premise that the soul comes to a being in act. I say that when 
the soul arrives all dispositions that are in matter are destroyed and re-
duced to the soul. In this respect it should be understood that when 
a child is in the mother's womb it has no soul, but there are only cer-
tain dispositions there. And when the soul arrives, these dispositions 
are corrupted and the soul is introduced, and all dispositions are re-
duced to the soul. Therefore these dispositions are reduced to the soul. 
And therefore these dispositions do not remain a being in act, but are 
corrupted. And thus the soul is introduced in an instant. 
In this passage, the unicity of substantial form — and the corresponding 
insight that no accidental perfection of a substance can be ontologically prior 
to the substantial form — is guaranteed by the corruption and regeneration of 
every disposition that existed prior to the advent of the soul. At the moment 
in which the soul is introduced, all previously existing dispositions of the body 
are corrupted. But the passage also acknowledges the factual existence of these 
dispositions prior to the advent of the soul. There is no attempt to claim that 
because the soul is the substantial form, it directly informs prime matter and 
therefore does not require any preceding dispositions. Anonymus Bazàn's re-
ply to the argument clearly presupposes that there are dispositions prior to the 
7 8 A N O N Y M U S B A Z À N , QdA, II.2, 4052! 
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soul, which is precisely why he attempts to explain what happens to them at 
the arrival of the soul. His realization that the question what happens to dis-
positions at the moment the soul is introduced must be raised and answered 
gives Anonymus Bazan an important place in the commentary tradition on 
the De anima. 
Anonymus Bazan's treatment is extremely brief and not fully clear, with 
its still slightly hesitant terminology: 'corrumpuntur' is clear enough, but 're-
ducuntur' is at the very least ambiguous on the question of whether these per-
fections remain numerically identical throughout this change. Still, this is, as 
far as I am aware, the first instance of a De anima commentary in which a 
metaphysical perspective that insists on the strict unicity of substantial form 
is combined with a natural-philosophical perspective which describes the gen-
eration of an organism as a process. It is characteristic of the De anima com-
mentaries from that moment on that this combination is made, and that, as 
a result, some new problems are discussed with increasing intensity. I will re-
turn to these new discussions in detail in section 4.3. For now, suffice it to say 
that the combined perspective as it is found in Anonymus Bazen raises new 
questions. The fundamental question is whether the perfections before and 
after the advent of the soul are numerically identical. This Anonymus Bazân 
denies; according to him they have a specific, but not a numerical identity.79 
In addition, given that the accidents before and after the advent of the soul 
are numerically distinct, what is the cause of the corruption of the first set of 
accidents? According to Anonymus Bazan this cause is the natural agent that 
disposed the matter prior to the advent of the soul.80 Ultimately, the combi-
nation of the two perspectives (metaphysical and natural-philosophical) will 
change the manner in which Aristotle's definition is discussed. 
4.2 Fourteenth-century interpretations 
From the late-thirteenth century onward, an alternative approach to explain-
ing Aristotle's definition became popular. Several fourteenth-century philoso-
phers began to treat it as if the soul were placed in a semi-Porphyrian tree, 
taking each element of the definition as analogous to a specific difference. Al-
though strictly speaking it is not the substantial form that can be described in 
terms of genus and difference, but only the substance itself, the analogy is not 
7 ,ANONYMUS BAZAN, QdA, 11.2, ΊΟδ4 6"4 8: "Et dicis quod anima advenit enti in actu orga-
nizato. Dico quod illae organizationes omnes, adveniente anima, in animam reducuntur et 
corrumpuntur numero, sed specie non." 
8 0ANONYMUS BAZÀN, Q<ÌA, II.2, 4054<M3: "Dico ad hoc quod illae dispositiones non cor-
rumpuntur propter animam, sed propter agens naturale, quia agens naturale disponit mate-
riam ad hoc quod, anima adveniente, dispositiones materiae corrumpuntur." 
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far-fetched. The popularity of this approach surely had to do with the fact that 
it was so well suited for didactic purposes, but perhaps also with the fact that 
in much of the earlier discussions on the definition of the soul, the question 
what type of substance the soul is the form of was always such a central ele­
ment. It seems just a small step from there to discussing the definition of the 
soul in a manner analogous to the definition of a substance.81 In this section I 
will first sketch the use of this new approach by the fourteenth-century com­
mentators. Next, I will discuss how these same commentators also continued 
to discuss the problematic aspects of Aristotle's definition. 
The 'Porphyrian' approach to Aristotle's definition can be found in John 
of Jandun, John Buridan, Anonymus Fatar, and Pierre d'Ailly, all of whom 
give a very similar explanation, differing mostly in their explanation of the fi­
nal part ('having life in potency').82 Jandun and d'Ailly explain the definition 
in the following manner: by using the term 'act', Aristotle wants to exclude 
prime matter that is in pure potency. By adding the term 'first', he wants to 
exclude all second acts, which are identified as the various operations and mo­
tions of the living being. By adding the term 'of a body', he wants to exclude 
all acts of a living being that are also called first acts, but that do not belong 
to the body. These are the various intellectual dispositions, such as knowl­
edge, virtue and mastery of an art. By adding the term 'natural' (or 'physical'), 
they continue, Aristotle wants to exclude all artifacts, leaving only the natural 
bodies of which, by adding the term 'organic', the simple homogeneous ele­
ments are also excluded. Finally, by adding 'having life in potency' he means 
to exclude the corpse that remains when the living being dies (Jandun) or the 
bodies that are seeds or semen (d'Ailly). 
Buridan and Anonymus Fatar offer a slightly different explanation, partly 
because they use a definition of the soul that differs subtly from the one used 
by Jandun and d'Ailly. The two variants of the definition are the following: 
8 1
 What makes this step even smaller is that the immortality of the soul and its continued 
subsistence after death gives it many of the characteristics normally associated with a primary 
substance. 
e2JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, II.3, JOHN BURIDAN, QdA, 11.3, 37-39, ANONYMUS FATAR, QdA, 
ΠΑ, 535-537, and PIERRE D'AILLY, Tractatus de anima, in: Ο. Fiuta, Die philosophische Psy­
chologie des Peter von Ailly. Em Beitrag zur Geschichte der Philosophie des spaten Mittelalters, 
Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner, 1987, c. 1, tertia pars: explanationis dearticulatio, 6. Although 
NICOLE ORESME, QdA, IM, 131-2 also discusses each part of the definition separately, I do not 
include him in this group. Instead of using the different parts of the definition to clearly dis-
tinguish the ensouled being from non-living things, Oresme has a completely different agenda. 
He offers two alternative interpretations for most of the parts of the definition. In this manner, 
he tries to show how Aristotle's definition is compatible with both the unicity and the plurality 
of substantial form frameworks. This clearly distinguishes his approach from the 'Porphyrian' 
approach. 
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- anima est actus primus corporis physici organici potentia vitam habentis (Jan-
dun, d'Ailly) 
- anima est actus primus substanttalis corporis physici organici potentia vitam 
habentis (Buridan, Anonymus Fatar)83 
Buridan and Anonymus Fatar side with d'Ailly on the function of 'having 
life in potency' and say that its function is to exclude seeds and semen.84 But 
they offer alternative interpretations for 'of a body' and 'physical'. According 
to them the function of 'of a body' is not to exclude anything, but to indi-
cate the material cause of the soul. Similarly, the function of 'physical' is not 
to exclude anything, but to indicate the soul's relation to motion and natu-
ral operations (Buridan) or to designate that the soul's relation to the body is 
natural (per naturam) and not artificial {per artem) (Anonymus Fatar). Buri-
dan and Anonymus Fatar do exclude knowledge and other habits, similar to 
how Jandun and d'Ailly interpreted 'of a body', but assign this role to the term 
'substantial', which was lacking in the definition used by Jandun and d'Ailly. 
Discussing Aristotle's definition as if it consisted of a semi-genus and 
semi-specific differences gives the definition a clarity that was often lost when 
it was discussed by looking at the potentially problematic parts in detail. 
Taking the definition as a whole, it accurately points to that class of beings 
that we would be willing to call alive. After expounding the meaning and 
function of the different elements of the definition, Jandun even exclaimed: 
"see how reasonably and beautifully Aristotle defines the soul, because no 
element is placed there superfluously, but all usefully and aptly!"85 
But no matter how beautiful and useful the elements of this definition 
may be, explaining them in this manner is a way of sidestepping and avoid-
ing the various difficulties connected with it. This is why this explanation was 
not perceived as a replacement for a more detailed analysis of the various ele-
ments.86 
83This variant is also used in the Lokert edition of Bundan's commentary and in Oresme's 
commentary 
'•"Olaf Pluta, the editor of d'Ailly's treatise, noted the similarities between d'Ailly's explana-
tion of the elements of the definition and Bundan's (as it is found in the Lokert edition of his 
De anima commentary). See O. PLUTA, Die philosophische Psychologie des Peter von Ailly Ein 
Beitrag zur Geschichte der Philosophie des spaten Mittehlters, Amsterdam. B. R. Grüner, 1987,6, 
footnote 7. But given that d'Ailly sides with (andun, both in the formulation of the definition 
(that is, without using the term 'substantial') and in the explanation of the terms 'of a body' 
and 'physical', Jandun's commentary is the more likely source. 
e5JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, II.3, 80: "Ecce quam rationabiliter et pulchre Aristoteles définit 
animam, quia nulla particula superflue ponitur, sed utihter et commode1" 
"Except in the case of Pierre d'Ailly. I will return to this in chapter 5 6 
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For the most part, the arguments and themes found in the three anony-
mous commentators continue to be used in the later commentary tradition, 
but the discussions tend to become more elaborate. To show the develop-
ments in the discussions in the period after the Anonymi, I will group the 
arguments into two basic themes, proceeding from the less to the more con-
troversial: the substantiality of the soul and the actuality of the body. The 
last of these themes leads fourteenth-century commentators into an elaborate 
discussion of the dispositions of the living body, which will be treated in a 
separate section. 
4.2.1 The substantiality of the soul 
Although none of the fourteenth-century commentators really doubted that 
the soul is a substantial form, the same objections against this position that 
were raised in the thirteenth century were still being discussed in the four-
teenth.87 In particular the soul's likeness to matter in some respects and the 
reference to the body in the definition of the soul continued to be discussed. 
Material characteristics 
The potential character of the soul and the other characteristics it seems to 
share with matter were still discussed in a similar manner as before, but with 
more sophistication. When Jandun replies to the argument that the soul is 
passive and is therefore more like matter than like form, he is no longer sat-
isfied with making the traditional distinction between being passive properly 
speaking (in which case the reception of a form implies the corruption of con-
trary forms) and being passive in a way which has to do more with perfection 
87That the description of the soul as a substantial form had become commonplace is also 
shown by the fact that the council of Vienne (16 October 1311-6 May 1312) adopted the de-
scription of even the intellective soul as form. See above, p. 40, footnote 87. This council's 
decision was made in the context of the condemnation of the teaching of Peter Olivi. See E. 
MÜLLER, Das Konzil von Vienne 1311-12. Seine Quellen und sein Geschichte, Munster: Aschen-
dorff, 1934, esp. 352-85 and T. SCHNEIDER, Die Einheit des Menschen. Die anthropologische 
Formel 'anima forma corporis' im sogenannten Korrektorienstreit und bei Petrus Johanms Olivi. 
Ein Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte des KonziL· von Vienne, Munster: Aschendorff, 1973, esp. 247-257. 
Olivi's views on the soul-body relation are discussed in R. PASNAU, 'Olivi on the Metaphysics 
of Soul', Medieval Philosophy and Theohgy, 6 (1997), 109-132. What was at stake in the coun-
cil's formulation was to guarantee the essential human nature of Christ. But an unexpected 
side effect of this decision turned out to be the promotion of the unicity of substantial form 
paradigm. Even though the council makes no decision on the question of whether there is one 
substantial form or whether there are many in any substance — its formula of the rational soul 
is compatible with both — most commentators seem to have interpreted it as endorsing the 
unicity paradigm. 
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(in which case the reception of a form does not imply the corruption of con­
trary forms).88 As he (rightly) points out, the soul is not only passive in the 
sense that has to do with perfection, but it is also passive in the proper sense. 
Almost everything connected to the sensitive and vegetative soul is, in fact, 
passive properly speaking.89 Instead of denying that the soul is passive in the 
strict sense, Jandun denies the principle underlying the argument that if some­
thing is passive in the strict sense, it must be matter. According to Jandun, if a 
substantial form is either essentially or operationally related to matter, it can 
and will be passive even if it is not matter.90 This solution is much more sat­
isfactory than the previous attempts by the Anonymi. But again, the fact that 
the soul has something in common with matter, is not seen as a particularly 
pressing philosophical problem, neither in the late-thirteenth nor in the four­
teenth century. All commentators were convinced that the soul is a substantial 
form, something they argued for in various ways. 
Substantiality confirmed 
Although each commentator had his own set of arguments to demonstrate the 
substantiahty of the soul, two arguments in particular became popular in the 
period following the Anonymi and are found in almost all commentaries. 
The first of these refers to the soul's nobility. The argument goes as fol­
lows: the soul is nobler than any accident; therefore the soul is not an accident 
but a substance. This 'nobility argument' finds its origin in Averroes and had 
8 8
 See p. 139. 
8 9 J O H N OF JANDUN, QdA, II.2, 72· "Ad aliam, cum dicitur quod patitur etc., dicunt ahqui 
quod duplex est passio, ut patet per philosophum in isfo secundo. Quaedam est passio proprie 
dicta, et quod tali passione patitur non est forma substantiahs et talis passio est ad dispositiones 
corruptivas Alia est passio improprie dicta, que est salus et perfectio, et quod tali passione pat­
itur bene est forma substantiahs. Modo dicunt quod anima non patitur primo modo, sed 
secundo modo. Quare etc. Posset responden quod intelligunt de pati subiective et non ter­
minative. Sed istud non valet, quia anima vegetativa et sensitiva non patiunt solum secundo 
modo sed etiam primo modo." 
" Ί Ο Η Ν OF JANDUN, QdA, II.2, 72: "Et ideo ahter dico. Cum dicitur 'illud quod patitur 
etc ', dico quod duplex est forma. Quaedam est liberata omnino a matena, et talis forma non 
potest esse illud quod patitur, nee passione proprie dieta nec passione improprie dieta. Alia est 
forma matene coniuncta vel secundum esse vel secundum ems primam operationem, et talis 
forma bene potest esse illud quod patitur sive passione proprie dieta sive passione improprie 
dieta. Modo talis forma est anima Quare etc " The difference between being essentially related 
to matter and operationally related to matter plays a large role in Jandun's description of the 
human intellect. Being essentially related to matter means being the form ofthat matter in the 
strict sense. Being operationally related to matter, by contrast, means being the form of that 
matter in the sense of using the matter as an instrument for performing some operation. For 
the importance of these two meanings of substantial form in Jandun, see BRENET, Transferts 
du sujet, 52-59. 
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been reintroduced by Anonymus Giele.91 Although it is difficult to see how 
the argument could have persuaded anyone, it became quite popular and is 
found in Brito, Jandun, Anonymus Fatar, Nicole Oresme and Buridan.92 On 
most readings, however, the argument seems to beg the question. For even if 
it is granted that the soul is nobler than whichever accident we compare it to, 
the inference to its substantiality would only be valid with the introduction of 
another premise. Otherwise, the most we could conclude from the argument 
is that the soul is at least the noblest accident, which is not sufficient. If, on 
the other hand, we read the premise as meaning that the soul is nobler than 
all accidents, then it can hardly be called an argument as it simply asserts the 
substantiality of the soul when the only two options available are that it is ei-
ther an accident or a substance. To make matters worse, if one is convinced 
that the soul is not a substance, there seems to be little reason to accept its 
nobility.93 
The second argument, which I will call the 'unity argument', is more 
promising.94 This argument tries to prove that the variety of life functions 
must ultimately derive from some substantial form as their unifying principle, 
which, in turn, is equated with the soul. An elaborate formulation is found in 
Buridan's commentary.95 If, he argues, the most important operations of a 
" A N O N Y M U S GIELE, QdA, II.2, 65: "Item, Commentator hie dicit quod est substantia et 
arguitur, nam nobilius in corpore animato, illud est substantia, non accidens; sed anima est 
huiusmodi: unde dicit hie Commentator quod omne nobilius aliquo, minus dignum est nobil-
itate quam anima. Et hoc concedimus."; compare AVERROES, Commentarium magnum in DA, 
II.2, 130, 16-19. 
9 2 R A D U L P H U S BRITO, QiiA, ILI2 3 - 2 6 , JOHN OF J A N D U N , QdA, ILI, 68, NICOLE O R E S M E , 
Q Ì M , ILI, 124, JOHN B U R I D A N , QdA, ILI, 4, A N O N Y M U S FATAR, QdA, ILI, 225-22645"51 . 
93The 'nobility' argument was treated with suspicion in later times as well. According 
to Zabarella, w h o comments on the argument as it is found in Averroes, some (unnamed) 
philosophers considered the argument to be a petitio principii; JACOPO ZABARELLA, De anima, 
11.2, 109: "Secundo, quia petit principium cum ilio syllogismo: Omne quod est nobilius omni 
accidente est substantia. Anima est nobilior omni accidente. Ergo. Quisquis enim negat an-
imam esse substantiam, negabit minorem." Zabarella himself looks more favorably on the 
argument, thinking that it was never intended to be a demonstrative argument, but that it was 
rather used "ut syllogismum probabilem, quo ducantur homines tanquam per coniecturam ad 
cognoscendum quod anima non sit accidens." (II.2, 110). 
94It is found in RADULPHUS BRITO, Q<iA, II.I27"33; JOHN OF JANDUN, Q Ì M , 11.1,68; A N O N Y -
MUS FATAR, QiiA, ILI, 227-22892"22; and JOHN B U R I D A N , QdA, ILI, 5-7. 
9 5JOHN B U R I D A N , QdA, ILI, 5-7: "Item operationes principales substantiarum non debent 
reduci in aliquod accidens tanquam in principale principium ipsarum, sed in substantiam; sed 
operationes principales animatorum, ut nutrire, sentire, et intelligere reducuntur in animam 
tanquam in principale principium earum; ergo etc. Et confirmatur secundum Aristotelem 
quia: operationes vitales non reducuntur sufficienter in accidentia, quia non in gravitatem vel 
levitatem, quia tunc in animali omnia ossa fièrent deorsum et consequenter nervi et tota caro 
supra. Nee reducuntur sufficienter in qualitates quatuor primas, scilicet in calidum et frigidum 
etc., quia hoc maxime esset in calidum. Non potest dici, quia calidum ex se non habet naturam 
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living being, such as those having to do with nutrition, sensing, understand­
ing etc., are grounded in the soul as their principle, that would justify the 
conclusion that the soul is a substantial form. The premise that the principal 
operations of a substance cannot be reduced to a set of accidents hardly seems 
to need justification. Once we grant that the most important operations of 
a substance pertain to each individual of that species, any reduction to a set 
of accidents seems to be ruled out. For if these operations were grounded 
in some accident or set of accidents, there could, in principle, be individuals 
within the species that would lack these principal operations, which would be 
absurd.96 It might be objected that it is still required, in order for the argu­
ment to be valid, to provide some proof that the soul can be identified with 
the principle to which these most important operations of a living being can 
be reduced. For as it stands, the argument — even if it proves that the vital 
operations must be grounded in a substantial form — seems to beg the ques­
tion when it equates the soul with this principle of vital operations. But that 
objection misunderstands the project Aristotle undertakes in his De anima. 
He proceeds from the empirically evident fact that there is a clear difference 
between the living and the non-living and simply defines 'soul' as the principle 
that accounts for that difference. It remains to be inquired what precisely this 
principle is (for example, a substance or an accident) and whether there is one 
such principle or many. But once 'soul' has been defined as the principle that 
accounts for the difference between the living and the non-living, no further 
proof needs to be given that the principle of life is indeed the soul.97 
That the principal operations of a substance cannot be ultimately 
grounded in some accident(s) seems to need little further argument, but 
Buridan does provide one. His argument proceeds by elimination: the 
operations cannot be reduced to the qualities of lightness and heaviness, for 
in that case the various parts of the organism could not grow in multiple 
directions. Every process of growth that is grounded in the quality of lightness 
would result in the organism growing in the direction of the sky, and if it 
were grounded in the quality of heaviness the organism would grow in the 
figurandi aliter et aliter membra diversa, nee habet naturam ex se terminandi augmentum, quia 
ignis in infinitum augmentaretur si apponetur combustibile, ut dicit Aristoteles Ergo oportet 
dispositiones naturales animatorum reducere pnncipahter ad principium substantiale, et hoc 
est anima, igitur " 
' ' it is possible that the proximate ground for these operations is a proprium But propria, 
in turn, must themselves be necessarily grounded in the substantial form The inseparable 
accidents discussed in Porphyry's Isagoge, on the other hand, cannot even be the proximate 
ground, since every substance must be at least conceivable without its inseparable accidents 
97
 See also 22, ρ 19. What could occur is that (some of) the properties of the principle of 
life are found to be incompatible with (some of) the properties we ascribe to the human soul 
in a moral or theological context. But that would be an entirely different problem. 
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direction of the center of the earth. But neither quality on its own could 
explain that, even in something as simple as a plant, the organism grows in 
multiple directions.98 Trying to explain growth by appealing to heaviness and 
lightness taken together will also fail; for as Aristotle rightly asks, what is it 
that keeps the organism together if its heavy parts tend downwards and its 
light parts upwards?" Neither can the operations be explained by reference to 
the four primary qualities, if only for the reason that an organism has certain 
maximum limits to its growth. The primary qualities taken by themselves 
are insufficient to explain the existence of these limits.100 Surprisingly, 
Buridan does not find it necessary to discuss the possibility of any other, more 
complex (set of) accidents being the principle of the operations and ends the 
argument by concluding that the principle must be something substantial, 
which he then equates with the soul. If the validity of the 'unity argument' 
really depends on the elimination of all other options, then not discussing the 
possibility of more complex (sets of) accidents is an oversight. Anonymus 
Fatar avoids this by stating that it is evident that the principle operations 
of a substance must ultimately be grounded in a substantial form.101 Still, 
as Buridan's argument stands, it is certainly effective in eliminating the 
possibility that the primary qualities or one of their derivatives such as 
lightness and heaviness can account for the presence of vital operations. 
But the elimination seems to have more of a didactic than a demonstrative 
function, given that the necessary presence of the vital operations in each and 
every member of a species is already enough to allow the conclusion that they 
are ultimately rooted in a substantial form. 
"This argument is also found in AVERROES, Commentanum magnum m DA, c. 14, 1539 M. 
The passage is quoted by Jandun when he discusses the 'unity argument' (JOHN OF JANDUN, 
Q Î M , 11.1,68). 
"ARISTOTLE, De anima, ΠΑ, 416a6-10: "Further we must ask what is the force that holds 
together the earth and the fire which tend to travel in contrary directions, if there is no coun­
teracting force, they will be torn asunder; if there is, this must be the soul and the cause of 
nutrition and growth." 
100This is particularly clear in the case of fire, Buridan's (and Aristotle's) favorite example. 
Fire will keep burning and expanding as long as it is supplied with suitable combustible ma­
terials JOHN BURIDAN, Q Î M , 11.1, 6: " . . . quia ignis in infinitum augmentaretur si apponetur 
combustibile, ut dicit Aristoteles " The body, on the other hand, has certain size limits even 
when it is continuously supplied with food. Compare ARISTOTLE, De antma, 11.4,416314-18. 
""ANONYMUS FATAR, QdA, II.1, 227%"99: "Maior est nota, nam non est verisimile quod 
principales operationes substantiae ammatae debeant reduci in accidens tamquam in princi-
pale prmcipium, immo magis ad substantiam." 
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Definitional dependence on the body 
An important difficulty that arose in the thirteenth-century commentaries was 
the soul's definitional dependence on the body. Recall Aquinas's lengthy dis-
cussion on this topic.102 This dependence on the body was discussed as if 
it were a threat to the substantiality of the soul: if the soul cannot even be 
defined without the body, then how could it exist without the body? Al-
though the fourteenth-century commentators still mention this argument, 
they use it in a very different manner. Not only do they not consider the 
definitional dependence to be a potential threat to the soul's character as sub-
stantial form, but they even use this dependence to establish and confirm the 
natural-philosophical character of the science that studies the soul. Brito is a 
good example of this practice. Already in his questions on book I, he connects 
Aristotle's definition of the soul to the subject matter of the scientia de anima, 
saying that it is precisely because the soul is defined by reference to the body 
that the subject matter is the animated body qua animated: 
Et confirmatur ex alio quia: quod est principium essendi alicuius est 
principium intelligendi eius; modo anima est principium essendi totius 
coniuncti; ergo est principium intelligendi. Et ideo totum est hie sub-
iectum ratione anime. Et propter hoc Philosophus in secundo huius 
diffiniens animam diffinit earn per corpus dicendo quod anima est ac-
tus corporis physici organici potentia vitam habentis.103 
This <namely that the composite of soul and body qua animated is the 
subject of the science of the soul 5iiß> is confirmed by another argu-
ment, namely the following: whatever is the principle of a thing's being 
is also the principle of understanding it. Now, the soul is the principle 
of the being of the whole composite. Therefore it is the principle of 
understanding it. And therefore the whole is the subject here qua ani-
mated. Because of this, when the Philosopher defines the soul in book 
II of De anima he does so by mentioning the body, saying that the soul 
is the act of a physical, organic body having life in potency. 
Another interesting example is Buridan. Of course he will not draw the 
conclusion that the ensouled body qua ensouled is the subject of the scientia 
de anima — recall that he considered the term 'soul' to be the subject matter 
of the scientia de anima —, but he does relate the fact that the soul is defined 
by reference to the body to its inclusion in natural philosophy. 
In his commentary on the De anima, Buridan mentions three types of def-
inition: a quidditative definition, a nominal definition {quid nominis) and a 
l02See above, p. 126 and onward. 
I03RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, U45"50: 'Utrum subiectum in ilio libro sit corpus animatum vel 
anima.' 
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causal definition.104 The nominal definition merely explains the meaning of 
a term, whereas a quidditative definition expresses the essence of the thing 
defined. The latter type of definition is the exclusive domain of the meta-
physician. Natural philosophy, by contrast, is mostly interested in the third 
type: the causal definition. Such a definition not only explains what a thing 
is, but also relates it to both matter and motion. Because of this relation, it 
is considered to be the most perfect definition within natural philosophy.105 
According to Buridan, Aristotle's definition of the soul in the De anima is an 
example of such a causal definition.106 In it, the body functions as the material 
cause of the soul and the vital operations function in some respects as its final 
cause. The formal cause is, of course, lacking, because the soul itself is a form. 
By understanding Aristotle's definition in these terms, the fact that the soul is 
defined by reference to the body is no longer an indication that the soul might 
lack substantiality, but instead a sure sign that the study of the soul pertains to 
natural philosophy. 
A very similar approach is taken by Anonymus Fatar, whose treatment of 
the definition resembles Buridan's. Most importantly, he also distinguishes 
between a quidditative definition that is the sole domain of the metaphysician 
and the causal type of definitions used in natural philosophy.107 In addition, 
1<MJOHN B U R I D A N , QdA, 11.3, 35. For a detailed analysis of their differences, see KLIMA, 
'Buridan's Theory of Definitions'. His conclusions on the development in Buridan's theory 
of definitions should be read with some caution, since they rely on the authenticity of the so-
called Prima lectura (i.e. the Anonymus Fatar) as Klima himself notes. For a brief discussion of 
the authenticity of the prima lectura, see the appendix. 
I 0 5 JOHN B U R I D A N , QdA, II.3, 35: "Item quedam est diffinitio dicens quid nominis, alia pure 
quidditativa, alia causalis, explicans non solum quid res est, sed etiam propter quid est. Et talis 
est magis perfecta."; JOHN B U R I D A N , QdA, II.3, 34: "Nota quod naturalis non considérât sub-
stantias secundum rationes earum simpliciter quidditativas, sed solus metaphysicus. Physicus 
enim solum considérât substantias in ordine ad motum et operationes ipsarum. Et quia forme 
materiales ad operationes suas requirunt certam materiam et appropriatam per dispositiones 
qualitativas vel quantitativas, ideo oportet quod naturales diffiniant formas per suas proprias 
materias." 
""JOHN B U R I D A N , QdA, II.3, 35-36: "Et huiusmodi <i.e. definitie causalis SdB> est ista de-
finitio <i.e. de anima S d B x Cum enim anima sit forma, non oportet quod habeat causam 
formalem.. . Et ad exprimendum causam eius materialem et subiectivam, dicitur 'corporis 
physici organici'. Et ad exprimendum quodammodo eius causam finalem, dicitur 'habentis 
vitam in potentia', sed per 'vitam' intelligimus hie operationem vitalem. Operatio enim est 
quodammodo finis operantis, ut félicitas hominis." 
1 0 7 A N O N Y M U S FATAR, QdA, II.3, 246 e , ~" (ad rationes): ". . . est notandum quod philoso-
phus naturalis ilia quae considérât, ipse considérât in ordine et in habitudine ad motus et 
operationes naturales; sic autem non facit metaphysicus. Et ergo etiam philosophas naturalis 
solet definire per terminos mediantibus quibus designatur huiusmodi habitudo. . . Et quando 
dicebatur: 'terminus absolutus non debet definiri per terminum relativum', hoc conceditur 
definitione metaphysica <mediata ed.> et pure quidditativa. Nihilominus potest definiri per 
terminos relativos definitione naturali quae non est definitio pure quidditativa, sed est definitio 
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he agrees with Buridan that the body functions as the material cause in the 
definition, and that the vital operations function as a quasi final cause. Nicole 
Oresme stands in the same tradition, with the minor exception that in his 
commentary we no longer find any reservations about the adequacy of the 
comparison between the vital operations and the final cause of the soul. The 
vital operations are not the quasi, but the real final cause.108 
Buridan uses the causal character of the soul's definition to explain other 
peculiarities of it as well. For example, his reply to the objection that the soul's 
definition contains a transcendental term ('act') in the place of the genus in-
stead of the normally required generic term is that in a causal definition other 
terms may take over the place and function of genus and specific difference.109 
In a quidditative definition this would not be permitted. Because quidditative 
definitions give the essence of the defined thing, they must necessarily give its 
genus and specific difference in order to show where it fits in Porphyry's tree. 
But on this point the explanations of Buridan and Anonymus Patar diverge. 
Anonymus Patar makes no reference to the possibility of using other terms 
than the genus and specific difference in a causal definition, but instead ex-
plains the occurrence of the transcendental term 'act' by appeaüng to the ana-
logical nature of the definition, quoting Averroes approvingly on this point.110 
If a definition is analogous, it can ipso facto not be composed of a genus and a 
specific difference, since the combination of these two would place the thing 
defined unambiguously in the Porphyrian tree. Nor is Buridan followed by 
Oresme in his understanding of the use of 'act' in the definition. Oresme 
excuses the use of a transcendental term in the definition by saying that Aris-
totle makes it clear that what he really means is that the soul is a 'substantial 
causahs." 
I 0 8NICOLE ORESME, Q Ì M , II.2, 13175"77· "Et etiam exprimit causam finalem in hoc quod 
dicit 'potentia vitam habentis', id est operationes vitales, quae sunt finis ipsius ammae." 
I 0 9JOHN BURIDAN, QdA, 11.3, 39-40. The necessity of using a genus as the first element of 
a proper definition is explained in ARISTOTLE, Topica, V.3, 132all—4 See also ARISTOTLE, 
Topica, VI.3, 140a23-32. 
""ANONYMUS PATAR, QdA, II.3, 2463 4 (ad rationes): "Nihilominus, si defimtio est analoga, 
tunc primus terminus potest esse analogus, sicut est iste terminus 'actus'. Modo praedicto 
defimtio ammae, sicut dicit Commentator, non convenu univoce omni ammae. Secundum 
aham enim rationem anima intellectiva est actus et similiter motor orbis, et secundum aham 
rationem anima vegetativa, sensitiva, etc , sunt actus." This is the only place that I have found 
in which Anonymus Patar treats the definition as analogical. Compare AVERROES, Commentar-
tum magnum in DA, II 5, ll6t6~5A: "Anima autem nutritiva nunquam invemtur in animahbus 
nisi secundum postremam perfectionem; nisi ahquis ponat quod sit quidam modus animal-
mm qui non nutntur in aliquo tempore, scilicet in tempore in quo manet in lapidibus, ut rane 
magne, que mchil thesaurizant et manent tota hyeme in lapidibus, et similiter plures serpentes. 
Et secundum hoc ent hoc commune anime sensibili et nutritive eadem intentione; et si non, 
tunc perfectio accepta in eis ent secundum equivocationem." 
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act'. In other words, Oresme thinks that the seemingly transcendental term 
'act' is used in conjunction with 'substantial' and as a result the transcenden-
tal meaning of the term 'act' is restricted to the non-transcendental meaning 
of'substantial form'.111 From a methodological viewpoint, these differences 
in the explanation of the elements of Aristotle's definition — especially of the 
term 'act' — are quite extreme. For although Buridan and Anonymus Fatar 
both consider 'act' to be a transcendental term in the definition of soul, the 
former relates this to the nature of causal definitions in general, whereas the 
latter sees it as confirmation for the analogical(!) nature of the definition of 
soul. Oresme, by contrast, is of the opinion that the term 'act' functions uni-
vocally in the definition, since it is only a shorthand for substantial form. 
To be sure, the same definitional dependence of soul on the body that 
is used to explain why and how the soul should be studied within natural 
philosophy was also often introduced as an objection against the substantiality 
of the soul, mostly by claiming that only accidents are defined by something 
external to them.112 But, like the arguments on the similarities between the 
soul and matter, the definitional dependence is not really seen as a threat to 
the status of the soul as a substantial form. Often a simple qualification that 
only primary substances are defined without reference to an external subject 
sufficed. Secondary substances — i.e. the substantial forms — are defined by 
reference to a subject, just as all forms are, including accidental ones. 
This is not to deny that the precise extent of the soul's dependence on 
the body was debated. But this debate was not in terms of definitional de-
pendence, but in terms of the metaphysical and the operational dependence 
between the two. That is to say, the real debate focused on the questions in 
what sense the body is the matter of the soul and whether the body is required 
for all vital operations, but not on the question of whether soul can be defined 
without the body."3 The 'having life in potency' that Aristode mentions in 
his definition of the soul was one of the most important starting points for 
this metaphysical debate. 
1
 "NICOLE ORESME, QdA,U.2,133,30-2: "Ad quintam, cum dicitur quod actus... est nomen 
transcendens, verum est; sed statim restringitur in hoc quod dicitur substantialis. Et ideo isla 
duo nomina sunt loco unius." 
"
2E.g. RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, ILI "~21: "Illud quod diffinitur per additamentum est acci-
dens; anima est huiusmodi, quia in diffinitione anime ponitur corpus, quod est additum extra 
essentiam anime." 
"
3The second question: whether the body is required for all vital operations was often 
phrased as: whether the soul has a proper operation, and could be raised in the commen-
tary on either book I or book III. See RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, 1.9; JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, 
1.11, 56-59; ANONYMUS BAZÀN, QdA, UIA, 472-A74; ANONYMUS GIELE, QdA, 1.6, 37^11. 
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4.2.2 The actuality of the body 
There had always been arguments against the soul being a substantial form 
that revolved around the actuality of the body. Take, for example, the follow-
ing argument from Brito: 
Arguitur quod non quia: quod advenit enti in actu non est forma sub-
stantialis; sed anima advenit enti in actu; ideo etc. Maior patet per 
Commentatorem supra secundum huius. Minor patet, quia anima ad-
venit enti in actu, scilicet corpori organizato. Modo organizatum est in 
actu, quia organizationes iste presupponunt formam substantialem."4 
It is argued that it is not: what comes to a being in act is not a substantial 
form; the soul comes to a being in act; therefore, etc. The major premise 
is clear from what the Commentator says in book II. The minor premise 
is clear, because the soul comes to a being in act, namely the organized 
body. Now, what is organized is in act, because these organizations 
presuppose a substantial form. 
Varieties of this argument can be found in almost every commentary on 
the De anima in the later Middle Ages. If the soul is the act of something 
that already has some actuality of its own, the soul can only be an accidental 
form. The actuality of the body is thus turned into a denial of the substantial-
ity of the soul. Of course, this argument can only have some force within the 
framework of the unicity of substantial form, since every author who upheld 
a plurality of substantial forms could legitimately deny the major premise that 
'whatever comes to a being in act is not a substantial form'. But the position 
that each substance has but one substantial form had quickly become dom-
inant in fourteenth-century Paris, certainly among those philosophers who 
commented on the De anima. And they made no exceptions, not even for the 
most difficult case: the rational soul of a human being. 
Although the commentators were more than capable of dealing with 'or-
ganized body' arguments insofar as the substantiality of the soul was con-
cerned, one problem remained that began to trouble them more and more. 
All the emphasis put on the actuality of the body prior to the advent of the 
soul, indeed even on the necessity of a properly disposed body, leads to an en-
tirely new debate that becomes more and more important from Brito onward. 
The context of this new debate still is the set of questions commentators raise 
about Aristotle's definition of the soul in the beginning of De anima II. The 
topic, however, is no longer linked with Aristotle's De anima, but much more 
with his De generatione et corruptione. the (lack of) numerical identity of the 
"' 'RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, I IJ2 - 6 . 
162 
C A N WE PERCEIVE THE IDENTITY OF ACCIDENTS? 
accidents of the body throughout generation and corruption. For example, is 
the whiteness of the corpse the same whiteness as the whiteness of the living 
body? One of the questions in that debate is whether or not we can perceive 
the numerical identity of accidents. Tracing the rise of this debate will reveal 
a fundamental transformation in the scientia de anima. 
4.3 Can we perceive the identity of accidents? 
The rational soul informs matter, thereby constituting a single rational sub-
stance, man; this much the fourteenth-century commentators agreed upon.115 
But although this general position was accepted, there is considerable varia-
tion in the details, as will become clear. Most of these commentators tried 
to work within the framework of the unicity of substantial forms, but they 
did not always find this easy to do. The main reason for this is that one of 
the implications of the unicity position — as it was understood by these later 
medieval commentators — is that a substantial change always impües a com-
plete concomitant corruption of the previous substance. Otherwise, the new 
substantial form would not inform prime matter directly, but would inform 
something that is already constituted by another substantial form, a situation 
which contradicts the unicity of substantial form. But at the same time, when 
one substance is corrupted and a new substance generated in its place, there 
is a clear and predictable connection between the two. For only certain sub-
stances can change into certain other substances, that is, only those substances 
that are properly disposed to receiving a certain substantial form can actually 
receive it, even if at the moment of reception the previous substance is com-
pletely corrupted, all the way down to prime matter. An obvious question 
here would be 'why are these dispositions necessary, if every substantial form 
directly informs prime matter'? If all these pre-dispositions are fully corrupted 
at the moment that the new substantial form is introduced, then why are they 
necessary in the first place? If they are corrupted they seem to have been there 
for no reason, which violates the 'nature does nothing in vain' principle. If, 
on the other hand, they are not corrupted, but remain present in the new sub-
stance, the dispositions would temporally precede the new substantial form. 
From the late thirteenth century onward, philosophers begin to raise and dis-
cuss the question 'what exactly happens to these dispositions?' in increasing 
detail. 
It can hardly be denied that when a substantial change occurs in some liv-
ing being — in other words, when a living being dies —, we perceive no im-
115
 Even Jandun agrees, although he radically alters the interpretation of how the intellective 
soul is the form of the body. See p. 26, footnote 39. 
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mediate change in its accidents. True, the corpse will no longer exercise any 
of the vital operations associated with the living body. But its length, color, 
complexity of organs, wounds and scars, etc. still look exactly the same as be­
fore (at least for some time). Yet in spite of this similarity, the paradigm of 
the unicity of substantial forms seems to dictate that all the dispositions of the 
living being have been corrupted and that similar ones have been newly gener­
ated. In order to show why this was perceived as a problem in the fourteenth 
century, I will return briefly to Aquinas. 
4.3.1 Aquinas 
In the previous section it has become clear that Aquinas consistently and con­
stantly explains the unity of a living being by reference to the fact that it is 
composed metaphysically of one single substantial form, which directly in­
forms prime matter. This became particularly clear in his interpretation of the 
phrase 'a natural organic body having life in potency' in Aristotle's definition 
of the soul. The natural organic body, or the body having life in potency (these 
are synonymous for Aquinas), is not strictly speaking the matter or subject of 
the soul. It only fulfills a quast material role in the definition; not, however, 
in the real constitution of the substance. In other words, we can consider the 
natural organic body as the matter or subject of the soul from a semantical 
viewpoint when we interpret the soul's definition, but not from the viewpoint 
of metaphysics. 
The difference between this metaphysical and semantical point of view im­
mediately becomes clear when one tried to describe what the natural organic 
body is without taking the soul into account. As this body functions as a quasi 
subject for the soul in the definition, it is possible from the semantical point of 
view to consider it on its own. What would remain in the description is some 
body having the required complexity and dispositions to be informed by the 
soul, without actually being informed by it.116 But now consider what would 
remain if one tries to consider from the metaphysical point of view what the 
natural organic body is without its soul. What would remain in that case, is 
not some body with a certain complexity and certain dispositions. Instead, 
nothing at all would remain. For from a metaphysical standpoint, the natural 
organic body is what it is, something natural, organic and a body, precisely on 
account of its being ensouled. If we were to try and grasp what the organic 
body is while setting aside one of its metaphysical components, the soul, the 
only thing left to consider would be its other metaphysical component, that 
is, prime matter. But this, taken in itself, is nothing except a pure potentiality. 
116This became clear in a passage from De spintuahbus creatuns, see above, ρ 135 
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Taking the metaphysical point of view proves to be most difficult at the 
moments of generation and corruption, in which some separation involv-
ing the two most basic metaphysical principles, prime matter and substantial 
form, actually occurs. How does Aquinas deal with the unity of the living be-
ing at these borderline cases? How does he analyze the moment a living being 
comes into existence, and how will he analyze the moment of its death? Un-
fortunately, these questions are very difficult to answer by looking at Aquinas's 
commentary on the De anima, as he rarely pays attention to them in that con-
text. The most important passage and the most obvious place to discuss such 
matters is the following: 
Et inde est quod recedente anima, non remanet idem corpus specie; 
nam oculus et caro in mortuo non dicuntur nisi equivoce, ut patet per 
Philosophum in VII Methaphisice ; recedente enim anima, succedi! aha 
forma substanciahs que dat aliud esse specificum, cum corruptio umus 
non sit sine generatio altenus.117 
Therefore, when the soul departs, the body is not left specifically the 
same; the eyes and flesh of a dead man, as is shown in Metaphysics, 
Book VII, are only equivocally called eyes and flesh. When the soul 
leaves the body another substantial form, which gives another specific 
being takes its place; for the corruption of something always involves 
the generation of something else. 
If one takes the unicity of substantial form seriously in conjunction with 
the principle given in the passage above that each corruption involves a con-
comitant generation, there can be only one description of the change occur-
ring in death.118 The soul departs, and a new substantial form, which came to 
"
7 THOMAS AQUINAS, SentdeA, II.1, 71. 
"
8There is an alternative solution, which is to deny that the corpse is a substance. But this 
possibility is not even mentioned, let alone endorsed, in any of the commentaries I looked 
at. Ludwig Hodl makes a very good case for such an alternative position in which the unic-
ity of substantial form is maintained, but the principle that each corruption involves a con-
comitant generation is rejected. L. HÖDL, 'Anima forma corporis. Philosophisch-theologische 
Erhebungen zur Grundformel der scholastischen Anthropologie im Korrektonenstreit (1277-
1287)', Theologie und Phtlosophte, 41 (1966), 536-556, 550-1: "Kritiker und Verteidiger der 
thomasischen Formlehre wollten die Begriffe nova forma — nova natura — introducilo fur 
das Verstandnis des Todes nicht gelten lassen. Mit Recht' Denn alle genannten Begriffe sind 
Seins-Termini. Sie bedeuten von Haus aus die Bewegung des Seins in der Vollendung der 
Seinsform. Wie konnte das Seinsvokabular Todesterminologie werden' Dieses sprachlich-
begriffliche Problem wurde bisweilen im Mittelalter zu wenig gesehen." I agree with Hodl that 
it makes little (if any) sense to describe the death of a living being as a generation, especially 
from the metaphysical viewpoint that there is only one substantial form. However, as soon as 
the viewpoint of the natural philosopher is seen as equally valid as that of the metaphysician, 
the option to describe the corpse merely in terms of a lack of form is no longer open. For from 
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be called the form of the corpse {forma cadavens), is introduced.119 And just 
as the soul informs prime matter directly, so also will the form of the corpse. 
Now although there may be, and in fact is, a similarity between the previous 
(living) substance and its parts and the new (dead) substance and its parts, it 
is just that: a simihrity. Even if something still looks like an eye or like flesh, 
it is something different now, which is why we can only call these parts eye 
or flesh in an equivocal sense.120 The plausibility of this description within a 
strict unicity of substantial forms framework is closely related to the level on 
which the change is described. As long as we focus on the whole substance and 
those of its parts that can be functionally described, it seems plausible enough. 
But as soon as we shift the focus to the level of accidents, the corruption and 
regeneration of the size and color of the body seems counter-intuitive at the 
very least. Yet the accidents must be corrupted and regenerated, since they 
cannot migrate from one substance into the next.121 
Aquinas was the first to advocate the unicity of substantial form as a gen-
eral metaphysical framework rather than as a mere psychological thesis. But 
in spite of the novelty of this view, he pays surprisingly little attention to ques-
tions about the (non-)endurance of accidents through generation and cor-
ruption. Although he discusses the metaphysical implications of the unicity 
of substantial form in great detail, questions about the generational aspects of 
the viewpoint of the natural philosopher the inquiry into the metaphysical principles of the 
corpse is equally valid as the inquiry into those of the living being. And as soon as the question 
is perceived to be valid, then the answer can never be that the corpse lacks a substantial form, 
for then the implication would be that it has prime matter (pure potency) as its sole principle, 
which is absurd. Yet this shift to a more natural philosophical perspective is what occurs in the 
fourteenth century, as can be seen in the remainder of this chapter. 
"
9As far as I know, Aquinas never uses the term forma cadavens. But it can be found, 
for example, in NICOLE ORESME, QdA, II.5, 156-IST65""69: "Vel potest dici aliter quod forma 
quae dispomt ad aham corrumpitur in adventu altenus, sicut forma animalis disponit et est 
dispositiva ad formam cadavens, quod patet statim, quia nunquam potest introduci forma 
cadavens nisi post formam animalis." The term seems to have become more popular in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (for some examples see DES CHENE, Life's Form, 91-92). But 
even when the term forma cadavens was not used, the principle that the corruption of a living 
being implies the generation of some new dead thing, rather than the continuation of the same 
body minus its soul, is always clearly expressed. To give but one example, ANONYMUS VAN 
STEENBERGHEN, QdA, 11.3, 202'""53: "Et dico quod resoluta anima, non manet corpus eiusdem 
speciei, secundum Anstotelem quarto Meteororum. corruptio enim umus est generano altenus· 
unde, corrupto corpore animato, corrumpitur et corpus sub ratione priore, et generans est 
corrumpens pnmum " 
'^Aristotle's example in Metaphystca VII (1035b24-25) is a finger- "for it is not a finger in 
any state that is the finger of a living thing, but the dead finger is a finger only homonymously " 
The example of the eye is taken from ARISTOTLE, De anima, 412bl8-22. 
'
2
'The principle that accidents cannot transfer from one substance to the next, setting aside 
divine intervention, was accepted as an axiom by virtually all later medieval philosophers 
166 
AQUINAS 
a living being, especially the role of the dispositions, are hardly discussed, let 
alone answered. Now, it could be objected that such questions are not per-
tinent or even misguided from the viewpoint of Aquinas's philosophy. But 
whether this is true or not has little historical relevance. For there is ample ev-
idence that many of Aquinas's contemporaries (and most of the philosophers 
in the fourteenth century) were convinced that such questions about the iden-
tity of accidents are decisive for the validity or non-validity of the framework 
of the unicity of substantial forms. Godfrey of Fontaines, for example, men-
tions the apparent identity of accidents throughout generation and corruption 
as one of the three most important arguments in favor of the plurality of sub-
stantial forms in his Quodlibet II, quaestio 7 (Easter 1286).122 
Aquinas's most general description of what happens at the metaphysical 
level during the generation of a living being can be found in the relatively early 
Summa contra gentiles II.89,123 which also draws out some impücations of the 
succession of substantial forms.124 When Aquinas comments on the corrup-
122GODFREY OF FONTAINES, Quodlibet Π, m: M de Wulf and A. Pelzer, Les quatre pre­
miers Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines, Louvain: Institut Supéneur de Philosophie de 
l'Université, 1904, q 7, 96. "Et arguebatur quod homo non habeat esse ab una forma sub-
stantiali tantum, quia ponere hominem habere tantum unam formam substantialem est contra 
sensum, item est contra rationem, item est contra fidem Contra sensum, quia m homme mor-
tuo ad sensum apparent eadem accidentia esse quae erant in ipso vivente. Hoc autem non esset 
nisi aliqua forma substantiahs quae erat in ipso vivente maneret in mortuo, quia accidentia 
non consequuntur matenam nisi mediante forma substantial]; sed forma substantiahs quae est 
anima non est in mortuo homme, sed alia Et ilia etiam erat in vivo simul cum anima; quare 
etc " For the Easter 1286 date of the Quodlibet, see J. F. WIPPEL, The Metaphysical Thought 
of Godfrey of Fontaines A Study in Late Thirteenth-Century Philosophy, Washington, DC- The 
Catholic University of America Press, 1981, xxvii, who agrees with the date Palémon Glorieux 
had proposed. 
123The Summa contra gentiles was written between 1258 and 1265; most of it, including book 
II, was composed in the period 1261/2-5 See J.-P TORRELL, Saint Thomas Aquinas Volume 
1 The Person and his Work, Revised edition; translated by Robert Royal, Washington, DC. The 
Catholic University of America Press, 2005 (originally published as. Inttation à Saint Thomas 
d'Aqutn Sa personne et son oeuvre. Pans [etc.]· Editions du Cerf [etc.], 1993), 328 
124THOMAS AQUINAS, SCG, 11.89,542: "Licet emm generatio simphcium corporum non pro-
cedat secundum ordinem, eo quod quodlibet eorum habet formam immediatam matenae pri-
mae, in generatione tarnen corporum aliorum oportet esse generationum ordinem, propter 
multas formas intermedias, inter pnmam formam elementi et ultimam formam ad quam gen-
eralo ordinatur. Et ideo sunt multae generationes et corruptiones sese conséquentes. Nee est 
inconveniens si aliquid intermediorum generatur et statim postmodum interrumpitur, quia 
intermedia non habent speciem completam, sed sunt ut in via ad speciem; et ideo non gen-
erantur ut permaneant, sed ut per ea ad ultimum generatum pervematur. Nee est mirum si 
tota generationis transmutatio non est continua, sed sunt multae generationes intermediae, 
quia hoc etiam accidit in alteratione et augmente. Non emm est tota alteratio continua, neque 
totum augmentum, sed solum motus localis est vere continuus, ut patet in VIII Physicorum 
Quanto igitur aliqua forma est nobdior et magis distans a forma elementi, tanto oportet esse 
plures formas intermedias, quibus gradatim ad formam ultimam veniatur, et per consequens 
167 
CHAPTER 4. THE ARISTOTELIAN DEFINITION OF THE SOUL 
tion of the forms of semen, blood and even the vegetative and sensitive souls 
during the generation of man, he touches on the question of why these forms 
are necessary if they are always corrupted. His answer is interesting. Aquinas 
points out that the corruption of the intermediate forms of the semen and 
of the nutritive and sensitive souls are not exceptions to, but instances of the 
rule. Nature is organized in such a way that the more complex a substance is, 
the more intermediate forms are required for it to come into being. Nor is it 
unfitting {inconveniens) that these intermediate forms are corrupted, because 
these forms do not have a complete species but are steps on the way to be-
coming a complete species. This argument strongly suggests that the principal 
reason why Aquinas did not find the generations and corruptions involved in 
the coming-to-be of a complex substance problematic, or even surprising, is 
that he tried to understand generation from the perspective of the final cause 
rather than the efficient cause. All intermediate forms are understood solely 
from the perspective of the final form, which makes the substance be what it 
is. The various steps in this process are never understood as independent, but 
always as related to the final form. If this is correct, then one of the changes 
that take place in the century after Aquinas is a shift of attention from fi-
nal causality toward efficient causality. This shift makes that questions about 
the status of dispositions and previous forms in generation can no longer be 
sidestepped as easily, since from the viewpoint of efficient causality the causes 
of their generation and corruption is one of the most pertinent questions one 
can ask. The first signs of this shift can be seen in Brito's commentary. 
4.3.2 Radulphus Brito 
At first sight, Brito's analysis of the change occurring at the death of a living 
being seems to be the same as Aquinas's: 
Et dicendum quod anima est forma substantialis corporis. Et hoc pro-
batur tripliciter vel quadrupliciter. Primo sic quia: ilia forma est forma 
substantialis corporis qua remota non remanet idem corpus numero 
plures generationes médias. Et ideo in generatione animalis et hominis in quibus est forma 
perfectissima, sunt plurimae formae et generationes intermediae, et per consequens corrup-
tiones, quia generatio unius est corruptio alterius. Anima igitur vegetabilis, quae primo inest, 
cum embryo vivit vita plantae, corrumpitur, et succedit anima perfectior, quae est nutritiva 
et sensitiva simul, et tunc embryo vivit vita animalis; hac autem corrupta, succedit anima ra-
tionalis ab extrinseco immissa, licet praecedentes fuerint virtute seminis." The same idea is 
expressed more briefly in THOMAS AQUINAS, QdSpir, q. 11, κ^3 0 0"3 0 5 (ad rationes): "Et ideo 
aliter dicendum est quod generatio animalis non est tantum una generatio simplex, sed succe-
dunt sibi invicem multe generationes et corruptiones: sicut dicitur quod primo habet formam 
seminis et secundo formam sanguinis, et sic deinceps quousque perficiatur generatio." 
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quod prius nisi equivoce; sed remota anima a corpore, non remanet 
idem corpus numero quod prius; ideo etc.125 
And it should be said that the soul is the substantial form of the body, 
which is proved in three or four ways. First thus: that form is the sub­
stantial form of the body which, when it is removed, <makes that> 
the body does not remain numerically the same body as before, except 
equivocally; but when the soul is removed from the body, the body does 
not remain numerically the same as before; therefore, etc. 
But in spite of the similarity of Brito's and Aquinas's positions, on closer 
inspection their treatments of the Aristotelian definition of the soul are quite 
different. In sharp contrast to Aquinas, Brito devotes most of his attention 
to what happens to the dispositions and accidents during the corruption and 
generation of the living being, a topic which had not occupied Aquinas's 
thought. In fact, Brito's treatment of this topic in his reply to the objections is 
more elaborate than several of his complete questions are as a whole. Exactly 
why Brito's treatment focuses on the dispositions and accidents through 
generation and corruption and their efficient causes, whereas this was hardly 
a relevant question for Aquinas, is a question we must return to later.126 
The problem that occupies Brito's attention can be made clear by a close 
reading of his question 'Whether the soul is the substantial form of the body'. 
In this question Brito introduces five objections against the possibility that the 
soul is the substantial form of the body: 
1. The soul comes to a being in act, because it comes to an organized body 
2. No substance is defined by something added to it 
3. The soul is such a form that when it departs the body still remains numerically 
the same 
4. The soul comes to something already having a form that remains after the 
advent of the soul and therefore comes to a being in act 
5. If the dispositions of the body to which the soul comes were subject to corrup­
tion, they would have been in vain 
Three of these arguments target the moment of generation of the living 
being (1, 4 and 5), two of which (1 and 4) imply that it is not prime matter 
'"RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, Ι1.338^2. 
126Although Aquinas does not discuss the non-identity of dispositions as a problem, the 
related problem of the numerical identity of the body before and after the resurrection is a 
topic that he pays ample attention to in his biblical commentaries. Cf. WALKER BYNUM, The 
Resurrection of the Body, 234, esp. footnote 17. 
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that is informed by the soul, but rather a being that is already actual and prop-
erly organized or disposed. One argument targets the moment of corruption 
of the living being (3) and the final argument (2) — which Aquinas had also 
discussed extensively—is concerned with the reference to the body in the def-
inition of the soul. All in all, four out of five arguments make some reference 
to the organized body existing apart from the soul. Although it is difficult 
to compare Aquinas's Expositio with Brito's Questiones, given that these are 
two different genres of commentary, the very occurrence of these objections 
already hints at a shift of interest. 
By raising these objections, Brito has forced himself to explain the manner 
in which dispositions before and after the advent or departure of the soul are 
the same. And he draws what seems to be the only possible conclusion within 
the framework of the unicity of substantial form: 
<Obiectio:> Arguitur quod non quia: quod advenit enti in actu non 
est forma substantialis. Anima advenit enti in actu. Ideo etc. Maior 
patet per Commentatorem supra secundum huius. Minor patet quia: 
anima advenit enti in actu, scilicet corpori organizato. Modo organi-
zatum est in actu, quia organizationes iste presupponunt formam sub-
stantialem... <Responsio:> Cum dicitur 'quod advenit enti', verum est, 
si maneat ens in actu eius. Sed si corrumpitur eius actualitas, non est 
verum. Et cum dicitur 'anima advenit enti in actu', dico quod ilia actu-
alitas in adventu anime corrumpitur, et consimilis forma et consimiles 
dispositiones introducuntur.127 
<Objection:> It is argued that the soul is not <the substantial form of 
the body SdB>. For what comes to a being in act is not a substantial 
form; but the soul comes to a being in act; therefore etc. The major 
premise is clear by what the Commentator says in book II of this work. 
The minor premise is clear: the soul comes to a being in act, namely 
an organized body; now, what is organized is a being in act, because 
these organizations presuppose a substantial form... <Reply:> When it 
is said 'what comes to a being in act', this is true, if it remains a being 
in act; but if its <i.e. the being in act's SdB> actuality is corrupted, it is 
untrue. And when it is said 'the soul comes to a being in act', I say that 
this actuality is corrupted when the soul comes, and a similar form and 
similar dispositions are introduced. 
All these dispositions are corrupted and then generated anew, with the 
consequence that they are not numerically identical. True, the dispositions 
before and after the advent of the soul are completely similar, which is to say 
that they are specifically identical, but numerically the dispositions before and 
RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, II.3 
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the dispositions after the advent of the soul are different.128 Although this may 
sound peculiar or at the very least counter-intuitive, this numerical dissimilar-
ity is in fact a necessary consequence of two basic metaphysical principles that 
are at work here: ( 1 ) whatever gives something its specific being, also gives 
it its unity, and (2) accidents inhere in a substance and cannot migrate from 
one substance to another. If these principles are strictly applied by someone 
who holds that each substance has one single substantial form, the accidents 
cannot remain numerically identical throughout generation and corruption, 
since that would imply their transfer from one substance to the next. 
In fact, Brito was not the first to raise these concerns in a De anima com-
mentary. As we have seen, Anonymus Bazân was the first commentator to 
write about the status of the dispositions in his question of whether the soul 
is a substantial or an accidental form, using a similar terminology and also 
claiming that all previous organizations are corrupted and regenerated at the 
moment of the introduction of the soul.129 He had even introduced the birth 
of a human being as an example, explaining that while a child is in the uterus 
it has no soul, but it does have certain dispositions. All these dispositions, 
however, are corrupted and regenerated at the moment of the advent of the 
soul.130 Although in Anonymus Bazan, the necessary corruption of the dispo-
sitions is noted but not yet discussed in any detail, in retrospect his comments 
12eThe lack of numerical identity is already difficult to explain in a strictly philosophical 
context But certain theological constraints that I will not go into here made the problems even 
worse, especially the resurrection of the (same) body. For the problem of identity connected 
with the resurrection, see M MCCORD ADAMS, 'The Resurrection of the Body According to 
Three Medieval Aristotelians: Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, William Ockham', Philo-
sophical Topics, 20:2 (1992), 1-33, esp. 23-7 and H. A. G. BRAAKHUIS, 'John Buridan and the 
"Parisian School" on the Possibility of Returning as Numerically the Same A Note on a Chap-
ter in the History of the Relationship between Faith and Natural Science', in: S. CAROTI and P. 
SOUFFRIN (eds.), La nouvelle physique du XIY siècle, Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1997, 111-140. 
129See above, 4.1 2 ANONYMUS BAZAN, QdA, II.2, 40545"5' "Ad secundum, cum dicitur. 
forma substantialis advenu enti in actu organizato, dico quod illae orgamzationes omnes, ad-
veniente anima, in ammam reducuntur et corrumpuntur numero, sed specie non, quia anima 
dat organis esse; ergo patet quod illae dispositiones corrumpuntur, et anima introducitur ut 
organa suum esse habeant, anima introducta." 
""Anonymus Van Steenberghen might have had something similar in mind when he claims 
that all dispositions of the organic body are consequent on the soul-matter union, and that 
the soul therefore needs no prior organic body. But contrary to Anonymus Bazân and Brito, 
he sidesteps the issue of the corruption and subsequent regeneration of accidents, although his 
claims occur in his answer to the objection that each specific soul needs its proper matter This 
indicates that he is not yet fully aware of the potential problem in the same manner as Brito 
and Anonymus Bazân are. ANONYMUS VAN STEENBERGHEN, QdA, II 5, 2043β~^2· "Ad aliud di-
cendum quod actus primus immediate unitur matenae; et omnes dispositiones, sive sint ipsius 
fonmae vel matenae, omnes sequuntur unionem formae cum materia, sive ipsum aggregatum: 
unde anima non praeexigit corpus organicum, sed per animam est corpus orgamcum." 
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prove to be very important. Nevertheless, Brito is the first to discuss the topic 
in full detail and clarity. 
The strange consequence of the view that all dispositions are corrupted at 
the advent of the soul seems to be that the substance that existed before the ad-
vent of the soul and the substance that exists after the advent of the soul seem 
to share absolutely nothing. They neither have (numerically or specifically) 
the same substantial form, nor (numerically) the same accidental forms.131 
All that is left to connect the two substances is two sets of accidents with an 
uncanny similarity but without any real identity.132 Recall that this peculiar 
consequence where the living and the dead body share nothing except a sim-
ilarity was the theme of the discussion between Ackrill and Whiting about 
Aristode's definition of the soul. 
Brito's solution that the accidents are merely similar and not numerically 
identical occasions an objection that is as obvious as powerful: given that all 
these accidents look precisely the same before and after the advent of the soul, 
as Brito admits, and that, moreover, we perceive no change in the accidents 
during this generation and corruption, should we not then simply conclude 
that the accidents are in fact numerically the same rather than merely similar? 
Why not take for granted, based on our sense experience, that numerically 
the same accidents somehow remain present throughout the generation and 
corruption and formulate our theories based on that assumption?133 Brito's 
131
 Pointing to prime matter as something the two substances share does not help. Although 
it is in some sense true that they "share" prime matter, this only means that they have a similar 
metaphysical structure at the very basic level. More concretely, they are both material sub-
stances. 
1321 take the term 'uncanny similarity' from WHITING, 'Living Bodies', 79 See above, section 
4 1 
133According to my reading of the texts, Brito considers the corruption and regeneration 
of all accidents of fundamental importance. This reading is supported by Donati's analysis 
of the use of dimenstones indetermmatae in unpublished commentaries on the Physica Put 
briefly dimenstones (de)terminatae are definite and distinct dimensions, whereas dimenstones 
tn(de)terminatae are indefinite and generic dimensions. The terminology is taken from Aver-
roes's De substantia orbts. In the Parisian commentaries Donati examined for the period ca 
1270-1310, she found that no author exphcidy rejects the analysis of substance in terms of 
indeterminate dimensions that ontologically precede substantial form, with one exception· 
Radulphus Brito Brito rejects both roles that the indeterminate dimensions were supposed 
to fulfill, namely that (1) they are ontologically prior to substantial form and (2) they sur-
vive substantial change The idea that any accident can precede substance or remain identical 
throughout substantial change is metaphysically unacceptable to Brito. See S DONATI, 'The 
Notion of Dimenstones indetermmatae in the Commentary Tradition of the Physics in the Thir-
teenth and in the Early Fourteenth Century', in. C. LEIJENHORST, C. LUTHY and J. M. M. H. 
THIJSSEN (eds ), The Dynamics of Aristotelian Philosophy from Antiquity to the Seventeenth Cen-
tury, Leiden [etc ]. Brill, 2002, 189-223, 218-9. For a historical analysis of the introduction of 
the dimenstones indetermmatae see S DONATI, 'La dottrina delle dimensioni indeterminate in 
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answer to this objection that our senses perceive that the accidents remain 
identical throughout generation and corruption is blunt: 
Et cum dicitur quod sensus hoc ludicat, dico quod sensum non est cre-
dendum de ydemptitate accidentium, sed solum de similitudine, quia 
quidditas rei solum ab intellectu percipitur, et non a sensu.134 
And when it said that the senses make this judgment, I say that the 
senses are not to be trusted when it comes to the identity of accidents, 
but only when it comes to their similitude, because the quiddity of a 
thing is perceived by the intellect only, and not by the senses. 
Briefly put, the fact that we cannot perceive a change in the accidents 
proves absolutely nothing about their identity or their non-identity. This ar-
gument will turn out to be one of two key arguments in the debate on the 
status of the dispositions in subsequent commentaries.135 The second key 
argument is that it seems that there is no causal explanation possible of the 
generation of these new accidents. And nothing is generated without a cause. 
The discussion of this second argument takes up most of Brito's text. I will 
not go into all the details of this discussion, but I will focus on what I consider 
to be the most interesting case: scars and wounds.136 By examining how Brito 
explains the similarity between the scars and wounds of the living and of the 
dead body, the impact that the question about the identity of accidents had 
will become clearer. 
The reason that scars and wounds are the most interesting example is that 
these became accidents of the living being by pure chance, which is literally 
what Brito calls them: accidentia casualia. Their existence can never be ex-
plained by mere reference to the substantial form and the particular balance 
of the four elements in the body, which might be a possibUity in the case of 
skin color, size, weight etc.137 Indeed, Brito tries to explain the regeneration 
of most of the accidents by reference to either the cause that introduces the 
new substantial form of the corpse, or to the proportions of the four elements 
Egidio Romano', Medioevo, 14 (1988), 149-233, esp. 149-173. 
I34RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, II.3, 81—4 Interestingly, Walter Burley's commentary on the 
De anima includes Bnto's lengthy discussion almost verbatim It can be found in WALTER 
BURLEY, ExpdA [unpublished transcription by Paul Bakker], II 1-2: 'Utrum anima sit substan-
tia, utrum anima sit forma substantiahs corporis', lO'^-lO"'. Unfortunately it is unclear who 
copied whom, or, alternatively, which third source formed the basis of both texts. 
"
5In the Venice, 1587 edition of Jandun's commentary, Averroes is mentioned in the mar-
gin, possibly as the source of the argument, but I have been unable to locate such a passage. 
l36For other cases and their technical solutions, see the edition given in the appendix. 
137
 At one point, Bnto seems to include color in the list of accidentia casualia (lines 105-106), 
but the rest of the text makes clear that he normally reserves the term 'casualia' for the results 
of damage done to the body 
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that are present in the corpse. But the very occurrence of scars and wounds is 
an abnormal state. Given that Brito is convinced that all accidents, including 
scars and wounds, are corrupted and regenerated at the moment of death of a 
living being, he feels obliged to come up with a reason why even these acciden-
tia casuaha are regenerated in the corpse. The text is unfortunately corrupt, 
so it is difficult to see the details of his solution. But his main approach is clear 
enough. The first thing that Brito does in the case of scars and wounds is to 
move most of the efficient causal explanation from the thing that caused the 
wound to the living body itself.138 True, there would have been no wound 
without something that wounded the body, but once this has happened, it is 
the body that either causes the scarring or causes the wound to stay open. By 
doing so, Brito avoids having to explain the presence of wounds and scars in 
the corpse by reference to the thing that originally caused the wound. The 
second thing that Brito does is to try and explain the wounds and scars in a 
manner similar to his explanation of the other accidents. That is, by reference 
to either the cause that introduces the new substantial form of the corpse, or to 
the proportions of the four elements that are present in the corpse. In prepa-
ration for this, Brito makes the unexpected claim that the form of the Uving 
body and the form of the corpse are quite similar forms. Although he does not 
explain this further, he is clearly thinking about the analogy he made earher 
in the question between the forms of wine and vinegar.139 
Just as vinegar is a form that naturally follows the form of wine, so the 
form of the corpse naturally follows the form of the body. And as closely re-
lated forms, they share many of the dispositions that are required for their 
presence. Not numerically, as was demonstrated, but specifically. Since Brito 
has already explained the similarity of dispositions by reference to the propor-
tion of the elements, he can now appeal to this almost similar proportion to 
explain why in the corpse the wounds also stay either open or have turned into 
scars, just as was the case in the living body. Whether or not this explanation 
is convincing — I would say not — is unimportant here. What is important 
is the sort of explanation Brito thought he had to provide to explain the sim-
" 'RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, II.3"5"134: "Cicatrix ergo que est facta per consohdationem 
partium est operata per naturam rei, quia natura intendit consolidare partem lesam." 
'
3 9RADULPHUS BRITO, QiiA, lU" 8^ ' 2 7 : "Unde non quecumque forma est in quacumque 
materia, sed determinata post determinatam, sicut apparet octavo Metaphysice, quia sicut ibi 
dicitur post formam vim non introducitur forma quecumque, set forma aceti que similis est 
ei in gradu perfectioms, sicut forma ordinate sequens est similis forme vini; et forma non in-
troducitur nisi in materia disposila, ut apparet secundo hums, quia actus activorum sunt in 
patiente disposito. Ideo dispositiones que sunt in matena cum forma sequenti sunt similes dis-
positiombus que sunt in materia cum forma precedenti. Et ideo cum color sequatur formam 
ratione commixtioms elementorum et consimihs commixtio sit in mortuo et vivo, consimihs 
color est in vivo et mortuo " 
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ilarities between the living body and the corpse. There can be doubt that he 
is convinced that all accidents are literally corrupted and then regenerated in 
an instant. And that for each of the regenerated accidents it must be possible 
to assign an efficient cause that explains their presence in the corpse, which 
turned out to be a difficult project. 
The difficulty in assigning a cause to these newly generated accidents is the 
weakest point of the position Brito defends. William Ockham, for instance, 
was convinced that it was not possible to assign a cause to the newly gener-
ated accidents. And he considered the impossibUity of assigning such a cause 
to be the strongest argument against the view that the accidents are numer-
ically diverse and, as a consequence, against the framework of the unicity of 
substantial form. Being convinced of their numerical identity, Ockham ar-
gued against the view that the soul directly informs the body and suggested 
instead that a form of corporeity is necessary. Otherwise the accidents would 
be transfered from one substance into the next.140 Similar arguments can also 
be found in commentaries on De generatiorte, where they are used to deny that 
some quality remains in the generated thing that was also present in the cor-
rupted thing, more specifically, that the symbofo — the quahties which two 
elements have in common — remain numerically identical through genera-
tion.141 
The discussion of the symbola in commentaries on the De generatiorte and 
the discussion on the identity of accidents in the commentaries on the De 
anima are closely connected in the fourteenth century. So close, in fact, that 
Buridan devotes a question to the soul in his commentary on the De genera-
tione.142 And we even find Brito's scars and wounds argument in the context 
of fourteenth-century commentaries on De generatione et corruptione, again 
'•""WILLIAM OCKHAM, Quodlibeta septem, edited by J. C. Wey, St. Bonaventure, New York: 
St. Bonaventure University, 1980 (Opera theologica, 9), 11.11, 162-16321"26: 'Utrum anima 
sensitiva et forma corporeitatis distinguantur realiter tam in brutis quam in hominibus": "As-
sumptum, scilicet quod eadem accidentia numero manent in animali vivo et mortuo, probo, 
quia saltern si sint alia accidentia, sunt eiusdem speciei cum accidentibus animalis vivi; quod 
patet ex hoc quod tantum assimilantur quod homo non potest iudicare inter ilia. Si igitur 
sint nova accidentia, quaero a quo causantur." For a more detailed discussion of Ockham's 
philosophical and theological arguments against the unicity of substantial form position, see 
M. MCCORD ADAMS, William Ockham, Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1987, vol. 2,647-669 
14
 ' See for example, NICOLE ORESME, Quaestiones super De generatione et corruptione, edited 
by S. Caroti, München: Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1996, 1.8, 67, 164-166: 
"Octavo, queritur quomodo sive a quo corrumpantur tales dispositiones; non a generante, 
quia non est contrarium, ymmo simile, ut patet de igne generante aerem." 
'
42See JOHN BURIDAN, Quaestiones super hbros De generatione et corruptione Aristotelis, 
edited by M. Streijger, P.JJ.M. Bakker and J.M.M.H. Thijssen, Leiden [etc.]: Brill, 2010, 1.8, 
80-89: 'Utrum in animato sit alia forma substantialis ab anima'. 
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in the questions about the symboL·140 This is not a coincidence; more and 
more of De generarione material will find its way into the discussions in the De 
anima during the fourteenth century, as we will see. 
4.3.3 Johnofjandun 
Brito gave a very consistent interpretation of the unicity of substantial form, 
and he was prepared to accept all consequences that this position implies, even 
if this meant having to accept that our senses are not to be trusted when it 
comes to perceiving the identity of accidents; and also even if this meant ac-
cepting that all accidents are corrupted and regenerated at the instant of sub-
stantial change, including those accidents that seem completely unnecessary 
in the new substance of the corpse, such as scars and wounds. But no matter 
how consistent his interpretation was, the consequences were too strange to be 
convincing to all his contemporaries.144 One of the first to respond was John 
of Jandun, who — although he does not mention Brito by name— seems to 
have Brito in mind when he discusses how certain philosophers speak of the 
dispositions of a body before and after the advent of the soul. The context 
of this discussion is still the same, namely the adequacy of the Aristotelian 
definition of the soul: 
Dicunt quod in adventu anime corrumpuntur omnes ille dispositiones 
et in eodem instanti similes introducuntur; quare etc. Sed istud non 
potest stare... Et ideo videtur mihi quod iste dispositiones et organiza-
tiones manent et non corrumpitur.145 
They say that with the advent of the soul, all these dispositions are cor-
rupted and in the same moment similar ones are introduced; hence, 
etc. But this cannot stand... And therefore it seems to me that these 
dispositions and organizations remain and are not corrupted. 
Before looking at Jandun's own opinions, we should briefly look at the 
objections he introduces to structure his discussion of this topic, which takes 
143
 NICOLE ORESME, QdGen, 1.8· 'Utrum aliqua qualitas maneat eadem in generato que pnus 
fuit in corrupto', 67167· "Nono, quod cycatres manent etc." Judging from the heavily abbrevi-
ated form of the argument in Oresme's commentary, it was well known. 
m I consider the impact of Bnto's discussion on the identity of accidents and Ackrill's article 
on essentially ensouled matter to be quite similar. Both argue from within the context of the 
De anima, and from the assumption of the unicity of substantial form, to a radical dissimilarity 
between the living body and the corpse. And, more importantly, both receive a variety of 
responses in the decades following their discussion, in which philosophers accept the legitimacy 
of their claims while trying to formulate an interpretation in which the consequences of these 
claims are avoided. 
'"'JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, II 2, 73-74 
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place in the question 'Whether the soul is a substance in the sense of a sub-
stantial form'. Of the complete set of nine objections against the thesis that the 
soul is substantial form, only three are concerned with the generation and cor-
ruption aspects that were so dominant in Brito's commentary. One of these is 
the famUiar argument that the soul comes to a being in act, namely the orga-
nized body. The other two focus on (1) the corruption of the living being and 
claim that the body remains numerically identical after death and (2) on the 
fact that the same whiteness that inheres in the body while it is alive continues 
to inhere in the corpse. 
If we were to stop the analysis here, we might conclude that questions con-
cerning the identity of accidents are not as important in Jandun's commentary 
as they were Brito's, given that only a third of the arguments address the is-
sue. But once we look at the actual impact of these arguments on the whole 
question, a completely different picture arises. The largest part of Jandun's 
replies to the initial arguments discuss precisely the identity of accidents. In 
fact, the discussion of these problems in Jandun's replies is almost three times 
as long as his entire determination of the question! This confirms that it is 
justified to refer to the debate on dispositions as an embedded question in 
fourteenth-century De anima commentaries.146 
Jandun's primary concern when it comes to the sudden corruption of pre-
vious dispositions is not so much the brute fact that these dispositions are cor-
rupted and regenerated, but rather that this alleged generation and corruption 
would imply many difficulties within Aristotelian physics. For instance, the 
preparatory process of gradual acquisition of the proper dispositions prior 
to the introduction of a new form is left unfinished if these dispositions are 
corrupted. For although the process would have a beginning, a first instant 
in which these dispositions begin to appear, it would have no end, that is to 
say, no last instant in which these dispositions are fully developed. In other 
words, the change has no end term (terminus ad quem).147 Jandun argues for 
his conclusion as follows: at every instant before the introduction of the soul 
these dispositions are not fully developed and the change is still going on. But 
the end term of the change cannot be the exact moment of the introduction of 
the soul, because at that moment all these dispositions are corrupted. Nor can 
the end term of the change be the fiilly developed dispositions that are found 
after the moment the body is informed by the soul, since these dispositions 
'^By 'embedded question' I mean that even if there is no separate question on the identity 
of accidents in the fourteenth-century commentaries on the De anima, the passages in which 
the topic is discussed have the same complexity and length as a regular question. 
' ' ' 'JOHN OF JANDUN, Q Ì M , II.2, 73: "... si sic esset, sequeretur quod motus finitus esset 
sine termino ad quem, et moveri sine termino mutato esse; consequens est falsum, ergo et 
antecedens. Falsitas consequentis patet per Philosophum sexto Physicorum." 
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are not numerically identical with the dispositions that were there prior to the 
advent of the soul. The only possible conclusion seems to be that there is no 
definite moment at which the change has ended, even if there is a moment at 
which there is an ensouled body with fully developed dispositions. To Jandun, 
following Aristotle, this seems absurd.148 Arguing along similar lines, Jandun 
denies that the dispositions can be corrupted, because it is impossible to assign 
an exact moment or even a time frame to their corruption.149 
The second difficulty discussed by Jandun is that it is difficult (if not im-
possible) to see what can be the cause of the corruption of these dispositions. 
This is an interesting question, even more so because Brito had devoted almost 
all his attention to the related problem of assigning a cause to the regenerated 
dispositions, and very little to assigning a cause to the corruption of the dis-
positions. Normally any accident is corrupted by the introduction of a new 
and contrary accident. For example, if water is cold at first and later becomes 
warm, the accident of cold has been corrupted by the introduction of the new 
and contrary accident of warm. But during the corruption and generation of 
the dispositions needed for the advent of the soul, no contrary accidents are 
introduced; quite the opposite, the new dispositions are specifically the same 
as the old ones. The alternative of assigning the causal role of the corruption 
of these dispositions to the soul seems impossible, since it is this very soul that 
is the cause of the generation of (specifically) the same dispositions. 
There is, however, another manner in which something can be corrupted 
without the introduction of a contrary form. For it can also be corrupted 
on account of the corruption of something else on which it depends for its 
existence. This is a called corruption per accidens, in contrast to the regular 
corruption per se. So it seems that someone holding Brito's view could simply 
claim that these dispositions corrupt per accidens on account of the corrup-
tion of the substance in which they inhere. Only the substance they inhere in 
is corrupted per se on account of the introduction of the soul. This possibility 
is denied by Jandun, who gives the following argument: dispositions cannot 
'•"The problems concerning first and last instants in continuous change are discussed in 
ARISTOTLE, Physica, esp. VI.8. Although the introduction of the limit problem in Jandun's De 
anima commentary is striking, these problems do become more and more prevalent in four-
teenth century philosophy and theology; their development and importance, especially in the 
context of what John Murdoch has called 'propositional analysis' as a way of doing (natural) 
philosophy in the fourteenth century, is described in detail in: MURDOCH, 'Propositional Anal-
ysis in Fourteenth-Century Natural Philosophy' and J. E. MURDOCH, 'Subttlitates Anglicanae in 
Fourteenth-Century Paris: John of Mirecourt and Peter Ceffons', in: M. PELNER COSMAN and 
B. CHANDLER (eds.), Machaut's World: Science and Arts in the Fourteenth Century, New York: 
The New York Academy of Sciences, 1978, 51-86. 
149JOHN OF JANDUN, Q Ì M , II.2, 73: "Item, si corrumperentur aut hoc esset in instanti, aut in 
tempore; sed nullo modo; quare etc." 
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be corrupted per accidens, since the generable and the corruptible belong to 
the category of substance.150 Although Jandun's argument is elliptical, a plau-
sible interpretation can be given. What he seems to be doing is denying the 
possibility of an accidental corruption on semantic grounds. The terms 'gen-
eration' and 'corruption' are only applicable to those things that belong to the 
category of substance. This means that no other thing than a substance can be 
called corruptible, so that talking about the accidental corruption of accidents 
is nonsensical. In short, Brito is making a category mistake. 
For these reasons, and others, Jandun refuses to accept the consequence 
that all previous dispositions and organizations are corrupted at the advent of 
the soul.151 But then the question becomes how he can maintain that position, 
since the corruption of the dispositions, as was seen above, seems a necessary 
consequence of the intransferability of accidents from one subject to the next 
combined with the thesis that substantial form directly informs prime matter. 
It seems therefore that Jandun must either allow for a transfer of dispositions 
and organizations from one substance to the next, or else he must deny that 
the soul directly informs prime matter. Before answering this question, we 
must look more closely at the exact meaning of dispositions in this context. 
For Jandun immediately qualifies his statement that the dispositions remain, 
by distinguishing between two manners in which they can remain. 
The first manner in which dispositions remain applies only to those dispo-
sitions that prepare matter for a new form of a compound substance {mixtio), 
whether this is an animate or an inanimate substance. In other words, this 
first manner considers only the dispositions of complex substances that pre-
pare them to receive another substantial form. The dispositions in question 
are the four primary qualities, which exist in the matter of a substance on ac-
count of the presence of the four elements in it, since these quahties are the 
proper accidents of the elements. These elements are always present in com-
plex substances, although they are present only according to what Jandun calls 
I50JOHN OF JANDUN, Q Î M , II.2, 73 "Sed istae dispositiones non sunt corruptibiles secun-
dum accidens, cum corruptibde et generabile sint in substantia, ut dicit Philosophus in quarto 
Metaphysice." 
151
 One of the other reasons is familiar· the dispositions seem to be introduced in vain if they 
are corrupted by the soul and regenerated Why should not the soul itself directly introduce 
all the necessary dispositions, rather than first corrupting and then regenerating them? This 
argument was included in Bnto's list of arguments against the possibility that the soul is the 
substantial form of the body See p. 169. E. MICHAEL, 'Averroes and the Plurality of Forms', 
Franciscan Studies, 52 (1992), 155-182, 168-169 cites passages from Jandun's commentary on 
the Phsyica, in which he also denies that scars and wounds are regenerated. His discussion is 
consistent with that in his commentary on the De anima 
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a diminished being.152 And most importantly, they remain present even dur-
ing generation and corruption.153 Taking 'dispositions' in this manner, it is 
possible to counter the objection that all forms that come to a being in act 
are accidental forms, by replying that this is only true when the form comes 
to a being that is in a complete and perfect act. But when it comes to a be-
ing in an incomplete and diminished state — which is precisely the state of 
the elements in a mixed body — the form can still be a substantial form.154 
Therefore, according to Jandun, the new form can be a substantial form while 
at the same time the elements and their qualities remain numerically identical 
through the corruption and generation. 
The second manner of speaking about dispositions applies not only to 
complex substances, but also to the elements. The dispositions in question 
are still the same (the four primary qualities), but now there can be no re-
course to a diminished and incomplete being of these elements because an 
element taken in itself, apart from the complex substance, has full being. Jan-
dun uses the example of the transformation of air (hot and moist) into fire 
(hot and dry). In this transformation it is clear that the moistness of the air 
is corrupted, because the resulting fire is not moist but dry. But what about 
the quality hotness that both elements share? Is this also corrupted and re-
generated? According to Jandun it is not. Quite the opposite, the hotness of 
the air is perfected into the hotness of fire. It cannot be corrupted because the 
fire lacks any contrary quality, and all corruption is based on the introduc-
tion of a contrary form. Jandun has a persuasive argument for this thesis: it 
is precisely the fact that one quality remains that accounts for the ease of the 
transformation of one element into another with which it shares a quality.155 
,52The terminology is taken from Averroes's commentary on the De cado; AVERROES, De 
caelo, in: Anstotehs Opera cum Averrois Commentarns, vol V, Venezia: Apud Junctas, 1562-
1574 (photomechanical reprint Frankfurt: Minerva, 1962), III, com 67, 227C-D: "Dicemus 
quod formae istorum elementorum substantiates sunt diminutae a formis substantialibus per-
fectis, et quasi suum esse est medium inter formas et accidentia. Et ideo non fiiit impossibile ut 
formae eorum substantiales admiscerunt, et provenirci ex collectione earum alia forma, sicut, 
cum albedo et nigredo admiscentur, fiunt ex eis multi colores medii." 
153JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, 11.2,75. "Et cum corrumpitur forma umus mixti in mixto, et 
introducitur forma altenus, elementa manent in materia utnusque, licet sub alio et alio esse." 
^ J O H N OF JANDUN, Q«ÌA, II.2, 75: "Tenentes autem istam viam possumus solvere rationes 
in oppositum Cum dicitur 'id quod advenit etc.', dico quod verum est si advenit enti complete 
et perfecto. Si tarnen adveniat imperfecto et remisse non oportet." 
l55The topic of transformation of elements into one another, especially of those elements 
that share a quality (the so-called symbola) is discussed in virtually all commentaries on Aris-
totle's De generattone et corruptwne. Jandun also seems to have commented on this C H. 
LOHR, 'Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors. Jacobus — Johannes JufP, Tradt-
tio, 26 (1970), 135-216, 212, n. 8 mentions an (unedited) question by Jandun entitled 'Utrum 
elementa sub proprns formis maneant in mixto', which, as A MAIER, 'Die Struktur der ma-
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The key principle in this description of the transformation of one element 
into another seems to be that corruption only occurs at the introduction of a 
contrary form of the same metaphysical level as the corrupting form. When 
a new substantial form is introduced, only the previous substantial form is 
corrupted, but not the previous accidents. Jandun seems hesitant to speak of 
accidents as corrupting, but whether we talk about the corruption of accidents 
or simply about a change in accidents makes little difference for the following: 
an accident only corrupts (or: changes) at the introduction of a contrary ac-
cident, not at the introduction of new substantial form. So no substantial 
form on its own will ever corrupt the previous dispositions. This becomes 
even clearer when Jandun moves from the example of the transformation of 
elements to the example of the introduction of the soul: 
Qualitates autem disponentes materiam ad introductionem anime non 
contrariantur sibi. Quare tales manent et non corrumpuntur in ad-
ventu anime, licet dispositiones contrarie, sicut dispositiones menstrui 
et spermatis corrumpantur, ut dicit Commentator primo Physicorum. 
Quare etc.156 
The qualities, however, that prepare matter for the introduction of the 
soul are not contrary to one another. Hence such qualities remain and 
are not corrupted at the advent of soul, although the contrary disposi-
tions, such as the dispositions of the menstrual blood and the semen are 
corrupted, as the Commentator states in Physica I. Hence etc. 
Within this second manner of speaking about dispositions, the reply to 
the objection that all forms that come to a being in act are accidental forms 
is more refined. Jandun now distinguishes between two manners of being in 
act (substantial or accidental) as well as two kinds of accidents (perfect and 
imperfect). If a form comes to a being that is either in substantial act or in 
perfect accidental act, it will be an accidental form. But if it comes to a being 
in an imperfect accidental act — which includes the primary qualities and in-
determinate dimensions (dimensiones interminatae) — it can be a substantial 
form.157 
The difference between this manner of discussing what happens when the 
soul informs a body and the manner in which Aquinas and the Anonymi dis-
cussed it cannot be overemphasized. What is occurring in Jandun (and Brito 
teriellen Substanz', in: An der Grenze von Scholastik und Naturwissenschaft, vol. III, Roma: 
Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1952, 1-140, 42 suggested, might be a question from a lost 
commentary on the De generatione et corruptione. 
I56JOHN OF JANDUN, Q Ì M . II.2,75. 
'
57For more information and literature about the dimensiones in(de)terminatae, see p. 172, 
footnote 133. Briefly put, they are generic and indefinite dimensions that ontologically precede 
the specific and definite dimension of any material substance. 
l8 l 
C H A P T E R 4. T H E ARISTOTELIAN DEFINITION OF THE SOUL 
before him) is a shift of perspective combined with a shift in sources. Instead 
of referring to Aristotle's Metaphysica and using the ontological precedence of 
substantial over accidental form to explain the informing of the body by the 
soul, the most important source has now become Aristotle's De generanone 
et corruptione and its discussion of the transformation of elements into one 
another. The unity of soul and body is no longer the central problem; instead, 
the discussion has shifted to the status of the dispositions through the advent 
and departure, or corruption, of the soul. What is occurring here is not the 
rise of a new perspective, for both perspectives already existed. What does oc-
cur, is that the dominant perspective changes, and that this change gives rise 
to a new set of problems. Perhaps the most surprising aspect of this shift is 
that the theories developed in De generatione commentaries really do not help 
much in accounting for the numerical identity of most of the accidents that 
seem to remain identical through generation and corruption. At best they can 
account for the numerical identity of the primary qualities and perhaps of the 
indeterminate dimensions. But this does not seem to bother Jandun in the 
least. In a surprising change of strategy, Jandun denies the identity of higher 
level accidents, using the same argument as Brito: our senses simply cannot 
be trusted when it comes to the identity of accidents:158 
. . . sed non manet eadem qualitas secunda, quia non manet idem mix-
turn; cum eadem sit forma per quam corpus animatum est inanimatum 
et est mixtum; et cum dicitur: sensus hoc iudicat, dico quod non est cre-
dendum sensui de identitate accidentis, cum non se profundet usque ad 
quiddidatem, ut dicit Commentator in hoc secundo; quare etc.159 
. . . but there does not remain the same second quality, because there 
does not remain the same mixtum, because the form by which the ani-
mated body is inanimate <i.e. merely organio and a mixtum is one and 
the same form. And when it is said: the senses make this judgment, I say 
that our senses are not be trusted concerning the identity of accidents, 
because they do not penetrate to the essence, as the Commentator says 
in the second book <of the De amma>; hence etc. 
Jandun's discussion with those who hold the position Brito holds, turns 
out not to be about the strange consequence that accidents corrupt and re-
generate, but instead about the question of whether the subject in which the 
primary qualities and the indeterminate dimensions inhere remains numer-
ically identical through generation and corruption. The description he gave 
'^Jandun's position is similar to Knapwell's position in his disputed question on the unicity 
of substantial form. Cf. RICHARD KNAPWELL, Quaestio disputata de umtäte formae, edited with 
introduction and notes by F. E. Kelley, Paris: Vrin, 1982, 39^10. 
'
59JOHN OF JANDUN, QÌM, 11.2, 77. 
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of the primary qualities as imperfect accidental acts was well as his analysis 
of corruption showed that this subject indeed remains numerically identical. 
The results of the analysis of the transitions of elements into one another is 
consequently applied to the question: what is the subject of the soul? Jan-
dun's final position in this question seems to be a variant of the plurality of 
substantial forms position, in which there are two substantial forms in a living 
being. One is the soul, the other the so-called form of the body (forma corpore-
itatis).160 This form of the body gives a minimum of actuality to bodily things, 
just enough to unify a mixture of elements into this or that particular lump 
of stuff. Since this form of the body remains present even after the advent 
of soul, all accidents up to this level of complexity, namely the primary acci-
dents, also remain present. More complex qualities, however, are corrupted 
and regenerated, in support of which Jandun denies the ability of our senses 
to perceive the identity of accidents. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to establish more details of Jandun's posi-
tion on the questions whether a substance has one or more forms and which 
forms persist through generation based on his commentary on the De anima. 
For in most other contexts where Jandun deals with the subject of the soul, 
he responds to objections from both the point of view of a single substantial 
form as well as from the point of view of some pluralist position, often not 
making it fully clear which of those positions he actually holds.161 Take for 
example his question 'whether the soul is the first act of the body'. When Jan-
dun discusses the objection that the soul seems to come to a being in act and 
therefore cannot be the substantial form of the body, he first replies {repon-
detur hie) that all dispositions are corrupted and regenerated at the advent of 
the soul.162 But he ends this reply with the words 'but at this moment I do not 
settle whether or not this is true' ('tarnen utrum sit verum vel non, ad praesens 
non determino'). This is odd, to say the least, given his elaborate arguments in 
favor of the persistence of dispositions just three questions earlier. To make 
things even more confusing, he continues by formulating an alternative re-
ply ('51 tarnen volumus tenere aliam viam'), according to which not only the 
160JOHN OF JANDUN, QiA, II.3, 81 (ad rationes): "Ad aliam cum dicitur 'quod est actus ma-
teriae primae etc.', potest dici quod verum est si sit actus matenae primae omnino immediate. 
Sed si mediante corporeitate, non est necesse quod sit actus pnmus. Sic autem est in proposito. 
Nam anima quae est forma dans esse non umtur matenae nisi mediante corporeitate, sicut et 
omnes ahae formae substantiales, ut docet Commentator in pnmo Phystcorum et in tractatus 
De substantia orbts." 
161
 The same strategy is also used in Nicole Oresme's commentary. 
I62JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, 90. "Tarnen in adventu ipsius anime omnes actus substantiates et 
accidentales précédentes corrumpuntur Et sit resolutio usque ad matenam pnmam. Et tunc 
in instanti educitur anima de potentia materie et similes dispositiones generantur simul cum 
anima, tarnen perfectiores." 
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dispositions but also the prior substantial forms, including at least the forma 
corporeitatis, but perhaps more, remain identical.163 Jandun seems to prefer 
this alternative reply, but never states that it is his own position. And even 
if it were his view, it is not exactly the same position he defended when he 
discussed the identity of dispositions.164 
In the end, it seems that Jandun never reached a solution in his commen-
tary on the De anima that he found satisfactory in all contexts. But although 
his solution is sketchy, it is possible to draw some conclusions. It is clear that 
Jandun, following Brito, was convinced that questions concerning the identity 
of accidents should be discussed in the De anima. He also accepts the principle 
that what our senses show us is irrelevant to this question. But in contrast to 
Brito, Jandun is also convinced that there must be some basic level on which 
the corrupted and the generated substance are numerically identical. True, 
the details of his account vary in different contexts, but there is always at least 
an identity up to the level of the form of the body, which includes the identity 
of the composing elements. The identity of more complex accidents remains 
connected to the identity of the ultimate substantial form, so that these are 
corrupted and regenerated. For a more definite answer to the identity prob-
'
63The edition uses both 'formae generales' and 'formas substantiates generales' See JOHN OF 
JANDUN, Q Î M , II.5, 90-91. This second reply ends with the words "Et adhuc nullum video 
inconvemens sequi si bene et sane intelligantur dicta Commentatons; de his autem amphus 
habetur in questione de gradibus et pluralitate formarum quam ordinavi." 
'
MIn question II.3 on the definition of the soul, when he replies to the objection: 'the an-
imated body has another act pnor to the soul, therefore the soul is not the first act', Jandun 
simply gives three responses without indicating that he prefers the one over the other: (1) (ac-
cording to common opinion) although the body has many forms prior to the soul, these are all 
corrupted on the advent of the soul and there is a resolution to prime matter, (2) in another 
manner it can be said that the soul is the first act in its genus, namely the genus of those acts 
that are proper to living beings, which is also expressed by the part of the definition 'having 
life in potency'; and (3) it can be said in yet another way and reasonably enough that although 
other forms are prior in the order of generation, the soul is prior in the order of perfection and 
nobility (p. 81-82). In question II.4 'An ex anima et corpore unum per se fiat', Jandun seems 
to defend some type of plurality where the form of body or of substance remains in the body, 
but the text gives few details; JOHN OF JANDUN, QCM, II 4, 86· "Nihil enim prohibet illud quod 
est ens in actu quodammodo per unam formam esse in potentia ad aham. Et sic intelligendum 
est dictum Commentatons quod anima est forma in ente acu, id est subiectum ammae est ens 
actu Non quidem secundum quod subiectum, sed secundum formam corporis aut substantiae 
aut huiusmodi." Also. "Et sic aliter se habet de compositione animalis ex corpore et anima et 
de compositione lapidis ex gravitate et materia prima." But when it is tune to give some details, 
Jandun merely refers to another work: ". . de hoc plenius habetur in questione De pluralitate 
formarum substantìalum." This (unedited) question is found in two manuscripts MS Madrid, 
Biblioteca del Monasteno de El Escoriai, lat. f.II.8, ƒ 52-78 and MS Reims, Bibliothèque mu-
nicipale, 493,/. 151-166. A related, also unedited question is found in MS Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, vat. lat., 6768, f. 213-216 under the title Quaestio de diversttate 
et ordine formarum generis etspeaet. Cf. WEIJERS, Le travail intellectuel, 99 and 102. 
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lem, we need turn to John Buridan. 
4.3.4 John Buridan 
In Buridan's commentary, the problem we found in Brito has become so im-
portant that the question of whether every soul is the first act of the organic 
body ( Utrum omnis anima sit actus primus corporis organici), is now treated as 
a separate question that is discussed before the question of whether or not the 
Aristotelian definition of the soul is correct. 
Buridan remarks that it is not obvious that the soul is the first act and 
he seriously considers the option of a plurality of substantial forms. In the 
end, however, he opts for the unicity of substantial form position. After this 
decision is made, we find the following remarks: 
Et adhuc est una opinio quod sic omnis anima, y m m o et omnis forma 
substantialis est actus primus. Dicunt enim: licet in materia disposi-
tiones pr ime requirantur ad hoc quod fiat et recipiatur in ista materia 
forma aliqua substantialis, tarnen in adventu istius forme substantialis, 
omnes iste accidentales prime corrumpuntur . 1 6 5 
And further there is one opinion that in this way every soul, yes even 
every substantial form is a first act. For the advocates of this opinion 
say: a l though in matter first dispositions are required so that some sub-
stantial form can become present and be received in this matter, nev-
ertheless, at the arrival of this substantial form, all these first accidental 
<forms> are corrupted. 
Here, again, we find the view ('one opinion') that Brito had expressed. 
And Buridan, just like Jandun, thinks that is not, or at least not completely 
correct. But where Jandun's extensive discussion had been an embedded ques-
tion located in his repUes to the initial objections, Buridan discusses it in his 
determination of the question.166 He gives a number of arguments in sup-
port of Brito's solution, taking it very seriously. Yet in spite of all these ar-
guments, Buridan ultimately disagrees with Brito, saying that "these <argu-
ments> notwithstanding, I believe the opposite, of which the demonstration 
belongs to the book On generation and corruption."167 
Buridan refers the reader to his commentary on De generanone for the 
main arguments in support of his own conclusion that the dispositions are 
I65)OHN BURIDAN, QdA, II.2, 21. 
I66ln the edition the explanation and defense of Brito's position takes up twenty percent of 
the entire question. This is without counting Buridan's defense of his own position and replies 
to the arguments in favor of Brito's view, which takes up close to another forty percent. 
167JOHN BURIDAN, QdA, II.2, 24: "Sed non obstantibus istis ego credo oppositum, quod 
demonstrare pertinet ad librum De generattone." 
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not corrupted at the advent of the soul.168 This should not come as a sur-
prise, as we have already seen how much the discussion of the definition of 
the soul in the fourteenth century came under the influence of argumentation 
strategies from the De generatione commentary tradition. In fact, by the time 
we reach Buridan's commentary the impact of the arguments taken from De 
generatione on the De anima tradition has become so strong that Buridan's 
commentary on De generatione includes a question entitled 'Whether in the 
living being there is another substantial form besides the soul'.169 Not only 
that, but several arguments and examples from the De anima tradition are 
now also employed in his De generatione commentary.170 
Although Buridan refers his readers to his commentary on the De genera-
tione for the full argumentation, he also discusses two arguments against the 
corruption and regeneration of dispositions in his De anima commentary, of 
which I will discuss one.171 Buridan asks the reader to consider the case where 
a horse dies.172 In that case the soul, which is (among other things) respon-
' ' 'The arguments are discussed in JOHN B U R I D A N , QdGen, 1.7-8, 74-89. 
I 6 9 J O H N B U R I D A N , QdGen, 1.8, 80-89: Utrum in animato sit alia forma substantialis ab 
anima. 
l70For example in JOHN B U R I D A N , QdGen, 1.7, 156, 17-22: 'Utrum omnis generatio unius 
sit corruptio alterius' we find the argument from De anima that when certain species of liv-
ing beings are cut in half, both parts continue to live: "Quarto. Si dividatur anguilla in duas 
medietates, adhuc utraque pars apparat vivere; et sic utraque pars est animai. Et tarnen neutra 
illarum partium erat ante animal, nisi diceremus quod anguilla erat duo animalia; quod videtur 
falsum. Ideo videtur quia per divisionem quaelibet pars facta est animai; et sic est ibi generatio 
animalis. Et non videtur ibi esse aliqua corruptio, quia sola divisio quantitativa non videtur 
esse corruptio substantialis. Igitur ibi est generatio sine corruptione." In his reply, Buridan 
explicitly refers to the discussion of living beings (158-159 and 70-81) : "Sed adhuc in sub-
stantiis est bene dubitatio propter viventia, quia ponentes quod anima sit addita alteri formae 
substantial! vel aliis formis substantialibus non oportet dicere quod ad generationem animalis 
per adventum animae aliquid corrumpatur.. . Sed si poneretur quod in nullo eodem supposito 
sunt simul plures formae substantiales, tunc universaliter esset dicendum quod o m n e m gen-
erationem unius substantialem concomitatur corruptio substantialis alterius." Interestingly, 
one of Buridan's claims in this question, and one of his most important arguments, is that the 
adage 'generatio umus est corruptio alterius' only has universal validity if each substance has but 
one substantial form. If the plurality of substantial forms position is true, then the adage only 
applies to the generation of the four elements. 
'
7
'The argument that I will not discuss, is typical of the De generatione tradition; JOHN B U R I -
DAN, Q Ì M , II. 1, 25: "Item si ex aqua fiet ignis, aqua calerti. Constat quod, licet ista caliditas 
educatur naturaliter de potentia materie que naturaliter inclinatur ad formam ignis ad quam 
ista caliditas disponit, tarnen non educitur ex forma substantial! aque, quoniam ista est innat-
uralis et disconveniens forme substantial! aque. Sed potius forma substantialis aque resisterei 
generation! caliditatis quam quod concurret ad eius generationem. Ideo nullo modo oportet, si 
forma substantialis aque corrumpatur, quod ista caliditas corrumpatur, ex quo materia manet 
<ex materia manente ed.> de cuius potentia educebatur." 
I 7 2 JOHN B U R I D A N , QdA, II. 1, 24: "Primum est, si equus interficiatur et ad corruptionem 
anime eius corrumpitur tota eius caliditas, adhuc ipso mortuo reperitur per aliquod tempus 
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sible for the presence of heat in the horse's body, is no longer there. Yet for a 
certain period of time, says Buridan, we can feel that heat remains present by 
touching the horse's breast. Now what could be the cause of this heat? Not the 
soul, as it is no longer there and cannot therefore cause the supposedly numer-
ically new heat. But what, then, could be the cause? The new substantial form 
of the corpse also cannot cause it, because the form of the corpse does not heat 
the body —or else all corpses would feel warm—, on the contrary, it makes 
the body cold. The only option left, which Buridan accepts, is that the initial 
assumption of a numerically new heat is wrong. The accidental form of heat 
must remam numerically the same. To be sure, the heat slowly disappears 
because the soul is no longer there to sustain it, but it is not corrupted and 
regenerated at the moment of the death of the horse. Buridan counters the fa-
miliar objection that accidents cannot remain numerically identical through 
generation and corruption by reference to an argument that he had already 
employed in his first question on book II: 
Ad aham dicitur quod, in generatione substantial!, remanent bene dis-
positiones accidentales sensibiles eedem in generato et corrupto Sed 
non manet subiectum idem, capiendo 'subiectum' pro supposito per 
se subsistenti, quod dicitur 'hoc aliquid' Et non dixit Aristoteles in 
descriptione generatioms quod simphciter nullum sensibile remaneret 
idem, sed dixit, cum addinone, 'nullo sensibili remanente in subiecto 
eodem', intelligendo per 'subiectum' sicud lam dictum fuit173 
To the other <argument> it is said that, in substantial generation, acci-
dental perceptible dispositions indeed remain identical in what is gen-
erated and in what is corrupted. But the subject does not remain the 
same, taking 'subject' for a suppositum that is self-subsistent, which is 
called a 'this something' And when Aristotle described generation, he 
magna cahditas in pectore Quid ergo generare! istam cahditatem novam ? N o n interficiens, 
quia non habet naturam generandi cahditatem plus <quam fngiditatem Nee ista cahditas 
generatur per modum <om ed > > sequele ad formam cadaveris, quia ista potius déterminât 
sibi frigiditatem quam talem cahditatem " The argument also occurs in JOHN B U R I D A N , Qd-
Cen, II 7, 262 ' ' 'Utrum qualitas symbola maneat eadem in generato quae fuit in corrupto.' A 
similar argument can be found in NICOLE O R E S M E , QdCen, I 8· 'Utrum aliqua qualitas maneat 
eadem in generato que pnus fiiit in corrupto', óo' 4 ' 145 "Tertio, si ita esset, sequitur quod 
frigiditas generaret novam cahditatem, quod videtur inconvemens Patet consequentia, pos-
ito quod aliquod fngidum remittat calorem naturalem sic quod corrumpat animal, tunc, si 
in cadavere esset novus calor, non videtur generan nisi ab ilio frigido corrumpente, quod est 
propositum " 
'
7 3 J O H N B U R I D A N , Q Ì M , II 1, 16 The reference is to ARISTOTLE, De generatione, I 4 , 3 1 9 b l 4 -
7 "But when nothing perceptible persists in its identity as a substratum, and the thing changes 
as a whole (when e g the seed as a whole is converted into blood, or water into air, or air as a 
whole into water, such an occurrence is a coming-to-be of one substance and a passing-away 
of the other " 
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did not say that unqualifiedly nothing perceptible remains the same, 
but he said, by way of an addition, 'when nothing perceptible remains 
the same in a subject', understanding 'subject' as we already said. 
In effect, Buridan has reached a position similar to that of Whiting whom I 
mentioned in the beginning of this chapter.174 Whiting's solution to the prob-
lem discussed by Ackrill — that we are unable to single out the matter apart 
from the form in living beings — is to distinguish between two conceptions of 
matter that play a role in Aristotle. She calls these two conceptions matter in 
the functionally and in the compositionally defined sense. Matter in the func-
tionally defined sense does not remain after the death of the body, whereas 
matter in the compositionally defined sense does. So when Aristotle claims 
that the corpse is not a body except equivocally, he employs the functional 
definition of body. The body in this sense is called a body on account of the 
functions it has and the activities it can employ. This is why it impossible to 
refer to this body in separation from the soul, because it is what it is, namely 
capable of all these vital functions and activities, on account of its soul. If 
this functional conception of matter is the only one we employ, then Ackrill's 
problem is unavoidable. But, according to Whiting, Aristotle also employs the 
second, compositional conception of matter. Matter in this compositionally 
defined sense has a meaning that is much closer to our contemporary every-
day use of the term matter: it is the particular piece of 'stuff we can perceive, 
in so far as it is composed of the four elements in a certain proportion. 
A similar distinction underUes Buridan's position. For on the one hand, 
he affirms that generation should be described in terms of prime matter and 
one substantial form. In this sense the soul is the only form of the body. Yet 
on the other hand, generation does not imply that all accidents of the previous 
substance are corrupted. At some basic level, the accidents remain numeri-
cally identical since they inhere in matter itself rather than in the composite. 
It is, in fact, the common lack of understanding of the meanings of the term 
'matter' that is one of the main causes of confusion in discussions of the status 
of accidents: 
Ad ultimam rationem dicitur quod, per ignorationem materie et noti-
tiam substantie composite, omnia accidentia secundum communem 
locutionem attribuuntur substantie composite et non materie. Tarnen 
non educuntur nisi de potentia materie, saltern ista que similia inveni-
untur in compositis diversarum specierum.175 
l74See above, p. 125. 
l75JOHN BURIDAN, QÌM, II.2, 26-7. This is echoed in Marilius of Inghen's commentary on 
the Sentences when he discusses the relation of the Divine Word to the soul and the flesh dur-
ing the three days between the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ. After making the claim 
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In response to the final argument, it is said that because of our unfa-
milianty with matter and our acquaintance with composite substance, 
all accidents are attributed in c o m m o n parlance to the composite sub­
stance and not to matter. They are, however, educed from the potency 
of matter alone, at least those that are found similarly in composite sub­
stances of diverse species. 
According to Buridan, there is matter that is not defined in terms of its 
function or powers, as it does not have a proper substantial form, but that 
nevertheless has some actuality and is the bearer of basic qualities such as 
heat.1 7 6 Although Buridan takes a different approach to the problem of es­
sentially ensouled matter, and employs a less clear terminology than Whit­
ing's functionally and compositionally defined matter, a distinction similar to 
the one she uses is certainly there and the sense of matter that was just de­
scribed corresponds to Whiting's compositional matter.1 7 7 This is not to say 
that Buridan is a functionalist, far from it. But it does mean that according to 
Buridan it is both true to say that ( 1 ) the matter of the living being, including 
some accidents, is numerically the same as that of the corpse and (2) the body 
that is mentioned in Aristotle's definition of the soul is what it is, a body, on 
account of its being ensouled, and once the soul departs, it is no longer a body 
except equivocally. 
With their respective distinctions in hand, both Buridan and Whiting 
refuse to accept the consequence that the accidents of the living body and the 
corpse have only an uncanny simitoity (Whiting's term); and both think that 
that the flesh that constitutes the body of Christ loses its substantial form during that period 
and does not receive another form (i.e a forma cadaverts), he deals with the objection that 
matter without form is just prime matter (which is pure potency and cannot be the bearer of 
properties) in the following way MARSILIUS OF INGHEN, Questiones super quattuor libros Sen-
tenttarum, Strassburg, 1501 (photomechanical reprint Frankfurt: Minerva, 1966), III. d. 13, 
44Γ: "Ad primam quam doctores veteres valde ponderabant, et credo quod ex inadvertentia 
metaphysice, quia materia est actu existentie una substantia non minus quam forma substan-
tialis Sed dicitur pura potentia in ordine ad formam, quia nullam earum tahter sibi déterminât 
ut sine ea manere non possit naturahter Sed quia quamhbet formam generabdem indifferenter 
potest recipere, ex hoc pura potentia dicta est." 
176That matter without any substantial form still has some actuality according to Buridan 
is confirmed in his commentary on the Phystca; JOHN BURIDAN, Physica, 1.20, f. 24rb: "Tertia 
conclusio: quod materia est actus et esset actus licet existeret sine forma sive substantial! sive 
accidentali." The idea that matter on its own has some actuality is also found in Duns Scotus 
and William Ockham, see MCCORD ADAMS, William Ockham, 639-647. The examples of scars 
and heat remaining in the body continue to be used in the sixteenth century as can be seen 
in D DES CHENE, Physiologia Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian and Cartesian Thought, 
Ithaca [etc.]: Cornell University Press, 1996, 138-157, esp. 146-148 His discussion of Suarez 
shows that Suarez defends a position similar to Bundan's, in which certain accidents, among 
which is quantity, persist through substantial change. 
177Whiting's interpretation was discussed on p. 125. 
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Aristotle introduces matter in the functionally defined sense to clearly distin-
guish generation and corruption from alteration.178 And finally, Buridan, just 
as Whiting, considers the fact that commentators are not dear on the meaning 
and function of matter in Aristotle to be one of the main causes for the confu-
sion about the status of the accidents of a living substance through generation 
and corruption.179 
It is important to note that the distinction between functionally and com-
positionally defined matter can only be made when the material in Aristotle's 
works on living beings is discussed in close conjunction with his treatise on 
generation and corruption. It has been Aquinas's great contribution to turn 
the unicity of substantial form from a psychological thesis (a living being has 
only one soul) into a general principle of metaphysics (each substance has but 
one substantial form). But it has been Buridan's achievement to employ this 
metaphysical principle in such a manner that the result is a unified natural 
philosophy in which the De generanone and the De anima supplement each 
other and are consistent with each other, so that the soul can be discussed in 
the De generatione context and the transitions of elements into one another in 
the De anima context. 
4.4 Excursus: condemnations and polemics 
Why did the unity of the accidents become a problem and why did it become 
more and more important in the fourteenth century? On the one hand, when 
we look back to Aquinas, we find no indication that he saw the numerical 
unity of accidents as a pressing problem, and the same applies for example to 
the two anonymous commentaries from the 1270s edited by Giele and Van 
Steenberghen. A third anonymous commentator, edited by Bazân, was the 
first to clearly raise the problem, but even there it seems of relatively little 
importance. On the other hand, if we look forward to Pietro Pomponazzi, 
we find a long question in the beginning of his commentary on book II of 
De anima in the context of the definition of the soul entitled: 'Whether some 
accident precedes the substantial form in matter'.180 I think the question of 
' ' "WHITING, 'Living Bodies', 85: "I will argue that Aristotle introduces essentially ensouled 
matter as part of his solution to the problem of distinguishing generation and destruction sim-
phater from alteration and other sorts of accidental change." Buridan argues a similar point, 
as can be seen in the quotation given above, p. 187. 
179JOHN BURIDAN, QdA, II.2, 27: "Ad ultimam rationem dicitur quod per ignorationem 
materie et notitiam substantie composite omnia accidentia secundum communem locutionem 
attribuuntur substantie composite et non materie. Tarnen non educuntur nisi de potentia 
materie, saltern ista que similia inveniuntur in compositis diversarum specierum." 
180Paul Bakker brought this question to my attention. 
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why the unity of the accidents became such a problem can be answered by 
looking at the debates surrounding Aquinas's position on substantial form in 
the decade following his death, in particular at the discussion now called the 
Correctoria debate.181 The most important phase of these debates occurs over 
a decade, beginning 1276 when the Parisian masters of theology rejected the 
unicity of substantial form position and ending 1286 when the masters claim 
that they can no longer recall ever having condemned Aquinas's position on 
substantial form.182 
Already during Thomas Aquinas's lifetime, his views on a number of sub-
jects came under attack, particularly from the side of the Franciscans.183 Of 
special importance is a debate between John Peckham and Thomas Aquinas 
on the unicity or plurality of substantial form in 1270 before the masters of 
the University of Paris. Peckham even claimed at one point that this debate 
led Thomas to retract his views on the unicity of substantial form.184 
In 1277, seven years after this debate with Peckham on the permissibil-
ity of defending the unicity of substantial form, two sets of condemnations 
were issued, one in Paris and one in Oxford.185 The condemnations in Paris 
"'For a much more detailed description of the debates on the unicity or plurality of sub-
stantial form, see the ground-breaking study of Roberto Zavallom as well as the more recent 
one by Theodor Schneider, ZAVALLONI, Richard de Mediavtlfo and SCHNEIDER, Die Einheit des 
Menschen. 
le2For the rejection of the Thomistic position on substantial form, see L. HODL, 'Neue 
Nachrichten über die Panser Verurteilungen der thomasischen Formlehre', Scholastik, 39 
(1964), 178-196, 179. This is an important supplement to ZAVALLONI, Richard de Mediavitta, 
esp. 492, who thought that the unicity of substantial form position had never been condemned 
in Pans. A. BOUREAU, Théologie, science et censure au XIIIe siècle Le cas de Jean Peckham, 
Pans. Les belles lettres, 1999, 343-345 supplies a chronology of most of the important texts 
and events. 
I83A convenient and detailed chronologically ordered summary of the various attacks on 
and defenses of Thomas Aquinas in the period 1270-the early 1320s is given in P. GLORIEUX, 
'Pro et contra Thomam Un survol de cinquante années', in: T. W. KÖHLER (ed.), Sapientiae 
procerum amore. Mélanges Médiévistes offerts à dom Jean-Pierre Muller O.S.B, à l'occasion de 
son 70ème anniversaire (24 février 1974), Roma. Editrice Anselmiana, 1974, 255-287. 
"''For the two conflicting accounts of this debate, one by Peckham who claims to have 
defended Aquinas as much as possible until Aquinas finally submitted his views to the censure 
of the faculty, and one by Bartholomew of Capua who stresses that Peckham attacked Aquinas, 
see ROENSCH, Early Thomistic School, 22, note 35. In the same year, on December 10, 1270, 
the Bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, condemned 13 propositions (CUP I, no. 432,486-487.). 
But although some of the condemned propositions concerned philosophical psychology, the 
condemnation had nothing to do with Aquinas and was directed rather at the so-called 'radical 
Aristotelians'. 
"
,5The Parisian condemnations can be found in CUP I, no. 473, 543-548. They have been 
organized and edited with a commentary on their background in HISSETTE, Enquête sur les 219 
articles See also the new edition by D. PICHÉ, La condamnation Parisienne de 1277, Nouvelle 
edition du texte latin, traduction, introduction, et commentaire par D. Piché, avec la collab-
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were issued on March 7 by bishop Stephen Tempier and include a wide range 
of teachings, most of which are not directed against Aquinas.186 Those that 
may be directed against Aquinas are so only indirectly.187 It is important to 
note that the thesis that was most controversial in Oxford, the unicity of sub-
stantial form, is not included in the Parisian list. This is all the more surpris-
ing given that Tempier and the papal legate Simon de Brion had organized a 
meeting of the masters of theology one year prior to these condemnations, in 
which Aquinas's position that the intellective soul is the only substantial form 
of the body had been almost unanimously rejected.188 The condemnations 
issued in Oxford on March 18, by contrast, are almost completely directed 
against Aquinas's views, especially his position that every substance, includ-
ing man, has but one substantial form. These condemnations were issued 
by the archbishop of Canterbury (1272-1278) and fellow Dominican, Robert 
KUwardby.189 
oration de C. Lafleur, Pans: Vnn, 1999. The Oxford condemnations can be found in CUP I, 
no. 474, 558-560. 
'^The intentions behind the Paris condemnations and their effects on the practice of phi-
losophy have been discussed for a long time in the literature, but still not all details are clear. 
For some recent and diverging interpretations, see. L. BIANCHI , '1277: A Turning Point in Me-
dieval Philosophy?' in· J. A. AERTSEN and A. SPEER (eds.), Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter'' 
Akten des X. Internationalen Kongresses fur mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société Interna-
tionale pour l'étude de la Philosophie Médiévale 25. bis 30. August 1997 in Erfurt, Berlin [etc.]· 
Walter de Gruyter, 1998, 90-110 and J. E. M U R D O C H , '1277 and Late Medieval Natural Phi-
losophy', in: ] . Α. AERTSEN and A. SPEER (eds.). Was isf Philosophie im Mittelalter' Akten des 
X. Internationalen Kongresses fur mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société Internationale pour 
l'étude de la Philosophie Médiévale 25. bis 30 August 1997 in Erfurt, Berlin [etc.]: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1998, 111-121. 
187For a list of sixteen theses that might (also) have been directed at Aquinas, see ROENSCH, 
Early Thomistic School, 183-184. The question of how far the condemnations were also directed 
against Aquinas has been more recently discussed, again, by R. HISSETTE, 'L'implication de 
Thomas d'Aquin dans les censures Parisiennes de 1277', Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie 
médiévales, 64:1 (1997), 3 -31 . 
" ' H O D L , 'Anima forma corporis', 537 Two of the masters voted differently, undoubtedly 
the two Dominican masters. Hodl convincingly showed that the vanous references to a Parisian 
condemnation of Aquinas's position in texts from the 1270s and 1280s refer to this magisterial 
meeting. 
'"'For his biography, see S. Tugwell, 'Kdwardby, Robert (c. 1215-1279)', Ox-
ford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford[etc.]. Oxford University Press, 2004 
<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/15546> (accessed 14 October 2010) There is an ex-
tant letter from Kilwardby addressed to Peter of Conflans in which he clarifies his intentions. 
It has been edited by F. EHRLE, 'Beitrage zur Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Scholastik. II 
Der Augustinismus und der Anstotehsmus in der Scholastik gegen Ende des 13 Jahrhunderts', 
in: H. DENIFLE and F. EHRLE (eds.), Archiv fur Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mitte-
lalters, Freiburg im Breisgau. Herder'sche Verlagshandlung, 1889, vol. 5, 603-635, 614-632 , 
but it contains no references to the unicity of substantial form position As it turned out, the 
manuscripts on which Franz Ehrle's edition was based were incomplete. A BIRKENMAIER, Ver-
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Kilwardby's condemnations were reaffirmed by his successor to the See 
of Canterbury, the Franciscan John Peckham on October 29, 1284, who took 
this opportunity to launch a new attack on Aquinas's position on substantial 
form.190 It seems that the reaffirmation of Kilwardby's condemnation did 
not have the effect Peckham intended, because only two years later, Peckham 
once again condemned the unicity thesis and several related theses, this time 
in London.191 But the bishops of Canterbury were not the only ones who 
attacked the unicity of substantial form position. 
Most important in this context is the so-called Correctona debate.192 This 
debate takes its name from a tract written by the Franciscan William de la 
Mare, entitled the Correctonum fratris Thomae, which was composed some­
time after 1277 but before the end of 1279.193 In this tract, De la Mare criti­
cizes and, as he calls it, corrects 118 statements by Aquinas taken from a va­
riety of works. By decision of the Franciscan general chapter held in 1282 in 
Strasburg, this Correctonum was turned into an obligatory companion to the 
study of the works of Aquinas in the Franciscan studia.194 
mischte Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der mtttefolterltchen Philosophie, Munster: Aschendorff, 
1922, 60-64 edited the remainder of the letter, in which the unicity position is discussed in 
detail. 
' ' "ROENSCH, Early Thomistic School, 179. Several letters of Peckham in which he explains 
why he condemned the unicity thesis are extant. A summary of these can be found in D. A. 
CALLUS, 'The Problem of the Unity of Substantial Form and Richard Knapwell, O P.' in. 
Melanges offerts a Etienne Gilson, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1959,123-
160, 126-133. Interestingly, Peckham gradually shifts from denying that Aquinas even held the 
unicity position to claiming that he, Peckham, was the only person to try to defend Aquinas 
when he was attacked for his unicity position by the other masters, including his fellow Do­
minicans (CALLUS, 'The Problem of the Unity of Substantial Form', 128-129). 
'"According to F. PELSTER, 'Die Satze der Londoner Verurteilung von 1286 und die 
Schnften des Magister Richard von Knapwell Ο Ρ ' Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum, 16 
(1946), 83-106, 89-90, there were two condemnations by Peckham in London. The first on 14 
Apnl 1286 and the second on 30 Apnl 1286. In the first, Richard Knapwell is mentioned by 
name, whereas in the second no specific philosopher is mentioned. 
'
9 2For an overview, see L. HODL, 'Geistesgeschichtliche und literarkntische Erhebungen zum 
Korrektonenstreit (1277-1287)', Recherches de Théologie ancienne et medievale, 33 (1966), 8 1 -
114; HODL, 'Anima forma corporis' and M. D. JORDAN, 'The Controversy of the Correctona 
and the Limits of Metaphysics', Speculum, 57:2 (1982), 292-314. 
"
3The tract has been edited together with one of the Dominican replies to it in P. GLORIEUX, 
Les premieres polémiques thomistes I Le Correctonum corruptoni 'Quare' edition critique, Kam: 
Le Saulchoir, 1927. It survives in two redactions. The first, edited and most important redac-
tion, on which all the later replies are based, was wntten sometime between March 1277 and 
August 1279. For a summary of the argument used to date the work, see D. A. CALLUS, 'Re-
view of: Muller, J.-P., O.S.B., Le correctonum Corruptoni "Quaestione".' Bulletin Thomiste, 9 
(1954-1956), 643-655, 646. Three articles that only appear in the second redaction have been 
edited in R. HISSETTE, 'Trois articles de la seconde rédaction du 'Correctonum' de Guillaume 
de la Mare', Recherches de Théologie ancienne et medievale, 51 (1984), 230-241. 
194
"Item Generalis Minister imponit ministns provincialibus quod non permittant multiph-
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Unsurprisingly, once this Correctonum became known outside the Fran-
ciscan studia, it provoked a strong rebuttal by several Dominicans; a total 
of four or five works were written in response to the Corruptonum fratris 
Thomae, as the Dominicans liked to call De la Mare's tract. These responses 
have come to be known by the first word of the text as the Quare,195 Scten-
dum,196 Ctrca197 and QuaesUone.198 Usually the Apologeticum veritatis contra 
corruptonum is also included in this list.199 Not all of these works respond to 
all of De la Mare's articles, as the Circa stops after article 60 and the Quaes-
can summam fratris Thome nisi apud lectores notabiliter intelligentes, et hoc nisi cum decla-
ratiombus fratris Wdhelmi de Mara, non in margmibus positis, sed in quaterms; et huiusmodi 
declarationes non scnbantur per ahquos seculares.", cited according to GLORIEUX, Le Correc-
tonum corruptom 'Quare', tx. 
"
5 RICHARD KNAPWELL, Correctonum corruptom 'Quare', edited by P. Glorieux, Kaïn: Le 
Saulchoir, 1927. The tract was written between 1278 and 1286, probably around 1282 or 1283, 
see HÓDL, 'Geistesgeschichthche und literarkntische Erhebungen', 93. The terminus post quern 
is the composition date of De la Mare's work, and the terminus ante quern is fixed by internal 
references to the condemnation of Aquinas's position on the unicity of substantial form by the 
Parisian masters of theology. Since in 1286 the masters of theology claimed that they could 
no longer recall any condemnation of Aquinas's position, the Quare must have been written 
previously. That the Parisian masters had indeed condemned the position (in 1276) was shown 
in HöDL, 'Neue Nachnchten'. The vanous alternatives that have been proposed for the date of 
the tract are conveniently summanzed in JORDAN, 'The Controversy of the Correctona', 293, 
footnote 6. When Glorieux edited the Quare in 1927, the author of the tract was unknown. 
Later research conducted especially by Gloneux and Hodl points so strongly to Knapwell as 
the author, or at the very least the main author if it was a group effort (GLORIEUX, 'Pro et con-
tra Thomam', 264 mentions the possibility that Knapwell and Thomas of Sutton have jointly 
composed the tract), that I see no compelling reason to continue to treat the Quare as an 
anonymous tract. For the arguments that Knapwell is the author of the Quare and a summary 
of the discussion concerning the authorship, see especially HÖDL, 'Anima forma corporis', 88-
93. Just as the Correctonum itself, the Quare also survives in two redactions, see GLORIEUX, Le 
Correctonum corruptom 'Quare', xxxvm-xliv 
196ROBERT OF ORFORD, Correctonum corruptom 'Sciendum', edited by P. Glorieux, Pans 
Vrin, 1956. The text was wntten in the same penod as the Quare (between 1278 and 1286) 
There have been two serious candidates for the authorship: Robert of Orford and William of 
Macklesfield. The editor of the Sciendum, Palémon Gloneux now takes Robert of Orford to be 
the more likely author (see GLORIEUX, 'Pro et contra Thomam', 264-265) In support of this, 
the arguments presented in HÖDL, 'Anima forma corporis', 94-99 also convincingly show that 
the author is Robert of Orford. 
197JOHN QUIDORT OF PARIS, Correctonum corruptom 'Circa', in: J.-P. Muller (ed.), Le correc-
tonum corruptom 'Circa' de Jean Quidort de Parts, Roma: Herder, 1941. The editor, Jean-Pierre 
Muller, dates it 1282-84 (p. xxxvi). 
" 'ANONYMUS, Correctonum corruptom 'Quaesttone', in: J.-P. Muller, Le correctonum cor-
ruptom 'Quaestione' texte anonyme du ms Merton 267, Roma: Herder, 1954 There is a good 
chance that it was written by William of Macklesfield, but the question of the authorship is still 
not settled. It is the shortest of the correctona 
' "RAMBERTO DE' PRIMADIZZI, Apologeticum veritatis contra corruptonum, edited by J -P. 
Muller, Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1943. It was written e. 1287-88. 
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itone after article 30. The Sciendum and the Quare, however, reply to all De 
la Mare's articles. Of these the Quare, written by Richard Knapwell, was the 
most influential. Something to keep in mind when reading these correctona is 
that all authors were young Dominican scholars who had not yet incepted as 
masters of theology.200 A second thing to note is that the first two were writ-
ten in England, and the final three were written in France, which means that 
the impact of De la Mare's Correctonum was felt in both Oxford and Paris. 
One of the statements that De la Mare corrected was Aquinas's position 
on the unicity of substantial form, especially in so far as it was applied to the 
rational soul in man. The correction is spread out over many articles,201 but I 
will discuss the two most important ones. The first is article 31 which attacks 
the statement that 'In man there is only one substantial form'.202 The second 
is the article immediately following this, which attacks the statement that 'no 
accidental disposition preexists in matter before the arrival (inductionem) of 
the soul'. 
De la Mare's strategy in his first article on the substantial form of man is 
the same strategy he favors in his entire tract, which is to draw as much atten-
tion as possible to every theological falsity that would result, were we to accept 
Aquinas's statements. And he is quick to point out that because of these the-
ological falsities, the unicity position has already been rejected or condemned 
{reprobatur).203 The most important falsities De la Mare mentions are that we 
could no longer explain the Eucharist, nor the transmission of original sin, and 
above all we could not explain the numerical identity of the body of Christ in 
the tomb with the living body of Christ. For, as the argument goes, if the only 
substantial form of the living body of Christ is his intellective soul, then what 
remains in the tomb after his death is either prime matter or a corpse with 
a new, different substantial form. Either way, the body of the living Christ 
and his corpse would not be numerically identical. Hence the corpse in tomb 
would not, strictly speaking, be his corpse. All of these arguments touch upon 
one of the fundamental problems that the proponents of a plurality of forms 
had with the unicity thesis, namely the apparent lack of numerical identity of 
both matter and accidents through generation and corruption.204 Although 
De la Mare briefly mentions some philosophical arguments, they hardly play 
2<)0The only possible exception is Knapwell, who incepted in 1284 which means that there is 
a small possibility that he incepted just before writing the Quare. See JORDAN, 'The Controversy 
of the Correctona', 297. 
201
 Among these are articles 31, 32 ,48, 52, 102, 107 and 114 
2<)2For detailed analysis of this article, see ROENSCH, Early Thomistic School, 201-12 . 
2 0 3 W I L L I A M DE LA M A R E , Correctonum, a. 31, 129: "Haec posino de umtate fonmae sub-
stantiahs reprobatur a magistris, primo, quia ex ipsa plura sequuntur contraria fidei cathohcae; 
secundo, quia contradicit philosophiae, tertio, quia répugnât Sacrae Scripturae." 
20ARICHARD KNAPWELL, De umtateformae, 24. 
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a role in his discussion.205 
In the second article, on the accidental dispositions before the advent of 
the soul, there is again a strong emphasis on the body of Christ, this time at 
the moment of incarnation, supported by two references to the Parisian con-
demnation of the unicity position. But this time the theological arguments 
are accompanied by several philosophical arguments that quite cleverly focus 
on the temporal generation of man. Their main thrust is this: at some point 
the rational soul is introduced in a man, but before that there is already an 
actually living body, therefore there must be more than one substantial form. 
Of particular importance is that De la Mare makes use of the principle of the 
identity of indiscemibles: if two things are similar in every respect, they are 
(numerically) the same thing.206 He can then use the similarity of the acci-
dents that are present before and after the introduction of the (intellective) 
soul as an argument that there is more than one substantial form, for if there 
were but one substantial form, the accidents would be corrupted and regen-
erated and hence numerically diverse which is ruled out on account of their 
complete similarity. 
Although De la Mare's arguments are brief, the reaction in one of the Do-
minican Correctoria corruptorii fratns Thomae, the Quare written by Knap-
well, is very long. One of the reasons for this, is that Knapwell does not limit 
himself to merely refuting De la Mare's arguments about the generation of 
a living being. For after his refutations he unexpectedly introduces a second 
set of arguments against the unicity of substantial form, claiming that many 
people employ such arguments. These arguments include some that focus on 
the death of a human being (instead of the generation). Knapwell then pro-
ceeds to solve these as well. And when he responds to the argument about the 
similarity of accidents he takes the same approach as Brito later takes when 
it comes to sensory evidence for the identity of accidents: he denies that our 
2 0 5WILLIAM DE LA MARE, Comctorium, 130-131: "Secundo reprobatur quia contradicit 
philosophiae. Si enim anima sola intellectiva immediate est perfectio materiae primae, tunc 
non esset in homine forma elementi, nee forma minti de quibus philosophia multa dicit. Cess-
abit etiam studium medicinae. Praeterea forma una et eadem numero dabit esse corporale 
et spirituale, et per consequens corporalis erit simul et spiritualis. Item sequitur quod ma-
teria prima sit gravis et levis, et quod habeat corpus ab anima quod sit grave et leve et non 
ab elemento dominante in corpore." He does, however, devote a large part of the text to a 
philosophical explanation of how the unity of a living being can still be explained assuming a 
plurality of substantial forms. 
2 0 6WILLIAM DE LA MARE, Cotrectonum, a. 32, 144-5: "Praeterea constat quod ante infu-
sionem animae rationalis est in corpore forma mixti, et qualitatum remissarum ab actibus suis, 
et forma et figura membrorum organiconim. Item, post animae infusionem sunt haec omnia 
in corpore omnino similia prioribus. Et quod non sint aha quam prius, videtur per omni-
modam similitudinem; quod enim per omnia simile est, idem est, ut dicit Damascenus, Libro 
III, capitulo 16." (The reference is to the De fide orthodoxa). 
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senses can discriminate between completely similar accidents.207 
These direct, theologically inspired attacks made against Thomas Aquinas 
in Oxford by De la Mare do not stand on their own. As Jean-Luc Solére con-
vincingly argued, several of the quodlibetal questions Aquinas had to answer 
in 1269-71 also try to attack him on the same theological grounds.208 Quodli-
bet II, q. 1, a. 2 (Advent 1269) is entitled 'whether Christ was the same man 
during the three days before resurrection', Quodlibet III, q. 2, a. 2 (Lent 1270) 
'whether the eye of Christ after his death was an eye equivocally', and Quodli-
bet rv, q. 5, a. 1 (Lent 1271 ) 'whether it is numerically one body of Christ that 
is hanging from the cross and lying in the grave'.209 
That the explanation of these theological cases, in particular the status of 
the body of Christ, was one of the main reasons to defend a plurality of sub-
stantial forms can also be confirmed by looking at the lengthy Quodlibet on the 
unicity or plurality of substantial form in man held by Godfrey of Fontaines 
during the final stages of the debate (Easter 1286).210 Godfrey lists three prin-
cipal reasons to choose the pluralist position: first, that we do not see the 
supposed corruption of accidents; second that the unicity position cannot ex-
plain how man is generated; and finally the theological cases: the Eucharist 
and the body of Christ.211 These arguments are connected with sense, reason 
207RICHARD KNAPWELL, Quare, a. 32, 153: "Nee est illud contra sensum, quia sensus non 
est distinguere inter accidentia omnino similia quando subito inducuntur in eadem materia, 
puta quod humiditas vel dimensio sit aha in aceto de novo generato et vino praeexistente." The 
proposition is argued for at some length in the passage immediately following this one. 
^'SOLÉRE, 'Was the Eye in the Tomb?', especially 527-529. 
209SoLÈRE, 'Was the Eye in the Tomb?', 526. That these questions targeted hotly debated 
issues can be seen from the recurrence of similar questions in other authors. Solére gives a list 
in footnote 72 on page 531 of his article. 
210GODFREY OF FONTAINES, Quodlibet II, q. 7: 'Utrum homo habeat esse ab una forma sub-
stantiali vel a pluribus'. For the date see footnote 122. 
2
"GODFREY OF FONTAINES, Quodlibet II, q. 7: "Et arguebatur quod homo non habeat esse 
ab una forma substantiali tantum, quia ponere hominem habere tantum unam formam sub-
stantialem est contra sensum, item est contra rationem, item est contra fidem. Contra sensum, 
quia in homine mortuo apparent eadem accidentia esse quae erant in ipso vivente. Hoc autem 
non esset nisi aliqua forma substantialis quae erat in ipso vivente maneret in mortuo, quia acci-
dentia non consequuntur materiam nisi mediante forma substantiali. Sed forma substantialis 
quae est anima non est in mortuo homine, sed alia; et ilia etiam erat in vivo simul cum anima. 
Quare etc. Hoc etiam est contra rationem, quia ratio iudicat quod unicuique agenti et actioni 
respondet suus terminus et effectus, quare duorum agentium quae agunt diversis actionibus re-
spondent diversi sive plures effectus et termini. Sed ad productionem hominis concurrunt duo 
agentia, scilicet agens naturale et agens supernaturale. Quare ad constitutionem eius concur-
runt duae formae substantiales, quarum una erit terminus agentis naturalis, alia erit terminus 
agentis supernaturalis. Hoc etiam videtur contra fidem, quoniam si in homine non sit nisi 
una forma, scilicet anima, tune cum Christus fuit mortuus, non remansit idem corpus numero 
mortuum quod fuerat vivum; tune etiam substantia panis converteretur in solam materiam 
quae non est corpus, nee caro, aut converteretur in compositum ex materia et anima quae 
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and faith respectively. Two of the arguments, the impossibility of seeing the 
corruption of accidents and the generation (and corruption) of man begin to 
play an increasingly important role in the De anima commentaries from Brito 
onward.212 
How do these discussions relate to the commentary tradition on the De 
anima7. I propose the following explanation. When Aquinas comments on 
the De anima, he is concerned with explaining the metaphysical composition 
and the functioning of the complete living being. In his commentary on the 
De anima he is not at all concerned with the temporal aspects of the generation 
of a living being. Precisely the opposite, it is the fully functioning living being 
with all its perfections and operations that is under consideration in the De 
anima. When De la Mare attacks Aquinas, however, using mainly theological 
arguments — especially arguments concerning the status of the body of Christ 
in the triduüm — he takes another perspective. De la Mare focuses precisely 
on the moments of generation and corruption. The arguments concerning the 
body of Christ in particular introduce this (more) temporal perspective, and 
in their slipstream there follow some arguments on the generation of a man. 
The Dominicans, in their response, did not dismiss this changed perspective, 
or even comment on this change, but instead tried to reply to it by elaborating 
a theory of the identity of accidents hardly found in Thomas.213 The effect of 
this is that in the Dominican replies the viewpoint of the natural philosopher 
and that of the metaphysician are conflated, contrary to what Aquinas did.214 
Between about 1276 and 1286 the debate was held hostage by those who con-
sidered the unicity of substantial form position to be heretical. But although 
after this period, the question on the unicity or plurality of substantial forms is 
once again a question that can be discussed on philosophical grounds, without 
one of the options being prohibited, something has definitely changed in the 
discussions. If we look at the doctrinal question, Thomas posthumously won 
the debate. The unicity of substantial form becomes dominant in De anima 
tarnen non dicitur ibi esse nisi per concomitantiam." 
212The final reason: the theological cases and in particular the status of the body of Christ, 
was not taken up in the De anima tradition. This is not surprising The exact division of labour 
between the artistae and the theologians was often debated between the two groups, but it 
seems to have been a matter of general agreement that discussing the mysteries of faith in any 
detail should be left to the theologians 
2
'
3Indeed> Aquinas had always tried to reply in his Quodltbeta without falling into this trap. 
2MI fully agree with the description of the difference between a metaphysical and natural 
philosophical viewpoint given by HODL, 'Anima forma corporis', 553 "Der Naturphilosoph 
kann immer nur von der Pluralitat der Formen sprechen, d.h., er betrachtet die Wirklichkeit 
in ihrer vielfaltigen und gegliederten Erscheinung (species). Der Metaphysiker achtet auf die 
Seins-Form in ihrer Einheit, Wesenthchkeit und Wirklichkeit und integriert, ergänzt und vol-
lendet die menschliche Betrachtung." 
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commentaries. But looking at the formal and the methodological aspect, the 
Franciscan attacks changed the perspective in which Aquinas proposed his 
theory.215 And once this perspective had been introduced, along with the 
difficult questions it raised about the unity of accidents, it was there to stay 
and gave rise to these detailed discussions in the fourteenth century. It is an 
irony of history that the fourteenth century, in which so many philosophers 
switched from metaphysics to semantics to solve philosophical problems, is 
the same period in which these debates on accidental identity became so im-
portant. 
4.5 Conclusions 
The later medieval commentators turned out to be fully aware of the problem 
that Aristotle seems to rely on 'essentially ensouled matter', which was dis-
cussed by John Ackrill in the 1970s. They agreed that the body which is men-
tioned in Aristotle's definition of the soul is not the soul's matter in the sense 
that the bronze is the matter of a statue. A body can only be potentially alive if 
it is actually ensouled, which is why after death there no longer is a body un-
less we use the term body 'equivocally'. Aquinas had explained in great detail 
why the body cannot be the matter of the soul, but other commentators were 
just as aware of the issue. For instance, the commentaries by Anonymi Giele 
and Bazan also discuss in some detail what sort of body qualifies as 'having life 
in potency'. It is a body that is in first actuality to life, i.e. which has a soul, but 
is not, at least not continuously in second actuality to life. The term 'potency' 
in Aristotle's definition of the soul refers to being capable of performing vital 
operations, not to being capable of becoming alive. 
When the acceptance of essentially ensouled bodies is combined with a 
strict adherence to the unicity of substantial form position, it becomes difficult 
to describe what happens when the soul departs or is corrupted. On the one 
hand, the corpse looks remarkably similar to the living body. But on the other 
hand, the corpse is not a body, unless we use the term 'body' equivocally. 
Moreover, there can be no numerical identity on any level between the body 
and the corpse, not even on the level of accidents. In Aquinas we find little 
if any discussion of these counter-intuitive consequences. As I have argued, 
the reason for this seems to be that Aquinas looks at living beings from the 
perspective of the final cause rather than from the perspective of the efficient 
cause. But when his opponents argue against his position, the philosophical 
2
'
5JORDAN, 'The Controversy of the Correctoria', 314 has aptly called the Dominican victory 
'Pyrrhic'. 
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arguments are often based on the perspective of efficient causality: what could 
possibly account for the regeneration of similar accidents? 
The discussion about the identity of accidents throughout the generation 
and corruption of the living being became an increasingly important topic 
in the fourteenth-century commentaries on the De anima. Once Brito had 
formulated the precise consequences of a strict application of the unicity of 
substantial forms framework for the identity of accidents, fourteenth-century 
commentators tried to find ways to avoid these consequences while (for the 
most part) continuing to endorse the unicity of substantial form. As a re-
sult, even within the unicity of substantial forms framework, matter is given 
a gradually more independent status. Again, this is clearest in Buridan, who 
explicitly states that some accidents inhere directly in matter, and that it is 
only our ignorance of what matter is (combined with our acquaintance with 
composite substances) that makes us ascribe these dispositions to the compos-
ite substance. Buridan's solution turned out to have many similarities to that 
defended by several twentieth-century commentators of Aristotle, including 
Jennifer Whiting. These commentators distinguished between two senses of 
matter in Aristotle. A matter that is essentially ensouled and a matter that is 
only contingently ensouled, and which is numerically identical in the body 
and the corpse. Although many of the modem commentators who follow this 
line of interpretation have a functionalist agenda, which is, obviously, lack-
ing in Buridan, they do share one concern. This is to find a way of defending 
both that the body is only a body on account of its being ensouled (hence 
the corpse is not a body) and that the body and the corpse share something, 
namely numerically the same matter and some basic accidents. 
The driving force behind the introduction of the often detailed discussions 
on the (non-)identity of body and corpse on the level of accidents turned out 
to be to a large extent theological. The early attacks on Aquinas's position, 
in the Quodlibeta and the Correctorium, had a strong theological motivation. 
The arguments addressed the status of relics, the status of Christ's body in the 
triduüm, etc. But these theological arguments were quickly supported by an 
appeal to (common) sense—we do not see the accidents being corrupted and 
regenerated — and by an appeal to the apparent lack of the proper efficient 
causality that could explain the regeneration, and the corruption of the acci-
dents. When the philosophical arguments find their way into the commen-
taries on the De anima, there is no mention anymore of theological aspects 
that originally motivated the discussion. It was now simply accepted by all 
commentators, both those who agreed with the unicity of substantial form 
and those who opposed it, that the discussion of the validity of the unicity 
of substantial form position was a philosophical discussion. Either position 
could be upheld without being charged with heresy. 
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In a second phase, the arguments against the regeneration of accidents in 
the corpse were supplemented by material taken from commentaries on De 
generatìone et corruptione. Slowly the discussion about accidents in the De 
anima tradition and the discussion on symbofo in the De generatìone tradition 
become intertwined. In the case of John Buridan, this even led to the inclusion 
of a separate question on the soul in his commentary on the De generatìone. 
The surprising result is that the popularity in late-thirteenth and fourteenth-
century commentaries on De anima of the position that man has but one soul 
and that this soul is his only substantial form hardly counts as a victory of 
Aquinas. Because of the new focus on efficient causality when explaining liv-
ing being, which was lacking in Aquinas, there is an ever increasing awareness 
of the difficulties involved in accounting for the identity of the living being 
and the corpse. Ultimately, this leads to a new conception of matter, in which 
prime matter has a certain actuality of its own apart from any substantial form, 
as we saw in Buridan. And, ironically, it was precisely the question of what 
matter is that occasioned the debates on unicity and plurality of forms in the 
first place.216 
2
'
6See section 2.4. 
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Substance, powers and acts 
Those who see any difference between soul 
and body have neither. 
OSCAR WILDE, 'Phrases and Philosophies 
for the Use of the Young', Chameleon, 
1894. 
Aquinas approvingly paraphrases Aristotle when he writes that defining the 
soul — as Aristotle had done in the beginning of book II of the De anima — 
amounts to nothing more than to giving a sketchy, preliminary description of 
it: 
Deinde epilogando colligit que dicta sunt et dicit quod secundum pre-
dicta determinatum est de anima et posila est anime descriptio figu-
raliter, quasi extrinsece et superficialiter et incomplete. Complebitur 
enim determinatio de anima quando pertinget usque ad intima ut de-
terminetur natura uniuscuiusque partis ipsius anime.1 
Next, by way of conclusion, he <i.e. Aristotle Sifß> sums up what has 
been said; and he says that in the foregoing a determination and de-
scription of the soul was given figuratively, as it were extrinsically and 
superficially and incompletely. The determination of the soul will be 
completed when he reaches its inner structure such that he determines 
the nature of each part of the soul. 
To elucidate the soul's definition, it is necessary to look more closely at 
the various 'parts' of the soul. Only then will the soul's definition become 
something more than a mere extrinsic, superficial and incomplete description. 
Looking back, we can see that this approach was already indicated in the ques-
tions on the possibility of any science of the soul taken up in book I, in which 
what I called the simplicity arguments were countered by the introduction of 
'THOMAS AQUINAS, SentdeA, II.2, 76l: 
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some structural complexity within the soul, either in terms of attributes (pas-
siones) or in terms of'parts' (partes).1 For if the soul were completely simple, 
lacking 'parts' in every sense of the word, as the simplicity arguments claimed, 
it would be impossible to study it scientifically. The 'parts' in question are the 
soul's powers, and their relation to each other and to the soul as a whole is one 
of the main subjects of this chapter.3 
All commentators included the soul's having parts — I will omit the scare 
quotes from now on — as one of the necessary conditions for the possibility 
of a scientìa de anima. But the methodological questions never made it fully 
clear how important these parts really are. The quote from Aquinas given 
above leaves no doubt as to their importance: defining the soul is not the ul-
timate goal of the scientìa de anima but merely its beginning.4 Much more 
important — and this takes up most of Aristotle's treatise — is fleshing out 
this definition by describing the various acts and powers of the soul, begin-
ning with those that are the easiest to understand (the vegetative powers) and 
ending with those that are the most difficult to understand (the intellective 
powers). If the soul were so completely simple and undivided that it lacked 
2See above, 3.1.2. 
'For example THOMAS AQUINAS, SentdeA, S?3-8: "Non autem habet aliter anima partes 
nisi secundum quod eius potencie partes eius dicuntur, prout alicuius potentis multa, partes 
dici possunt potestates ad singula; unde determinare de partibus anime est determinare de 
singulis potenciis eius." See also ANONYMUS GIELE, QdA, II.5, 7715"": "Sensitivum siquidem 
et secundum locum motivum universaliter sunt partes animae in quibuscumque inveniantur, 
quia secundum locum etc., non est sine sensitivo, nee sensitivum sine vegetativo; ideo quodli-
bet istorum est semper pars animae et non tota anima." 
4
 Aristotle's approach in the scientìa de anima, in which he first gives a definition of the 
soul, and then devotes the remainder of the treatise to discussing and elucidating the various 
parts of the definition (as well as those other topics that are either presupposed by or necessar-
ily connected to the elements of the definition), is a method he also employs elsewhere. LANG, 
'Aristotelian Physics', using the Physica as a case-study, gives an excellent analysis of the man-
ners in which both Aristotle and Aquinas proceed in natural philosophy. Both philosophers 
take the definition of nature as their starting point and then explore the various elements re-
lated to this definition. Moreover, both philosophers employ teleologica! procedures, which 
are reflected in the structure of their texts. But whereas for Aristotle the teleologica! procedure 
consists in a gradual unfolding of the definition of nature, for Aquinas it consists in a progres-
sion from the general definition of nature to the proof of the ultimate cause of nature, God, in 
book VIII. So both authors employ a teleologica! procedure in their work, but the teleologica! 
order is reversed. Still, in both cases there is ". . . a radical unity of ( 1 ) the procedure by which 
arguments and conclusions are construed, and (2) the particular content, that is, the definition 
of problems within physics, and (3) the conception of physics as a science." (p. 572). This 
conclusion even holds for Buridan's commentary, which is Lang's third and final example, in 
which the teleologica! procedure is absent and the treatment of topics is simply sequential. Al-
though I would say that this has less to do with Buridan than with the fact that the Quaestiones 
genre is simply not suited for any teleologica! organization of the material discussed in the 
commentary. 
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parts in every sense of the word, then, after giving the definition of soul, there 
would be no possible way of proceeding. But precisely because the soul is ulti-
mately responsible for a variety, even a broad variety, of powers and acts, it can 
be studied in a scientific manner. In the late-thirteenth and fourteenth cen-
turies this meant, as we have seen, studying it within the natural philosophical 
framework.5 
It was considered to be one of the most important tasks of the scientia de 
anima, once the definition of soul had been given and explained, to describe 
the relation of the different vital acts to the different powers of the soul. And 
having made such a classification of powers and acts, the relation between the 
powers and the essence of the soul also had to be explained. Are the powers 
really the same thing as the soul itself and is any distinction between them 
merely a convenient way of discussing them, or is there a distinction indepen-
dent of the way in which we think and speak about soul and powers? This 
final question on the relation between the soul and its powers continues to be 
debated throughout the fourteenth century, although after Ockham there are 
some important changes in the manner in which the question is understood 
and discussed. Interestingly, however, these changes cannot be captured in 
terms of either a growing empiricism or an increased appUcation of logic and 
semantics.6 
5.1 A curious fourteenth-century thought experiment 
Let's have a look at the following, curious thought experiment found in Buri-
dan, Oresme, and the Anonymus Fatar: it is clear that the power of vision is 
located in the eye, since it is only by using our eyes that we are able to see. 
But suppose that a part of an animal's foot were to take on the same material 
dispositions as its eye; would this animal then also be able to see by using that 
foot?7 At first sight, the question may seem as bizarre as it is pointless. Given 
that the situation may be logically possible (let's say, through divine interven-
5See section 3.1.4. 
6For the adjective 'empirical' as applied to the philosophers of the fourteenth century, 
see MOODY, 'Buridan and a Dilemma of Nominalism', 299 and its revival in ZUPKO, 'What is 
the Science of the Soul?', esp. 297-299. See also ZUPKO, John Bundan, esp. 203-205. For the 
increasing importance of logic and semantics, see, for example, MURDOCH, 'The Involvement 
of Logic'. 
7To give some indication of the importance of the discussion, Oresme returns to it at least 
three times in his commentary on the De anima, in questions II.3: 'Utrum potentie anime 
sint ipsa anima vel distinguantur ab ipsa et inter se', II.4: 'Utrum in qualibet parte corporis sit 
tota anima', and II.5: 'Utrum in eodem vivente, sicut in homine, sint plures animae, scilicet 
vegetativa, sensitiva, inteiiectiva'. Also, Buridan even returns to it in his commentary on the 
Ethica in question VI.3: 'Utrum potentie anime sint ab anima realiter distincta.' 
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tion), but will never occur within the normal course of nature, why should a 
natural philosopher even be interested in the question? Yet the thought ex-
periment is present in many of the commentaries from the mid-fourteenth 
century, and its discussion is taken very seriously. 
What is even more surprising than the very occurrence of the question 
of whether or not an animal would be able to see with its foot, when it has 
acquired the dispositions of an eye, is that Oresme and Buridan seem to give 
the exact opposite answer. To begin with Buridan, his answer to the question 
introduced in the thought experiment is affirmative: 
Sed tu rationabiliter queris utrum anima in pede equi sit visiva. Et ego 
dico quod sic, loquendo de potentia principali et remota, quia secun-
dum se innata est videre, et videret in pede si Deus et natura formarent 
sibi oculum in pede. Tarnen ipsa non est in pede potentia propinqua 
ad videndum, quia per potentiam propinquam debemus intelligere vel 
dispositiones requisites cum principali agente vel ipsamet principalem 
potentiam habentem suas dispositiones.8 
But you, reasonably, ask whether the soul in a horse's foot is capable of 
vision. And I say that it is, speaking about a principal and remote power, 
because the soul is naturally capable to see, and it would see in the foot 
if God and nature were to form an eye for it in the foot. However, this 
power is not in the foot as a proximate power of seeing, because by a 
proximate power we must understand either the required dispositions 
together with the principal agent or the principal power itself that is in 
possession of its dispositions. 
If God were to create an eye in the foot of an animal, the soul would then 
be able to see in the foot. Not only that, but the power of vision is in some 
sense 'naturally present' {innata) in that part of the soul that informs the foot. 
The only reason that the power of sight was not actually exercised in the foot 
prior to the formation of the eye there is that the foot lacked the required 
organ. I will return to the distinction between proximate and remote powers 
later.9 
Oresme, by contrast, seems to disagree with all of the above: 
Ex hoc sequitur corrolarie quod, si oculus esset in pede vel fieret ibi talis 
dispositie corporea, adhuc pes non videret, quia pars animae quae est 
ibi, non est nata videre.10 
' J O H N B U R I D A N , Q Ì M , II.5, 66-67 . 
'For a more detailed analysis of the passage, see 5.4.4. 
'"NICOLE ORESME, QdA, 11.5, 15187"*9. 
2 0 6 
A CURIOUS FOURTEENTH-CENTURY THOUGHT EXPERIMENT 
From this it follows as a corollary that, if there were an eye in the foot 
or if such a bodily disposition were made there, the foot would still not 
see, because the part of the soul that is there is not naturally capable to 
see. 
Even if God were to create an eye in the foot, the foot ofthat animal would 
still not be able to see. The reason for this is, apparently, that the soul has 
different parts, each of which can only cause a certain subset of the soul's 
powers. These "soul parts" are commensurate with the bodily organs, and 
the part of the soul that is present in the foot is simply not made for seeing. 
Oresme's position is similar to that taken up by Anonymus Fatar, who also 
argues against the position of some philosophers {ahqui) who claim that the 
part of the soul that is in the foot can somehow be the formal cause of vision 
once an eye is present in the foot. But he goes even further than Oresme by 
reversing the example used in the thought experiment. As Anonymus Fatar 
claims, if the part of the soul that is in the foot were to be placed in the eye, 
then it would still not able to see!" 
The first thing that is important to note is that none of these three com-
mentators show any sign of doubt or even hesitation when arguing for their 
respective positions. Yet the question seems speculative to the extreme. Not 
only does it seem that it cannot be settled by empirical observation (given that 
the situation never occurs in the normal course of nature), but it also seems 
that it cannot be settled by logical or semantical analysis. The latter option 
seems ruled out because the question is not whether God could make a living 
being with such a soul that its powers are present everywhere, needing only 
the required bodily dispositions to be exercised — that question could be set-
tled by logical and semantical analysis.12 Instead the question is: given the 
factual metaphysical structure of living beings as found in the normal course 
of nature, how are the soul's powers distributed over the body? The appeal 
to divine intervention is merely a tool that enables us to have a thorough and 
clear discussion of this question by taking all logically possible scenarios into 
"ANONYMUS FATAR, QdA, II.5, 2706O~67: "Sexta condusio: in eodem, sicut in bruto, sunt 
plures animae partiales Patet ex dictis, nam alia est anima ossis et alia est anima carnis; istae 
autem animae sunt animae partiales. Sequitur corollarie quod, si ilia pars animae quae est 
in pede equi esset in oculo equi, non videret- patet, quia ilia pars animae equi quae est in 
pede non est apta nata nee ordinata ad videndum. Sequitur etiam hoc esse falsum quod aliqui 
dicunt de anima equi quod ita anima equi quae est in pede videret, si haberet Organum sicut 
ilia quae est in oculo." Incidentally, this passage alone already counts as strong evidence against 
the identification of Anonymus Patar with John Bundan, since Bundan explicitly defends the 
position of the ahqut that Anonymus Patar argues against 
'
2The only thing that needs to be done to settle that question is to show whether or not it 
implies a logical contradiction. If so, even God cannot do it. If not. He can, at least in principle 
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account.13 But what is really at stake here is not the question of what God 
could do, or even, the question of what could have been the relation between 
our soul and its powers, but the question of how the soul and its powers are 
actually related. 
Clearly Buridan disagrees with Oresme and Anonymus Fatar at some level 
when it comes to the answer we should give to the thought experiment. But 
the precise extent to which they disagree is still unknown at this point, since 
there are at least two reasons why a comparison between the passages is dif-
ficult. First, Buridan's exact words are that 'the soul would see in the foot', 
whereas Oresme uses the words 'the foot would still not see'. And second, 
since Buridan limits his claim to the soul taken as a principal and remote 
power, whereas neither Oresme nor Anonymus Pater makes such a distinc-
tion in the passages quoted above, there remains the possibility that they are 
talking about two different things. The first reason can be easily dismissed by 
pointing out that neither Buridan nor Oresme is very strict in his terminology 
when it comes to ascribing powers to a subject. They just as easily say that the 
eye sees, as they say that the soul sees or that the whole animal sees.14 Whether 
or not the second reason can be dismissed as easily is a question that can only 
be answered later in this chapter. 
At this moment, there are two possible ways of interpreting the thought 
experiment. We can either assume that Buridan and Oresme are talking about 
the same thing, in which case they have a radically different conception of the 
soul and the way it relates to its powers and to the body. Or we can assume 
that when Buridan affirms the presence of the powers of sight in the foot and 
when Oresme denies it, they are talking about different senses of the term 
13There is an increasing emphasis on God's omnipotence in the fourteenth century, which 
has been very well documented See especially W. J. COURTENAY, Capacity and Volition a 
History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power, Bergamo: Pierluigi Lubnna, 1990. 
For the impact of these medieval discussions of divine omnipotence on the early modern dis-
cussions in the context of natural phdosophy, see A. FUNKENSTEIN, Theology and the Scientific 
Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century, Princeton, New Jersey Princeton 
University Press, 1986, 117-201. 
'''For example, JOHN BURIDAN, QdA, 11.12, 182: "Et cams mdicat quern videt vocare eum et 
per visum vadit ad eum, vel etiam mdicat vocantem non esse istum quern videt, ideo non vadit 
ad istum quern videt, sed querit ahum " Also, JOHN BURIDAN, Questwnes super decern libros 
Ethicorum, Pans, 1513 (photomechanical reprint Frankfurt Minerva, 1968), VI.3, f. 119™. 
"Unde si oculus esset talis in pede qualis est in capite quantum ad quahtativas dispositiones 
utique nos oculo pedis videremus sicut oculo capitis", NICOLE ORESME, QdA, II 5, ISl87"89· 
"Ex hoc sequitur corrolarie quod, si oculus esset in pede vel fieret ibi talis disposino corporea, 
adhuc pes non videret, quia pars animae quae est ibi, non est nata videre " Additional evidence 
that the precise phrasing of the argument in Oresme and Buridan matters little can be found 
in Anonymus Patar, who phrases the argument in the same way as Buridan (that is, by saying 
that the soul in the foot would see), but reaches Oresme's conclusions. See above, footnote 11. 
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'power', in which case their disagreement may be minor, perhaps merely a 
matter of emphasis. Whichever of these two interpretations turns out to be 
correct, these philosophers disagree at some level. 
A detailed analysis of the debate found in Buridan, Oresme and Anony-
mus Fatar in relation to its historical context will allow me to answer several 
important questions: 
1. What causes this debate to arise and what is at stake for these philosophers? 
2. What are the ramifications of their respective positions for the scientia de 
anima as a whole? 
3. What is the difference (if any) between the scientia de anima as it is practiced 
in the later thirteenth century and as it it practiced in the fourteenth century? 
More specifically, can the difference be located in a shift from (a more) meta-
physical to (a more) empirical approach as has been suggested in some studies? 
The third question needs some introduction. Jack Zupko especially has 
argued in favor of qualifying the fourteenth-century De anima tradition as be-
coming more and more empirical. But it is easy to misunderstand his claim. It 
does not mean that the fourteenth-century commentators have something in 
common with either British or Logical Empiricism. Instead Zupko connects 
the term to what he calls a cluster of epistemic doctrines, including an em-
phasis on what is given in sense perception and on a-posteriori modes of rea-
soning.15 After applying his criteria to the De anima tradition from Thomas 
Aquinas to Nicole Oresme, Zupko concludes that there is indeed a shift in the 
fourteenth century as compared to the thirteenth: 
What we are seeing here is the migration of the concept of the soul in 
Aristotelian psychology from a substance whose essence can be revealed 
by studying its motions in Thomas, to the imperceptible and undisclos-
able subject of those movements in Buridan, and finally, to something 
of which corporeal matter must itself be mentioned as an essential part 
in Oresme.16 
15ZUPKO, !ohn Buridan, 204: "For if we understand empiricism in terms of a cluster of 
broadly epistemic doctrines concerned with the methodology of knowing, and emphasizing 
in particular (1) the evidentness of sensory appearances and judgments (as opposed to their 
intrinsic, formal content) as the primary criterion for their veridicality, (2) the reliability of a 
posteriori modes of reasoning, such as induction (as opposed to modes based on the notion 
that empirical truths are deductively demonstrable), and (3) the utility of naturalistic mod-
els of explanation, including their analogous application to non-physical phenomena (as op-
posed to their disuse, or limited application to specific natural phenomena), then much of 
what fourteenth-century philosophers did can count as empiricist, especially in contrast to the 
thirteenth century)." 
I6ZUPKO, lohn Buridan, 210. 
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Whereas Aquinas is still confident that we can demonstrate the real nature 
of the soul, Buridan and Oresme no longer share his optimism.17 The essence 
of the soul is not something we can say much about. I think that the descrip-
tion of the fourteenth-century De anima tradition as more empirical fails to 
capture the most significant changes. My analysis of the thought experiment 
will show the reasons for this. 
In order to answer the three questions I raised above, there are several 
topics that need to be discussed first, most of which concern the metaphysi-
cal structure of the soul. The soul's structure was usually discussed by refer-
ence to four elements: object (obiectum), act (acius), power (potentia), and the 
(essence of the) soul itself {anima). Superficially, the relation between these 
four elements is a given. The soul has a variety of powers, which are exercised 
through a variety of acts, which in turn are directed to a variety of objects. 
But, unsurprisingly, the exact relations between these elements were debated. 
There seem to have been two main issues in these debates: ( 1 ) Is the relation 
between two elements one of identity or non-identity; e.g. is the soul really the 
same as its powers or not? and (2) By means of which principle can we decide 
on the number of a particular element; e.g. what would enable us to infer that 
there are two different powers rather than one more comprehensive power? 
Or three different souls rather than one soul in a human being? As can already 
be gathered from these questions, one of the driving forces in the discussion 
is the tension between unity and multiplicity that also drove the debate on the 
scientific status of the De anima. How can the unity of the living being be 
reconciled philosophically with its multitude of acts, of powers and, perhaps, 
even of souls? 
In the remainder of this chapter I will look at the discussions about the 
structure of the soul on different levels, from the more general to the more 
detailed. First, I will briefly look at what the commentators say about the 
divisions on the level of the soul itself: do all living beings have but one soul, 
or do the more complex living beings have multiple souls? Second, I will look 
at their discussions of the difference between the soul and its powers. And 
third, I will look at the debates concerning the manner in which the soul is 
present in the body. All three themes will come together in the final part of 
the chapter, where I will return to the thought experiment of the eye in the 
foot and try to answer the questions raised above.18 Just as in the previous 
chapters, one of my aims is to show the transformations of the discussions 
in the period from, roughly, Aquinas to Oresme. But given that there is an 
almost complete consensus on several of the relevant topics up until Jandun, 
17See ZUPKO, John Buridan, 225-226. 
"See p. 209. 
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I will often not discuss each individual author in detail. 
5.2 One soul or multiple souls? 
'Vegetative', 'sensitive' and 'intellective soul' are the terms that are used to 
refer to plant souls, animal souls and human souls respectively. But the terms 
are also used in a slightly different sense in which they refer to something like 
clusters of powers. It is in this latter sense that we can say that a human being 
has all three souls, since in human beings we find vegetative, sensitive and 
intellective operations. As Aristotle's definition of the soul shows, when we 
use the term 'soul' in the first manner, it refers to the first act, or substantial 
form, of the organic body. But when we use the term in the second manner, it 
is not immediately clear whether or not we are still talking about substantial 
forms. When we say that a human being has all three souls, does this imply 
that he has three substantial forms? Or does it merely mean that the various 
powers of the one substantial form he has can be conveniently grouped into 
these three clusters of powers?19 
For those philosophers who adhered to the position that there is a plurality 
of substantial forms in every substance, the question of whether there is one or 
whether there are multiple souls in a living being was easy to answer: since ev-
ery essential perfection has to be accounted for by a different substantial form, 
the vegetative and sensitive souls in an animal must be distinct forms. And if 
the vegetative and sensitive souls are already distinct, there can be no doubt 
that the rational, immortal soul is a distinct form also. It might be debated 
whether the vegetative and sensitive forms should properly be called souls in 
a human being, but there can be no question that they are different substan-
tial forms. But for those who advocated the unicity of substantial form, the 
question turned out to be more difficult, especially when it came to our in-
tellective soul. It may be relatively unproblematic to say that the vegetative 
and sensitive functions can be accounted for by reference to one substantial 
form only. But can one and the same substantial form really be the source of 
both corporeal and incorporeal operations? Or is the intellective soul unique, 
in the sense that it cannot be accounted for by the unicity of substantial form 
paradigm? 
"There is a tendency among those who want to modernize Aristode to avoid speaking 
about substantial forms, using expressions such as 'dusters of powers' exclusively instead. But 
since this leaves the ontologica! status of the vegetative, sensitive and intellective souls unspeci-
fied, 1 find it unsuccessful as an interpretation of Aristotle. For whatever their ontological status 
is, it is clear that for Aristotle the term 'soul' is not only a short-hand for a cluster of powers, 
but is also that which accounts for their unity and their being present in the first place. 
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The answers which the various thirteenth-century commentators gave to 
this question are well known for the most part, and I do not intend to discuss 
them here.20 Those inclined to follow Averroes, such as Anonymus Giele and 
Jandun, obviously thought that there is a real distinction between the intel-
lect and the vegetative/sensitive soul. Aquinas, Anonymus van Steenberghen, 
Ananymus Bazàn, and Brito, by contrast, all argued that we have but one 
soul.21 In order to understand the thought experiment of the eye in the foot, 
however, it is necessary to at least look at the way in which the question was 
discussed in the fourteenth century, from Ockham onwards, which is what I 
will do here. 
One way of deciding the question of whether each living being has but 
one soul or multiple souls is by taking the operations of the soul as a start-
ing point. This seems to be a sensible thing to do from a methodological 
standpoint, because the validity and even necessity of such an approach is 
continuously affirmed in the Aristotelian tradition with the adage 'the oper-
ation discloses the form' (operatio arguit formam).22 But it also seems to be 
simple common sense to use the operations as our starting point, since, after 
all, it is normally the perceptible operations that indicate what kind of sub-
stance we are dealing with. It is but a small step from this principle to saying 
that a difference between the various operations of a substance points to dif-
ferent substantial forms within that substance, provided that this difference in 
20For the tradition prior to Aquinas, see ZA VALLONI, Richard de Mediavilh, 384—404, and 
LOTTI Ν, Psychohgie et morale, voi. 1, 464—479. 
2
' A N O N Y M U S V A N STEENBERGHEN, QdA, II.7: Utrum Vegetativum, sensitivum et intellec-
tivum in eodem sint formae diversae: "Dicendum quod ista tria, secundum quod sunt in eo-
dem, non sunt actus vel formae diversae." A N O N Y M U S BAZAN, QdA, III.2: Utrum potentia 
vegetativa et potentia sensitiva, etiam intellectiva in homine pertineant ad unam essentiam: 
"Ad quaestionem dico quod hae potentiae pertinent ad unum essentiam et hoc confirmo tali 
ratione: si potentiae istae in homine essent diversae essentiae, sequeretur quod unum Indi­
viduum esset plura individua; consequens est falsum; ergo et antecedens." RADULPHUS BRITO, 
QdA, III.l, 9 6 1 7 6 " ' 8 ' : "Sed obmissis istis opinionibus, quia erronea sunt, dico quod potentia 
intellectiva pertinet ad unam essentiam animae cum potentia vegetativa et sensitiva." 
2 2 The most important epistemologica! access we have to a substantial form is through the 
operations it exhibits in the substance of which it is the form. Beginning with the operations, 
or perhaps even with the objects to which these operations are directed, is one of the basic 
methodological principles of natural philosophy (see ARISTOTLE, De anima, II.4, 415a 14-22). 
It is through the vital operations that we know that something has a soul. See for example 
R A D U L P H U S BRITO, QdA, II.ó36"37: "Ideo dico quod in partibus animalis anulosi decisis et in 
partibus plantarum decisis est anima, quia propria operatio alicuius forme arguit illam for-
mam." Compare NICOLE ORESME, QdA, II.4, 143 7 4~ 7 β: "Tunc sunt conclusiones. Prima est 
quod in quibusdam animalibus annulosis et quibusdam plantis est totum homogeneum, et est 
in qualibet parte notabilis quantitatis tota potentialiter et essentialiter. Patet, quia post separa-
tionem partium apparent ibi opera vitae, et per consequens ibi est anima, quia operatio arguit 
formam." 
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operations is fundamental enough.23 And given that we can find vegetative 
operations combined with sensation and even thinking in some living beings, 
it is perhaps not so far-fetched to suppose that such a broad variety of op-
erations cannot be accounted for by a single substantial form. This line of 
reasoning can be made more persuasive in a number of ways. Buridan, for 
example, mentions the following argument: if we assign (specifically) differ-
ent sensitive souls to horses and donkeys on account of the differences in both 
organ and subject of vision, then so much the more should we assign different 
souls to the powers of vegetation and sensation in a single living being, since 
these powers differ even more from each other than the powers of vision in a 
horse and a donkey do.24 
Alternatively, the arguments could be taken from the evidence we can ob-
tain through introspection. One clever psychological argument for a plurality 
of souls was given by William Ockham, who bases his argument on the em-
pirical fact that we sometimes experience contrary desires. 
Probo tarnen quod distinguuntur <i.e. anima sensitiva et intellectiva 
in homine Siiß> realiter, primo sic: impossibile est quod in eodem 
subiecto sint simul contraria; sed actus appetendi aliquid et actus renu-
endi idem in eodem subiecto sunt contraria; igitur si sint simul in re-
rum natura, non sunt in eodem subiecto. Sed manifestum est quod 
sunt simul in homine, quia illud idem quod homo appétit per appeti-
tum sensitivum, renuit per appetitum intellectivum.25 
I prove that the sensitive and intellective soul in man are really distinct. 
Firstly thus: it is impossible that contraries exist simultaneously in the 
same subject. But the act of desiring and the act of disapproving of 
the same thing are contraries. If, therefore, they exist simultaneously 
in nature, they do not exist in the same subject. But it is evident that 
they exist simultaneously in man, because the very same thing that a 
man desires through his sensitive appetite he disapproves of through 
his intellective appetite. 
"Clearly, the difference between seeing red and seeing blue, for example, will not count. 
But the difference between seeing red and thinking about it might. 
24JOHN BURIDAN, Q<fA, II.4, 42-43: "Item operationes magis différentes debent provenire 
a formis et principiis magis differentibus. Sed constat quod videre et nutrire in isto equo sunt 
operationes magis différentes quam videre in equo et asino. Quod apparet, quia et organa et 
subiecta habet magis differentiam. Ergo si videre in asino et videre in equo proveniunt ab an-
imabus diversis secundum speciem, sequitur quod magis in equo videre et nutrire proveniunt 
ab animabus specifice differentibus." 
"WILLIAM OCKHAM, Quodlibeta, 11.10,157'3"". Ockham gives two more arguments in this 
Quodlibet: ( 1 ) that sensation has the sensitive soul as its subject and not the intellective soul 
and (2) that the same form cannot be both extended (as the sensitive soul is) and unextended 
(as the intellective soul is). 
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I may have the strong (intellectual) desire to study all night, but at the 
same time also have a strong (sensitive) desire to set aside the books and go to 
sleep instead. Since the principle of non-contradiction dictates that contraries 
cannot belong to a single subject in the same respect at the same time, Ockham 
can argue that in order to account for such contrary desires we need to posit 
a different subject for each of them. Hence the desires must be caused by 
different souls. Ockham ends up with the position that man is unique in the 
sense that he has two souls, in contrast to plants and animals, all of which 
have only one soul.26 Over and above our sensitive soul, which includes all 
the vegetative powers, we also have a rational soul. 
I have chosen Buridan and Ockham as examples for a reason. Both 
philosophers are well known for their attempts at ontological parsimony. 
If there is one thing that a non-specialist knows about fourteenth-century 
philosophy, there is a good chance that this will be some formulation of 
Ockham's razor: the principle that in any (scientific) theory we should 
employ the barest ontology possible that still leaves us with full explanatory 
force.27 So when these philosophers take the existence of multiple souls 
seriously, or in Ockham's case even as the truth, it is clear that there must be 
some really compelling reasons to assume such a plurality.28 
Ockham unfortunately never wrote a commentary on Aristotle's De 
anima, although, as we will see, the discussions he devoted to the soul in 
other places exerted a tremendous influence on later fourteenth-century 
commentators. Buridan, by contrast, wrote several commentaries and 
discussed the question of whether we have one soul or multiple souls 
extensively. He takes the question very seriously, emphasizing its difficulty.29 
And after giving a fair account of the plurality of souls position, which he 
equates with the plurality of forms position in general, and showing how 
26For a discussion of Ockham's position in the context of the general controversy on the 
unicity or plurality of substantial forms, see MCCORD ADAMS, William Ockham, vol. 2, 633-
669. 
27The principle is usually quoted as enfia non sunt multiphcanda praeter necessitatem, but 
that formulation is not found in Ockham's texts. For Ockham's own different formulations of 
the principle and their context, see MCCORD ADAMS, William Ockham, vol. 1, 156-161. See 
also A. A. MAURER, 'Method in Ockham's Nominalism', The Monist, 61 (1978), 426—443 for 
the broader methodological context of the razor 
28This becomes even more clear when we see that Ockham denied that there is a real distinc-
tion in two other psychological cases: (1) between intellect and will and (2) between the agent 
and potential intellect. See WILLIAM OCKHAM, Quaestiones in librum secundum Sententiarum 
(Reportatw), edited by G Gal and R. Wood, St. Bonaventure, New York: St Bonaventure 
University, 1981 (Opera theologica, 5), II, q 20, 425-447 
2 , JOHN BURIDAN, Q Î M , II.4,45· "Ista questio bene est difficüis quia difficile est demonstrare 
ahquam partem." 
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from a plurality viewpoint one could reply to possible counterarguments, 
he gives his own position. This is introduced by one of his favorite phrases 
'these arguments not withstanding, I believe the opposite' (non obstantibus 
istis ego credo opposttum), namely, that there is only one soul in each living 
being.31 
5.2.1 Buridan's arguments against a plurality of souls 
A first sign of Ockham's influence may already be found in how Buridan struc-
tures his discussion of the question of whether we have one or more souls. The 
question is divided in two parts. In question II.4, Buridan raises the question 
of whether the vegetative and sensitive soul are one, to which he gives an affir-
mative answer. The question of whether the intellective soul is also identical 
with the vegetative/sensitive part is postponed until III.17.32 The same strat-
egy was followed by Ockham in his Quodlibeta?3 
Buridan's first argument, in the question from book II, against the plu-
ralist position would only have been effective against an extreme variant of 
that position. To paraphrase the argument: if the sensitive and vegetative soul 
are really distinct, God could take away one while leaving the other intact.34 
This would either, for example, turn a horse into a plant when its sensitive 
soul is taken away, or, equally strange, leave a horse without any vegetative 
functions at all if its vegetative soul is taken away. I find it doubtful whether 
there is anyone in the pluralist camp who would accept such a loose connec-
tion between the substantial forms that, at least in principle, whichever one of 
these forms could be removed, while the substance as a whole remains some-
how intact. And they would almost certainly deny that one of the lower forms 
'"JOHN B U R I D A N , QdA, UA, 45-48 . 
3
'For his general argumentation against a plurality of forms Buridan refers the reader to 
his commentary on the Metaphysica The topic is discussed in JOHN B U R I D A N , QMetaph, VII, 
q 14, j f 49 r -50 r . In his commentary on the Deamma Bundan argues specifically for the unicity 
of the soul. 
32Both questions are discussed in ZUPKO, 'Horse Sense and Human Sense'. 
" W I L L I A M O C K H A M , Quodhbeta, II, q 10· 'Utrum anima sensitiva et intellectiva in homme 
distinguantur realiter' The relation between the vegetative and sensitive soul is discussed as 
a dubium within WILLIAM O C K H A M , Quodhbeta, II, q. 11: 'Utrum anima sensitiva et forma 
corporeitatis distinguantur tarn in brutis quam in homimbus'. Ockham's position there is 
that the sensitive soul is identical to the vegetative soul, but is really distinct from the form of 
corporeity 
'''JOHN BURIDAN, QdA, II.4, 49 "Prima ratio est si in equo ab anima sensitiva circum-
scribatur anima vegetativa vel econverso. Deus enim sic eas posset aufern ad invicem si essent 
diverse anime. Remota igitur sensitiva, remanente vegetativa, quod remaneret esset planta 
Omne enim animatum habens animam vegetativam sine anima sensitiva est pianta. Econverso 
autem, remota vegetativa et remanente sensitiva, quod remaneret esset animal. Et ex utrisque 
est nunc equus compositus. Ergo ipse est compositus ex animali et pianta, quod est absurdum." 
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could be taken away while the higher remains. But the argument does succeed 
in showing one thing. Any pluralist owes us an account of how the different 
substantial forms are connected within a given substance. And whatever this 
connection is, if it is too loose, the counterintuitive conclusions of Buridan's 
argument cannot be avoided. 
More convincing is the approach Buridan takes in two of his other argu-
ments. The plurality of forms position, he argues, is committed to an intro-
duction of forms from the most general to the most specific. First, something 
would have to receive the form of corporeality, then that of being alive, then 
that of being an animal, etc. The most specific form, for instance being a don-
key, would always be added last. Buridan takes this to imply that all forms 
prior to the specific and last form are general, in the sense that, for example, 
the sensitive soul in a horse and a donkey would be exactly the same.35 It is 
only when the specific forms of being a horse and being a donkey are intro-
duced that they begin to differ. But that implies, so goes the argument, that 
a horse and a donkey should form the exact same organs and have the exact 
same vegetative and sensitive operations, since these result from the general 
souls that they have in common. This is obviously not the case.36 
In spite of these difficulties, the pluralist still has one powerful argument 
left, and that is the appeal to the methodological principle that a difference in 
operations indicates a difference in forms. To this, Buridan replies that the 
principle itself is valid, but only when applied to the operations that belong 
to different substances.37 If I see, for example, a substance that is capable of 
3 5 J O H N B U R I D A N , QdA, II.4, 50: "Item difficilius arguitur quia isti ponunt quod, secun-
dum animam sensitivem, equus et canis sunt eiusdem rationis substantialis et quod tantum 
<tamen ed.> differunt secundum rationes substantiales specificas, hoc est, per diversas formas 
substantiales specificas additas anime sensitive vel animabus sensitivis." Buridan makes a good 
point here. The forms are taken from the logico-semantical divisions that are made within 
Porphyry's tree, which already points to their generality. But also, if the previous forms are not 
general, then the forms of corporeity as are introduced, for instance, in a human being and a 
horse respectively, must be generically different. Horse corporeality would be something other 
than human corporeality even before the most specific forms of horseness and humanness are 
introduced. But it is difficult to imagine how these forms of corporeality can be determined to 
one species or another in the absence of all specific differences. 
' ' J O H N B U R I D A N , QdA, II.4,52: "Item isti ponunt animam vegetativam esse eiusdem ratio-
nis in homine, equo, pisce, et hoc est valde inconveniens, quia tunc consimiliter deberet facere 
nutritionem et consimilem camem facere et consimilia membra formare, quod est manifeste 
falsum." 
" J O H N B U R I D A N , Q Ì M , II.4, 54-55: "Ad primam dicitur quod non possumus arguere di-
versitates specificas formarum substantialium in istis materialibus, nisi ex diversitate opera-
tionum. Hoc conceditur, sed tarnen non quecumque diversitas specifica operationum arguit 
diversitatem formarum substantialium. Hoc enim non arguit in uno supposito propter hoc 
quod forma superioris gradus est maioris actualitatis, potest in plures et nobiliores operationes, 
et continet potentialiter formas inferiores, sicud mixtum continet et retinet de dementis ali-
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laughing and a substance that only shows vegetative functions and nothing 
else, I can, and should, infer that the two substances are specifically distinct 
and thus have different substantial forms. But when I see both laughter and 
vegetative functions in one and the same substance, I cannot infer that this 
substance has two different substantial forms. 
The reason that Buridan does not admit the validity of the inference from 
different operations to different forms within one and the same substance is 
a metaphysical principle. Buridan is convinced that there is a hierarchy of 
substantial forms, in which the higher form can do all that the lower form can 
and more. Given this hierarchy, the only thing that can be concluded from the 
great variety of operations in a single substance is that they must be grounded 
in a form that occupies a higher place in this hierarchy than forms that can 
only account for a subset of these operations.38 The example he gives is that 
of the qualities of the elements. These qualities remain present in a compound 
substance (mixtum), let's say a human being, although the substantial forms 
of the elements are no longer present. The human body is a unity in which 
the elements are not present according to their substantial forms — otherwise 
the human body would be a mere aggregate of these elements. But never-
theless, the body is still heavy and tends downward when it falls on account 
of its heaviness, which is an elemental quality.39 We cannot, Buridan argues, 
infer the presence of the forms of the elements from the fact that the body 
displays heaviness; instead we should say that the body has retained some of 
the qualities of the dominant element. 
Buridan's final position is that each living being, including human beings, 
has but one soul, which is at the same time its only substantial form. As such, 
he defends the same viewpoint as Aquinas. The ontological status of the hu-
man soul, however, will turn out to be very different from that defended by 
Aquinas.40 
quas virtutes et operationes operationibus earum consimiles, iuxta illud quod mixtum movetur 
secundum naturam elementi predominantis, licet non remaneant forme substantiales elemen-
torum, ut suppono." 
^SeeZuPKO./o/inBuniia/i, 168-169. 
"The terminology for such a presence of qualities of lower forms within a higher form 
is not completely fixed in the Middle Ages. Buridan uses the terms 'potentialiter' and 'virtu-
aliter' interchangeably to describe such a presence. The term 'virtualiter' was also preferred by 
Aquinas. 
"""it is not only the ontological status of the soul that is different. As became clear in section 
4.3.4, p. 189, Buridan and Aquinas also assign a different status to the matter that is informed 
by the soul. Whereas for Aquinas matter is pure potentiality, for Buridan matter has some 
degree of actuality on its own, enough to be the subject of several accidents. 
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5.2.2 Nicole Oresme's hesitation 
Oresme and Anonymus Fatar are peculiar cases when it comes to the discus-
sion of the unicity or plurality of forms. Throughout his commentary on the 
De anima Oresme especially went to considerable trouble to avoid taking sides 
in this debate. There are numerous passages where the question is discussed in 
the conditional sense: if there are multiple forms, then...41 I know of no other 
commentator who is so careful to avoid taking a stand on this issue in his De 
anima commentary. And although Anonymus Fatar is perhaps less extreme, 
he also leaves both options open in the most important questions related to 
the unicity or plurality of the soul in his commentary.42 
Oresme's most important question on the topic, the fifth question of book 
two ('whether in the same living being, as in man, there are multiple souls, 
namely a vegetative, sensitive and intellective soul') is no exception. But it at 
least gives some indication of which option he seems to prefer. The question 
contains an elaborate argument to reject the principle that contrary opera-
tions cannot proceed from one and the same form, which had led Ockham 
to conclude that there are two souls in man, a sensitive and intellective soul. 
According to Oresme (and to Anonymus Fatar also), there are no fewer than 
eight possible causes that can explain the existence of diverse, or even contrary 
acts that proceed from the same form, and he discusses each of these.43 This 
•"For example, NICOLE ORESME, QdA, II 4, 14250"55: "Iterum, si in homme non sit aliqua 
aha anima, tunc absolute dicendum est quod in qualibet parte hominis est tota anima hominis 
et omnes potentiae... Et si in homme sit alia anima et forma, scilicet sensitiva, tunc dicendum 
est de ipsa sicut de ammabus brutorum." See also NICOLE ORESME, QdA, II 3, ad 4, 13990"93 
"Ad quartam, cum dicitur quod sensus répugnât intellectui, potest dici quod sunt diversae 
animae. Et si sit eadem, tune non est proprie repugnantia, sed solum hoc est propter inch-
nationem ex disposinone corporali." And in NICOLE ORESME, QdA, ILI, Ι Β Ι ^ - Π Ι 7 , where 
he discusses the Aristotelian definition of the soul, Oresme offers two possible interpretations 
for the elements of the definition: one which is compatible with the unicity, and one which is 
compatible with the plurality of substantial form 
•^ANONYMUS FATAR, QdA, II.5: 'Utrum in eodem vivente sint plures formae substantiates, 
verbi gratia, sicut in homme vel in equo', ends with the words "Et sic patet quahter secundum 
duplicem opinionem potest solvi quaestio." The two opinions in question are the position that 
a human being has but one soul and Ockham's position that a human being has two souls 
He also keeps his options open in other questions, such as ANONYMUS FATAR, QdA, II 4, 252-
25320-24 " Q
u a n
t
u r n a ( j secundum notandum est quod conclusiones quas intendo ponere, volo 
intelhgere saltern ahquas speciahter de anima extensa ad extensionem corpons, sicut est anima 
equi vel anima asini vel huiusmodi, et etiam de anima sensitiva hominis, si ponatur distincta 
ab anima intellectiva " 
" N I C O L E ORESME, QdA, II.5, 149-50. These possible causes are. (1) propter passa aliter 
et aliter disposila, (2) propter coagentia, agentia et concurrentia, (3) propter agentia parttculana 
et determmantia, (4) propter quahtates aut nrtutes aut dispositiones diversas, (5) propter instru­
menta extrtnseca, (6) propter diversas partes heterogeneas talis formae agentis, (7) propter hber-
tatem, and (8) quia agens est causa untus per se et altenus per acadens Compare ANONYMUS 
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discussion is enough to lead Oresme to the conclusion that any inference from 
the existence of diverse and even contrary operations to a plurality of forms 
is invalid. Using the principle of parsimony in scientific explanation he then 
draws the conclusion that the vegetative and sensitive souls, at least, are not 
distinct. These are one and the same soul. 
An identification of the intellective soul with the vegetative/sensitive soul, 
however, is more difficult. The fact that the intellective soul and the sensi-
tive soul can have contrary operations simultaneously is not enough to con-
clude that the two souls are distinct, as we have seen. But Oresme seems to 
be persuaded by another of Ockham's three arguments in favor of a distinc-
tion between the intellective and vegetative-sensitive soul in man, namely the 
following:44 
Eadem forma numero non est extena et non-extensa, materialis et 
immaterialis; sed anima sensitiva in homine est extensa et materialis, 
anima intellectiva non, quia est tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte; 
igitur etc.45 
Numerically the same form is not extended and non-extended, material 
and immaterial; but the sensitive soul in man is extended and material, 
the intellective soul is not, because it is wholly in the whole and wholly 
in whichever part; hence etc. 
Apart from having operations that are contrary to those of the sensitive 
soul, the intellect also has properties that are contrary to those of the sensitive 
soul. In particular, the intellective soul is unextended, whereas the sensitive 
soul is extended. Also, the intellective soul is immortal, whereas the sensitive 
soul is not.46 Since contrary properties cannot belong to the same substance 
simultaneously, it seems that the intellective soul is distinct from the sensitive 
soul. After considering this argument, Oresme hesitantly adopts the same po-
sition that Ockham defended: in a human being, the sensitive soul (including 
the vegetative operations) is distinct from the intellective soul. I say hesitantly, 
because Oresme says that this position appears, for now, to be the more likely 
position (isifl via apparetpro nunc verior). Moreover, he also leaves open the 
PATAR, QdA, 11.5, 267-268. Although the texts of Oresme and Anonymus Fatar are not exact 
copies, the list is the same, down to the examples they use to illustrate the eight causes. The 
same goes for the structure of the question and the conclusions both authors posit. 
''''See above, p. 213, footnote 25. 
^WILLIAM OCKHAM, Quodltbeta, II, q. 10, 15962"65. 
"NICOLE ORESME, QdA, II.5, ISS41-14: "Et ideo in homine cum hoc est anima intellectiva 
quae est omnino alterius rationis a forma materiali; et ideo potest esse suppositum per se, et 
separari a corpore ipsa manente." 
219 
CHAPTER 5. SUBSTANCE, POWERS AND ACTS 
possibility that the intellective soul is identical to the sensitive soul, by show-
ing in detail how anyone who wants to adhere to the unicity position should 
proceed to counter all arguments put forward against this position.47 
It is difficult to determine how we should interpret Oresme's answer to the 
question. Although he does take Ockham's side in this question, he does so 
with the qualification that it only appears to him, for now, to be the more likely 
position. And in all other contexts in his commentary on the De anima he 
leaves both the unicity and plurality option open.48 But what is clear, at least, 
is that the position that distinguishes between the sensitive and intellective 
soul was not the default position, not even after Ockham. 
5.2.3 Summary 
The few commentators who were inclined to follow Averroes, for instance, 
Jandun and Anonymus Giele, argued that the intellect is really distinct from 
the vegetative/sensitive soul and that it is a separate, unique substance. Ock-
ham, by contrast, also argued that the intellect is really distinct from the vege-
tative/sensitive soul, but considered both souls to be a form of the body. Man, 
he claimed, has two souls. The vegetative/sensitive soul on the one hand, and 
the intellective soul on the other. Oresme and Anonymus Fatar tried to avoid 
taking a stance on the issue, but when pressed to do so, Oresme, at least, seems 
more inclined to side with Ockham in this respect. The option that man has 
three souls, which had been defended in the second half of the thirteenth cen-
tury, is not defended by any of the commentators I discussed. All the remain-
ing commentators I discuss in this study argued for the substantial unity of 
the soul. 
The answers to the question of whether in man the intellective soul is 
distinct from the sensitive soul seem to be irrelevant to the question of how 
the thought experiment of the eye in the foot should be interpreted. Appar-
ently, the thought experiment can be formulated and answered irrespective of 
whether the distinction between the two souls is accepted or not. Both Oresme 
and the Anonymus Fatar, who, at the very least, avoid committing to the po-
sition that there is but one soul in man, also agree that the sensitive soul has 
different parts, each of which has its own functions. This is why the part of 
47NICOLE ORESME, Q Ì M , II.5, ISS12"1'1: "Nunc ergo, si quis vellet tenere aliam viam, dis-
currendum est per rationes quae sunt contra non sciendae sed evadendae, ut videatur etiam 
propter quas opertet hoc ponere et propter quas non." 
•"Oresme's commentary has a bit of encyclopedic feel to it, which does not always make it 
the most interesting text to read. Another noticeable feature is the very large number of (often 
vague) internal references, as was also noted by E. GRANT, The Foundations of Modem Science 
in the Middle Ages. Their Religious, Institutional, and Intellectual Contexts, Cambridge [etc.]: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996, 130. 
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the soul in a horse's foot is unable to be the cause of vision. Buridan, by con-
trast, who is fully committed to the position that there is but one soul in each 
living being, also holds that the sensitive soul has different parts, all of which 
are equally capable of causing vision. The difference between them seems to 
stem from a disagreement on how we should analyze the soul in terms of its 
powers, not from how we should analyze the soul in terms of its substantial 
unity. 
Saying that the soul is a substantial unity leaves unspecified how that unity 
is internally structured in terms of powers, but also how it relates to the body 
as a whole. Is the soul an indivisible whole which is present as such in each 
part of the body? Or does the soul have some internal structure? And if so, 
does this mean that the soul's structural parts are in some sense located in 
different parts of the body? These questions will be discussed in the next part. 
5.3 The relation between the soul and its powers 
Prior to Ockham, there is a remarkable unanimity when it comes to the ques-
tion of whether there is a difference between the soul and its powers. Virtually 
all commentators accepted both Albert the Great's position and his terminol-
ogy.49 That is, they all argued that there must be a real distinction between the 
soul and its powers. And they all claimed that the way in which the relation 
between the soul and its powers should be specified is that the soul's powers 
49Albert the Great not only made an influential attempt to describe the overall structure of 
the various powers of soul, but he also supplied what became the most popular way of speaking 
about the relation between soul and powers, namely that the powers flow forth from the soul. 
See PARK, 'Albert's Influence', 507. The background and sources for Albert's terminology are 
discussed in BONIN, 'The Emanative Psychology'. But although Albert's terminology and posi-
tion were accepted, there is still a great difference between Albert and those who take over his 
terminology. Bonin shows that the term 'fluxus', as well as other terms related to emanation, 
has a very rich meaning in Albert's theory of the soul, something which is already no longer 
the case in Aquinas (p. 53). For Albert, the flowing forth of the powers is closely related to his 
idea that the rational soul is a substance in its own right, essentially separate from the body. For 
Aquinas, by contrast, the soul is not a substance, but merely subsistent. BONIN, 'The Emanative 
Psychology' puts it very well when she says that "Thomas agrees with Albert that the soul is the 
principle of the powers, and he too can call it the font of the powers; after all, the composite 
causes its powers insofar as it is actual, and the soul is what actualizes it. Nonetheless, talk of 
fonts no longer fits quite as well when the font stands in need of something else in order to 
flow." (p. 53). What she says of Aquinas is also applicable to all other commentators I discuss. 
Although all of them, at least up until Ockham, use Albert's terminology, the connotations of 
an essentially separate soul are no longer present. Saying that the powers flow forth from the 
soul has simply become a slightly awkward metaphor; it amounts to nothing more than a way 
of saying that the powers are ontologically distinct from the soul's essence, while at the same 
time they are intimately related to it. This explains why they just as easily say that the soul's 
powers are proper accidents (propria) of the soul. 
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flow forth from its essence (fluunt ab essentia animae). Moreover, they even 
introduce mostly the same arguments, both for and against a real distinction 
between the soul and its powers. This means that there is little to be gained 
by discussing the different commentators one by one. Instead I will focus on 
the general argumentative strategies they employ. But before looking at the 
arguments for and against a real distinction, we should first establish what it 
means to say that the powers are really identical or really distinct from the 
soul.51 
A good starting point is Anonymus Van Steenberghen 's discussion of the 
question, in which he gives a precise definition of power: 
Potentia enim nihil aliud est quam primum principium operationis: ac-
tiva emm potentia est principium operandi in aliud secundum quod 
aliud; passiva est principium transmutationis ab alio secundum quod 
aliud. Et dico 'primum principium', non sicut subiectum, sed quo sub-
iectum agit vel patitur, sicut cahditas est primum principium quo ignis 
calefacit.52 
For a power is nothing else than the first principle of an operation: that 
is to say an active power is a principle of operation with respect to some-
thing else in so far as it is something else; a passive power is a principle 
of transmutation <caused> by something else in so far as it is some-
thing else. And I say 'first principle', not in the meaning of a subject, 
but in the meaning ofthat through which a subject acts or undergoes, 
just as heat is the first principle through which fire heats. 
Saying that the soul is really identical to its powers, therefore, is saying 
that the soul is the first and immediate principle of the vital operations.53 And 
saying that the soul is really distinct from its powers, is saying that the soul 
^See, for instance, A N O N Y M U S BAZAN, Q Î M , 40924"25: "In oppositum sunt omnes doctores, 
dicentes quod potentiae animae fluant ab essentia animae." 
5
Ά real distinction is opposed here to a merely conceptual distinction. John Duns Scotus's 
formal distinction is not accepted by any of the authors I discuss in this book. 
" A N O N Y M U S VAN STEENBERGHEN, Q Î M , II 9, 21024"27 
" A N O N Y M U S V A N STEENBERGHEN, Q«ÎA, II.9, 21030"34: "Qui igitur dixerunt quod anima 
est suae potentiae, dixerunt quod anima est principium p n m u m suarum operationum, scil-
icet sentiendi et vivendi et intelligendi; sed secundum quod principium intelhgendi, dicitur 
intellectivum; secundum quod principium sentiendi, dicitur sensitivum, et sic in alns " Com-
pare T H O M A S A Q U I N A S , Q Î M , q. 12, 108131"'43. "Ponentes igitur quod anima sit sue potentie, 
hoc intelhgunt, quod ipsa essentia anime sit principium immediatum omnium operationum 
anime, dicentes quod homo per essentiam anime intelhgit, sentit et alia huiusmodi operatur, et 
quod secundum diversitatem operationum diversis nomimbus nominatur sensus quidem in 
quantum est principium sentiendi, intellectus autem in quantum est intelhgendi principium, 
et sic de alus; utpote si calorem ignis nominaremus potentiam liquefactivam, calefactivam et 
desiccativam, quia hec omnia operatur. Sed hec opinio stare non potest." 
222 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST A REAL DISTINCTION 
is merely the mediate, but not immediate principle of the vital operations. It 
is true that the term 'power' is used in other senses also. Jandun and Brito 
mention power as taken for the subject that is able to do something — in this 
sense, they say, the soul is identical to its powers — and power as a relation 
{respectus) to an act.54 But although the term 'power' also has these other 
meanings, the one that is really at stake here is power in the sense of being the 
immediate principle of operations. 
5.3.1 Arguments against a real distinction 
There were three popular ways of arguing against a real distinction between 
the soul and its powers that can be found in almost all commentaries. Looking 
at these arguments and their counters is a good way to obtain a detailed picture 
of the commentator's views on the relation between the soul and its powers. 
The powers as essential parts of the soul 
The first of the arguments against the real distinction between the soul and its 
powers compares the soul to matter. Just as the potency (potentta) of matter 
to become all forms belongs to its 'essence', it is said, so also must the powers 
(potenttae) of the soul belong to its essence.55 This argument is almost always 
related by the commentators to a passage from Averroes's De substantia orbis, 
^JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, II.9, 104-105 gives the following list of the meanings of the term 
'potentia'. It is sometimes (1) taken for the subject that is able to do something (pro subiecto 
potente, sive quod potest), sometimes (2) for the immediate principle (immediate pnnaptum) of 
an active or passive operation, and sometimes (3) for a relation (respectus) and a being ordered 
(ordo) to an act Taken in the first sense, the soul is essentially the same as its powers, since 
the soul is the basic principle of its acts, the composite receives the acts only on account of the 
soul Taken in the second sense, soul and powers differ essentially. The third sense has to do 
with how a power can lead us to knowledge of the soul. "Et ex hoc sic patet tertia conclusio 
quaestioms, scilicet quod per ipsam potentiam ahquahter notificatur substantia animae, cum 
per ipsam potentiam refertur ad actionem. Et agere facit scire formam, sicut pati materiam. 
Quare etc " (p. 106). The same threefold distinction is found in RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, 
II 9',2~6', who criticizes some anonymous commentators for focusing on the third meaning, 
and saying that the powers, taken as respectus, are really distinct from the soul. A power of 
the soul, Brito argues, is not a relation This critique is probably directed against Henry of 
Ghent, who seems to have defended this view in Quodlibet III.14 (Pans, 1518) Henry of Ghent 
is identified as the defender of this view by the editors of WILLIAM OCKHAM, Quodhbeta, II, 
q. 20,431. 
55JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, 11.9, 103: "Sicut se habet potentia matenae ad materiam, sic 
potentia animae ad animam, per convementem simihtudinem. Sed potentia matenae est idem 
essentiahter cum materia, ut videtur velie Commentator in tractatus De substantia orbis, ubi 
dicit quod materia prima substantiatur per posse Quare etc " See also ANONYMUS BAZÀN, 
QdA, 113, 4065~"; ANONYMUS VAN STEENBERGHEN, QdA, 11.8, 2093"7, RADULPHUS BRITO, 
QdA, II93-13. 
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in which it is said that matter is characterized by potency (materia substan-
tiatur per posse).56 There are two possible strategies to counter this argument. 
The first is to deny the validity of the comparison between the soul and mat-
ter,57 the second is to deny the real identity between the 'essence' of matter 
and the potency to become all forms.58 Both strategies are used. The main 
result, however, is the same. The powers of the soul are not identical to the 
essence of the soul. 
The replies to this argument show that the soul's powers should be con-
ceived as accidents, more precisely, as proper accidents (propria). As proper 
accidents, they neither belong to the soul's essence, nor are they separable 
from it. Rather, they follow, or 'flow forth' as it was often called, from the 
essence. A mathematical example should make it clear what the term 'fol-
low' means here. Let us take, for example, Euclid's definition of a triangle as 
'a plane figure which is contained by three straight lines'.59 The essence of a 
triangle is what is expressed in that definition. But now take the property of 
having the sum of all angles equal 180 degrees. This is neither something that 
forms part of the essence of a triangle — since the definition mentions noth-
ing about this property — nor is it an accidental property that some triangles 
have and some not. The presence of the property is a direct consequence 
of the essence even though it is not, strictly speaking, part of it. This shows 
what proper accidents are; accidents that are necessarily present whenever the 
essence is present, because their presence is implied in the essence. 
Yet, there is something very peculiar about the solution that the soul's 
powers are proper accidents. If it is true that the powers are not part of the 
essence of the soul, but are related to it as its propria, then what is the essence 
of the soul? And, if we cannot give an answer to that question, then what can 
we hope to accomplish in the scientia de animai The problem did not escape 
the commentators as can be gathered from their answers to a second popular 
argument against the distinction between the soul and its powers. 
The powers as specific differences 
The second argument claims that the vegetative, sensitive and intellective 
powers of the soul are its specific differences, and, as such, are part of the 
'"Cf. AA 10:5. Anonymus Van Steenberghen is the only commentator I found who does 
not connect the argument to Averroes's text. 
"This strategy is used, for example, by RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, I lV" 9 3 . 
5eThis strategy is used, for example, by JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, II.9, 106: "... quod posse, 
quo substantiatur hoc subiectum, non est de natura ipsius subiecti." 
5 9EUCLID, Elements, Book I, def. 20. 
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soul's essence.60 This argument is more sophisticated than the first one, and, 
at least at first sight, more convincing. When we examine Porphyry's tree, we 
can see that at some point body is contracted into living being, living being 
into animal, and, lastly, animal into man. Each of these contractions is the 
result of the addition of a specific difference to a genus. The most obvious 
answer to the question of what these specific differences are, is that they are 
having vegetative powers, having sensitive powers, and having intellective 
powers respectively. This is especially clear in the classical definition of 
a human being as a rational animal. What else can 'rational' mean other 
than having the power to think? But if that is the case, having vegetative 
powers, having sensitive powers, and having intellective powers are all specific 
differences. And any specific difference by definition belongs to the essence. 
Given that every essence is a unity, the powers of the soul cannot be really 
distinct from the essence of the soul. 
There is only one possible way to counter this argument, and that is to 
deny that the vegetative, sensitive and intellective powers constitute the soul's 
essential differences.61 That strategy, however, has serious consequences. It 
means that we lose the possibility of saying anything concrete about the soul's 
essence. Not every commentator seems to be fully aware of this, but Aquinas 
certainly is, as Robert Pasnau has shown.62 When Aquinas, in his Summa 
theologiae, replies to the objection that the powers of the soul cannot be ac-
cidents, because they constitute the soul's essential differences, he not only 
denies the claim that the powers are differentiae, but he also states that we can 
never know substantial forms direcdy. The only cognitive access we have to 
substantial forms is through their accidents. Hence, accidents can sometimes 
^See A N O N Y M U S BAZAN, QiiA, II.3, 40727"29; A N O N Y M U S V A N STEENBERGHEN, Q Ì M , II 8, 
2091 '""; R A D U L P H U S BRITO, QdA, II.930"33. A vanant on this line of reasoning is found in JOHN 
OF JANDUN, QiiA, II 9, 104. "Item illud per quod ammatum agit suam operationem propnam 
est forma animati, ut videbitur manifestum. Formae enim est agere, ut patet secundo Degene-
ratione Sed ammatum agit suam operationem per suam potentiam ammae, ut per potentiam 
augmentativam augmentât, et per potentiam generativam general, et sic de caeteris. Ergo po-
tentia ammae est forma ipsius animati Sed forma animati est anima, ut manifestum est. Quare 
etc." 
61
 See, for example, in A N O N Y M U S BAZAN, QdA, 11.3, 4086 4 _ e 6: "Ad tertium, cum dicitur: 
istud est de essentia ammae per quod ammatum differì ab inanimato, concedo. Et dicis quod 
per potentiam ammatum differt ab inanimato, nego. Et tu probas quia homo differì a lapide 
per potentias, scilicet intelhgere, sentire, dico quod homo differt per suam essentiam a lapide 
et non per potentias."; A N O N Y M U S V A N STEENBERGHEN, Q Ì M , II.8, ZÌI68"72: "Ad aliud di-
cendum quod huiusmodi differentiae non sumuntur a potentns ammae, sed ab ipsa anima' 
secundum enim quod sunt in diversis, sunt ammae diversae; secundum autem quod sunt in 
eodem, sumuntur illae differentiae a re una, secundum diversa apparentia de re." 
62See P A S N A U , Thomas Aquinas, 165-170. 
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take the place of the essential differences in the description of a substance.63 
Aquinas's reply in the Summa theologiae puts his discussion of the rela-
tion between our cognition of accidents and our cognition of substance in his 
commentary on the De anima in a new light. When discussing the possibility 
of having a science of the soul, Aquinas had argued as foUows: 
Consequenter etiam cum dicit: 'videtur autem non solum quod 
quid est' ponit difficultates que emergunt quantum ad ilia quae sunt 
in adiutorium diffinitionis anime, quia in diffinitione oportet non 
solum cognoscere principia essentialia, set etiam accidentalia. Si enim 
recte diffinirentur et possent cognosci principia essencialia, diffinitio 
non indigeret accidentibus; set quia principia essencialia rerum sunt 
nobis ignota, ideo oportet quod utamur differenciis accidentalibus in 
designatione essencialium (bipes enim non est essenciale, set ponitur 
in designatione essencialis), et ut per ea, scilicet per différencias 
accidentales, perveniamus in cognitionem essencialium.64 
Next, when he <i.e. Aristotle SdB> says 'it seems, however', he posits 
difficulties, which emerge in relation to the things that support the def-
inition of the soul. For in a definition, we ought not only to know the 
essential principles, but also the accidental ones. Indeed, if essential 
principles were rightly defined and could be known, a definition would 
not require accidents. But because the essential principles of things are 
unknown to us, we ought to use accidental differences when designat-
ing the essential ones (for being two-footed is not essential, but it is 
placed in the designation of the essential). And through these, namely 
the accidental differences, we come to a knowledge of the essential dif-
ferences. 
Clearly, for Aquinas at least, there was far more at stake than just dis-
cussing Aristotle's somewhat incidental comment that "it seems not only use-
ful for the discovery of the causes of the incidental properties of substances to 
63THOMAS AQUINAS, STh, I, q. 77, a. 1, ad 7, 237: "Ad septimum dicendum quod rationale 
et sensibile, prout sunt differentiae, non sumuntur a potentiis sensus et rationis, sed ab ipsa 
anima sensitiva et rationali. Quia tarnen formae substantiates, quae secundum se sunt nobis 
ignotae, innotescunt per accidentia, nihil prohibet interdum accidentia loco differentiarum 
substantialium poni." 
MTHOMAS AQUINAS, SentdeA, 1.1, 7247-260. The passage continues as follows: "Et ideo diffi-
cile est, quia oportet nos cognoscere quod quid est anime ad cognoscendum facilius accidencia 
anime, sicut in mathematicis valde utile est preaccipere quod quid erat esse recti et curvi et 
plani ad cognoscendum quot rectis trianguli anguli sint equales; e converso etiam accidentia, si 
preaccipiantur, multum conferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid erat esse, ut dictum est. Si quis 
ergo assignet diffinitionem per quam non deveniatur in cognitionem accidencium rei diffinite, 
illa diffinitio non est realis, set remota et dyaletica. Set illa diffinitio per quam devenitur in 
cognitionem accidencium est realis et ex propriis et essencialibus rei." (p. y260-273). 
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be acquainted with the essential nature of those substances... but also con-
versely, for the knowledge of the essential nature of a substance is largely pro-
moted by an acquaintance with its properties."65 Our intellect is too weak to 
penetrate into the essences of things. By using proper accidents as our starting 
point, we can conduct a scientific investigation, but the result can never be 
proper knowledge of the essences of things, since that knowledge would have 
to include knowing exactly how the proper accidents and the essence are re-
lated. But this relation is something that we will never be able to grasp.66 This 
does not mean that real scientific knowledge is impossible. It simply means 
that there are limits to what we are able understand. 
Infinite regress 
The final argument against a real distinction between the soul and its powers 
tries to show that such a distinction would lead to an infinite regress.67 I will 
discuss the argument in the formulation in which it is found in Brito's com-
mentary. Let us assume that a power (potentia) of the soul adds something 
over and above the soul's essence. In that case, the soul, taken on its own, 
must be in potency (in potentia) to that power.68 And then we can ask of that 
potency, whether it is the same as the soul's essence or something added to it. 
Neither reply will do. For if it said that this potency is the same as the soul's 
essence, then for the same reason we could have said that the original power 
of the soul is identical to its essence. If, on the other hand, the soul's potency 
to its powers is itself something added over and above the soul, the soul must 
be in potency to that potency, and we can repeat the question ad infinitum.69 
When it is said that the soul must be in potency to its powers, this is 
granted by Brito as long as we are clear on the type of potency in question, 
" A R I S T O T L E , De anima, I . l , 4 0 2 b l 7 - 2 2 . 
^See P A S N A U , Thomas Aquinas, 167. 
67See R A D U L P H U S BRITO, QdA, U.C14"24; A N O N Y M U S BAZAN, QdA, 406--10712"26; JOHN OF 
JANDUN, QdA, II.9, 103-104; JOHN B U R I D A N , QdA, 11.5, 61. The formulation of the argument 
in Anonymus Bazän is somewhat confusing, possibly because of an omission in the first three 
sentences: "Praeterea, hoc idem secundo arguitur sic: si potentia esset quoddam accidens ad-
veniens animae, <omission SdB>; modo quando anima haberet actu illam potentiam, ipsa esset 
in potentia ad aliam potentiam; tunc quaero de ilia potentia: vel est de essentia animae, vel est 
accidens adveniens animae?" 
'"This works better in Latin: "per suam essentiam est in potentia ad suas potentias". 
6 9The argument assumes that the soul must be in potency to its powers when those powers 
are distinct from it. Perhaps it relies on the following presupposition: if the powers of the soul 
are distinct from the soul, they are either accidents or substances. It is clear that they are not 
substances, so they must be accidents. Now the relation between any substance (or essence) 
and its accidents is that between potency and act. Therefore the soul must be in potency to its 
powers if these powers are really distinct from the soul. 
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namely a potency that does not disappear as potency when it is actualized 
(potenna coniuncta actui). As for the question of whether this potency is dis-
tinct from the soul's essence or not, it should be said that having these powers 
belongs to the soul essentially. The solution of the argument thus closely par-
allels the interpretation which the commentators gave to Aristotle's definition 
of the soul as actus primus corporis physici organici habentis vitam inpotentia. 
The soul's potency to life was interpreted as a potency that is not lost when it is 
actualized, but, on the contrary, as a potency that, although perfected through 
its act, itself remains present. A potency in that sense is always an inborn or 
acquired power instead of merely a condition. It is, in more technical terms, a 
potency that belongs to the second species of the category of quality.70 
5.3.2 Arguments in favor of a real distinction 
What the discussion of the arguments against a real distinction showed is that 
the powers were conceived of as proper accidents. More precisely, the powers 
are located in the second species of the category of quality. The fact that the 
powers are proper accidents explains why the soul and its powers are onto-
logically distinct, whereas the fact that they are proper accidents explains why 
we never encounter a soul that has no powers. Now that the most common 
arguments against the position that the soul is distinct from its powers are 
discussed, we can turn to the arguments that were introduced to defend this 
position to see why the distinction was so important for the commentators. 
Belonging to different categories 
The first argument is that soul and powers belong to two different categories, 
which means that these are two different kinds of entities. The soul belongs to 
the category of substance, whereas its powers belong to the category of qual-
ity.71 Hence the soul is distinct from its powers. When the powers of the soul 
are conceived of as accidents, the question of whether the soul is ontologi-
cally distinct from its powers becomes the same question as that of whether a 
substance is ontologically distinct from its accidents. The answer to the latter 
70The description 'second species of quality' refers to the discussion of quality in ARISTO-
TLE, Categonae, translated by J. L. Acknll, in: J. Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Anstotle. 
The Revised Oxford Translation, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, 8,9314—19, p. 14: 
"Another kind of quality is that in virtue of which we call people boxers or runners or healthy 
or sickly — anything, in short, which they are called in virtue of a natural capacity or incapac-
ity For it is not because one is in some condition that one is called anything of this sort, but 
because one has a natural capacity for doing something easily or for being affected." 
71RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, ll^50"61; ANONYMUS BAZAN, Q Ì M , 40732 3 \ JOHN OF JANDUN, 
QdA, 11.9, 104. 
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question is obvious within the Aristotelian tradition; every accident is onto-
logjcally distinct from its substance. It is not surprising that the answer is 
obvious, since the argument now begs the question. To say that the powers 
are accidents presupposes that they are ontologically different from the soul. 
What needs to be done is to show why the powers of the soul must be con­
ceived of as accidents, which is what the commentators in fact do in the second 
and third argument. 
We also find a closely related argument that phrases the difference be­
tween the soul and its powers in terms of actuality and potentiality instead of 
in terms of substance and accident. The advantage of this argument is that it 
is able to stand on its own. Since this argument is the dominant strategy in 
Aquinas, I will use his formulation.72 
Nam anima secundum suam essentiam est actus. Si ergo ipsa essentia 
ammae esset immediatum operatioms principium, semper Habens an-
imam actu haberet opera vitae, sicut semper Habens animam actu est 
vivum Non enim, inquantum est forma, est actus ordinatus ad ulteri-
orem actum, sed est ultimus terminus generatioms Unde quod sit in 
potentia adhuc ad ahum actum, hoc non competit ei secundum suam 
essentiam, inquantum est forma, sed secundum suam potentiam Et sic 
ipsa anima, secundum quod subest suae potentiae, dicitur actus primus, 
ordinatus ad actum secundum Invemtur autem habens animam non 
semper esse in actu operum vitae. Unde etiam in defimtione ammae 
dicitur quod est actus corporis potentia vitam habentis, quae tarnen po­
tentia non abiicit animam Rehnquitur ergo quod essentia ammae non 
est eius potentia Nihil enim est in potentia secundum actum, inquan-
The soul is essentially an act If, therefore, the very essence of the soul 
were to be the immediate principle of its operations, then what has a 
soul would always actually have the vital operations, just as what has a 
soul is always actually alive. For it is not, in so far as it is a form, an 
act that is ordered to a further act, but it is the end term of generation 
Hence that it is still in potency to another act does not belong to it 
according to its essence, in so far as it is a form, but according to its 
powers. And so, the soul, as it underlies its powers, is called the first act, 
which is ordered to a second act But we find that what has a soul is not 
always in act with respect to the vital operations Whence it is said in 
the soul's definition that it is the act of the body having life in potency, a 
72For a detailed analysis — that is still worth reading — of all the texts in which Aquinas 
discusses the relation between the soul and its powers, see Ρ KUNZLE, Das Verhältnis der Seele 
zu ihren Potenzen problemgeschichtliche Untersuchungen von Augustin bis und mit Thomas von 
Aqmn, Freiburg, Schweiz Umversitatsverlag, 1956, 171-218 
73THOMAS AQUINAS, STh, I, q 77, a 1,236-237 Utrum essentia ammae sit ems potentia 
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potency, however, that does not exclude the soul. It remains, therefore, 
that the essence of the soul is not its power. For nothing is in potency 
according to act, insofar as it is act. 
The soul is always the act of the body. Being the actuality of the body is 
what constitutes its essence. The soul's powers, by contrast, are sometimes 
in act and sometimes merely present in potency. This suggests that the soul 
and its powers are ontologically distinct. The soul is in first act, whereas the 
powers are in second act. And since nothing can be in potency in so far as 
it is in act, the soul's powers must be ontologically distinct from its essence. 
The argument also aims to show something else. The crucial passage is 'quae 
tamen potentia non abiicit animam': the soul's potency to the vital operations 
as it is expressed in the soul's definition is a potency that is never removed 
from the soul. Even if the vital operations are actually exercised, the soul is 
still in potency to these vital operations, for otherwise the soul's definition 
would no longer apply to it.74 
The differences between the powers themselves 
The second argument in favor of a distinction between soul and powers fo-
cuses on the differences between the powers among themselves. If we suppose 
that the powers are really identical to the soul, it follows that they must also be 
really identical to each other.75 But that gives rise to several counter-intuitive 
consequences. If the powers are really identical to one another, then, since 
identity is a transitive relation, whatever we can predicate of one power, we 
should also be able to predicate of another. Take, for example, intellect and 
will. Intellect is a power capable of acquiring knowledge (potentia cognosci-
tiva). But on the assumption that the powers are identical to the soul, what-
ever applies to the intellect will apply to the will also. So we should admit that 
the will is also capable of acquiring knowledge, with the result that the origi-
nal distinction between knowing and willing collapses. Similar problems arise 
on the level of the sensitive functions. If sight and hearing are both identical 
to the soul, then wherever we find the one, it seems we should also find the 
other. But this runs counter to the empirical observation that the two powers 
are located in two different places of the body. 
74The argument also aims to show that the ontological distinction between the soul and its 
powers is already implied in Aristotle's definition of the soul. 
"RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, II.962"74; JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, 105. 
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From simplicity to multiplicity 
The final argument is simple. In its briefest formulation it goes as follows: 
given that there is only one soul and a multitude of powers, the powers must 
be distinct from the soul.76 Since the powers can be multiplied while the soul 
remains one, the powers and the soul cannot be identical. The problem with 
this brief formulation, however, is that it does not make clear why this con-
clusion follows. Why should it be impossible for one soul to have multiple 
powers when the powers are not distinct from the soul? Moreover, the argu-
ment seems to beg the question. Only if the powers are multiplied in the sense 
that they are different entities does the conclusion follow. But if powers are 
thought of more in terms of the soul being related to different acts, there is no 
compelling reason to accept the conclusion. 
A more promising variant of the argument is found in Jandun. Nature, 
he says, does not proceed from one thing to another very dissimilar thing un-
less through a medium. But the soul and its operations are very dissimilar. 
Whereas the soul is a substance, the operations are accidents. And whereas 
there will no longer be an animal if the soul is separated from its operations 
— with the soul no longer remaining part of the animal —, there will still 
be an animal if the operations are separated from the soul — with the soul 
remaining part of the animal.77 This formulation combines the intuition un-
derlying the argument that the multitude of powers implies their ontological 
distinction from the soul with the previous argument that soul and powers 
belong to different categories. 
Interestingly, at this point Jandun pauses to discuss an objection (sed du-
bitaret tuvenis).76 The objection is the following: if accidents are capable of 
being the immediate principle of operations, then, given that a substance is 
more perfect and more noble, a substance should be even more capable of be-
ing the immediate principle of operations. If this objection is valid, then there 
is no reason to assume an ontological distinction between the soul and its 
powers. Recall that the whole debate is about the question of whether the soul 
7 6 R A D U L P H U S BRITO, QdA, II.93e"", A N O N Y M U S V A N STEENBERGHEN, QdA, II.8, 21016"'8. 
7 7JOHN OF J A N D U N , QdA, 105: "Item. Natura non procedit a multum dissimili et diverso ad 
multum diversum nisi per medium, quod quodammo<do> convenu cum utroque extremo-
rum. Huiusmodi enim est ordo naturae, ut manifestum est; modo ipsa anima et eius operatio, 
seu actus, sunt multum diversa entia Nam anima est substantia et est inseparabilis ab ipso [in] 
animato manente. Operatio vero est accidens eius et est separabdis ab ipso animato manente; et 
ideo est rationabüe ista unin per medium, quod aliquo modo sit conveniens utrique, et hoc est 
ipsa potentia naturalis animae. Ipsa enim est conveniens cum anima in hoc quod permanet in 
animato quandiu vivit et convenit cum operatione in hoc quod est accidens quoddam Et ideo 
ex ordine naturae rationabile est concedere potentiam naturalem differentem esse a substantia 
animae mediante qua operatur." 
7β)θΗΝ OF J A N D U N , Q Ì M , 105. 
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is identical to its powers, where 'powers' is taken as the immediate principles 
of its operations. So if the soul can be the immediate principle of its opera-
tions, there is no need for any additional powers that are ontologically distinct 
from the soul itself. A substantial part of Jandun's response to the question 
on the relation between the soul and its powers is devoted to this more gen-
eral question of whether it is the substantial or the accidental form that is the 
immediate cause of operations. And from his reply, we can gather that for 
Jandun the question about the relation between the soul and its powers is pri-
marily an instance of the more general question of how created substances 
cause their operations, just as it was for Aquinas. 
Being the immediate principle of operations in the material, sublunary 
realm (in istis inferioribus) is, according to Jandun, a form of instrumental, 
or organic, causality. He invokes the analogy with arts and crafts, where the 
instrument is a proximate principle of operation and the art itself a remote 
principle. Remote principles are not a form of instrumental causality, but 
a form of principal causality. It is being the principal cause that belongs to 
more noble things, but not necessarily being the immediate cause. Jandun 
approvingly cites Aristotle's De sensu where it said that fire does not act in so 
far as it is fire, but in so far as it is hot.79 That is, fire acts in so far as it has 
certain accidents that are the immediate principles of its operations. Jandun 
also briefly mentions the separated substances, but says that the discussion of 
how they are related to their operations is another question. The important 
point is that in material substances the principal and the immediate causes of 
operations are two ontologically distinct entities. 
5.3.3 Some preliminary conclusions 
The questions on the distinction between the soul and its powers often give 
the impression of a more general discussion of the relation between any sub-
stance and its powers that just happens to be held in the context of the De 
anima. This already becomes apparent when we look at how Jandun struc-
tures his discussion: we find a long dubium which is concerned with the more 
general thesis that not substantial, but accidental forms are the immediate 
principles of operation. It is even more visible in Aquinas, for whom the ar-
guments for a real distinction between the soul and its powers often appear 
to be an afterthought. Aquinas views the question from a much broader per-
spective, namely that of the distinction between God and creature. The real 
distinction between essence and power is a mark of creation, since only in 
'cf. A R I S T O T L E , D e sensu et sensibilibus, 4 , 4 4 1 0 1 1 - 1 5 ; A N O N Y M U S , AA, 7:17. 
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God are essence and powers identical.80 From this perspective, the question 
of whether the soul is identical with its powers is settled long before it can 
even arise. This broader perspective can, undoubtedly, be at least partially ex-
plained by reference to the fact that most of Aquinas's discussions on the soul 
take place in more theological genres. But even so, this perspective is so im-
portant in Aquinas that it is almost inconceivable that he would ever identity 
the soul with its powers. 
The different arguments for and against the distinction between the soul 
and its powers show that the underlying discussion is the question of whether 
the soul's powers are accidents or part of its essence. If they are accidents, 
then they are ipso facto distinct from the soul. If they are not, they are ipso 
facto identical to it. Given that all commentators agreed that the powers are, 
and must be, accidents, the only thing that remained to be done is to spell 
out the exact relation between these accidents and the soul. This is where they 
relied on Albert the Great. The powers are proper accidents of the soul, and 
they proceed from the soul by way oiafluxus, a flowing forth. 
5.3.4 The identification of the soul with its powers 
In the tradition after Ockham — who denied that there is any real distinction 
between the soul and its powers — the question of whether the soul and its 
powers are really distinct or not is discussed differently. This difference is 
reflected in both the terminology and in the arguments that are being used. 
Thefluxus terminology is abandoned, new arguments are introduced, and the 
real distinction between the soul and its powers is no longer the communis 
opinio. 
Buridan mentions no fewer than twelve arguments in favor of a real dis-
tinction between the soul and its powers. The 'simplicity to multiplicity' argu-
ment is still used by Buridan. Interestingly, the second stock argument against 
a real distinction, that of the similarity between the soul and matter, is now in-
80THOMAS AQUINAS, STTI, I, q. 77, a. 1, 236: "Primo quia, cum potentia et actus dividunt 
ens et quodlibet genus entis, oportet quod ad idem genus referatur potentia et actus Et ideo, 
si actus non est in genere substantiae, potentia quae dicitur ad ilium actum non potest esse in 
genere substantiae; sed in solo Deo, cuius operatio est eius substantia. Unde Dei potentia, quae 
est operatioms pnncipium, est ipsa Dei essentia. Quod non potest esse verum neque in anima, 
neque in ahqua creatura, ut supra etiam de angelo dictum est." The same idea is expressed in 
THOMAS AQUINAS, QdA, q. 12, Ì09174 l82· "Si vero est aliquod agens quod directe et immediate 
sua actione producat substantiam, sicut nos dicimus de Deo, qui creando producit rerum sub-
stantias, et sicut Avicenna dicit de intelhgentia agente, a qua secundum ipsum effluunt forme 
substantiates in istis infenonbus, huiusmodi agens agit per suam essentiam, et sic non ent in 
eo aliud potentia activa et eius essentia " 
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troduced as an argument both for and against a real distinction.81 The final 
argument, that the soul and its powers belong to different categories, is not 
mentioned anymore. By far the dominant strategy used by Buridan, however, 
is concerned with the necessary distinction of the powers among themselves. 
Eight of the twelve arguments aim to show that the different powers must be 
distinct from each other, from which a real distinction between the soul and its 
powers is supposed to follow. One of these is the following argument, which 
is closely related to the thought experiment of the eye in the foot: 
Tertio quia: ubi una non est, ibi altera est, ut in oculo est visiva et non 
in pede vel aure. Si enim virtus visiva esset in pede vel in aure, ipsa ibi 
esset frustra, quia non possit excercere suam operationem. Et natura 
nihil facit frustra. Igitur.82 
Third: where one <power> is not, another is, as the power of sight is in 
the eye and not in the foot or the ear. For if the power of sight were in 
the foot or the ear, it would be there in vain, because it would not be able 
to exercise its operation. And nature does nothing in vain. Therefore. 
Buridan introduces the observation that powers are exercised in specific 
organs as an argument in favor of a real distinction between the soul and its 
powers. The power of vision is exercised in the eye but not in the foot, whereas 
the soul is present in the whole body. Supposing that the powers are not dis-
tinct from the soul, all powers must be in the whole body although they are 
only exercised in particular parts of it. But this situation would seem to con-
flict with the Aristotelian adage that nature does nothing in vain (natura nihil 
facit frustra). 
In spite of the impressive list of arguments in favor of a real distinction, the 
question seems to have already been decided in the opening lines of Buridan's 
reply, which are the following: 
Dicendum est breviter quod omnis anima est potentia, quia omne prin-
cipium activum vel passivum alicuius motus vel operationis est potentia 
activa vel passiva, activa si sit principium activum et passiva si sit pas-
sivum operationis et passionum.83 
"'JOHN B U R I D A N , QdA, II.5, 59-60: "Item ad principale. Sicud se habet potentia materie 
ad materiam, ita potentia anime ad animam. Sed potentia materie non est de essentia materie, 
ut dicit Commentator primo Physicorum." Notice that although the argument is still based on 
a passage from Averroes, the source is no longer De substantia orbis, but the commentary on 
Physica I. The same argument is also to argue against the distinction, only this time by reference 
to Aristotle. JOHN BURIDAN, QdA, II.5, 60-61: "Oppositum arguitur quia: sicud se habet 
potentia materie ad materiam, ita potentia anime ad animam. Sed Aristoteles in principio 
istius secundi dicit materiam esse potentiam." 
" J O H N B U R I D A N , QdA, 11.5, 58. 
" J O H N B U R I D A N , QdA, II.5, 61. 
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It should be said briefly that every soul is a power, since every active or 
passive principle of some motion or operation is an active or a passive 
power; an active power if it is an active principle and a passive power if 
it is a passive principle of an operation and of passions. 
That every soul is a power is clear, Buridan claims, since everyone con-
cedes that the soul is the principle of its operations, whether these are active 
or passive. This is a somewhat puzzling reply in light of the distinctions that 
the previous generations of commentators made between the different senses 
of the term 'power'. In the earher discussions, the relevant sense of 'power' 
was being the immediate principle of operations.84 But there is no mention 
anymore of this qualification. The meaning of the term 'power' in the passage 
cited above seems to be closer to power in the sense of the subject that is able 
to do something, an interpretation under which the earher commentators also 
claimed that the soul is identical to its powers. 
Obviously, Buridan's first reply, taken on its own, cannot settle the ques-
tion of whether the soul is identical to its powers. It either seems to sidestep 
the question completely by denying that there are two things we are talking 
about, a soul and a set of powers, or else it fails to reply to the controversial 
question: is the soul (even granted that we may call it a power) really the same 
as its different powers?85 Buridan is clearly aware of this, for he quickly moves 
on to discuss a more controversial question, namely whether the soul of a hu-
man being has a plurality of powers. This he answers in the negative: when we 
mean principal powers, and also, when we take the question in its proper sense 
(loquendo de proprietate sermonis), there is no plurality of powers.86 Only in 
an improper sense can we say that a man's soul has multiple powers, namely 
in the sense that his soul can exercise diverse operations. At this point, the 
question seems to be answered fully. There is no real distinction between the 
soul and its powers, nor between the powers amongst themselves. There are 
only different descriptions of the soul in relation to its different operations. 
But unexpectedly, immediately after Buridan establishes the identity of 
the soul with its powers, he goes on to deny that very same identity.87 The 
'""See Anonymus Van Steenberghen's definition of power as cited on p. 222. 
85The role of this first reply in Buridan's entire discussion is not clear. Its main purpose 
seems to be to establish a basis on which referring to the soul as a power in some sense is 
justified. A similar passage is found in ANONYMUS FATAR, QdA, IIA, 25325"27. It is not found 
in Oresme. 
^JOHN BURIDAN, QdA, II.5, 63: "Et tunc est dubitatio utrum sit bene dictum quod in 
homine sint plures potentie anime. Et ego credo quod non, loquendo de potentiis principalibus 
secundum quod postea distinguemus de potentiis et etiam loquendo de proprietate sermonis." 
87JOHN BURIDAN, QÌJA, II.5, 64: "Sed non obstantibus predictis, que vera sunt, ego pono 
aliam conclusionem, scilicet quod potentie anime sunt distincte ab anima et a se [in] invicem, 
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fact that this conclusion seems to blatandy contradict the first part of his so­
lution did not escape him, so he carefully explains the relation between both 
answers. When identifying the soul with its powers, he was discussing the 
powers of the soul insofar as we can refer to the powers while excluding the 
necessary bodily dispositions required for their exercise. Buridan reserves the 
expression 'principal powers' (potentiae principales) for this usage. But when 
denying the identity of soul and powers, Buridan uses the term 'power' in a 
second, derivative sense, for which he reserves the expression 'instrumental 
powers' {potentiae instrumentales)}6 In this second sense, the powers refer to 
whatever is required for the exercise of their operation, in particular to the 
various bodily dispositions that are necessary for the exercise of the powers 
in the first, principal sense. For example, we can call the dispositions needed 
for seeing (the eye and the sensible species it receives) a sensitive instrumen­
tal power. In contrast to the principal powers, these instrumental powers are 
both distinct from the soul and from each other.89 This distinction, Buridan 
claims, is all that is needed to solve the question of the relation between the 
soul and its powers.90 
Although Buridan gives a few initial arguments against a distinction be­
tween the soul and its powers, including the infinite regress argument, it never 
really becomes clear what his main grounds to oppose this distinction are. 
Luckily, there is another text in which Buridan also discusses the difference 
between instrumental and principal powers where this becomes clearer. His 
commentary on Aristotle's Ethica also includes a question on the relation be­
tween the soul and its powers.91 In contrast to his discussion of the question 
in his commentary on the De anima, he devotes ample attention to the logico-
semantical aspects of the question. 'Power', Buridan says, has more than one 
meaning, but in all its meanings it is a relative term.9 2 The question then 
quia suppono ex diffimtiombus potentiarum activarum et passivarum quod omne activum 
est potentia activa et omne passivum est potentia passiva, et capiunt denominationes proprias 
ab operationibus, ita quod omne activum nutntionis est potentia nutritiva, et omne activum 
caliditatis est potentia calefactiva." 
"Buridan also uses the term 'potentia remota as a synonym for 'potentia pnnapahs', and 
'potentia propinqua'', and sometimes 'potentia dispositiva', as a synonym for 'potentia instru­
mentalis', see for example JOHN BURIDAN, QdA, II.5,66-7. 
8 9 J O H N B U R I D A N , QdA, II.5,65: "Et sic dispositiones ad sentiendum sunt potentie sensitive 
instrumentales et different ab anima sensitiva " 
" Ί Ο Η Ν B U R I D A N , QdA, II.5, 66: "Totum ergo solvitur distinguendo inter potentiam ρ π η -
cipalem et instrumentalem sive dispositivam." 
" J O H N B U R I D A N , Ethica, VI, q 3. 'Utrum potentie anime sint ab anima realiter distincte', 
ff. 118 r -119 v 
92JoHN B U R I D A N , Ethica, VI, q. 3, ƒ. I18 r a . "Potentia e m m quolibet dictorum modorum 
est pnncipium aut activum aut passivum aut princiaple aut dispositivum Pnncipium autem, 
secundum suam propnam rationem, respectivum est, nee potest nisi ad aliud intelhgi." 
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becomes how propositions in which a relative term is predicated of a sub-
ject should be analyzed. Buridan gives several examples of such propositions, 
which include 'God is His powers', and 'form is nature'.93 The truth condi-
tions of these propositions are the same as in propositions in which the pred-
icate is a non-relative term. The proposition is true if and only if the subject 
and predicate terms stand for (supportunt) the same thing.94 Where opinions 
differ, however, is whether in propositions such as 'form is nature', the pred-
icate signifies something over and above what the subject signifies, and if so, 
what? 
Buridan discusses three views on the signification of relative terms, one of 
which is that relative terms signify something that has its own reality, over and 
above what the subject signifies. According to that view, 'power' not only sig-
nifies something over and above the subject ofthat power, but what it signifies 
has the same ontological status as, for example, a quality has. This interpre-
tation of 'power' neatly corresponds to the earUer tradition that denied the 
identity of the soul with its powers: the powers are accidents that are really 
distinct from the soul. To refute this view, Buridan gives one single argument. 
There is at least one case, Buridan argues, in which we know for sure that a 
subject and its powers are really identical, namely God.95 On account of the 
divine simplicity, there can be no ontological distinction between God and 
His powers. So when we talk about God's powers, the term 'powers' signifies 
nothing other than God Himself. And if we can account for the proposition 
that God is his powers without introducing something over and above God 
Himself, then there is no reason why we cannot do the same in all other cases, 
such as when we talk about the soul and its powers, or about the power of 
matter. Why posit additional entities if we can explain everything without 
these?96 
93
 In the proposition 'form is nature', nature is the relative term, according to Buridan, since 
nature is defined as a principle, and principles are relative terms. 
'''For a discussion of the way in which Buridan analyses propositions in terms of supposi-
tion and signification, see ZUPKO, John Buridan, esp. 61. In short, supposition has to do with 
a term's reference, and, as such, is a property of terms only in so far as they form part of a 
proposition. Signification, by contrast, has to do with a term's meaning, which is a property 
that terms have on their own account. 
95JOHN BURIDAN, Ethica, VI, q. ì,f. 118va: "Saltern enim cum dicimus Deum esse princi-
pium aliorum, non potest dici quod principium significet in Deo rem aliam ab ipso Deo, cum 
Deus sit omnino <corr. ex o ra tk» simplex et nihil sit in eo quod non sit ipse Deus. Ideo saltern 
in Deo necesse est redire ad primam opinionem vel ad tertiam. Et si talis predicatio potest 
de Deo salvari sine re sibi addita, poterit etiam in aliis. Propter quod ociosum erit in materia 
vel in anima vel in quocumque alio principio ponere relationem prêter animam superadditam 
fundamento. Frustra enim ponuntur plura ubi totum potest salvari per pauciora." 
"interestingly, this is the mirror image of the general argument that Aquinas used to estab-
lish the distinction between essence and powers in all created substances. As Aquinas argued, 
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Now that Buridan has established the identity of the soul with its powers 
in this way, he proceeds in the same way as in his commentary on the De 
anima. He introduces a distinction between proximate (or, instrumental) and 
remote (or, principal) powers. But it is made in slightly different terms than 
in the question from his commentary on the De anima. A proximate power is 
now one that can act — or be acted upon, in the case of a passive power — 
without needing a mediating quality to dispose it to acting. A remote power, 
by contrast, is dependent on such a mediate quality to dispose it to acting.97 
Buridan gives prime matter as an example to clarify this distinction. Prime 
matter is in potency to receiving all forms. But is not in proximate potency 
to receiving all forms, but only to those it can receive immediately, without 
needing to be predisposed by the reception of other forms first. 
This distinction between proximate and remote powers as a distinction 
between powers that can be exercised without requiring anything else, and 
powers that can only be exercised once the proper material dispositions are 
in place, seems, at first sight, to be different from the distinction Buridan in-
troduced in his commentary on the De anima. There the distinction was be-
tween powers as identical with the soul and powers as the bodily dispositions 
required for the exercise of powers in the first sense. Although there is, indeed, 
a difference, the two uses are closely related, which can be gathered from the 
following passage: 
Ignis autem secundum eius substantiam precise acceptus non est in po-
tentia propinqua ad calefaciendum, sed mediante caliditate <corr ex 
qualiditate(!)>. Propter hoc igitur substantie active et passive, licet 
pnncipaliter agant vel patiantur, tarnen non solum ipse dicuntur po-
tentie active vel passive, sed etiam quahtates disponentes ipsas ad agen-
dum vel patiendum dicuntur potentie. Et sic potentia est de secunda 
specie quahtatis.98 
Fire, however, when taken precisely according to its substance, is not 
in proximate potency to heating something, but <only as> mediated 
by heat. Because of this, even though active and passive substances are 
what act or undergo principally, not only they are called active or pas-
sive powers, but also the qualities that dispose them to acting or under-
going are called powers. And in this sense, power belongs to the second 
species of quality. 
only God acts according to His essence. All created substances can only act through their pow-
ers, since they lack the divine simplicity 
9 7 J O H N B U R I D A N , Ethica, f 118va~vb "Dicitur autem propinqua <i e potentia Siffl> quia 
sine qualitate media disponente ipsam ad agendum vel patiendum agit vel patitur Dicitur 
autem remota quando non agit vel patitur nisi mediante qualitate aliqua dispotente ipsam ad 
agendum vel patiendum " 
" J O H N B U R I D A N , Ethica, f 118vb 
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Here we have a distinction between senses of 'power' that resembles the 
one found in Buridan's commentary on the De anima. On the one hand, 
we can talk about powers as the required dispositions. On the other hand, 
we can talk about powers as belonging to that which acts principally. The 
remainder of the Ethics question relies on this distinction. Buridan makes a 
distinction between the powers of the intellective soul that are not exercised 
in any bodily organ and the other powers that are, but then argues that all 
these powers should be analyzed in a similar way. If by 'power' we refer to 
the required qualitative dispositions, then the powers are distinct from the 
soul and from one another. If, on the other hand, we refer to power in the 
sense that the dispositions are not included, then all powers, including the 
vegetative and sensitives ones, are identical to the soul. Even though the terms 
'proximate power' and 'remote power' are defined differently, what Buridan 
tries to accomplish with the distinction is the same as in his commentary on 
the De anima. And just as in the De anima, Buridan considers the thought 
experiment of the eye in the foot, to which he gives the same answer." If 
there were an eye in the foot, we would be able to see through that eye. 
The distinction between two meanings of the term 'power' allows Buri-
dan to simultaneously maintain that the powers are distinct from the soul (as 
instrumental powers) and that they are identical to the soul (as principal pow-
ers) — for simplicity's sake, I will stick to the meanings of instrumental and 
proximate power as they are defined in the commentary on the De anima in 
the remainder of this book. In terms of parsimony, Buridan seems to be suc-
cessful. Having denied any real distinction within the soul, he did even better 
than Ockham himself who still had to allow for a real distinction between the 
sensitive and the intellective soul in man. And by accepting the instrumental 
meaning of'power', he can grant his opponents that the powers are, of course, 
different from each other. We only need to keep in mind that we are talking 
about a difference between instrumental powers. 
Turning to Oresme and the Anonymus Fatar, it becomes clear that what 
Buridan is defending became a mainstream view. The distinction between the 
two senses of the term 'power' that Buridan employed in order to solve the 
question of the identity or diversity between the soul and its powers is also 
found in their commentaries. Although they do not use the terminology of 
principal and instrumental powers, the distinction they make is exactly the 
same. In one sense, they argue, 'power' is used to refer to the active or passive 
agent itself, i.e. the soul, (corresponding to Buridan's principal powers) and in 
" J O H N BURIDAN, Ethica, f. 119ra: "Unde si oculus esset talis in pede qualis est in capite 
quantum ad qualitativas dispositiones, utique nos oculo pedis videremus sicut oculo capitis. 
Ubique enim per totum corpus est anime substantia que innata est omnem suam operationem 
exercere ubi fuerint organice dispositiones ad hoc requisite." 
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another sense 'power' is used to refer to the bodily dispositions and accidents 
that are necessary for the exercise of the power (corresponding to Buridan's 
instrumental powers).100 When the term 'power' is used in the first sense, to 
refer to an acting or undergoing substance, it is used in its proper sense. And 
in that sense it is identical to the soul. When used in the second sense, the 
powers are distinct from the soul and from one another. There is no need, 
therefore, to posit any accidents in the soul that are distinct from the soul 
itself.101 
The question is, however, to what extent this new view of the relation be-
tween the soul and its powers differs from the earlier view that the powers 
are distinct from the soul. If we take the criterion for the affirmative answer 
proposed by most earlier commentators, namely that the soul has to be the 
immédiate principle of its operations, it seems that the position defended by 
Buridan, Oresme and Anonymus Fatar is not that different from theirs. Even 
according to the new view, the soul is not the immediate principle of its op-
erations, at least not of its vegetative and sensitive operations, but merely the 
principal principle. And taking powers as principal principle, Brito and Jan-
dun, for instance, had already identified the soul with its powers. Because of 
the difference in terminology between the tradition prior to and posterior to 
Ockham, the important similarities between the old and the new view are eas-
ily overlooked. But these similarities notwithstanding, there is one crucial dif-
ference between the new instrumental powers and the earlier commentators's 
powers that flow forth from the soul. That difference is that the instrumental 
powers are no longer described as accidents of the soul, let alone its proper 
accidents. Instead, the instrumental powers are described as dispositions, or 
accidents, of the body. 
Intermezzo: William Ockham 
I have mentioned William Ockham several times in the previous section and 
for good reason. The discussion as it is found in Buridan, Oresme, and Anony-
" " N I C O L E O R E S M E , Q Ì M , II.3, 136: "Secunda distinctio est quod potentia activa dicitur du-
pliciter Uno modo capitur pro substantia agente vel activa; alia modo pro dispositionibus et 
accidentibus mediantibus quibus faciliter potest agere, et sunt quasi agentia instrumentaha." 
Compare A N O N Y M U S FATAR, QdA, II.4, 252A~7: "Secunda distinctio: potentia activa dicitur 
dupliciter. Uno modo potentia activa accipitur pro substantia quae est principale agens; alio 
modo accipitur pro accidentibus mediantibus quibus tamquam mediantibus instrumentis sub-
stantia agit " The same distinction applies to the passive powers. 
101
 NICOLE O R E S M E , Q Ì M , II 3, Πδ5 8""6 0: "Quarta conclusio est quod non oportet in ipsa sola 
anima ponere ahqua accidentia praeter istas potentias, sed sufficiunt ista corporaha " Com­
pare A N O N Y M U S FATAR, Q Ì M , II.4, 2561*"21: "Octava conclusio: non oportet ponere in ipsa 
anima ahqua accidentia praeter istas potentias quae sunt huiusmodi accidentia corporaha, sed 
sufficiunt ista." 
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mus Fatar can be almost completely traced back to Ockham's discussion of the 
relation between the soul and its powers, something which, as far as I know, 
has never been noted in the secondary literature.102 In the second book of his 
commentary on Peter Lombard's Sententiae, Ockham discusses the question 
of whether memory, understanding, and will are really distinct powers.103 It is 
a long question, partly because Ockham discusses and refutes the opinions of 
Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and John Duns Scotus in turn, all of whom 
posit some form of distinction between the soul and its powers.104 Ockham's 
own position, by contrast, is that both intellect and will are really identical 
to the intellective soul itself. To support his position, Ockham, among other 
arguments, invokes the analogy with God's relation to His powers.105 These 
different powers add nothing to God's essence, but merely point to the differ-
ent effects God can accomphsh. Ockham leaves it to the reader to conclude 
that, since there is no need to posit a real distinction between God and His 
powers, there is also no need to posit a real distinction between the human 
soul and its powers. 
More details on Ockham's views of the relation between the soul and its 
powers can be found in another question, in book III of his commentary: 
whether the sensitive powers are really distinct from the soul itself and from 
102For instance, R PASNAU, 'The Mind-Soul Problem', in P. J. J M BAKKER and J. M M.H. 
THIJSSEN (eds.), Mind, Cogmtton and Representation The Tradition of Commentaries on Aris-
totle's De anima, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007, 3-19, 11, states that Ockham's standpoint on the 
identity of the soul with its powers is "almost universally accepted, at least at Oxford", but says 
nothing about the situation in Pans. And P. KING, 'The Inner Cathedral: Mental Architecture 
in High Scholasticism', Vivanum, 46 (2008), 253-274, 271, even makes a much stronger claim 
about the relation between the soul and its powers, namely that Ockham held the minority 
position, both in Oxford and in Paris. He argues that it was not even accepted by Buridan, 
who, according to King, held the same view as Aquinas For a more general description of the 
reception of Ockham's works in Pans, see COURTENAY, Ockham and Ockhamtsm, 127-153. 
""WILLIAM OCKHAM, Reportatio, II, q. 20,425—447: 'Utrum memoria intellectus et voluntas 
sint potentiae realiter distinctae' Notice that these are all powers of the intellective part of the 
soul; the relation between the soul and its sensitive powers is discussed elsewhere, in question 
III.4. 
104
 Aquinas's position has already been described. According to Henry, the powers only add 
to the soul a certain relation (respectus) to different objects. According to Scotus, the powers 
are not really, but formally distinct from the soul itself. 
I05WILLIAM OCKHAM, Reportatio, II, q. 20, 4368"'9: "Sed sic est una substantia animae 
potens habere distinctos actus, respectu quorum potest habere diverses denominationes. Quia 
ut elicit vel elicere potest actum intelligendi dicitur intellectus; ut actum volendi voluntas. II-
lud patet in divims, nam Deus habet potentiam gubernativam, reparativam, praedestmativam, 
reprobativam, quae nullam distinctionem ponunt in Deo. Sed quia alius effectus consequitur 
potentiam Dei creativam, gubernativam, praedestmativam, et propter diverses effectus de-
nommatur Deus diversis denominatiombus, et hoc denominatione extrmseca, sic est in multis, 
sicut saepe dictum est. Et sic est in proposito." 
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one another.106 This is the question that is the most important for under-
standing the fourteenth-century Parisian tradition. The answer to it, Ockham 
states, depends on what sense of'power' we are talking about: 
Ad istam quaestionem dico quod potentia animae potest duphciter ac-
cipi: uno modo pro omni necessario requisito ad quemcumque actum 
vitalem tanquam causa partialis; alio modo pro ilio praecise quod se 
tenet a parte animae elicientis tanquam principium partiale.107 
To this question I reply that 'power of the soul' can be taken in two 
ways: in one way for the necessary conditions for whichever vital act, as 
partial causes; in another way for precisely that which holds from the 
part of the soul eliciting that act, as a partial principle. 
In the first way, 'power' refers to all that is required for a vital act, and 
most importantly, to the necessary bodily dispositions. In that sense, the pow-
ers are distinct from both one another and the soul itself. In the second way, 
'power' refers only to the soul. In that sense, the soul is identical to its pow-
ers. The distinction does not correspond completely to Buridan's distinction 
between power as a proximate and as a remote principle, but it is a very close 
match. The only difference is that Buridan's proximate power (as defined in 
his commentary on De anima) refers to the bodily dispositions only, whereas 
Ockham's refers to the bodily dispositions plus the soul. Because of this dif-
ference, Ockham is forced to make a qualification when he argues that powers 
in Buridan's proximate sense of'power' are subject to corruption; they can be 
corrupted according to at least part of what is signified by the term, namely ac-
cording to the bodily dispositions.108 But in all other respects, the distinction 
functions on the same level as the distinction made later by Buridan, Oresme, 
and Anonymus Patar. When Peter King writes that only a few philosophers 
followed Ockham in his identification of the soul and its power, since even 
Buridan opted to endorse Aquinas's view, he misinterprets Buridan on this 
""WILLIAM OCKHAM, Quaesttones in hbrum tertium Sententiarwn (Reportatto), edited by 
F. E. Kelley and G. I. Etzkorn, St. Bonaventure, New York: St. Bonaventure University, 1982 
(Opera theologica, 6), III, q. 4, 130-148: 'Utrum potentiae sensitivae différant realiter ab ipsa 
anima sensitiva et inter se'. 
107WILLIAM OCKHAM, Reportatw, III, q. 4, 1351"6. 
' " 'WILLIAM OCKHAM, Reportatto-, III, q. 4, 135l9-1363: "Et ideo, accipiendo potentiam vi-
sivam pro forma sensitiva quae nata est elicere actum videndi, et pro accidentibus necessano 
requisitis tanquam causae partiales, sic potest concedi quod potentia visiva corrumpitur, saltern 
quantum ad sigmficatum partiale, puta quantum ad dispositiones accidentales." 
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issue.109 Buridan, Oresme and the Anonymus Fatar (as well as Pierre d'Ailly) 
all side with Ockham in this respect.110 
Conclusions 
To sum up, the question of whether the soul and its powers are really distinct 
or not was considered to be, at least until Ockham, mostly a particular in-
stance of the more general question of whether a substantial form can be the 
immediate principle of its operations. Since this was denied on theological 
(for instance, in Aquinas) and natural-philosophical (for instance, in Jandun) 
grounds, the real distinction between the soul and its powers could be estab-
lished easily. Since an adequate terminology to describe the relation between 
the soul and its powers was already developed by Albert the Great, virtually 
all commentators simply adopted that way of speaking about the soul and its 
powers, even though the term fluxus can never be more than a slightly awk-
ward metaphor within an Aristotelian view of the soul-body relationship. 
All this changes after Ockham, and under the influence of Ockham, as can 
be seen in the commentaries by Buridan, Oresme and the Anonymus Fatar. 
All commentators now begin to link the discussion of the relation between the 
soul and its powers to a related discussion about the manner in which the soul 
is present in the body. They do this by establishing an identity between soul 
and powers in the principal sense, while insisting on a difference between soul 
and powers in the instrumental sense. Since powers in the instrumental sense 
are accidents of the body and not of the soul, there is no distinction between 
essence and (proper) accidents within the soul itself. 
Interestingly, the discussion of the relation between the soul and its pow-
ers was considered to be just the first step in describing the way the soul and 
""KING, 'The Inner Cathedral', 271: "Ockham's radical rejection of the mainstream view 
<that the soul is really distinct from its powers Siiß> seems to have had some currency at 
Oxford in the 1320s... Even the arch-nominalist Jean Buridan, when he discussed the relation 
of the soul to its act, opted to endorse Aquinas's view rather than Ockham's in his Quaestiones 
in De anima 3.20 <sic SdB>." In support of this, King cites a passage from question III.ll, 
in which Buridan argues that the intellect cannot be identified with either its act of knowing 
(intellecrio) or its knowledge (scientia), and then continues to say "As for intellect and act of 
cognition, so too for the soul and any of its faculties in general. Ockham's opposition was 
strident but it did not even become an entrenched dogma of nominalism." I am puzzled by 
this argument. For not only is there a difference between asking whether the soul and its powers 
are distinct and asking whether the soul and its acts are distinct, but also, even Ockham never 
identified the soul with its acts. 
""PIERRE D'AILLY, TdA, 10-11: "Loquendo igitur de potentia principali et essentiali anima 
est unica potentia, nee est verum de virtute sermonis, quod in homine sint plures potentiae... 
Loquendo vero de potentia instrumentali et accidentali anima a suis potentiis distinguitur, et 
sunt ipsius plures potentiae." 
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the body are related. For the further question of how the soul is present in 
the body in terms of its powers arose regardless of whether a commentator ac-
cepted the identity between the soul and its powers or not. Is the soul present 
in each part according to all its powers, they all asked, or are the powers them-
selves spatially distributed over the body? The question becomes even more 
pertinent, and difficult, when it comes to the intellective soul, since it was 
thought to be immaterial, and, as a result, to be in some sense unextended. 
Most commentaries on the De anima devote at least one question to the man-
ner in which the soul is present in the body, particularly whether the soul is 
present in each part, and if so, in what manner. 
The discussion of these questions is crucial to understanding the thought 
experiment of the eye in the foot. Buridan, Oresme, and Anonymus Fatar 
have established that the soul is identical to its powers when we take 'powers' 
in its proper sense, that is, as principal powers. This allows us to say that in the 
proper sense powers can be present even in those places where they are never 
exercised. For as long as the soul is present in a place, all its principal powers 
are present there too. But this distinction alone, it turns out, cannot settle 
the thought experiment. For even though Buridan, Oresme, and Anonymus 
Fatar agree on the distinction between two meanings of'power', and also agree 
that in the sense in which 'power' refers to the soul as a principal agent, the 
powers are identical to the soul, they still disagree about the right answer to 
the thought experiment. Even when it is admitted that the power of vision 
is identical with the soul itself, it is, apparently, still possible to deny that the 
power of vision is present in the foot even when there is an eye there. 
In order to solve this final puzzle, there are two more questions that need 
to be answered. The first is whether the soul is indeed present in each and 
every part of the body. And the second is whether the soul is present in each 
part of the body in the same way, or, as the commentators put it, whether 
the soul is a homogeneous or heterogeneous form. These questions will be 
answered in the next section. 
5.4 The soul's presence in the body 
Almost all commentators on the De anima devoted at least one question to the 
presence of the soul in the body. Often, the question was phrased as follows: 
whether the whole soul is present in each and every part of the body. This 
formulation is indebted to Augustine, who had described the (human) soul as 
something that is wholly in the whole body and wholly in each of its parts.1 ' ' 
' "The presence of the soul in the body is discussed in AUGUSTINE, De immortahtate am-
mae, traduction, introduction et notes par P. de Labriolle, Paris: Desclée De Brouwer, 1939 
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Given that Augustine thought of the soul as a substance in its own right, his 
description makes sense at least, whether we agree with it or not. But it is 
not immediately clear what this formula means in the context of the De anima 
when the soul is thought of as a substantial form. Nevertheless, the description 
of the soul as something that is wholly present in the whole body and also 
wholly present in each and every part of the body was very influential. It 
became the standard answer to the question of the soul's presence in the body 
in the commentary tradition on the De anima.112 
If the soul really is a substantial form, it cannot, strictly speaking, have 
parts in the quantitative sense of the word.113 So then what does being wholly 
(or partially) in each part of the body mean? A similar question can be asked 
about the closely related discussion of the question of whether the soul is an 
extended or an unextended form. If the soul really is a substantial form, that is, 
a metaphysical constituent of the living organism rather than a thing in its own 
right, then what exactly can it mean that it is either extended or unextended? Is 
it not just the living substance itself that is extended rather than its substantial 
form? In order to make the meaning of these two questions about the presence 
of the soul in the body as clear as possible, it is helpful to begin by looking at 
the context in which they arose. 
Both questions can be traced back to the same textual source, namely Aris-
totle's observation in De anima II that most plants as well as a certain class of 
animals, the so-called annulose animals, share an interesting property. When 
we sever a part of the plant, or the animal, both the severed part and the sub-
stance it was severed from continue to Uve, at least for some time.114 This then 
(Bibliothèque Augustinienne, 5), c. XVI, 218: "Tota igitur <anima> singulis partibus simul 
adest, quae tota simul sentit in singulis Nee tarnen hoc modo adest tota, ut candor vel alia hu-
jusmodi qualitas in unaquaque parte corporis tota est. Nam quod in aha parte corpus patitur 
candons immutatione, potest ad candorem qui est in aha parte non pertinere. Quapropter se-
cundum partes mol is a se distantes, et ipse a se distare convincitur. Non autem ita esse m anima 
per sensum, de quo dictum est, probatur " Augustine, in turn, took this idea from PLOTINUS, 
The Enneads, translated by S. MacKenna. Third edition revised by B. S. Page, with a foreword 
by prof. E. R. Dodds, and an introduction by prof. Ρ Henry, S J., London: Faber and Faber, 
1962, IV 2, 257: "The nature, at once divisible and indivisible, which we affirm to be soul, has 
not the unity of an extended thing: it does not consist of separate sections; its divisibility lies 
in its presence at every point of the recipient, but it is indivisible as dwelling entire in the total 
and entire in any part." 
"
2But, as will become clear in this chapter, the answer could be interpreted in very different 
ways. 
"
3That the soul has parts in a derivative sense, that is, various powers, was acknowledged 
and defended by all commentators, since the existence of these 'parts' was seen as a necessary 
condition for the very possibility of a science of the soul. See above, sections 3 1 and 5. 
114
 ARISTOTLE, De anima, II 2,413bl7-24 "Just as in the case of plants which when divided 
are observed to continue to live though separated from one another (thus showing that in 
their case the soul of each individual plant was actually one, potentially many), so we notice 
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raises the question of whether the whole soul was present in both parts to be-
gin with, and if so, in what manner. This brief passage in Aristode became 
enormously important in the fourteenth-century debates on the manner in 
which the soul is present in the living being, from Radulphus Brito onward. 
In fact, as we will see, the discussions about the souls of annulose animals 
were used to establish the general framework for all subsequent discussion of 
the souls of more complex animals. In the fourteenth century, the discus-
sion about the soul-body relationship is no longer structured in terms of the 
vegetative, sensitive, and intellective soul, but instead in terms of the souls of 
plants and annulose animals, the souls of perfect animals, and the intellective 
souls of human beings. 
5.4.1 From annulose to perfect animals 
The annulose animals are mentioned in commentaries on the De anima prior 
to Brito, but they play only a minor role. Two of the three anonymous com-
mentators from the 1270s mention the annulose animals when they discuss 
whether or not the soul is located in some specific part of the body.115 But 
their mention of the annulose animals is simply one more argument in fa-
vor of a negative answer to this question. The same goes for Aquinas. When 
he discusses Aristode's passage on annulose animals in his commentary on 
the De anima, he does little more than accept Aristotle's conclusions that the 
a similar result in other varieties of soul, i.e. in insects which have been cut in two; each of 
the segments possesses both sensation and local movement; and if sensation, necessarily also 
imagination and appetition; for, where there is sensation, there is also pleasure and pain, and, 
where these, necessarily also desire." See also ARISTOTLE, De antma, 1.5, 41 lbl9-22: "It is a 
fact of observation that plants and certain insects go on living when divided into segments; this 
means that each of the segments has a soul in it identical in species, though not numerically; for 
both of the segments for a time possess the power of sensation and local movement." According 
to M. DUNNE, 'Thirteenth- and Fourteenth-Century Commentaries on the De Longitudine et 
Brevitate Vitae', Early Science and Mediane, 8:4 (2003), 320-335, 327, the term 'anulosa' is 
probably taken from Michael Scot's translation of the De anima, which accompanied the Latin 
translation of Averroes's commentary. These animals are also sometimes called entoma (in 
Moerbeke's transliteration), or incisa. 
"
5ANONYMUS VAN STEENBERGHEN, QdA, II.6, 205 , 3"' ,: "Item, plantae decisae vivunt, et in 
qualibet parte decisa invenitur omnis pars animae et nutritiva et generativa et augmentativa; 
hoc autem non esset si essent distinctae loco et subiecto. Item, partes animalium inveniun-
tur vivere, et etiam in partibus animalium decisis inveniuntur diversae partes, quia in ilhs est 
virtus motiva et virtus sensitiva et per consequens virtus appetitiva quae est mdicativa alicuius 
convementis vel nocivi." ANONYMUS GIELE, Q Ì M , II 6,79-805*~65· "Virtutes animae in corpore 
non sunt distinctae loco et subiecto, ut probat Aristoteles de vegetativa, sensitiva et appetitiva 
in animahbus annulosis; virtus autem visiva et auditiva etc. distincta sunt in animali. Tarnen, 
si dictae virtutes accipiantur secundum illud secundum quod maxime operantur, sunt in loco 
et subiecto distinctae, nam Vegetativum in instrumentis hums operatioms, ut hepate etc., ap-
petitiva autem in anteriore parte cerebri." 
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principles of motion, sensation and imagination are not located in any specific 
part of the body, even though many other powers are. '16 
Starting with Brito, however, Aristotle's remarks on annulose animals be-
come increasingly important for the discussions of the soul-body relation in 
general. Instead of being an interesting exception to what normally happens 
when a living being is divided into two parts, the annulose animals become the 
paradigmatic example of the manner in which the soul is present in the body. 
They begin to constitute the general framework within which the presence of 
the soul in more complex animals must be explained. This is especially clear 
in Brito, who devotes three questions of his commentary on the De anima 
(II.6-8) to a discussion of the manner in which the soul is present throughout 
the body. Beginning by answering the question for annulose animals (Utrum 
in partibus animalis anulosi decisis sit anima), he moves on to discuss the pres-
ence of the soul in all animals (Utrum tota anima sit in quahbet parte corporis 
animati), and ends his discussion by taking a closer look at what the presence 
of the soul in the body implies for its being extended or not ( Utrum anime 
brutorum sunt extenseper accidens quantum ad essentiam extenswne corporis). 
A similar division, but without the final question, is found in Jandun. ' I7 
The example that Brito uses to establish his conclusions about the manner 
in which the soul is present in the body is that of cutting an eel (anguilfo) 
in two parts. When we do so, Brito says, both halves continue to exercise 
vital operations, which can only mean that both halves are still ensouled. For 
not only do both parts continue to move, but also, when we prick a part, it 
will retract from us. This shows that both parts still have a sensitive soul. At 
least, that is Brito's final conclusion. But before drawing that conclusion he 
"'Aquinas does make one interesting qualification concerning imagination that is not 
found in Aristotle. THOMAS AQUINAS, SentdeA, IIA, 8490~'00: "Set quod dicit, quod fantasia 
est in parte decisa, videtur esse dubium. Nam a quibusdam fantasie attribuitur determinatum 
Organum in corpore. Set sciendum est quod fantasia invemtur indeterminate in animahbus 
inperfectis, in animahbus vero perfectis determinate, sicut infra in III dicetur, Organum ergo 
ahquod determinatum fantasie attribuitur ad maiorem perfectionem et determinationem sui 
actus, non sine quo fantasie actus nullo modo esse possit sicut actus visus nullo modo potest 
esse sine oculo." The ammalia anulosa are also mentioned in both his disputed questions about 
whether the whole soul is in each part of the body: THOMAS AQUINAS, QdA, q. 10 "Ad quin-
tum decimum dicendum quod ammalia anulosa decisa uiuunt non solum quia anima est in 
quahbet parte corporis, set quia anima eorum, cum sit imperfecta et paucarum actionum, re-
quirit paucam diuersitatem in partibus, que etiam inuemtur in parte decisa uiuente. Vnde, 
cum retineat dispositionem per quam totum corpus est perfectibile ab anima, remanet in ea 
anima Secus autem est in animahbus perfectis." See also THOMAS AQUINAS, QdSptr, a. 4, ad 
19, SS389-39'1: "Ad undevicesimum dicendum quod in ilhs animahbus que decisa vivunt est una 
anima in actu et multe in potentia, per decisionem autem inducuntur in actum multitudims, 
sicut contingit in omnibus formis que habent extensionem in materia." 
"
7 JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, II 6: 'An in partibus dicisis animalis anulosi anima remaneat'; 
JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, II 7· 'An tota anima sit in quahbet parte corporis animati.' 
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considers an alternative explanation. The continued motion of the severed 
part could simply be due to the presence of a remainder of the vital heat and 
spirits, which are unable to escape because of the stickiness of the humors 
(vtscosttas humons). And as long as this vital heat and spirits are present, the 
parts of the eel will continue to exhibit signs of life, without actually being 
alive.118 
Brito discards this solution on two grounds. The first is that vital heat 
and spirits are instrumental agents, not principal agents. And an instrumental 
agent only functions on account of the presence of a principal agent, which 
in this case is the soul. When the soul is no longer present, the vital heat 
and spirits can no longer perform the causal role they performed earlier. The 
situation can be compared to trying to explain the sculpting of a statue by an 
appeal to only the marble and the chisel. Although no one would deny that 
the chisel is instrumental in sculpting the statue, it only functions on account 
of the presence of the principal agent, the sculptor. In the same way, vital heat 
and spirits are merely instruments of the soul.119 
The second, more important ground on which Brito discards the solu­
tion has to do with an important methodological principle.120 Brito reminds 
his readers that the perceptible presence of operations establishes (arguit) the 
presence of the form to which these operations are related. The mere pres­
ence of the vital operations, therefore, is enough to estabUsh the presence of a 
soul. And he has a good point. Although the implications of abandoning this 
principle are not spelled out, it would mean that we can never establish the 
presence of any substantial form with certainty.121 
Whatever its exact mode of presence in the body, the experiment with eels 
at least shows that the soul is present in each part after the eel has been cut 
in two.122 But to avoid any misunderstanding we have to keep the following 
' " R A D U L P H U S BRITO, QdA, II.624 N . 
' " R A D U L P H U S BRITO, QdA, ILO30"35. 
1 2 0 RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, ΙΙ.ό 3 6 - 3 7 
l 2 lNicholas of Autrecourt was one of the very few willing to accept this consequence. 
NICHOLAS OF AUTRECOURT, Second Letter to Bernard of Arezzo, 72: "Ex ista régula sic declarata 
cuicumque habenti intellectum infero quod numquam Anstotehs habuit notitiam evidentem 
de aliqua substantia alia ab anima sua, intelhgendo 'substantiam' quandum rem aliam ab obiec-
tis quinque sensuum et a formalibus expenentus nostns. Et ita est, quia de tali re habuisset 
notitiam ante omnem discursum; quod non est verum, cum non appareant intuitive et etiam 
rustici scirent tales res esse. Nee sciuntur ex discursu, quia ex una re non potest inferri quod 
alia res sit, ut dicit conclusici supraposita. Et si de coniunctis non habuit, multo minus de 
abstractis habuit notitiam evidentem." 
'"There is little chance that Brito actually conducted the experiment. The experimen-
tal examples in medieval texts often have more in common with thought experiments than 
with experiments in our modern sense. For the role of experiments in medieval texts see E. 
GRANT, 'Medieval Natural Philosophy Empiricism without Observation', in. C. LEIJENHORST, 
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three points in mind. (1) The experiment only works if the severed part is not 
too small, and if we make the cut in the right place. For if we make the cut 
along the length of the eel's body, the result will be two lifeless parts. Brito's 
explanation of this is important. For the reason why both parts are dead is that 
in annulose animals (and also plants) the marrow, or spine, or what functions 
as such, corresponds to the heart in more complex animals. If we cut along 
the length of the body, this 'heart' is destroyed and both parts will be dead.123 
(2) Although the severed part of a plant can continue to live for a long time, 
the severed part of annulose animals will often live only briefly. The reason 
for this is that annulose animals are more complex than plants, and therefore 
their soul needs more complex dispositions in matter in order to continue to 
function. (3) The perfect animals require an even more complexly organized 
matter. This is the reason that their soul will not remain present in the severed 
part even for a short time. Instead, once a part is cut off, it no longer lives. 
I discussed Brito's question of the soul of annulose animals in detail, be-
cause his argumentative strategy is important. The annulose animals are taken 
as the paradigmatic example for the soul's presence in the body. An analysis of 
what happens when these these animals are cut in two halves shows that their 
soul must be present throughout the whole body. Then, assuming the same 
presence of the soul in perfect animals, the fact that the severed parts of per-
fect animals display no signs of life, not even for a short period, is explained by 
reference to the more complex material dispositions that need for their vital 
operations. The annulose animals are not the exception, but the rule when it 
comes to the presence of the soul in the body. 
On different types of wholes 
Now that it has been established that the soul is present in each part of the 
body, Brito asks the follow-up question of whether that also implies that the 
whole soul is present in each part of the body. But before discussing that ques-
tion, it is necessary to pause briefly in order to look at the terminology that he 
C LUTHY and J. M. M. H. THIJSSEN (eds.), The Dynamics of Aristotelian Philosophy from An-
tiquity to the Seventeenth Century, Leiden [etc.]· Brill, 2002, 141-168. 
l23The same remark is found in ANONYMUS VENNEBUSCH, QdA.q 27,15563"73· "Huiusmodi 
Organum in unoquoque animali est cor vel simile cordi, quod in animahbus anulosis extendi-
tur secundum longitudinem animalis sub rotunditate extensa existens sub toto; que quidem 
rotunditas manet in quahbet parte decisa. De parte autem anime que fuit in ipsa, fit una anima 
tota in actu propter conformitatem organi, que prius fuit in toto et que manet in parte Et 
propter hoc in alns animahbus non anulosis, in quibus est radicale Organum ut cor sub figura 
rotunda, orbiculan vel piramidali, et hoc in parte determinata corporis ita quod non in quahbet 
divisa a parte in qua manet tale Organum, non manet anima post decisionem. Et secundum 
hoc contingit quod, si anguilla decindatur in transversum, manet anima in partibus; si autem 
dividatur secundum tensionem spine dorsi, partes post decisionem non habent vitam." 
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and other commentators use when they speak about the presence of the soul 
as a whole. Much of it can be traced back to Boethius's influential Liber de 
divisione,124 in which we find a distinction between the following four types of 
division: 
- that of a genus into its species; 
- that of a whole into its proper parts; 
- that of a spoken sound into its proper significations (for those that have more 
than one proper signification); 
- a division secundum acadens.125 
Boethius's discussion of the second type is the most relevant for the later 
debates on the relation between the soul and its powers, because it contains an 
analysis of the various meanings of the term 'whole'. As Boethius shows, there 
are several types of wholes that can be divided into their proper parts, one 
of which is a whole consisting of different powers.126 The soul is introduced 
as the paradigmatic example of this type of whole, which later became called 
a totunt potestative (or also: totum virtuale I totum potentielle).127 It played 
124BOETHIUS, De divisione liber, critical edition, translation, prolegomena and commentary 
by J. Magee, Leiden [etc.]: Bnll, 1998. For Boethius as the source of the terminology, see 
KUNZLE, Das Verhältnis der Seele zu ihren Potenzen, esp. 31-33. 
' "BOETHIUS, De divistone, 6'7 26: "Nunc divisioms ipsius nomen dividendum est et secun-
dum unumquodque dmsioms vocabulum uniuscuiusque propositi propnetas partesque trac-
tandae sunt, dmsio namque multis dicitur modis. Est emm dmsio generis m species, est rursus 
divisto cum totum in proprias distnbuitur partes, est aha cum vox multa significane in signi-
ficationes proprias recipit sectionem. Praeter has autem tres est alia dmsio quae secundum 
accidens fieri dicitur. Hums tnplex modus est: unus cum subiectum in accidentia separamus, 
alius cum accidens in subiecta dmdimus, tertius cum accidens in accidentia secamus (hoc ita 
fit si utraque eidem subiecto messe videantur)." 
'
2 6BOETHIUS, De divisione, 3825"27· "Dicitur quoque totum quod ex quibusdam virtutibus 
constat, ut animae aha potentia est sapiendi, aha sentiendi, aha vegetandi." The other types of 
wholes Boethius mentions are a continuous whole (such as a body), a non-continuous whole 
(such as an army), and a universal whole (such as man). 
127The division of such a whole, says Boethius, has to be distinguished from the division of 
another type of whole, namely that of a genus into its species. BOETHIUS, De divisione, 402<>~'2· 
"Ems quoque totius quod ex virtutibus constat hoc modo facienda est divisto: 'animae alia 
pars est in virgultis, aha in ammalibus' et rursus 'ems quae est in ammahbus alia rationahs, aha 
sensibilis est' et rursus haec alus sub dmsiombus dissipantur Sed non est anima horum genus 
sed totum, partes enim hae animae sunt, sed non ut in quantitate, sed ut in ahqua potestate 
atque virtute, ex his enim potentus substantia animae mngitur. Unde fit ut quiddam simile 
habeat huiusmodi divisio et generis et totius divisioni, nam quod quaehbet eius pars fuent ani-
mae praedicatio earn sequitur, ad generis dmsionem refertur, cuius ubicumque fuent species 
ipsum mox consequitur genus, quod autem non omnis anima omnibus partibus mngitur sed 
aha alus, hoc ad totius naturam referri necesse est." 
250 
FROM ANNULOSE TO PERFECT ANIMALS 
an important role in later discussions about the presence of the soul in the 
body.128 
Boethius's potestative whole is not the only type of whole that is relevant to 
the question of whether the whole soul is present in each and every part of the 
body. Jandun mentions three different ways in which the question of whether 
the whole soul is present in each part of the body is normally understood: 
Ad istam questionem dicitur commumter quod anima est tota triplici 
totalitate, scilicet totalitate essential!, totalitate quantitativa et totalitate 
virtuali seu potestativa. Et secundum hoc respondetur ad questionem 
tria. Primo: quod anima totalitate essential] est in qualibet parte cor-
poris animati. Secundo: quod non est ibi tota totalitate quantitativa. 
Tertio: quod nee totalitate potestativa sive virtuali.129 
It is generally responded to this question that the soul is a whole by 
a threefold totality, namely an essential totality, a quantitative totality 
and a totality according to its powers. And accordingly, three answers 
will be given to the question. First: that the soul is in whichever part 
of the animated body by an an essential totality. Second: that it is not 
there by a quantitative totality. Third: neither by a totality according to 
its powers. 
So the question of whether the soul as a whole is present in each part of the 
body can be understood in three ways, one of which is Boethius's potestative 
whole. We can either interpret the expression 'the whole soul' as a quantita-
tive whole, or as an essential whole, or as a whole consisting of powers. This 
threefold meaning of totahty is found in many of the earlier commentators, 
such as Thomas Aquinas, Radulphus Brito, and Anonymus Bazân.130 It is 
'
28See, for example, PARK, 'Albert's Influence', 506-507, who shows that this type of whole 
is taken over by Albert the Great. 
, 29JOHN OF JANDUN, Q Î M , II.7, 97. 
""See, for example THOMAS AQUINAS, Q Î M , q. 10, 91 , 8 9 - 2 0 , : "Potest autem attribuì totahtas 
ahcui forme triphciter, secundum quod tnbus modis conuenit ahquid habere partes. Vno enim 
modo aiiquid habet partes secundum dmisionem quantitatis... Alio modo dicitur ahquid to-
tum per comparationem ad partes essentiales speciei . Tertio modo dicitur ahquid totum per 
comparationem ad partes virtutis seu potestatis"; compare also THOMAS AQUINAS, QdSpir, 
a. 4, 522"-532 3 4; ANONYMUS BAZAN, QdA, 1.1, 39052"60: "Ad tertium: de ilio non est scientia 
quod non habet partes, propnetates et passiones, concedo. Sed cum dicitur: anima non habet 
huiusmodi partes, propnetates et passiones, ego nego. Et tu probas quia anima est indivisi-
bihs. Verum est secundum partes essentiales et integrales, tarnen anima est dmsibüis in multas 
partes potentiales, utpote in intellectivam, sensitivam et vegetativam." — but notice the use of 
the expression integral parts instead of quantitative parts. For Bnto, see q. II.7. The debates 
on the divisibility of the soul in the sixteenth and seventeenth century continue to use this 
framework of three types of divisibility. See DES CHENE, Life's Form, 173-189. 
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also found in Albert the Great, who may have been the first to use it in this 
context.131 
Whether the whole soul is present in each part of the body 
The first option that the soul is in the whole body and each of its parts ac-
cording to a quantitative totality seems to have been a non starter, for being 
present in something according to a quantitative totality normally means be-
ing present as, for example, a volume of water is present in a barrel. The water 
is present in the barrel according to a quantitative totaUty, if and only if all of 
the water is contained in the barrel. In the case of the soul we are speaking 
about the quantitative presence of a substantial form. This means that the sit-
uation is altogether different, since a form, strictly speaking, has no quantity. 
But we might still say that the soul is quantitatively present in the body in a 
manner that is analogous to how we can say that whiteness is quantitatively 
present in a white surface. That is, in each quantitative part of the extended 
white substance, the form of whiteness is clearly present. Likewise, we could 
say that the soul is present in each quantitative part of the body, since each of 
these parts is alive. 
But even when we are allowed to speak of the 'quantitative' parts of the 
soul by reference to the quantitative parts of the body, it is immediately ob-
vious that these 'quantitative' parts of the soul must be different from each 
other. The part of the soul that is in my left hand, is clearly different from 
the part in my right hand. And if that is so, then the soul is not present as a 
quantitative whole in each and every part. So any interpretation of the term 
'whole' in the quantitative sense is clearly impossible in this context. Even if 
we allow that the soul has 'quantity' in a derivative sense, if it is quantitatively 
totally present in one part, then there is nothing left to be present in any other 
part. Not even things that have extension, such as the water used in the ex-
ample above, can be quantatively present as a whole in each and every part of 
something. For even supposing, for simplicity's sake, that the barrel has just 
two parts, the bottom half and the top half, once the total volume of water 
is present in the bottom half of the barrel, there is obviously nothing left to 
131
 ALBERT THE GREAT, De anima, edited by C. Stroick, Münster: Aschendorff, 1968 (Opera 
omnia, 7:1 ), II. 1, cap. 11, 79eo-807: "Oportet autem scire, quod partes eius quod est spirituale, 
et eius quod est corporale, differunt, quoniam partes corporeae rei componunt aut suam essen-
tiam aut suam quantitatem. Et si componunt suam essentiam, tunc sicut materia et forma aut 
sicut mixta in eo quod mixtum vocamus. Si autem componunt suam quantitatem, tunc sunt 
tertiae vel mediae vel quartae, et sic de aliis quantitativis partibus. Et has vocare consuevimus 
integrales, primas autem essentiales. In spiritualibus autem dicimus, quoniam ipsa spiritu-
alia potentiae quaedam sunt et habent suas partes naturales potestates, ex quibus constituitur 
quoddam universum suae potestatis, sicut apparet in urbanitatibus." 
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fill the top half of the barrel. In short, taking the total presence in each and 
every part in the quantitative sense, neither the soul nor anything else for that 
matter is present in this way. 
The essential presence of the soul in each part of the body seems more 
to the point. But the manner in which an essential presence is argued for by 
Brito makes it clear that in this sense the answer to the question of whether 
or not the soul is wholly present in each part is obvious. The examples that 
are invoked make it clear that the essential presence of the whole form in each 
part of a substance means little more than that each part ofthat substance is a 
part ofthat substance. Take for instance Brito's argument that we can observe 
signs of life in each part of a living being. From this observation, he immedi­
ately concludes that the soul is essentially present in all parts: since the soul is 
one single essence (i.e. without parts in the relevant sense), if it is present, it 
must be present according to its total essence.132 We can find a similar argu­
ment in Aquinas, who says that there can be no doubt that the soul is present 
wholly in each part of the body.133 Nor is this a unique property of the soul; 
on the contrary, the claim that it is present in each part of the substance it 
informs according to its whole essence holds true of every substantial form. ' 3 4 
Even Jandun agrees with Brito and Thomas on this point; the statement that 
the form is present in each part according to its total essence is true of every 
material substance.135 Nevertheless, Jandun also argues that strictly speaking 
we should deny that the soul is present as an essential whole, since in the strict 
sense the term 'whole' applies only to what has parts.136 But this is mostly 
I 3 2 RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, ILy5 8 - 6 3. 
l 3 3This is discussed, for example in THOMAS AQUINAS, STft, Γ, q. 76, a. 8: "Sed quia anima 
unitur corpori ut forma, necesse est quod sit in toto et in qualibet parte corporis. Non enim 
est forma corporis accidentalis, sed substantialis. Substantialis autem forma non solum est 
perfectio totius, sed cuiuslibet partis." And later in the same question: "Sed totalitas secunda, 
quae attenditur secundum rationis et essentiae perfectionis, proprie et per se convenit formis." 
(p. 232). 
'
M The general principle that each substantial form is wholly in each part of the substance 
it informs can be found in THOMAS AQUINAS, SCG, II, 72: 'Quod anima sit tota in corpore et 
tota in qualibet parte', 457: "De hac igitur totalitate loquendo <i.e. secundum essentiae per-
fectionem SdB>, quae per se formis competit, in qualibet forma apparet quod est tota in toto 
et tota in qualibet parte eius." For a discussion of this passage, see PASNAU, Thomas Aquinas, 
93-94. 
I 3 5 JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, II.7, 97: "Modo essentia animae est in qualibet parte corporis 
animatum, sicut essentia cuiuslibet formae materialis est in qualibet parte corporis matenae." 
1 3 6 JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, 11.7, 97: "Ergo relinquitur primum, scilicet quod essentia ani­
mae tota totalitate essentiali est in qualibet parte corporis. Sed antequam procedam ulterius, 
mihi videtur, salva reverentia sic dicentium, quod illud non est omnino verum. Quod illud 
quod non habet partes essentiales non est totum totalitate essentiali, haec est manifesta cuilibet 
intelligenti... Si quis autem vellet salvare illud commune dictum quod tota anima totalitate 
essentiali etc., forte posset dicere quod illud intelligitur quasi privative non positive. Et est sen-
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a semantic disagreement. In all other respects he remains close to the tradi-
tional answer: in terms of essence, if the soul is present in a part, it must be 
completely present in that part. 
The only alternative that could be controversial turns out to be the total 
presence of the soul in each part of the body according to its powers (totalitate 
virtuali seu potestativa). If the soul is not present in each part of the body in 
this manner, it simply means that the various powers are spatially distributed 
throughout the body, in the sense that the power of vision is present in only 
one place, and that of hearing in another. If, on the other hand, the soul 
is present in each part in a potestative manner, then all of the soul's powers 
will somehow be present in each part, even if most of these are obviously not 
exercised in each part. This second alternative is certainly the most intriguing. 
It is also the one that is the most relevant for the thought experiment of the 
eye in the foot. But at the same time, it is also the most difficult to understand. 
Even more difficult than determining the exact meaning of such a totality — 
for what can it mean to say that a power is present while at the same time it 
cannot ever be exercised in the normal course of nature? — is understanding 
how the question of whether or not the soul is present in each part in this 
manner could ever be conclusively answered. 
Assuming that the proposition that the soul is present in each part of the 
body according to all its powers is meaningful, and that the answer is not 
evident, by what method can we determine whether the proposition is true 
or not? There is no natural philosophical observation that could settle the 
question. Whether or not the soul is present according to all its powers, the 
observable phenomena will be identical. This is why the thought experiment 
of the eye in the foot is such a powerful tool in the discussion. 
With the later fourteenth-century approach to the question in mind, 
Brito's answer may come as a surprise. He thinks that the option of the 
potestative presence of the soul merits little discussion, because it is easy 
to see that the soul is not present in this way. It certainly does not need a 
thought experiment to be discussed. 
Secundo dico quod anima tota totalitate potestativa non est tota in qua-
libet parte corporis. Et intelligo per totalitem potestativam animam to-
tani cum eius potentiis. Modo ilio modo non est tota in qualibet parte 
corporis. Cuius ratio est quia: si anima tota esset in qualibet parte cor-
poris isto modo, tunc secundum quamlibet partem corporis posset op-
erar! omnes suas operationes, sicut videre, audire, odorare, et sic de 
aliis; sed hoc est falsum, quia secundum partem determinatam aliam et 
sus quod essentia animae non est in una parte corporis sine alia parte essentiae. Hoc est verum 
propter hoc quod anima huiusmodi partes non habet, sed improprie diceretur. " 
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aliam exercet operationem, quia secundum oculum videt et per aurem 
audit et sic de aliis; quare etc. Maior patet, quia ubicumque est prin-
cipium operationum ibi possunt esse operationes; ergo si in qualibet 
parte corporis esset tota anima quantum ad eius omnes potentias, que 
sunt operationis principium, tunc secundum quamlibet partem anima 
posset operari, quod est inconveniens; quare etc.1 3 7 
Second, I say that the whole soul, taken as a potestative whole, is not 
wholly in whichever part of the body. And I understand by 'potestative 
whole' the whole soul with all its powers. Now, in this way it is not 
wholly in whichever part of the body. The reason for this is the follow­
ing: if the whole soul were in whichever part of the body in this way, 
then it could exercise all its operations with each part of the body, such 
seeing, hearing, smelling, an so forth. But this is false, because it exer­
cises different powers with determinate parts, since it sees with the eye 
and hears with the ear and so forth. Hence etc. The major premise is 
clear, because in whichever place there is a principle of operations the 
operations can be present; therefore, if the whole soul were in whichever 
part of the body according to all its powers, which are the principles of 
operation, then the soul could operate with whichever part <of the body 
SdB>, which is unfitting. Hence etc. 
For Brito, the answer is simple, and the question can be settled empiri­
cally. Saying that a power is present amounts to saying that the operations 
corresponding to that power can be exercised. Saying, therefore, that the soul 
is present according to all its powers in each part of the body, is saying that all 
its powers can be exercised in each part of the body, which is clearly not true. 
A similar response is given by Aquinas.138 Given that Brito has estabhshed 
'"RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, ΙΙ.?4 6 - 5 7. 
'''interestingly, Aquinas included the thought experiment of the eye in the foot among his 
many arguments. THOMAS AQUINAS, QdSpir, a. 4, 5082"89: "Preterea. Si in quacumque parte 
corporis est operatic anime, ibi est ipsa anima; pari ratione in quacumque parte corporis est 
operatic visive potentie, ibi est visiva potentia. Set operatic visive potentie esset in pede, si ibi 
esset Organum visive potentie; unde quod desit operatic visiva erit propter defectum organi 
tantum. Erit igitur ibi potentia visiva, si ibi sit anima." The argument is countered with just 
a brief reply. If there were an eye in the foot, then the visual power would also be there, since 
the visual power is precisely the act of such an organ. But if we take away the organ, the soul 
remains, but not the visual power. THOMAS AQUINAS, QdSpir, a. 4, 54334"338: "Ad undecimum 
dicendum quod, si esset oculus in pede, esset ibi potentia visiva, quia hec potentia est actus 
talis organi animati; remoto autem organo, remanet ibi anima, non tarnen potentia visiva." 
Although the example of vision in relation to the foot is not found in the parallel question 
in the disputed questions on the soul, the text does contain a closely related argument (also 
found in De spiritualibus creaturis as argument three): THOMAS AQUINAS, QÌM, q. 10, 8996"'0': 
"Preterea. Omnes potentie anime radicantur in essentia anime. Si igitur essentia anime sit 
in qualibet parte corporis, oportet quod quelibet potentia anime sit in qualibet parte corporis; 
quod patet esse falsum, nam auditus non est in oculo set in aure tantum, et sic de aliis." Aquinas 
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that the powers are distinct from the soul, what reason could there ever be for 
him to accept that all powers are present everywhere in the body? 
Actually there could be one reason. When arguing for the distinction be-
tween the soul and its powers, Brito, and many others had claimed that the 
powers flow forth from the essence of the soul. That is to say, whenever the 
soul is present, so will its powers be. But since the soul is present according to 
its entire essence in every part of the body, as Brito has just proven, it would 
seem that all the powers must necessarily flow forth from it into every part.139 
In his reply to this argument, Brito gives a few more details on how ihisfluxus 
works. The powers do not flow forth from the soul immediately, but mediated 
by the various organs. Only when a properly disposed organ is present will the 
power that is exercised through that organ flow forth from the soul. The es-
sential presence of the whole soul in each and every part does not, therefore, 
lead to the actual presence of all of the soul's powers in each and every part, 
on the assumption that the powers are distinct from the soul. This is why all 
commentators up until Brito insist, when they ask whether the soul is iden-
tical to its powers, that the relevant sense of 'power' is that of the immediate 
principle of operations. Recall Anonymus Van Steenberghen's definition of 
power (see p. 222), where this aspect was emphasized. 
The only philosopher who entertains some doubt as to whether the answer 
to the question of the presence of the soul in the body as a potestative whole 
really is that obvious is Jandun. He was already critical when it came to the 
soul's presence as an essential whole, pointing out that the term 'whole' is used 
improperly when we apply it to something that has no parts in the relevant 
sense. But he is even more critical when discussing the soul's presence as a 
potestative whole. The opinion that the soul is also present in each part of 
the body as a potestative whole only looks false and absurd on first sight, he 
says, because the alternative is so famous that we have become accustomed to 
it. And that to which we have become accustomed, we deem to be the best 
thing to say. So if that is what someone wants (si pfocet), it may be said (as is 
the common opinion) that the soul is not present throughout the body as a 
potestative whole. Jandun, however, does not commit himself fully to the one 
gives the following reply: "Ad tertium decimum dicendum quod licet omnes potentie anime 
radicentur in essentia anime, tarnen quelibet pars corporis recipit animam secundum suum 
modum; et ideo in diuersis partibus est secundum diuersas potentias, neque oportet quod in 
una secundum omnes." (pp. 93365-94370) Again, the reply can be so brief, because for Aquinas, 
the existence of a power implies the existence of the subject of that power, that is to say, of the 
organ in which the power is exercised There can be no question of the existence of a power in 
the absence of its subject. 
'
3,This is one of the arguments that Bnto introduced to argue against the soul's presence as 
an (essential) whole in each and every part. 
256 
IS THE SOUL EXTENDED OR NOT? 
answer or the other. 
5.4.2 Is the soul extended or not? 
The final part of Brito's discussion of the manner in which the soul is present 
in the body is carried out in a question entitled 'whether the souls of brute an-
imals are extended per acadens according to their essence by the extension of 
the body.' The per acadens qualification is clearly important here. Substantial 
forms, as such, are neither extended nor unextended, since they are princi-
ples and not things in their own right.141 But even with the qualification per 
acadens it remains a strange question to ask. The notion of a per accidens ex-
tension came up in the discussion of whether the soul is present in each part 
of the body as a quantitative whole. In that context, it was only invoked to 
establish the meaning of quantitative when the predicate is applied to some-
thing that has no extension on its own. No commentator took the option that 
the soul was present as a quantitative whole in each part of the body seriously, 
and righdy so. So why devote a separate question to the possible extension per 
acadens of the animal soul? 
In order to understand why Brito includes this question in his commen-
tary, and the answer he gives to it, we must return to Aquinas. Not, however, 
to his commentary on the De anima, but to either his Quaesttones dtsputatae 
de anima or his Quaesttones de spintuahbus creatuns, both of which discuss 
the same question: "whether the whole soul is in whichever part of the body", 
and both of which give the same answer.142 Here I will use the latter text, 
since it contains the most elaborate set of arguments. In it, Aquinas discusses 
twentyO) objections against the affirmative answer. And what is most impor-
tant here, is that, in the course of this discussion, he makes it clear what being 
extended in a body means when applied to the soul. 
Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod <triplex SdB> totahtas 
mvenitur. Prima quidem et manifestior secundum quantitatem, prout 
H 0JOHN OF JANDUN, QdA, II.7, 99: "Huic autem opinioni <i e. quod anima est tota in qua-
hbet parte corpons totahtate potestativa S<ifl> non video ahquid inconvemens sequi nisi quod 
non est famosa et consueta. Et ideo primo aspectu videtur falsa et absurda, quae enim consue-
vimus dignamur dici secundo Metaphysicae. Et propter hoc si placet dicatur alio modo quod 
non omnes virtutes ammae sunt in qualibet parte corporis animati, sed diversae virtutes ah-
quae sunt in diversis partibus corporis, ut visus et auditus et huiusmodi. Et sic non tota anima 
totahtate potential!, vel potestativa, ent in qualibet parte animalis sive corporis animati " 
1411 think that this is also what Pasnau is pointing to when he discusses Aquinas's critique of 
those who consider the soul to be some sort of body: "What soul is, in fact, is the actuality of a 
living body, and to be an actuality is to be incorporeal." PASNAU, Thomas Aquinas, 29 
' ^THOMAS AQUINAS, QdA, q. 10· 'Utrum anima sit in toto corpore et qualibet parte ems', 
THOMAS AQUINAS, QdSptr, a. 4· 'Utrum tota anima sit in qualibet parte corporis'. 
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totum quantum dicitur quod natum est dividi in partes quantitatis: et 
hec totahtas non potest attribuì formis nisi per accidens, in quantum 
scilicet per accidens dividuntur divisione quantitatis, sicut albedo divi-
sione superficiel. Set hoc est illarum tantum formarum que coexten-
duntur quantitati, quod ex hoc competit ahquibus formis, quia habent 
matenam similem aut fere similem et in toto et in parte. Unde forme 
que requirunt magnam dissimilitudinem in partibus non habent huius-
modi extensionem et totalitatem siculi anime, precipue animalium per-
fectorum.143 
In order to make this evident <namely that the soul is wholly in the 
whole body and wholly in each of its parts>, we should consider that 
we find a threefold totality. The first and more noticeable totality is ac-
cording to quantity, as we call a quantitative whole that which is suited 
to be divided into quantitative parts. And this totality cannot be at-
tributed to forms, except per accidens, namely in so much as they are 
divided per accidens by the division of a quantity, just as whiteness is di-
vided by the division of the surface. But this belongs only to those forms 
that are coextensive with quantity, something that is applicable to some 
forms because they have matter that is similar, or almost similar, in the 
whole <substance> and in a part of it. Whence the forms that require 
greatly dissimilar parts, do not have such extension and totality in this 
manner, such as souls, especially that of perfect animals. 
The first, and most important thing is that strictly speaking (per sé) no 
form is a quantitative whole, because no form can be divided on its own into 
quantitative parts. Only material things can be divided in this way. There is an 
extended sense, however, in which we might say that a form is a quantitative 
whole, namely, when it can be divided per accidens through the division of the 
subject it inheres in. It is in this same way that we say that the whiteness of a 
surface is divided per accidens when the surface it inheres in is divided.144 But, 
secondly, the passage makes it clear that according to Aquinas there is not one 
but two criteria that need to be met before we can call a form extended even 
per accidens. ( 1 ) The subject it inheres in must be material, that is, must have 
'"THOMAS AQUINAS, QdSpir, a. 4,522l3-5i227. Aqumas's answer became controversial even 
among later Thomists. For the sixteenth-century debates on the question of whether or not the 
souls of perfect animals are extended, see DES CHENE, Life's Form, 171-189. 
'"The qualification per accidens as it is applied to the division of the whiteness does not 
mean that the original whiteness is still essentially one whiteness, even though accidentally 
there are now two whitenesses. There really are two new whitenesses after the division. In-
stead, the qualification is introduced to point out that the division of the original whiteness 
was indirect It is the (white) surface that is divided per se. That the whiteness is also divided 
is a consequence of this per se division. Hence the qualification per accidens only indicates that 
the whiteness has been divided on account of something else (that has quantity) having been 
divided. 
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extension. But also (2) the different quantitative parts ofthat subject must be 
similar (or next to similar) to each other, so that after the division, we end up 
with two things, both of which are similar in all respects but their quantity to 
the original thing. 
To stick with the example of a white surface, imagine a white sheet of 
paper being cut in half. The resulting parts will be very similar, both to each 
other and to the original sheet of paper. In fact, there is only one difference 
between the parts and the original sheet, and that is that the parts are only half 
the size of the original. Only when both criteria are met, are we allowed to say 
that a form has been divided per accidens. In all other cases, the form has not 
been divided per accidens, but destroyed per accidens. In other words, instead 
of there now being two forms whereas there used to be one, there is now no 
longer a form whereas there used to be one. Imagine doing the same with an 
animal as with the sheet of paper. Clearly the result will be different. Instead 
of ending up with, let us us say, two cats, identical in all respects but size to 
the original cat, we now have two parts of a dead cat. There was no division of 
the substantial form (or soul) per accidens, since the form is no longer present. 
The conclusion can only be that the cat's soul was destroyed per accidens. 
This gives a reasonably clear criterion when it comes to answering the 
question of whether the soul is extended per accidens through the body. We 
can answer the question in the affirmative, when, after we sever a part from 
a living being, both what is left of the original substance and the severed part 
continue to Uve.145 The criterion can only be specified in terms of the pres-
ence of vital operations, because only these indicate the presence of the cor-
responding vital powers. This explains why Aquinas qualifies his example of 
soul by saying 'especially that of perfect animals'. The forms of plants and 
annulose animals, by contrast, require only slightly dissimilar material parts 
as compared to perfect animals, which is precisely what makes them the ex-
145Compare THOMAS AQUINAS, QdSpir, a 4, ad 9, 54322 329· "Unde in ammahbus in quibus 
figura partis fere est conformis figure totius, pars recipit animam ut quoddam totum· quare de-
cisa vivit In ammahbus tarnen perfectis, in quibus figura partis multum differt a figura totius, 
pars non recipit animam sicut totum et pnmum perfectibile, ut decisa vivat; recipit tarnen an-
imam in ordine ad totum, ut coniuncta vivat." Compare also THOMAS AQUINAS, SCG, II, 72, 
457: Quod anima sit tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte. "Totum autem et pars secundum 
quantitatem dicta formis non conveniunt nisi per accidens, scilicet inquantum dividuntur di-
visione subiecti quantitatem habentis. Totum autem vel pars secundum perfectionem essentiae 
invemtur in formis per se De hac igitur totalitate loquendo, quae per se formis competit, in 
qualibet forma apparet quod est tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte eius: nam albedo, sicut se-
cundum totam rationem albedmis est in toto corpore, ita et in qualibet parte eius. Secus autem 
est de totalitate quae per accidens attnbuitur formis: sic emm non possumus dicere quod tota 
albedo sit in qualibet parte. Si igitur est ahqua forma quae non dmdatur divisione subiecti, 
sicut sunt ammae animahum perfectorum, non ent opus distinctione, cum eis non competa! 
nisi una totalitas: sed absolute dicendum est earn totam esse in qualibet parte corporis " 
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ception. As it turns out, the question of whether the soul is extended per 
acctdens throughout the body is for Aquinas exactly the same question as that 
of whether the soul is present in each part of the body according to all its pow-
ers! l46 Notice that Aquinas's criterion is applicable to all souls including the 
human intellective soul. This will be important in the discussion of the later 
tradition. 
Ambiguous criteria 
With Aquinas's criterion in mind, we are ready to return to Brito's discus-
sion of the extension of the animal soul. His discussion reflects an important 
shift which remains present in the whole fourteenth century. The shift is lo-
cated in the criteria Brito uses to answer the question. Instead of appealing to 
Aquinas's criterion of the presence of vital operations after division to settle 
the question for all souls including human soul, Brito begins to use different 
criteria for different souls. In addition to appealing to the presence of vital 
operations, he introduces a second unrelated criterion, which is that of being 
educed from the potency of matter. In his discussion, Brito distinguishes be-
tween three types of soul. I will follow Brito in first turning to the human soul, 
then to that of the annulose animals, and lastly to that of perfect animals. 
In the opening lines of his reply, Brito denies the extension, even per ac-
cidens, of the intellective soul with the following argument: if a form is not 
educed from the potency of matter, as is the case with the intellective soul, 
it cannot be extended, even per accidens, by the extension of the subject to 
which it belongs.147 There is no need to appeal to the criterion of the presence 
' ^ T H O M A S AQUINAS, QdSpir, a 4, 53234-2'''1· "Si igitur loqueremur de aliqua forma habente 
extensionem in matena, puta de albedine, possemus dicere quod est tota in quahbet parte 
totalitate essentie et virtutis, non autem totahtate prima, que est ei per accidens, sicut tota ratio 
speciei albedims invemtur in quahbet parte superficiel, non autem tota quantitas quam habet 
per accidens, set pars in parte Anima autem, et precipue humana, non habet extensionem in 
materia; unde in ea prima totalitas locum non habet " Notice again the qualification Aquinas 
makes especially the human soul. As we descend in the hierarchy of living beings, the question 
of whether the soul is present in each part according to all its powers becomes more difficult to 
answer, since the material parts of the living being become increasingly similar to each other. 
At which point exactly all powers are present in each part is a difficult question to answer 
Is it already the case in the annulose animals, even if they only live for a short time after the 
division? And even if both parts only continue to live when we do not make the cut along the 
length of the body? Or is it only in plants, the parts of which can live for a long time after the 
division' Although even there, the cut can only be made in some places. Cutting offa leaf and 
expecting it to develop into a whole plant again is bound to end in disappointment. 
' ^ O . PLUTA, 'HOW Matter Becomes Mind· Late-Medieval Theories of Emergence', in: H. 
LAGERLUND (ed.), Forming the Mind Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem 
from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment, Dordrecht: Springer, 2007, 149-167, 154, bnefly 
discusses the origin of the expression 'educta de potentia matenae'. The expression can be 
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of vital operations. Not being educed from the potency of matter immediately 
implies that quantitative predicates can never be applied. This limits the dis-
cussion to those souls that are educed from the potency of matter, that is, to 
every non-human soul. 
For the souls of the annulose animals (and plants), the question is settled 
in the same way as it was settled by Aquinas. From the fact that both halves 
of these animals continue to exercise their vital operations, at least for some 
time, we may conclude that their soul is extended per acadens according to 
the extension of the body.148 
Having settled the issue for human souls and for the souls of the annulose 
animals, Brito now turns to the souls of perfect animals. And here he seems 
to hesitate. Although he argues, pace Aquinas, that they are extended per aca-
dens, he also suggests that they are not extended in the same way as the souls 
of the annulose animals are.149 For in the annulose animals the soul's pow-
ers are also extended through the body, whereas in the case of perfect animals 
traced back to the psychological writings of Siger of Brabant, and the underlying theory (but 
not the precise formulation) at least to Albert the Great. M. J. F. M. HOENEN, 'Die Intellek-
dehre des Johannes Buridan - Ihre Quellen und historisch-doktrinären Bezüge', 'Acts of the 
Second Symposium Organized by the Dutch Society for Medieval Philosophy Medium Aevum 
on the Occasion of its 15th Anniversary Leiden-Amsterdam (Vrije Universiteit), 20-21 June, 
1991, in: E. P. Bos and H. A. KROP (eds.), John Burtdan A Master of Arts Some Aspects of 
hts Philosophy, Nijmegen. Ingenium, 1993, 89-106, 90-95, had reached the same conclusions. 
Bnto gives an explanation of being educed from the potency of matter in the third book of 
his commentary RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, IILS85""90: "Est autem intelhgendum quod educi de 
potentia matenae loquendo naturahter est, quando materia, quae erat de se in pura potentia 
ad formam, est educta de ilia potentia ab agente naturali ad lUam formam ita quod illa forma 
in suo esse et fieri dependet ex materia et ab agente naturali per transmutationem et motum 
in materia introducatur. Ex hoc patet quod formae eductae de potentiae matenae sunt cor-
ruptibiles." Interestingly, almost none of the later commentators bother to discuss what being 
educed from the potency of matter means exactly. One of the few places where at least one 
of the connotations of the expression is made explicit is the following, in which the human 
intellect is discussed; NICOLE ORESME, QdA, III.4, ad 4, 34073~75: "Bene tarnen sequitur quod 
non est matenalis, id est educta, quia tunc una pars esset educta de una parte matenae et aha 
de alia." 
148Augustine also discussed the division of annulose animals in his De quantttate ammae 
(xxx, 61-xxxii, 68) and uses the presence of all powers in both parts as an argument to prove 
in what way the animal's soul is present in its whole body. There is an important difference in 
emphasis though. Whereas Bnto uses the example to argue for the per acadens extension of 
the soul, Augustine uses it to argue for the per se lack of quantity of the soul. 
149RADULPHUS BRITO, QdlA, II.855~59. "Set notandum quod non eodem modo iste forme 
<i.e. brutorum perfectorum SdB> sunt extense per accidens sicut anime animahum anuloso-
rum, quia essentia illius est extensa per accidens et secundum essentiam et secundum virtutes 
saltern in aliquibus. Et in alus animalibus anulosis ahque virtutes sunt extense, sicut virtus mo-
tiva in anguillis et consimilibus animalibus. Sed in istis, licet essentia per accidens sit extensa 
per totum, tarnen quehbet eius virtus non est extensa per totum, quia non in qualibet parte 
asinus vel equus videt vel audit " 
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the powers are not extended through the body, but located in specific places. 
Touch, as Brito himself notices, is the exception here. 
Given his approach to the question, it is not surprising that Brito hesitates 
when it comes to the souls of perfect animals. Contrary to Aquinas, Brito no 
longer has a clear criterion on which to decide the issue. The limit cases were 
decided by an appeal to two different principles: ( 1 ) not being educed from 
matter implies not being extended and (2) when both parts of a plant or an 
animal continue to live after division, this implies that the soul is extended. 
Because of these two different principles, Brito has created a problem he can-
not solve. Taking principle (1), he is inclined to argue that since the souls of 
perfect animals are educed from matter, they are also extended.150 But taking 
principle (2) he should argue that since perfect animals cannot survive divi-
sion, their soul is not extended. His solution that the souls of perfect animals 
are extended, albeit in a different way than those of annulose animals, is the 
ambiguous result of ambiguous criteria.151 
Because Brito is unclear on his criteria, it also becomes unclear what he 
thought was at stake in this question. What is clear, however, is the result: 
a distinction between the manner in which the human soul is present in the 
body and the manner in which all other souls are present in their bodies. The 
human soul is not educed from the potency of matter and hence has a com-
pletely different manner of inhering in the body than all souls that are educed 
from the potency of matter. The difference is not simply that the human soul 
will survive the death of the body, although, as all commentators admitted, it 
will. Rather, it is that the presence of the soul in the human and in the animal 
body are fundamentally different, the one being extended per acadens, and the 
other not being extended even per acadens. The connection that Brito makes 
in this question between the concepts of being, or not being, educed from 
the potency of matter and being, or not being, extended will play a large and 
important role in the subsequent debates on the soul's presence in the body. 
5.4.3 The discussion of the soul's presence after Ockham 
There is again a difference between the manner in which the question is han-
dled by the philosophers prior to Ockham, and those after Ockham, which 
can be explained as follows. The question of whether the whole soul, taken 
l50Granted, logically speaking the inference is invalid. From the proposition 'forms that are 
not educed from matter are not extended' the proposition 'forms that are educed from matter 
are extended' cannot be inferred. But as will become clear later in this chapter, fourteenth-
century commentators accept both these principles almost as axioms. 
151
 Brito gives no further account of the difference between the different modes of inherence 
of the souls of annulose animals and those of perfect animals. 
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as a potestative whole, is present in whichever part of the body is closely re­
lated to the question of whether the soul is distinct from its powers. When the 
powers are distinct from the soul, it becomes possible to say that the soul is 
essentially present everywhere in the body, even though its powers are located 
in specific parts. But when a distinction between soul and powers is denied, 
this becomes much more difficult. This is why the distinction between proxi­
mate and remote powers began to play such an important role. The proximate 
powers, at least, are located in specific parts of the body. But the distinction 
also opened up the possibility of asking whether or not the remote, or princi­
pal, powers are present in each and every part of the body. And the meaning 
of that question is now clear: it amounts to asking whether the soul is a ho­
mogeneous or heterogeneous form. Although all of this makes sense from the 
fourteenth-century perspective, it is difficult even to translate the question to 
the thirteenth-century perspective. 
Buridan, Oresme, and the Anonymus Fatar all argue for the same position 
as Brito when it comes to the extension of the plant and animal souls. That is 
to say, they all argue that the vegetative as well as sensitive souls are extended 
according to the extension of the body.152 Jack Zupko has aptly called this 
the 'extensionality principle'. As he puts it: "According to the extentionality 
principle, when an animating principle has been derived from an extended 
subject, it must inhere commensurably in that subject."153 An important part 
of this definition is the connection between the soul's extension and its being 
educed from the potency of matter. But it is even more important to note that 
what began as an incidental comment in Aquinas, namely that some forms, 
including the souls of the annulose animals can be called extended per acci-
dens, is now, rightly I think, considered by Zupko to be one of the four most 
important principles of the soul-body relation in Buridan.154 As will be illus­
trated below, the principle is equally important in Oresme and the Anonymus 
Fatar. In fact, it has become so important that no one bothers to use the qual-
1 5 2 N I C O L E ORESME, QdA, II.3, Π ? ' " 4 : "Quarto, supponendum est quod anima sensitiva 
est extensa Habens partes quantitativas secundum extensionem subiecti in brutis... Et eodem 
modo de vegetativa."; JOHN BURIDAN, QdA, II.7, 89: "Aristoteles autem contra hoc ponit duas 
contradictiones quas etiam ponimus. Prima est quod anima vegetativa et anima sensitiva in 
equo non sunt distincte secundum diversas partes corporis, sed per totum corpus animalis ex­
tensa est vegetativa et sensitiva et appetitiva." The same position is also defended by MARSILIUS 
OF INGHEN, Questiones Sententiarum, II, q. I I , ƒ 248v b: "Secundo est notandum quod omnes 
anime brutorum et plantarum sunt extense extensione corporis." 
I 5 3 Z U P K O , John Bundan, 165. 
1 5 4The other three principles Zupko mentions are the 'subject identity principle' (every liv­
ing being has but one soul), the 'definitional distinction principle' (the terms 'vegetative soul', 
'sensitive soul' and 'intellective soul' are not synonymous), and the 'homogeneity principle' 
(each part of the soul is of the same nature). See ZUPKO, John Buridan-, 165-175. 
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ification per acadens any more when discussing the soul's extension. Again, 
recall that although Brito also adheres to this extensionality principle, Aquinas 
does not.155 And in Brito, it is nowhere near as important as is it in the later 
fourteenth-century commentators. 
Adherence to this principle of extensionality is still compatible with a vari-
ety of philosophical positions. Not only is it compatible with both the unicity 
and the plurality of substantial forms and even of souls, but it also leaves the 
manner in which the soul is present in each of the bodily parts in terms of its 
powers undetermined. I will not specify this principle further at this point, 
so that it can serve as a common ground for comparing Buridan, Oresme, 
and the Anonymus Fatar.156 Since all three philosophers agree that there is 
no distinction between the vegetative and sensitive soul, the complete animal 
soul must be extended according to the extension of the body, and hence be 
present in the whole body and each of its parts. The final question that needs 
to be answered now is 'how is the soul present?' Is it present wholly in each 
part or not, and if it is, in what sense is it wholly present in these parts? The 
distinction used by the thirteenth and early fourteenth-century philosophers 
between a presence in a quantitative manner, an essential manner, and ac-
cording to powers, will be useful here, even though it no longer occupies a 
central place in the later fourteenth-century commentaries.157 
Buridan discusses the manner in which the soul is present in the body 
in great detail. After giving the arguments for and against the thesis that the 
whole soul is present in each and every part of the body, he begins by giving a 
list of six difficulties (dubttationes) connected to it, each of which, he says, is 
worthy of having a separate long and difficult question devoted to it.158 
l55For anyone adhering to this 'extensionality' principle, the question of whether a form is 
extended according to the extension of the subject it inheres in is the same question as whether 
the form is educed from the potency of matter To put it briefly, the human intellective soul is 
the only exception there is, on account of its immortality. 
156Since Zupko formulated the extensionality principle in the context of his study of Bun-
dan, he was able to give it a very precise meaning: "Bundan's extensionality principle as applied 
to the soul, then, is a claim about capacities of the soul conceived as remote potentialities." This 
more precise formulation makes it inapplicable to anyone but Buridan, which is why I will stick 
to the more general formulation for now. 
'
57It is still mentioned, however, in NICOLE ORESME, Q Ì M , II.4, 144e"'3. 
l58JOHN BURIDAN, Q Ì M , II 7: 'Utrum tota anima sit in qualibet parte corporis', 87: "Et 
quelibet istarum dubitationum posset esse una magna questio et difficilis." These difficulties 
are. ( 1 ) how are we to understand Aristotle's comment that the parts of the soul are not spatially 
distinct' (2) if the human soul is unextended and indivisible, how does it inform the whole 
body and each of its parts' (3) whether each part of a plant is itself a plant, and each part of an 
animal itself an animal' (4) whether each part of a man is itself a man ' (5) whether the same 
plant, or animal, or man remains when parts are cut off, or added (through the intake of food)' 
And finally, (6) how should we reply to the original question on the presence of the soul in the 
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On account of the difficulties connected to the human soul, Buridan post-
pones the discussion of it to the third book of his commentary. In the question 
at hand, he only concerns himself with plant and animal souls. Since his views 
on the inherence of plant and animals souls in the body have already been de-
scribed in detail by Jack Zupko, I will simply summarize his findings here.159 
The animal soul is wholly present in the whole body and each of its parts. We 
can capture precisely what Buridan means by this presence if we use the dis-
tinction made by the earlier commentators between three kinds of presence. 
The animal soul is present as an essential whole, as a potestative whole, but 
not as a quantitative whole. In Buridan's own terminology this means that the 
animal soul is a homogeneous form that is extended according to the exten-
sion of the body: 
Item non ponimus quod anima sensitiva equi sit composita ex partibus, 
scilicet ex substantifs diversarum rationum, sed ex partibus eiusdem ra-
tionis, sicud erat forma aeris. Sed propter homogenitatem in talibus 
homogeniis, partes recipiunt predicationes totius quantum ad predi-
cate quidditativa.160 
Also we do not posit that the sensitive soul of a horse is composed of 
parts, namely of substances of different kinds, but of parts of the same 
kind, just as the form of air is. But on account of the homogeneity in 
these homogeneous substances, the parts receive the same predications 
as the whole in so far as the quidditative predications are concerned. 
Although Buridan' view of the inherence of the soul is well known, the 
views of Oresme and Anonymus Fatar are not known all. And as it turns 
out, they defend the exact opposite view. Both of them do accept that the 
animal soul is extended according to the extension of the body, since this is 
a property, they argue, of all material forms. But the animal soul, at least the 
soul of perfect animals, is a heterogeneous form, not a homogeneous form. 
Each part of the soul itself is different. To quote Oresme: 
Tunc de sensitiva in aliis animalibus perfectis, sicut est bos, etc., prima 
conclusio est quod talis anima est totum heterogeneum. Probatur quia 
totum est totum heterogeneum; igitur anima. Antecedens est notum. 
Et patet consequentie per Commentatorem in primo huius, ubi dicit 
quod diversitas in partibus corporis est secundum exigentiam ipsius 
animae, quia corpus ordinatur ad animam tamquam fìnem, non e con-
whole body and each of its parts? 
'
59SeeZvPKO,JohnBundan, 165-175. 
I 6 0JOHN B U R I D A N , QdA, 11.7, 93. 
""NICOLE O R E S M E , QdA, 11.4, 1439 3-144'9 . 
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Now for the sensitive soul in other perfect animals, such as an ox etc, the 
first thesis is that such a soul is a heterogeneous whole. This is shown 
to be true, because the whole is a heterogeneous whole; hence the soul 
<is a heteregeneous whole>. The antecedent is known. And the con-
sequence is dea r from what the Commenta tor says in book I of the De 
anima that a diversity in bodily parts exists according to the need of the 
soul, because the body is ordered to the soul as its goal, not the other 
way around. 
Oresme's view is difficult to understand. It is because the soul is a het-
erogeneous form, he argues, that the body is a heterogeneous body. But does 
it really make sense to talk about the heterogeneity of the soul as a property 
that it has on its own account? The only possible interpretation seems to be 
that "behind" each different bodily part lies a different soul part, not just in a 
quantitative sense, but also in a qualitative sense! Oresme is not the only one 
to defend this peculiar position. Anonymus Fatar gives the exact same anal-
ysis.162 On this issue, there really are two positions in Paris in the fourteenth 
century. 
Again, Ockham turns out to have influenced the discussion gready, as he 
also did with the distinction between two senses of'power' and the subsequent 
identification of the soul with its powers. In the same question where Ockham 
identified the soul with even its sensitive powers, immediately after establish-
ing this identity, he moves on to discuss a question which he thinks is related, 
namely that of the extension of the animal soul. The animal soul, Ockham 
says, is extended according to the extension of the body and is divisible into 
homogeneous parts (partibus eiusdem rationis).163 So notwithstanding that 
the animal soul is one single form, its powers are distinct from one another, 
although not from the soul itself, in a quantitative sense. If, for instance, an 
162ANONYMUS FATAR, QdA, 11.5, 269'"-27059: "Quinta condusio: anima equi vel alterius 
bruti, et similar anima sensitiva hominis si ponitur distincte ab anima intellectiva, est forma 
heterogenea, hoc est Habens partes distinctas specie. Patet, nam ilia pars animae quae est in 
carne distinguitur specie ab illa parte animae quae est in osse. Probatur sic: os et caro distingu-
untur specie et habent diversa nomina substantialia et similiter diversas defìnitiones; ergo illa 
distinctio specifica est ab aliquo. Vel igitur a materia vel a forma. Non a materia, quia illa est 
eiusdem rationis in osse et in carne; relinquitur ergo quod a forma. Et per consequens forma 
ossis dinstinguitur specie a forma camis et istae formae partiales sunt partes formae totalis 
ipsius equi; ergo ipsa est heterogenea." Again this shows that there are substantial doctrinal 
differences between Buridan and Anonymus Fatar. 
' " W I L L I A M OCKHAM, Reportatio, III, q. 4, 13622-1378: "Intelligendum tarnen quod licet in 
animali sit tantum una forma sensitiva quae elicit omnes istas operationes, tarnen ipsa forma 
non est indivisibilis sed divisibilis in partes eiusdem rationis, quia forma sensitiva in quolibet 
animali — sicut pono — extenditur ad extensionem quantitatis in materia ita quod sicut una 
pars quantitatis est in una parte materiae et alia pars in alia parte, ita una pars animae sensitivae 
perficit unam partem materiae et alia pars eiusdem rationis per omnia perficit aliam partem." 
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animal's eye is destroyed, then that part of the soul that informed the eye is 
destroyed including its powers, whereas the powers of the other parts of the 
soul remain intact.164 
Having made the distinction between two senses of 'power' and having 
argued for the extension of the soul, Ockham raises the same question as the 
one discussed in the thought experiment of the eye in the foot: are all the 
powers present in every (quantitative) soul part? And it is not just the same 
question he raises. Ockham actually discusses the same thought experiment: 
Et ideo dico quod si pars ilia formae sensitivae quae perficit Organum 
auditus vel gustus vel quae est in pede perficeret Organum visus, et pars 
quae perficit Organum visus perficeret Organum auditus, tunc ilia pars 
formae quae prius eliciebat actum videndi nunc eliceret actum audiendi 
vel gustandi et e converso. Et si dispositio ilia accidentalis quae est in 
organo visus esset in pede, ilia pars sensitivae quae nunc est in pede ita 
eliceret actum videndi sicut nunc elicit oculus, quia materia est eiusdem 
rationis in oculo et in pede, et forma similiter.165 
And hence I say that if the part of the sensitive form that perfects the 
organ of hearing or taste or that which is in the foot were to perfect 
the organ of sight, and the part that perfects the organ of sight were 
to perfect the organ of hearing, then that part of the form that first 
elicited the act of sight would then elicit the act of hearing or tasting 
and conversely. And if that accidental disposition that is in the organ of 
sight were to be in the foot, the part of the sensitive form that is now in 
the foot would elicit the act of sight just as the eye elicits it now, because 
the matter in the eye and the foot is the same, and the form also. 
Here we have the position that Buridan will defend later, using the same 
distinction, for all practical purposes, between two senses of the term 'power'. 
Not only does Buridan's view of the relation between the soul and its powers 
correspond generally to Ockham's, but it seems to correspond to it in de-
tail. The positions of Oresme and Anonymus Fatar, by contrast, agree with 
Ockham's in the general sense that they also identify the soul with its pow-
ers. But on a more detailed level, their views differ from both Ockham's and 
Buridan's, since they do not accept the conclusion that the animal soul is a ho-
mogeneous whole. Instead, they say, the animal soul is heterogeneous, with 
different parts, each of which is capable of only a subset of the total of func-
tions the soul as a whole is able to perform. 
' "WILLIAM OCKHAM, Reportatio, III, q. 4, 137'7"19: "Sicut si ervatur oculus, tunc ilia pars 
formae quae perficiebat pupillam oculi corrumpitur, et adhuc remanet ilia pars formae sensi-
tivae quae perficit Organum auditus." 
' "WILLIAM OCKHAM, Reportatio, III, q. 4, 138l2-1392. 
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5.4.4 Is the power of sight really present in the foot? 
We are now finally in the position to give an accurate interpretation of the 
thought experiment of the eye in the foot from the beginning of this chapter. 
Buridan's affirmation that the power of vision is indeed present in the foot 
should be understood as follows. As Buridan already indicated, 'power' must 
be taken here in the principal sense, that is to say, in the sense in which the 
powers are identical to the soul. This soul is, in every animal, no matter how 
simple or complex, a perfectly homogeneous form.166 In this respect, the soul 
is no different from the forms of the elements. It is present in its (essential) 
totality in each part of the animal in exactly the same way. This is why the 
empirical fact that most of the vital powers are localized should be explained 
by reference to the instrumental powers only, that is, to the fact that the animal 
body is structured differently in different places. The soul's powers are only 
'activated' in those places where the structure of the body is suited for the 
exercise ofthat power. This explains why Buridan is so confident in his answer 
to the thought experiment. The answer he gives is the only logical conclusion 
within his metaphysics of the soul. To question the answer is to question the 
entire framework he developed so carefully. Since the soul is proven to be a 
homogeneous whole, there can be no reason why the power of sight would not 
be exercised in the foot if this foot were to take on the material dispositions of 
an eye. 
For Oresme, matters are more complex. And the reason for this is his con-
clusion that although the animal soul is extended according to the extension 
of the body, it is not homogeneous but heterogeneous, at least in the case of 
perfect animals. The question we must answer now is whether he specifies 
heterogeneity in terms of principal powers. If he does, his metaphysics of the 
soul is fundamentally different from Buridan's. There are several places in his 
commentary where Oresme specifies what it means that the soul is heteroge-
16
*Marsilius of Inghen's commentary on the De anima unfortunately remains unedited, a 
few questions excepted. But some trace of the debate is clearly present in his commentary on 
the Sentences, where he defends the same position as Buridan. MARSILIUS OF INGHEN, Ques-
tiones Sententiarum, II, q. 11, ƒ 250ra: "Quartum correlarium: si pars anime ossis equi per 
potentiam Dei mutaretur ad Organum oculi, et anima organi oculi in os, ita bene videretur 
equus post sicut ante. Patet ex quo forme sunt omnimode similes essentialiter. Quicquid una 
facit eodem instrumento hoc alia equalis, si esset ilio instrumento, equaliter faceret. Quintum 
corrolarium: quod pes non videt vel os, hoc non est ex impotentia anime, sed ex defectu organi 
et dispositionis organice." And just as Buridan, Marsilius connects these conclusions to the 
homogeneity of the soul of all plants and animals; MARSILIUS OF INGHEN, Questwnes Senten-
tiarum, II, q. 11, ƒ 249vb: "His premissis est condusio responsalis hec: omnes partes eiusdem 
anime extense asini vel equi vel alterìus vivi sunt essentialiter specialissime similes." For an-
other example of the relation between Marsilius of Inghen's commentary on the Sentences and 
the discussion in the De anima tradition in the fourteenth century, see p. 188, footnote 175. 
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neous to which we can now turn. 
In some of the passages, Oresme's formulation is ambiguous between 
powers in the principal and in the instrumental sense. For example, when 
Oresme discusses a by now familiar argument against the position that the 
whole soul is in whichever part of the body, as the argument goes, in that 
case the visual power would be located in the foot as well as in the eye, 
which would violate the adage that nature does nothing in vain. The souls 
of perfect animals, Oresme replies, are heterogeneous in the sense that they 
are not wholly present in whichever part of the body, neither quantitatively 
(integraliter), nor according to their powers {potentialiter), nor according to 
their essence (essentialiter).167 And if the powers are only located in the parts 
in which they are exercised, the argument fails. 
The ambiguity is contained in the term potentialiter, for as we have seen, 
this can refer to either the principal or the instrumental powers. Although 
Oresme certainly seems to be talking about powers in the principal sense, he 
does not say so explicitly. But once we take all of the passages in which he 
discusses the heterogeneity of the souls of perfect animals into account, there 
can be absolutely no doubt that he is indeed talking about the heterogeneity of 
the soul in terms of its principal powers. Take, for example, in the following 
passage 
Et ideo qui non habet oculos non dicitur habere potentiam visivam: et 
causa huius est quia ex supposito patet quod talis anima habet diversas 
partes heterogeneas et habentes diversa officia in diversis organis. Et 
ideo pars quae est in pede non potest illud quod potest ilia quae est in 
oculo.168 
And so, someone who has no eyes is not said to have the power of sight: 
and the reason for this is that it is clear from what has been assumed 
that such a soul has different, heterogeneous parts, that also exercise 
different functions in different organs. And therefore the part that is in 
the foot cannot do that which the part that is in the eye can do. 
Moreover, in retrospect, the proof that Oresme is indeed talking about 
powers in the principal sense is already contained in his answer to the thought 
experiment that was quoted in the beginning of this chapter. 
167NICOLE ORESME, QdA, II.4, 144e"13: "Tunc est secunda conclusio quod talis anima <i.e. 
sensitiva in animalibus perfectis SdB> in qualibet parte non est tota, nee integraliter nee poten-
tialiter nee essentialiter. Quod non integraliter, notum est, quia pars quae est in pede non est 
in manu; nee potentialiter, quia non omnes potentiae sunt in qualibet parte; nee essentialiter 
exponendo ut prius, quia pars quae est in manu non est anima, sed aliquid animae." 
' ' "NICOLE ORESME, QdA, II.3, 137lf"20. 
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Ex hoc sequitur corrolarie quod, si oculus esset in pede vel fieret ibi talis 
dispositie corporea, adhuc pes non videret, quia pars animae quae est 
ibi, non est nata videre.169 
From this it follows as a corollary that, if there were an eye in the foot 
or if such a bodily disposition were made there, the foot would still not 
see, because the part of the soul that is there is not naturally capable to 
see. 
The many doctrinal similarities in their commentaries on the De anima 
notwithstanding, Oresme and Buridan disagree about the structure of the ani-
mal soul at its most basic level.170 According to Buridan there is no difference 
between the form of an element, such as air, and the form of a complex ani-
mal. In both cases, the form is extended according to the extension of matter, 
and in both cases the form is perfectly homogeneous. It is present in each 
part in the exact same way. According to Oresme and Anonymus Fatar, by 
contrast, there is a fundamental difference between the forms of the elements 
and the form of a complex animal. Although both forms are extended accord-
ing to the extension of matter, the former is homogeneous, whereas the latter 
is heterogeneous. This leaves only the following important question: how is 
this fundamental disagreement between Buridan and Oresme (and Anony-
mus Fatar) possible? How can they agree that there is no distinction between 
the sensitive and vegetative souls; agree that these are extended according to 
the extension of the body, introduce the same distinction between a principal 
and an instrumental power; identify the soul with its powers; and yet arrive 
at the exact opposite description of the soul: homogeneous versus heteroge-
neous? If we are to give a qualification of the sort of transformations that took 
place in the scientia de anima in the fourteenth century, this is a question that 
must be addressed. 
5.4.5 From annulose animals to perfect animals 
In the discussion of Brito's position about the manner in which the soul is 
present in the body, it became clear that for him the annulose animals are 
paradigmatic for the soul-body relation. The soul's extension in the bodies of 
the annulose animals can be proven, and that conclusion can be transferred 
169NICOLE ORESME, QdA, II.5, 151. 
170In case there is any remaining doubt what Oresme's heteregeneous soul means, the fol-
lowing passage, I am sure, will take it away. NICOLE ORESME, QdA, II.4, 1448"13: "Tunc est 
secunda condusio quod talis anima in qualibet parte non est tota, nee integraliter, nee poten-
tialiter, nee essentialiter. Quod non integraliter, notum est, quia pars quae est in pede non est 
in manu; nee potentialiter, quia non omnes potentiae sunt in qualibet parte; nee essentialiter 
exponendo ut prius, quia pars quae est in manu non est anima, sed aliquid animae." 
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to the souls of perfect animals. But the criteria for this transfer were not fiilly 
clear. Even though Brito concluded that the souls of perfect animals are also 
extended, he added that they are so in a different way than the souls of annu-
lose animals. On the level of the soul, it turned out to be possible to conclude 
that the souls of perfect animals are extended on the basis of the extension of 
the souls of the annulose animals. But on the level of the soul's powers, Brito 
thought that the annulose animals tell us little about the souls of perfect ani-
mals. For in the case of annulose animals, all powers are present in each and 
every part of the body, whereas in the case of perfect animals the powers are 
located in specific parts of the body. As it turns out, the same implicit ques-
tion of what criteria we should use when transfering our conclusion about the 
annulose animals to perfect animals is central in the debate in the period of 
Oresme, Buridan, and the Anonymus Fatar. Although their position on the 
relation between the soul and its powers is indebted to Ockham, their treat-
ment of the question of how the soul is present in the body of different kinds 
of living beings is indebted to the tradition exemplified by Brito and Jandun. 
So let us return, once last time, to the most simple forms of life, to those 
plants and animals that survive being cut in two halves. Let's take plants, 
where both halves — if they continue to live — continue to live for a long time, 
and are capable of performing all the life functions of the original plant. The 
part that has no roots will begin to sprout them if it is well taken care of, and 
the other part will grow into a fiilly developed plant as well. Buridan, Oresme, 
and Anonymus Fatar draw the same two conclusions from this observation: 
1. The souls of such simple life forms are extended according to the extension of 
the body, that is, one part of the body is informed by one part of the soul and 
another part by another. 
2. The souls are homogeneous, that is, they are present essentially and according 
to all their powers in each part.171 
Their radical difference, however, stems from in an implicit disagreement 
about the principles by which a conclusion about the soul of these simple life 
forms can be extended to more complex life forms. Buridan's main justifica-
tion for the extension of the conclusions drawn from the observation of plants 
and annulose animals to more complex animals is difficult to accept for any 
171
 Aristotle had already pointed out that the souls of plants and annulose animals are homo-
geneous in ARISTOTLE, De anima, 1.5, 24-27: "But, all the same, in each of the parts there are 
present all the parts of soul, and the souls so present are homogeneous with one another and 
with the whole — the several parts of the soul being inseparable from one another, although 
the whole soul is divisible." 
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modem reader.172 It is an appeal to the 'hierarchy principle', the same princi-
ple he had used to deny the plurality of souls in animals.173 Whatever perfec-
tion may be found in some being, that same perfection will also be present in 
a more perfect manner in a more perfect being: 
Ergo non solum in capite vel in parte que est proportionalis capiti est 
potentia sensitiva, sed per totum corpus; et similiter appetitiva et se-
cundum locum motiva... Et si hec sunt concessa de illis animalibus im-
perfectis, ita debet hoc concedi de perfectis, licet non sic possint vivere 
divisa, quia anima, propter eius maiorem perfectionem, requirit in sua 
permanentia nobiliorem et perfectiorem organizationem.174 
Therefore, the sensitive power <of the annulose animals Siiß> is not 
solely in the head, or in the part that corresponds to the head, but in the 
whole body; and the same goes for the appetitive power and the power 
of local motion... And if these things are conceded for those imperfect 
animals, it should also be conceded for the perfect animals, although 
they are incapable of surviving in this way after division, because their 
soul, on account of its greater perfection, requires a more noble and 
perfect organization in order to endure. 
The argument works because the presence of all powers throughout the 
whole body is seen as a perfection. The annulose animals show us something 
very important about the perfections found in living beings, namely that all 
vital powers are present everywhere in the body. Now, if something as simple 
as the soul of a plant or of an annulose animal is already homogeneous, then 
so much the more so are the souls of more perfect and more complex ani-
mals. That more complex animals do not stay alive when cut in half, let alone 
that both parts develop all vital functions again, is explained by reference to 
the complex body required for the exercise of these vital functions. Since it is 
not the case that both parts of a complex animal have the required complex-
ity to perform all vital functions, indeed, at best only one does, they will not 
both continue to live. But this is not an indication of the lack of presence of 
the full range of powers in the principal sense, but only an indication of the 
172Buridan supplies one other justification, and that is that a horse will show signs of pain 
when it is pricked, regardless of the part of its body in which it is pricked. From this Buridan 
concludes that the sensitive soul must be in each part of the body. Although the argument is 
closely related to that of the division of the annulose animals, it is much less powerful. Even if 
this argument is successful in showing that the sensitive sou] is present in each and every part 
of the animal, it can never demonstrate that this soul is present as a homogeneous whole. 
l73For Buridan's appeal to the hierarchy principle in his denial that a diversity of opera-
tions in any given substances can be used to establish a plurality of substantial forms in that 
substance, see p. 217. 
17A]OHN BURIDAN, Q Ì M , II.7,90. 
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complexity of the powers in the instrumental sense. And since powers in the 
instrumental sense are defined in bodily terms, we can also phrase this differ-
ently, it is an indication of the complexity of the living body that is required 
for the exercise of the vital operations. 
Oresme, by contrast, argues in the opposite direction. That the soul of 
simple life forms is homogeneous is not only apparent from the fact that the 
two parts continue to live, but also, and perhaps more so, from the lack of di-
versity of bodily parts. This is particularly clear in annulose animals, where all 
parts look more or less alike. But once we examine the more complex animals, 
we notice a great variety of bodily dispositions. Clearly there is an important 
difference between the two types of living beings. And this difference, Oresme 
concludes, can only be explained in terms of the structure of the soul. So when 
the annulose animals have a homogeneous soul, the perfect animals must have 
a heterogeneous soul.175 For Oresme, the conclusion that a complex animal 
would have a homogeneous form must have seemed almost absurd. For it is 
precisely from the fact that one part looks the same as the other part that we 
normally call something homogeneous, as we do for instance with water or 
air. 
The inference from heterogeneous bodily parts to a heterogeneous soul is 
an important methodological principle in Oresme. This can be seen, for in-
stance, in his question on the unicity or plurality of souls. Oresme begins by 
denying that a diversity or even contrariety of operations must necessarily be 
caused by a diversity of forms. He then applies the principle of parsimony by 
claiming that we do not need to posit a diversity of souls to explain the di-
versity of life functions. Since the diversity of dispositions of the body is one 
of the most important reasons that the soul can have such diverse operations, 
and since the soul is the formal cause ofthat diversity, Oresme concludes that 
the soul is a heterogeneous form. This move from the heterogeneity of bod-
ily parts to the heterogeneity of the substantial form is especially clear in the 
following passage: 
Quinta conclusio est quod anima bruti est forma heterogenea, et prius 
fuit probatum. Et probatur adhuc quia: dat aliud esse ossi et aliud esse 
carni. Unde caro et os differunt specie et habent diversa nomina sub-
stantialia et definitiones; et aliud est esse carnem et esse os; igitur habent 
formas diversarum rationum; et illae sunt partes unius totalis animae; 
igitur ipsa est totum heterogeneum.176 
' " N I C O L E ORESME, QdA, II.4, 14393"'5: "Tunc de sensitiva in aliis animalis perfectis, sicut 
est bos, etc., prima conclusio est quod talis anima est totum heterogeneum. Probatur, quia 
totum est totum heterogeneum; igitur anima." 
I 7 6NICOLE ORESME, QdA, 11.5, ISl74"79. 
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The fifth conclusion is that the soul of a brute animal is a heterogeneous 
form, and this was proved previously. And besides it is proved as fol-
lows: it gives different being to bone and to flesh. Hence flesh and bone 
differ in species and have diverse substantial names and definitions; and 
the being of flesh and bone differs; therefore they have forms of a differ-
ent nature; and these are the parts of one complete soul; therefore this 
soul is a heterogeneous whole. 
This heterogeneity of the soul is subsequendy specified in the following 
way: in any complex living being there exists a variety of partial forms (fortnae 
partiales), of which Oresme gives one example, namely the power of sight. 
These partial forms are localized in specific places in the body. Oresme then 
draws two final conclusions. The first is that because of the localization of 
these partial forms, the power of sight is not in any place other than the eye. 
The second conclusion is that something can be composed of a body and a 
part of the soul without thereby being an animal. The requirement for being 
an animal is having a complete soul.177 
So when Oresme describes the soul as a 'heterogeneous form', the basic 
meaning of this expression is that the soul's various powers are located in spe-
cific parts of the body, not only in the sense that not all powers can be actually 
exercised everywhere because of a lack of the proper organ — this much Buri-
dan would agree with — but in the much stronger sense that the powers are 
distributed spatially over the body, somehow independently of the placement 
of organs. In the normal course of nature there is a harmony, to be sure, 
between the spatial distribution of the soul's powers and the location of the 
organs required for the exercise of those powers. But this harmony ultimately 
turns out to be a contingent fact. It is possible, through divine intervention, 
that two bodily parts change places with the result that the soul part and the 
l77This final conclusion is introduced as an explanation of the generation and corruption of 
living beings. By assuming that the soul can be gradually introduced or gradually corrupted, 
Oresme is able to explain how the complexity of bodily dispositions (that is the result of the 
generation of an animal) can develop. But this relies on a peculiar interpretation of the suc-
cession of forms in generation. The two standard positions were that either each successive 
form corrupts the previous form or that each successive form perfects the previous form. Both 
these extremes had in common that the forms perfecting a substance were unqualifiedly called 
substantial forms. In Oresme's interpretation, there is a succession of partial forms that are 
not really substantial forms. The implication is that one can be more or less informed by a 
soul, meaning that more or fewer parts of the soul can be introduced. The difficulty with this 
solution is that we either have to accept the consequence (contra Aristotle) that something can 
be more or less an animal, or we have to specify how many and which parts of the form are 
required for something to be an animal. Both options are problematic at least, and the only 
way out, that all the parts must present before something can be called an animal, leads to the 
absurdity that a man who has lost a limb has lost part of his soul and can therefore no longer 
be called a man. 
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bodily part no longer match. And, at least according to Anonymus Fatar, the 
same can be done with soul parts, with the same result.178 The combination 
of the presence of an organ that has all the required material characteristics 
(e.g. an undamaged eye) and the presence of a soul in the body to which the 
organ belongs does not guarantee that the power corresponding to the organ 
(i.e. vision) can be exercised. For this, a third condition must be met, namely 
that the spatial positions of the power and of the organ coincide.179 
This debate on the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the soul also explains 
an interesting, but puzzling passage in Buridan's commentary. One of the 
arguments that was often introduced against the presence of the whole soul 
in every part of the body is that this would mean that every part of animal 
is itself an animal. For every part of animal would consist of a (whole) soul 
and an organic (part of the) body. It is discussed at great lengths by Buri-
dan, whose approach to this argument is for the most part semantical. Put 
briefly, he distinguishes between two interpretations of the term 'animal'. In 
the first interpretation we take the term to be a truly substantial term, that is, 
a term that does not connote anything apart from the substance for which it 
stands. In this particular case, that means especially that it does not connote 
the totality of the animal's bodily parts. In this sense, Buridan concludes, we 
should indeed say that every part of an animal is animal, nor is there anything 
strange about this conclusion. In a second sense, and this is the sense most 
often used, the term is not truly substantial, but connotes the totality of the 
bodily parts.180 And in this sense, clearly, the parts of an animal are not them-
178ANONYMUS FATAR, QdA, 11.5, 27060"67: "Sexta condusio: in eodem, sicut in bruto, sunt 
plures animae partiales Patet ex dictis, nam aha est anima ossis et alia est anima carnis, istae 
autem animae sunt animae partiales. Sequitur corollarie quod, si ilia pars animae quae est in 
pede equi esset in oculo equi, non videret· patet, quia ilia pars animae equi quae est in pede non 
est apta nata nee ordinata ad videndum. Sequitur etiam hoc esse falsum quod aliqui dicunt de 
anima equi quod ita anima equi quae est in pede videret, si haberet organum sicut ilia quae est 
in oculo." 
179Although Oresme makes an interesting case for the heterogeneity of the soul of perfect 
animals, his position is also not without difficulties, for we can easily turn his argument against 
him Although the parts of, let's say a worm may be similar in the sense that is required for 
homogeneity, most plants have a more complex structure comprising at least roots, a stem, 
and leaves. If the heterogeneity of bodily parts must lead to the conclusion that soul is hetero-
geneous as well, it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that the souls of the plants must be 
heterogeneous even if the plant structure is not very complex. Indeed, at some point, Oresme 
himself uses plants as an example of diverse operations in diverse parts in the context of the 
question of how one form can be responsible for diverse operations; NICOLE ORESME, QdA, 
II 5, 15032"35: "Sexto, propter diversas partes heterogeneas talis formae agentis, sicut forma ovi 
aliud facit per partem quae est in vitello et aliud per albumen <album ed >. Et similiter de 
herbis. quaedam habent aliam virtutem in radice et aliam in folns." 
""JOHN BURIDAN, QdA, 11.7, 97· "Secundam conclusionem ego pono quod si hec nomina 
'animal', 'equus', 'asinus' etc. non sint nomina vere substantiaha, sed connotativa, scilicet con-
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selves an animal. This part of his answer is clear enough. The puzzling part 
comes next, when he says that the answer he just gave solves one of the diffi-
culties (dubitano) connected to the presence of the whole soul in each part of 
the body: 
Et hoc sit dictum de ista tertia dubitatione, nisi quod adhuc addi potest 
rationabiliter causa quare magis consuevimus dicere quod quelibet pars 
aeris est aer et quelibet pars aque est aqua quam quod quelibet pars equi 
est equus vel capre capra. Videtur enim mihi quod causa in hoc est 
quia vulgus et multi philosophorum putant membra animalis esse sub-
stantialiter diversarum rationum, non solum quantum ad accidentia, 
et quod hoc nomen 'animal' sit appropriate impositum ad supponen-
dum pro composito ex partibus sic dissimilium rationum, sicud esset 
de domo. Et si ita esset, tunc non quelibet pars animalis esset animal, 
sicud nee quelibet pars domus esset domus. Sed si hoc non est ita, tunc 
debet dici sicud ante dictum est.181 
And this concludes the reply to this third difficulty, except that <this> 
can be added reasonably: the reason why we are more accustomed to 
say that each part of air is air and each part of water is water than that 
each part of a horse is a horse or of a she-goat is a she-goat. It seems to 
me that the cause in this matter is that both the general public and many 
philosophers believe that the limbs and organs of an animal have a sub-
stantially different nature, not only in respect of accidents, and that the 
name 'animal' is appropriately imposed to supposit for the composite 
of the parts that have different natures in this way, as is the case with a 
house. And if this were so, then it would not be the case that each part 
of an animal is an animal, just as neither each part of a house is a house. 
But if this is not so, then it should be said what was said previously. 
Indeed, many philosophers make this assumption, Oresme and Anony-
mus Fatar being two of them. 
5.5 From animal to human soul 
We have seen how from Brito onward the analysis of plants and annulose 
animals provided the basic metaphysical framework for the discussion of the 
manner in which the soul is present in the body. In addition it has been shown 
how the commentators used different criteria when transferring their conclu-
sions about the souls of annulose animals to their discussion of the souls of 
notativa totalitatem, tunc non quelibet pars quantitativa animalis vel equi est animal vel equus, 
nee pes equi est equus." 
""JOHN B U R I D A N , QdA, 11.7, 99-100. 
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perfect animals. Because of these different criteria, they reached different con-
clusions about the structure of the souls of perfect animals. What remains to 
be investigated is how they make the final step. What conclusions can we draw 
about the way in which the human soul is present in the body? Are we allowed 
to transfer the conclusions reached in the discussion of either the annulose or 
the perfect animals to the human soul? And if so, how? 
5.5.1 The intellective soul: material or immaterial? 
The main reason that the discussion of the human soul differs from the dis-
cussion of the soul of perfect animals is that the aspect of immateriality comes 
into play. Aristotle had argued that the power of thinking is unique, in the 
sense that it is not exercised in any organ.182 And although he had been less 
clear on the ontological status of the human soul, he had hinted in several 
places that it contains at the very least a divine element, and might be capable 
of continued existence after the death of the body.183 And for his medieval 
commentators, there could be no doubt about the truth of the immortality 
of the intellective soul, although whether or not this truth is demonstrable is 
another matter. 
The immateriality of the human soul, or part of it, alone, makes it an 
exceptional subject to study within natural philosophy. When the commenta-
tors discussed the possibility of a sdentia de anima, it was the inclusion of the 
intellective soul that resulted in what I called the fragile unity of this science. 
But also when it came to the discussion of the metaphysical structure of the 
human soul, it was not always evident if and how the conclusions about the 
souls of perfect animals could be extended to the human soul, even if both 
types of soul fall under the same definition of 'first act of the natural organic 
body having life in potency'. 
In the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, the difference be-
tween the immaterial human soul and the material souls of perfect animals 
was usually clarified in one of two ways. One could either, following Averroes, 
place the divine immaterial element outside of the individual and postulate a 
unique, single, immortal intellect, or, one could say that the human intellect 
is immaterial in the sense that it has some operations, thinking and willing, 
that are not exercised in any bodily organ. The existence of these immaterial 
operations could then function as a premise in the proofs of the immortality 
""ARISTOTLE, De anima, UIA, 429al9-28. 
183ARISTOTLE, De generatione ammahum, 736b27-28: "It remains, then for the reason alone 
so to enter <i.e. from without SdB> and alone to be divine, for no bodily activity has any 
connection with the activity of reason." 
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of the soul.184 
The few commentators who tried to defend Averroes's position excepted, 
almost all commentators thought that the human soul could be discussed 
in the same way as the plant and animal souls. The human soul did come 
with some unique operations and properties, in particular the immateriauty 
of thought and the immortality of the soul itself, but these operations and 
properties could be demonstrated within the scientta de antma. In so far as 
the human soul is embodied, it could be studied in the same way as animal 
souls, and the conclusions concerning it have the same degree of certainty as 
those concerning the animal soul. Granted, there are things about the human 
soul that cannot be discussed with certainty. Especially in so far as the human 
soul can continue to exist in an unembodied state, only this possibility could 
be demonstrated. All the details of the soul's unembodied existence, for in-
stance, its mode of cognition, fall outside of the natural philosophical range. 
But since the scientia de anima studies the soul as form of the body, this was 
not seen as a problem. More detailed discussions on the human soul after the 
death of the body could be left to the theologians.185 
When we compare the period from Aquinas and the Anonymi with the 
period starting from Ockham, several things have changed. First, the overall 
structure of the discussion of the ontological status of the intellect is now a 
discussion of the relative merits and demerits of three famous positions: that 
of Alexander of Aphrodisias, that of Averroes, and that of faith. This same 
structure is found Oresme, in Buridan and in the Anonymus Fatar.186 Each of 
these positions is then characterized by reference to the list of properties of the 
human soul given in table 5.1.187 These properties, as well as their opposites, 
were considered to be mutually implicative, that is, if we set aside what we 
184
 Later thirteenth-century discussions of the immortality of the intellect were very much 
structured by the question of whether and in what sense an immaterial operation can be as-
cribed to a material individual. 
'
e5See, for example, RADULPHUS BRITO, QiiA, 1.9s7'94· "Quando ergo dicitur 'anima est 
separabihs', verum est, 'ergo habet operationem propnam', verum est. Tarnen ilia operatio non 
est talis qualem habet in hac vita, quia anima in hac vita intelligit ex sensatis et ymaginatis. Sed 
quando est separata a corpore non sic intelligit, sed per revelationem supenons intelligentie, 
vel per species infusas, vel per habitus acquisitos hie, vel secundum ahquem ahum modum " 
18
*The same strategy is also followed by Marsilius of Inghen. MARSILIUS OF INGHEN, Quaes-
tiones tn tres libro Artstotelis De anima. III 3 'Utrum cum perpetuiate intellectus stet intel-
lectum esse formam inhaerentem corpori humano', in· O. Pluta, 'Die Diskussion der Un-
sterbhchkeitsfrage bei Marsilius von Inghen', in: S. Wielgus, Marsilius von Inghen Werk und 
Wirkung, Lublin. Redakcja Wydawnictw Katolickiego Umwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1993, 119-
164, 151 l27"129: "Quantum ad pnmum (articulum) est sciendum, quod tres sunt opimones de 
ista quaestione: prima est Alexandn, secunda est Commentatons, tertia est fidei cathohcae." 
187For example: NICOLE ORESME, QdA, III.4, 33854-60; JOHN BURIDAN, QdA, III^130"'36; and 
ANONYMUS FATAR, QdA, UIA, 42363"6,. 
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know through faith.188 
Table 5.1: The three famous opinions on the intellect 
Claim 
inheres in matter 
is educed from the potency of matter 
is extended 
is multiplied 
is begotten 
is corruptible 
Alexander 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Averroes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Faith and Truth 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Supernaturally 
No 
As can be seen in this table, Alexander's position is characterized as fol-
lows: the human intellect is a material form, educed from the potency of 
matter, which is extended according to the extension of matter, is multiplied 
according to the number of humans, is begotten, and is corruptible.189 The 
second position, that of Averroes is characterized as the exact inverse of that 
of Alexander.190 But ultimately, all these mid-fourteenth-century commen-
tators accept the position held by faith, which states that the human soul is 
truly a form inhering in the body, although it is not extended according to the 
extension of the body, nor educed from the potency of matter.191 
A second change is that the conclusions about the manner in which the 
human soul inheres in the body are no longer considered to be demonstrable, 
l 88This conclusion is drawn by Buridan in several places, e.g. in JOHN B U R I D A N , QdA, III.6, 
50e7"92: "Quinta conclusio: quod haec sex se mutuo consequuntur: intellectum esse per-
petuum, non esse genitum nee corruptibilem, non esse eductum de potentia materiae, non 
inhaerere materiae, non esse extensum extensione materiae, et non esse multiplicatum. Et 
similiter sex opposita illorum consequuntur se mutuo." 
""JOHN B U R I D A N , Q Ì M , III.3, 22 5 β ~ 6 2 : "Dicebat Alexander quod intellectus humanus est 
forma materialis generabilis et corruptibilis, educta de potentia materiae, et extensa extensione 
materiae, sicut anima bovis aut anima canis, et non est manens post mortem." 
I 9 C J O H N BURIDAN, QdA, 111.3, 2 2 6 3 " 6 , : "Alia fuit opinio Averrois quod intellectus humanus 
est forma immaterialis, et ingenita et incorruptibilis, et sic non est educta de potentia materiae, 
nec extensa, immo nec multiplicata multiplicatione hominum, sed quod est unicus intellectus 
omnibus hominibus, scilicet quo ego inteliigo, quo tu intelligis, et sic de aliis. Ideo non est 
forma inhaerens corpori." 
' " It has been debated whether Buridan's acceptance of the position held by faith really cor­
responds to the position he believed to be true. Olaf Pluta has defended a Straussian reading 
of the question, whereas Jack Zupko defends the literal reading. See especially O. PLUTA, 'Per­
secution and the Art of Writing. The Parisian Statute of April 1, 1272, and Its Philosophical 
Consequences', in: P. J. J. M. BAKKER (ed.), Chemins de la Pensée médiévale. Études offertes à 
Zenon Kaluza. Turnhout: Brepols, 2002,563-585 and J. Z U P K O , 'On Buridan's Alleged Alexan-
drianism: Heterodoxy and Natural Philosophy in Fourteenth-Century Paris', Vivarium, 42:1 
(2004), 4 3 - 5 7 . 1 am inclined to follow Zupko in this matter. 
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but merely probable.19 Here again, the later fourteenth-century commenta-
tors seem to echo Ockham.193 Strictly speaking, the scientia de anima is only 
able to demonstrate the manner in which the souls of plants/annulose animals 
and those of perfect animals inhere in their bodies. As a result of this, theo-
logical arguments are now being introduced into the discussion of the human 
soul. When Buridan discusses the question of whether the sensitive soul and 
intellective soul are the same or different in humans beings, for example, he 
begins in his normal manner by referring the reader to all his arguments in 
favor of the identity of the vegetative and sensitive souls that also apply to the 
identity of the sensitive and intellectual soul. But instead of then elaborat-
ing on the reasons for his identification of the sensitive and intellective soul 
— the usual thing to do after presenting the arguments for and against —, 
he proceeds to give three "theological arguments that produce in me a great 
faith" that a human being has but one soul. There is no determination of the 
question besides these three arguments. One of these runs as follows: 
Et possum addere rationes theologicas quae mihi in hoc faciunt mag-
nani fidem. Quarum una est quod filius Dei assumpsit sibi totam hu-
manitatem et integram. Ideo cum anima sensitiva sit de integritate ho-
minis, illam assumpsit. Et nihil dimissit qoud assumpsit. Ergo illam 
in morte non dimisit, et sic in morte non corrumpebatur. Et tarnen 
dicentes earn esse substantialiter distinctam ab intellective dicunt earn 
corrumpi in morte; ergo etc.194 
And I can add theological arguments that produce in me a great faith in 
this matter. One of which is that the son of God took up the whole and 
complete human nature. Hence, since the sensitive soul belongs to the 
completeness of man, he took it up. And he abandoned nothing which 
1 9 2 JOHN B U R I D A N , QdA, III.3, 25' 4 4 -26' 5 1 : "Notandum est tamen quod ilia conclusio sit 
simpliciter vera, et firmiter fide tenenda, et quod rationes ad earn adductae sint probabiles, 
tamen non apparet mihi quod sint demonstrative, ex principiis (fide circumscripta) evidentiam 
habentibus, nisi Deus de gratia speciali et ultra communem cursum naturae nobis faceret illam 
evidentiam, sicut ipse posset alicui facere evidentem articulum trinitatis vel incarnationis."; See 
also NICOLE O R E S M E , QdA, III.4, 33578"80, and A N O N Y M U S FATAR, Q Ì M , III.4, 423""3 8 . Mar-
silius of Inghen agrees, see O. PLUTA, 'Utrum intellectus utitur organo corporeo in intelligendo. 
Eine verborgene Frage in den De anima Quaestionen des Marsilius von Inghen', in: M. J. F. M. 
H O E N E N and P. J. J. M. BAKKER (eds.), Phifosophie und Theologie des ausgehenden Mittelalters. 
Marsilius von Inghen und das Denken seinerzeit, Leiden [etc.]: Brill, 2000, 159-174, 155253"256. 
' " W I L L I A M O C K H A M , Quodlibeta, 1.10, 63 3 9 -64 4 7 : "Dico quod intelligendo per 'animam 
intellectivam' formam immaterialem, incorruptibilem quae tota est in toto corpore et tota in 
qualibet parte, nee potest evidenter sciri per rationem vel per experientiam quod talis forma sit 
in nobis, nee quod intelligere tali substantiae proprium sit in nobis, nee quod talis anima sit 
forma corporis, — quidquid de hoc sensuerit Philosophus non curo ad praesens, quia ubique 
dubitative videtur loqui — , sed ista tria solum credimus." 
1 9 4 JOHN B U R I D A N , QdA, 111.17, 192e2"89. 
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he took up . Hence he did not abandon the sensitive soul in death, and 
so it was not corrupted in death. And yet those who say that this soul 
is substantially distinct from the intellective soul say that it is corrupted 
in death; hence etc. 
So, apparently, that Christ took up human nature as a whole makes it 
more plausible that the human soul is a unity, even though the consequence of 
this unity turns out to be that the human soul always inheres in a supernatural 
manner, in such a way that even the vegetative and sensitive operations are 
immaterial and hence incomparable to those in plants and animals.195 Strange 
as this may seem, Buridan is not the only one to introduce the incarnation as 
an argument in favor of the unity of the human soul. Marsilius of Inghen 
does the same in his commentary on the De anima}96 And the argument is 
also discussed by Ockham when he asks the question of whether or not the 
sensitive and intellective souls are distinct in man.197 But Ockham, at least, 
introduced this argument in the theological context of the Sententiae. 
The mere feet that theological considerations play a role in the determi-
nation of questions from the De anima is not surprising. We have already 
seen how similar considerations played a substantial role when it came to dis-
cussing the unicity or plurality of substantial form and the related question of 
whether or not the accidents of the living body and of the corpse are numer-
ically identical.198 The crucial difference, however, is that these theological 
considerations are now explicitly introduced in the context of the De anima 
rather than merely playing their important role in the background without be-
ing mentioned. This reflects the methodological change that occurred in the 
later fourteenth-century commentaries, namely that the natural philosophical 
"
5The other two arguments that produce "great faith" are: (1) a reference to Psalm 16:10 
"For thou wilt not leave my soul in hell; neither wilt thou suffer thine Holy One to see cor-
ruption." (King James version), which would be false if Christ's sensitive soul were corrupted. 
And (2) an analogy between the manner in which God is present in the world {cmlibet parti 
ems prmapahter and sine dtstantta) and the manner in which the soul is present in the body. 
Although Buridan emphasizes that whereas the soul is a form that inheres in the body, God is 
not form that inheres in the world. 
'"The argument is that Christ took up the whole human nature including the sensitive 
soul. And what Christ has taken up he will not abandon From this Marsilius draws the con-
clusion that the sensitive and intellective soul cannot be two separate souls, since otherwise 
either Christ's death is not truly a death (when his sensitive soul survives) or he abandons part 
of what he took up (if the sensitive soul corrupts). See PLUTA, 'Utrum intellectus utitur organo 
corporeo', 175. 
' "WILLIAM OCKHAM, Quodlibeta, II, q. 10, I59 l70"7\ It is countered with the following 
reply "Dico quod ilia sensitiva Christi remansit ubi Deo placuit; tarnen semper fuit unita 
dettati. Sed utrum remansit cum corpore vel cum anima intellectiva, solus Deus novit. Sed 
utrumque potest dici." (p. lóO91"95). 
l98See above, section 4.4. 
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paradigm is no longer deemed adequate to demonstrate the manner in which 
the human soul inheres in the body. We can demonstrate how the souls of 
annulose animals inhere in their bodies, and, based on these demonstrations, 
move on to show the manner in which the souls of perfect animals inhere. 
But at that point the natural philosophical approach has reached its limits. If 
we want to discuss the human soul also, we have to resort to theological argu­
ments in order to give a convincing (but not demonstrative!) description of 
how the human soul inheres in the body. 
The limits of natural philosophy 
Buridan makes it very clear that when it comes to the human intellect, philos­
ophy has reached its limits.199 Since his views on the difference between the 
human soul and other souls have been analyzed in detail by other scholars, I 
can be brief here.200 The presence of the human soul in the body is described 
in the terminology of the Eucharist, and is explicitly called a super-natural 
mode of inhering.201 Because of the fact that the human soul is not educed 
from the potency of matter, every human vegetative and sensitive power must 
be immaterial! By maintaining the unity of the soul, Buridan has, in the end, 
broken the fragile unity of the science that studies it. Almost nothing about 
the human soul can be proven, or even adequately understood in the scientia 
de anima. As it turns out, even the vegetative and sensitive aspects of hu­
man beings inhere in this supernatural manner, and are fundamentally differ­
ent from similar processes in plants and animals. The human soul has now 
become the limit of natural philosophy; not in the sense of the place where 
'"See ZUPKO, John Buridan, 180-182. 
2 0 0 For the historical background of Buridan's views on the human soul, see HOENEN, 'Die 
Intellektlehre des Johannes Buridan'. For discussion of Buridan's position, see ZUPKO, John 
Bundan, 175-182, O. PLUTA, 'Einige Bemerkungen zur Deutung der Unsterblichkeitsdiskus­
sion bei Johannes Buridan', 'Acts of the Second Symposium Organized by the Dutch Soci­
ety for Medieval Philosophy Medium Aevum on the Occasion of its 15th Anniversary Leiden-
Amsterdam (Vrije Universiteit), 20-21 June, 1991, in: E. P. Bos and H. A. KROP (eds.), John 
Bundan: A Master of Arts. Some Aspects of his Phibsophy, Nijmegen: Ingenium, 1993, 107-
119 and H. LAGERLUND, 'John Buridan and the Problems of Dualism in the Early Fourteenth 
Century', Journal of the History of Philosophy, 42:4 (2004), 369-387. The most detailed, and 
accurate description of the differences between animals souls and human souls in Bundan is 
found in ZUPKO, 'Horse Sense and Human Sense'. 
2 0 1
 JOHN BURIDAN, QdA, ΠΙΑ, 36 | 7 β" 1 8 7 : "Et non est inconveniens idem esse non commen-
surabiliter in diversis locis ab invicem distantibus et secundum se totum, licet hoc sit modo 
supernaturali, ut corpus Christi simul est in paradiso et super altari (non enim corpus Christi 
in hostia super altari commensuratur magnitudine hostiae, sed est in qualibet parte hostiae, 
licet partes distent ab invicem, et non ob hoc distal a se). Et ideo consimiliter quodammodo 
intellectus est in manu et in pede, et in neutro commensurative, cum non sit extensus in aliquo 
illorum membrorum." 
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natural philosophy and metaphysics touch, but in the sense of that place that 
natural philosophy can never reach. All that remains is faith. 
Buridan's description of the inherence of the intellective soul as supernat-
ural has been noted in the secondary Uterature. But there has been little or 
no discussion about the position of Oresme and Anonymus Fatar on this is-
sue. At first sight, it may look as if they have fewer difficulties than Buridan 
when describing the inherence of the human. They certainly do not resort to 
theological arguments to establish the relation between the sensitive and intel-
lectual parts of the human soul, and there is no mention of any supernatural 
inherence. Nor do they feel the need to introduce theological arguments into 
the discussions on the inherence of the human soul, as Buridan and Marsilius 
do.202 But once we consider the matter more carefully, we can see that they 
are really little better off than Buridan. They are simply less clear about the 
difficulties connected to the human soul. Now that the soul has been identi-
fied with its powers, they have only two options. Either, following Ockham, 
they can say that a human being has two souls, or, following Buridan, they 
can say that a human being has one soul which inheres in the body in a su-
pernatural manner. If they follow Ockham, they can, at least, maintain that 
the vegetative and sensitive operations in humans and animals function in a 
similar manner. In that way, part of the human being can be studied in the 
saentia de anima in the same way, and according to the same principles, as 
other living things are studied there. They only have to admit that we have 
reached the limits of natural philosophy when it comes to the intellective part 
of the human soul.203 If, on the other hand, they follow Buridan, they have 
to say that all vital operations of a human being are radically different from 
those found other living things, since all these operations come from a soul 
that inheres in the body in a radically different manner than the souls of ani-
mals do. And then the whole human soul becomes mysterious to the natural 
philosopher. 
The reason that Anonymus Fatar and Oresme cannot offer a better alter-
native to the description of the inherence of the human soul given by Buridan 
is that they refuse to (fully) commit themselves to either option.204 Because 
202
 Although Anonymus Fatar does compare the inherence of the human soul to the presence 
of God in the universe, just like Buridan did. See ANONYMUS FATAR, QdA, II 6, Z S S ^ S ^ 8 . 
203
 And they have to hope that no one asks too many question about the interaction between 
the sensitive and intellective functions LAGERLUND, 'John Bundan and the Problems of Du-
alism', 386-387, is right to point out that several problems in Ockham's epistemology are the 
result of the real distinction between sensitive and intellective soul. 
2(MMore precisely, Anonymus Fatar never commits himself to either alternative. Oresme 
does commit himself to Ockham's position in one passage from his commentary, but only 
hesitandy Moreover, he consistendy leaves both options open in almost every other place in 
his commentary. 
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both solutions, that of Ockham and that of Buridan, are possible, they are also 
unable to account for the human soul within the normal framework of the 
scientia de anima. For if we really are unable to establish whether a human 
being has but one soul or two within the scientia de anima, this means that, 
at least in principle, none of the conclusions we reached when discussing the 
souls of annulose and of perfect animals can be extended to the human soul. 
If there is but one soul, then this soul cannot be heterogeneous as the souls of 
perfect animals are.205 In that case, the whole human soul inheres in the body 
in a radically different manner from that of perfect animals. This implies that 
the basic principle that the heterogeneity or homogeneity of the soul is estab-
lished on the basis of the heterogeneity or homogeneity of the body has to be 
abandoned. The inherence of the human soul is so exceptional that it cannot 
be established or explained by the principles they developed in the scientia de 
anima. That they do not use the term 'supernaturaliter' matters little. 
Although the earlier commentators considered the intellective soul to be a 
very difficult subject to study, they remained convinced that the science of the 
soul can establish the following three points conclusively: ( 1 ) that the imma-
terial intellective soul is the form of the body, (2) in what sense it is the form 
of the body, and (3) that it can survive the death of the body. This changes 
radically with Buridan, Oresme and the Anonymus Patar. The science of the 
soul cannot estabhsh conclusively that the immaterial intellective soul is the 
form of the body. It might buttress the conclusion with probable arguments, 
but it can never demonstrate it. Also, strictly from the viewpoint of natu-
ral philosophy, Alexander of Aphrodisias's position of a mortal soul that is 
educed from the potency of matter and extended according to the extension 
of matter is the more plausible position.206 As a result, very few conclusions 
2Q5ANONYMUS PATAR, QdA, II.4, 25585~98: "Sed notandum est hie quod, si in homme poni-
mus sensitivam non esse distinctam ab intellectiva, et quod in homme est solum una anima, 
puta intellectiva indmsibüis et inextensa, nos debemus dicere de homme quod in homme ea-
dem est potentia visiva, auditiva, et sic de alns; et potentia visiva est in pede et in manu et 
ubique in corpore, quamvis non in quahbet parte corporis ipsius hominis sed in parte deter-
minata exerceat illam Operationen! quae est videre, et mediante una alia parte corporis ipsius 
hominis aham operationem quae est audire, et sic de alns. Sed si in homme ponamus animam 
sensitivam esse distinctam ab anima intellectiva, tunc debemus loqui de anima sensitiva homi-
nis sicut lam dictum est de anima equi vel asini, scilicet quod ilia pars animae sensitivae quae 
est in oculo dicitur potentia visiva et ilia quae est in organo auditus, auditiva, et sic de alns." 
NICOLE ORESME, QdA, 142',3"55: "Et tunc dicendum est quod anima intellectiva isto modo 
est in quahbet parte tota, quia informat corpus et non est extensa ad extensionem corporis... 
Iterum, si in homme non sit ahqua alia anima, tunc absolute dicendum est quod in quahbet 
parte hominis est tota anima hominis et omnes potentiae, ita quod in pede est intellectiva, vi-
siva, etc Et si in homme sit alia anima et forma, scilicet sensitiva, tunc dicendum est de ipsa 
sicut de ammabus brutorum." 
2 0 6NICOLE ORESME, Q<M, III.4, 33681"83 "Et ideo, post opimonem ventatis et fidei, opimo 
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that we can draw about the souls of perfect animals can be translated to the 
soul of humans. According to Buridan, the inherence of the human soul can 
only be described in terms that are taken from the theological context of the 
Eucharist. And even for Oresme and the Anonymus Fatar, the human soul is 
structured completely differently from that of perfect animals. Whereas the 
souls of the latter are heterogeneous, with powers that are located in specific 
parts of the body, the human soul is homogeneous, without any such struc-
ture, whereas, at the same time, this homogeneous soul is responsible for all 
the heterogeneous bodily parts of a human being. 
5.6 Epilogue and conclusions 
With the discussions between Buridan, Oresme and Anonymus Fatar in mind, 
one can hardly blame Pierre d'Ailly for becoming bored with the detailed ex-
positions of the relations between powers and essences. In the opening words 
of his Tractatus de anima, written sometime between 1377 and 1385,207 d'Ailly 
writes the following: 
Quidditatem animae umbratice somniantes philosophi de ea diversa 
et adversa senserunt, quae omnia disserere longum esset. Sed quia 
Aristoteles inter eos obtinens principatum animam probabilius 
definivit dicens quod ipsa est 'actus primus substantialis corporis 
physici, organici habentis vitam in potentia', ideo huius definitionis 
explanationem prosequamur.208 
Considering the essence of the soul obscurely as if in a dream, philoso-
phers have thought diverse and opposite things about it, the discussion 
of which would take a long time. But because Aristotle, who holds the 
first place among them, defined the soul rather probably by saying that 
it is 'the first substantial act of the physical, organic body having life in 
potency', let us give an explanation of this definition. 
D'Ailly devotes six pages in the edition to a "discussion" of the definition 
of the soul, the relation to its powers and the manner in which it is present 
in the body. The remainder of the tract is devoted to a discussion of the var-
ious powers of the soul. It is clear that d'Ailly was familiar with the type of 
commentaries written by Buridan and Oresme. On several points, his brief 
Alexandri inter omnes alias est bene probabilis et multum magis quam opinio Commenta-
toris." See also, A N O N Y M U S FATAR, QdA, III.4,423'"M 9 ) and JOHN B U R I D A N , QdA, III.4, 32 7 9 ^ 2 . 
Marsilius of Inghen agrees, see PLUT A, 'Utrum intellectus utitur organo corporeo', IS?327"33'. 
207See PIERRE D'AILLY, TVM, iv. 
20ePiERRE D'AILLY, TdA, 5. 
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discussion of the structure of the soul is indebted to this tradition. The ed-
itor of the treatise, Olaf Pluta, has pointed out that d'Ailly seems to borrow 
from Buridan's commentary in his discussion of Aristotle's definition of the 
soul.209 In all likelihood he was indeed familiar with Buridan's commentary, 
since he takes over many important elements, such as beginning with the an-
nulose animals when discussing the soul, the distinction between principal 
and instrumental powers, and the thought experiment of the presence of the 
principal power of sight in the foot (to which he gives the same answer as 
Buridan had done). The one element that d'Ailly does not take over uncrit-
ically is Buridan's indivisible human soul, in which the sensitive powers are 
also unextended. After a very brief discussion of this topic, d'Ailly claims that 
the question of whether in man the sensitive and intellective soul are distinct is 
a undecidable question (problema neutrum), to which both answers are prob-
able, so if someone wants to claim that they are identical, that is fine also.210 
In stark contrast to the commentators from whom takes his material, 
however, d'Ailly is not at all interested in discussing the arguments for and 
against a position; he is content to simply state, or better, copy what he con-
siders to be the more probable opinion. There is not even any discussion of 
the difference between the souls of plants and animals on the one hand, and 
those of men, on the other, let alone any mention of the finer points on which 
Buridan, Oresme and the Anonymus Fatar disagreed. The detailed discussions 
about the essence of the soul, its mode of presence in the body and its relation 
to its powers have come to an end here, at least temporarily. But not because 
the fourteenth-century Parisian commentators had moved from trying to de-
termine the essential structure of the soul to a more empirical approach that 
focuses on the soul's operations. On the contrary, the discussions have ended, 
at least temporarily, with d'Ailly, because the speculative approach had been 
taken to its limits. The detailed discussions on the continuity of the living 
body with the corpse,2" as well as the thought experiment that was supposed 
to show the precise relations between the essence and the powers of the soul, 
as well as their mode of inherence in the body, had taken the scientia de anima 
to its breaking point. It was no longer possible to return to the way in which 
Aquinas had approached the unity of the soul and its relation to the body as 
its substantial form, in which these problems could not even arise. Nor was 
209PIERRE D'AILLY, TdA, especially 39^11. The definition turns out to be a bad example, 
since the structure corresponds to that found in fandun and not to that found in Buridan. 
2
'
0PiERRE D'AILLY, TdA, 10: "Ideo propter ista principaliter quidam dixerunt quod non est 
in homine eadem anima sensitiva et intellectiva. Sed cum hoc sit problema neutrum, cuius 
utraque pars est probabilis, cui placet tenere oppositum, potest dicere quod anima sensitiva 
hominis est indivisibilis nee ipsa est eiusdem talionis in homimbus et brutis." 
211
 See above 4.3. 
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it possible to solve all the technical problems that had arisen in the course of 
the final two decades of the thirteenth and in the first half of the fourteenth 
century. Why not then just ignore the technical difficulties, and simply write 
a treatise on the soul's powers without entering into details about the onto-
logica! structure of the soul? Maybe this is not a strategy that is convincing in 
the long run — indeed, later commentators will return to these difficulties in 
ever increasing detail, with the result that once again a philosopher, Descartes 
this time, will try to put an end to the discussion by simply ignoring all the 
detailed speculations —, but it is a strategy that is understandable. 
5.6.1 Conclusions 
Was there a shift from metaphysical speculation about the essential structure 
of the soul — combined with an optimism about our ability to know the soul's 
essence — in the thirteenth century to a more empirical approach — com-
bined with a pessimism about our ability to know the soul's essence — in 
the fourteenth? Looking at the case studies I discussed, I would say no. The 
thought experiment of the eye in the foot shows that the fourteenth century 
was in this sense as metaphysical, if not more so, as the late thirteenth century. 
This is consistent with the findings in the previous chapter, where it became 
clear that the discussions on the relation between soul and body became in-
creasingly metaphysical and detailed in the fourteenth century, leading to var-
ious problems concerning the identity of the living body and the corpse. At 
the same time, it cannot be denied that the later fourteenth-century commen-
taries have a very different feel from their earlier counterparts. Especially the 
conclusions related to the intellective soul are much more tentative in these 
later commentaries than before; they are often qualified by saying that they 
are merely probable, but not demonstrable. 
I propose the following alternative interpretation. The always fragile unity 
of the scientia de anima has reached its breaking point in the commentaries by 
Oresme, Buridan and the Anonymus Fatar. On the one hand, the discussions 
about the ontological structure of the vegetative and sensitive soul have be-
come increasingly detailed. Granted, semantical analysis had become a much 
more important tool than in the thirteenth century, and the commentators 
used this tool as much as possible when discussing questions such as the re-
lation between the soul and its powers. But once this tool had done its job, 
for example, by distinguishing between proximate and remote potentialities, 
or between the different senses of the term 'animal', there was still room for 
controversy on the manner in which the soul is present in the body. So much 
room even, that Buridan and Oresme (and Anonymus Fatar also) reached op-
posite conclusions about the structure of the souls of perfect animals. Where 
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these are homogeneous according to Buridan, they are heterogeneous accord-
ing to Oresme and Anonymus Fatar. At the same time, however, almost none 
of the results of these detailed discussions were considered to be transferable 
to the intellective soul. 
The fundamental division in the commentaries on the De anima from 
Brito onward is not that between the vegetative, sensitive and intellective soul. 
Instead it is the division between that souls of plants and annulose animals, 
the souls of perfect animals, and the intellective soul. As we have seen, all 
commentators agreed on the properties of the lowest level of souls. These are 
extended according to extension of matter, homogeneous and divisible. But 
they disagreed on how we can use these conclusions in our discussion of the 
souls of perfect animals and humans. Is the homogeneity a perfection (Buri-
dan) or an imperfection (Oresme, Anonymus Fatar)? Is the extension a result 
of the fact that the soul is educed from the potency of matter (Brito, Oresme, 
Anonymus Fatar, Buridan) or of the fact that the bodily parts are (almost) 
similar to each other (Aquinas)? This disagreement on how to proceed from 
annulose to perfect animals is a disagreement on the principles that allow us 
to makes inferences within the science of the soul. Although opinions differed 
on what principles we should use, there was a consensus that such inferences 
are possible. But when it comes to the human soul, something changes with 
Ockham. After Ockham, the commentators no longer considered it merely 
difficult to go from perfect animals to human beings in the scientia de anima, 
they considered it impossible! Not in the sense that they had nothing to say 
about the human soul, far from it, but in the sense that the structure of plant 
and animal souls and their modes of inherence in the body tells us little or 
nothing about that of the human soul. It is not just that the human soul 
has some unique properties that we have to account for, such as the power 
of understanding and its immortality, but the entire human soul should be 
analyzed in a completely different way from all the other souls. Also, as a 
consequence of this, none of the conclusions we reach about the human soul 
can be demonstrable within natural philosophy, even though they can still be 
probable. 
This consensus that almost none of the results from the discussion of plant 
and animal souls are applicable to the human soul is, I would argue, by far the 
most important difference between the period up to Ockham and the later-
fourteenth century. The human soul turned out to be completely different 
in almost all its properties from the souls of perfect animals, not just in the 
properties that it also has immaterial operations and is immortal. It matters 
little whether the intellect is said to inhere supernaturaliter in such a way that 
even the vegetative and sensitive operations are immaterial, and hence com-
pletely incomparable to those of plants and animals (Buridan), or that the 
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human soul is said to be an indivisible whole of which all powers are present 
in every place — if it turns out not to be distinct from the sensitive soul — 
in contrast to the souls of perfect animals that are completely heterogeneous 
and composed ofvarious ƒ'ormae partiales (Oresme and Anonymus Fatar). For 
in both cases, the scientia de anima, as a science that studies all souls, seems 
to be reduced to a mere nominal unity. What I have called the fragile unity 
of this science is now lost, even though this conclusion is not (yet) drawn by 
the commentators themselves. The project of giving a natural philosophical 
account of soul that is able to incorporate the intellect as well has failed. It 
is not that the whole scientia de anima has changed its method; it is not that 
it became more empirical; it is simply that the intellective soul no longer fits 
within the basic natural philosophical framework. In that respect the later 
fourteenth-century tradition is more radical than even someone like Jandun, 
who, at least, was still able to incorporate the study of the separate intellect 
within natural philosophy. 
After the middle of the fourteenth century, it had become very difficult to 
maintain simultaneously that ( 1 ) the scientia de anima is a unity in which both 
the non-intellective and intellective souls are studied and (2) that it forms a 
part of natural philosophy. It becomes more and more appealing to assign 
this science to another domain. But it would take the next century before 
philosophers take this final step.212 
2,2BAKKER ) 'Natural Philosophy, Metaphysics, or Something in Between?', discusses the po-
sitions of three Renaissance authors: Agostino Nifo, Pietro Pomponazzi, and Marcantonio 
Genua. Of the three, only Pomponazzi considers the scientia de anima to be a part of natural 
philosophy. 
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Final conclusions 
In the introduction, I claimed that it is better to say that scientia de anima 
transforms than to say that it changes. In this concluding chapter I want to 
bring together what I think are some of the most important transformations 
in the period c. 1260-c. 1360. In doing so, I will also take up the question of 
the relation between the methodological and the doctrinal parts of the com-
mentaries. 
Radulphus Brito and William Ockham 
In the fourteenth century, two commentators in particular influenced the De 
anima tradition in ways that have not been noted before, namely Radulphus 
Brito and William Ockham. Brito made several important contributions. He 
was the first to discuss the topic of the numerical identity of accidents through 
generation and corruption in detail, in which he was followed by all later com-
mentators. But he was also the first to structure the discussion about the 
manner in which the soul inheres in the body by first discussing the souls of 
annulose animals, then those of perfect animals, and finally those of human 
beings. This method of beginning with the annulose animals and then mov-
ing to more complex animals became the standard manner in which the later 
commentators discuss the structure of the soul and its relation to the body. 
Unfortunately Brito was unclear about the criteria by means of which we 
can move from one level of complexity to the next. This became apparent 
in his discussion of the question whether the soul is extended throughout the 
body. Whereas Aquinas formulated one criterion that could be applied to all 
souls, namely that the soul is extended if and only if the living being can be 
divided in such a way that both parts continue to exercise all vital operations, 
Brito formulated two different criteria. The first is that souls that are not 
educed from the potency of matter are not extended throughout the body. 
The second is that in those cases where both parts of a divided living being 
continue to exercise all vital operations, their soul is extended. This led to 
difficulties in describing how the souls of perfect animals inhere in the body. 
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The mid-fourteenth-century commentators who took over Brito's 
approach to discussing the inherence of the soul disagreed about the criteria 
by which to move from the souls of the annulose animals to those of perfect 
animals. Because of their (implicit) disagreement about these criteria, they 
reached opposite conclusions about the innermost structure of the souls 
of perfect animals. Whereas these are heterogeneous according Oresme 
and Anonymus Fatar, these are homogeneous according to Buridan and 
Marsilius. 
William Ockham is the second philosopher who greatly influenced the De 
anima tradition, in spite of the fact that he has never written his own com-
mentary on Aristotle's treatise. All commentators from Aquinas to Jandun 
were practically unanimous in their description of the relation between the 
soul and its powers. The same applies to their description of the presence of 
the vegetative and sensitive souls in the body. All of them claimed, following 
Albert the Great, that the soul is really distinct from its powers, and that the 
relation between the powers and the soul should be described in terms of a 
flowing forth (fluxus). Ockham, by contrast, identifies the soul with its pow-
ers. In doing so, he introduces a distinction between two senses of the term 
'power', one of which applies to the soul itself and the other to the dispositions 
of the body. The soul is identical with its powers in the first sense, whereas in 
the second sense the powers are distinct from the soul. The distinction en-
abled him to discuss the question whether the soul is present everywhere in 
the body according to all its powers by means of the thought experiment of 
the eye in the foot. In all of this, he is followed by Buridan, Oresme, Anony-
mus Fatar, and Marsilius of Inghen. Even Pierre d'Ailly places himself in this 
tradition by including this new solution in his brief discussion of the soul's 
structure. There remained, however, two topics on which these philosophers 
could not agree even with the new distinction between senses of 'power' and 
the thought experiment in hand. The first is the structure of the souls of per-
fect animals. The second is the question whether a human being has one soul 
or two. Even Pierre d'Ailly called this second topic an undecidable question 
(problema neutrum). 
Methodology and doctrine 
The disagreement between the later fourteenth-century commentators can be 
traced back to a disagreement about the methodological aspects of the sci-
ence of the soul. But this latter disagreement is, contrary to what one might 
expect, not voiced in the methodological questions they take up in their com-
mentaries on the first book of the De anima. The methodological questions 
from book I turn out to be almost completely isolated from the remainder 
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of the commentaries. Their impact on how a commentator proceeds in his 
discussion of the controversial questions is negligible. Yet the methodological 
questions do have a crucial function, namely that of maintaining the fragile 
unity of the scientia de anima. All the methodological questions turn out to 
be, first of all, and most importandy, ways of including the human intellective 
soul within the same discipline that studies the other souls. It does not matter 
whether a commentator is closer to Aquinas, or Ockham, or even Averroes; 
they all agreed that the scientia de anima both belongs to natural philosophy 
and includes the study of the human soul. This is why it hardly mattered 
what stand a commentator took on the subject matter of the De anima. The 
constraint that this science belongs to natural philosophy precluded any real 
discussion of what is studied and how it is studied in terms of subject matter. 
Whether we opt for the soul or for the ensouled body, qua ensouled, the end 
result is the same. 
There are important methodological discussions that have a large impact 
on what views a commentators will defend. But these are not found in the 
methodological questions from book I. They are, instead, found, often im-
plicitly, in the questions from books II and III. The questions that seem, on 
the surface, to be methodological are not. But several questions that seem, 
on the surface, to have nothing to do with methodology are. Some important 
examples that I discussed in this book are, for instance: 
- How can we decide whether or not two accidents are numerically identical? 
And what does this imply for the question whether a human being has but one 
substantial form or multiple? 
- What allows us to decide whether a human being has but one soul or two? 
- By means of what criteria can we transfer our conclusions from the souls of 
annulose animals to those of perfect animals, and, finally, to those of humans? 
Sometimes the methodological aspect is discussed explicitly, as is the case 
in the second example given above. But more often this aspect is not thema-
tized explicitly, even though it plays a decisive role in the various answers to 
the question. The third example mentioned above shows this clearly. The rea-
son why it was so difficult to see to what extent Buridan, Oresme, and Anony-
mus Fatar differ in their views of the manner in which souls inhere in bodies 
is precisely because of the underlying disagreement about methodology. 
Natural philosophy, metaphysics and theology 
The examples of methodological disagreement given above go beyond the De 
anima tradition strictly speaking. The discussion about the identity of ac-
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cidents is closely related to the De generatione tradition, and the discussion 
about the number of souls in a human being is closely linked to that of the 
Metaphysica. Because the De anima tradition became a focal point for these 
important philosophical controversies, it was influenced by several other con-
texts. Perhaps the most important influence came from theology. The discus-
sions about the unicity and plurality of substantial form are heavily impacted 
by the Correctoria debates and the related Quodlibeta literature. Interestingly 
we find no direct references to the discussions from these theological genres 
in the commentaries on the De anima. But in the background the influence is 
there. One of the most important transformations that took place under the 
influence of the Correctoria literature and the related genre of Quodlibeta was 
a shift in emphasis from explaining the soul-body relation in terms of final 
causality to explaining it in terms of efficient causality. It was this shift that 
occasioned some new debates. The best example is the discussion of whether 
or not the dispositions of a substance that is complex enough to become alive 
and those of the actually living substance — as well as the accidents of the 
living body and those of the corpse — are numerically identical. In order to 
answer this new question, commentators increasingly turned to Aristotle's De 
generatione et corrupttone in their discussions about the soul. The result is that 
discussions about generation and corruption in general and those about how 
the soul is related to the body become intertwined. In the case of Buridan, this 
even led to the inclusion of two questions on the soul in his commentary on 
De generatione et corruptione. 
Here too there is an important difference between the period up until Jan-
dun and the period from Ockham onward. At first, the theological concerns 
that drive the discussion in the De anima function almost exclusively in the 
background. But in the period from Ockham onward, their influence be-
comes much more explicit, especially in the context of the discussions about 
the human soul. To put this more precisely, the theological concerns become 
explicit at the same time that the fragile unity of the De anima can no longer be 
maintained. This unity is disrupted once we are no longer allowed to transfer 
our conclusions about the souls of perfect animals to those of human beings. 
Theology fills this now open space. For even if we can demonstrate virtually 
nothing about the inherence of the human soul, we can, at least, introduce 
arguments that produce great faith, as we have seen in Ockham, Buridan, and 
Marsilius. 
It seemed, at first, that Oresme and Anonymus Fatar were able to maintain 
the unity of the scientia de anima. In contrast to the commentators mentioned 
above, they do not resort to theological arguments in the context of their dis-
cussion of the human soul. Nor do they describe the inherence of the soul 
as supernatural. But, on closer inspection, Oresme and Anonymus Fatar are 
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also the ones who are the least clear about how the human soul inheres in the 
body. In (almost) all places where they need to mention the human soul, they 
try to avoid taking a stand on the question whether human beings have but 
one soul, or two. From this perspective, that they did not resort to theological 
arguments, or to a description of the inherence of the human soul as super-
natural, hardly counts as an accompüshment. A more plausible interpretation 
is that they were not yet fully aware of the extent of the difficulties connected 
to the human soul, or, more precisely, of the impact that the description of the 
inherence of the human soul necessarily has on other parts of the De anima. 
The disruption of the fragile unity of the scientia de anima 
The increasing emphasis on the difference between the human soul and all 
other souls has a counterpart in the increasing emphasis on the difficulty of 
the scientia de anima. By the middle of the fourteenth century the discussion 
about Aristotle's comments on the difficulty and the certainty (ακρίβεια) of 
the science that studies the soul had led to the following position: the difficulty 
lies completely on the side of the intellective soul, which is enormously diffi­
cult to study on account the fact that neither the intellect nor its operations 
can be perceived. The certainty, on the other hand, was placed completely 
on the side of the vegetative and sensitive soul.1 Once the inherence of the 
intellective soul is thought to be completely different from that of the sensi­
tive soul, the already existing tendency to consider the intellective soul a very 
difficult subject to study is reinforced to the point that the intellective soul 
becomes so elusive that we could even begin to question whether it can be 
studied by a natural philosopher at all. 
Even if we maintain that it should still be studied in natural philosophy, 
we now have to admit that there is very little that we can demonstrate about 
it, whereas we certainly can demonstrate how the vegetative and sensitive soul 
relate to the bodies of plants/annulose animals and perfect animals. This does 
not mean that the later fourteenth-century philosophers were skeptical about 
what we, qua human beings, can know about the human soul. The evidence 
given by faith is a perfectly acceptable, and reliable basis for drawing inferences 
about the manner in which our soul inheres in our body. But it does mean 
that we, qua natural philosophers, are unable to develop a scientia de anima in 
which the vegetative, sensitive and intellective souls are studied according to 
the same paradigm and according to the same principles. It is in this precise 
sense that the fourteenth century bears witness to the gradual disruption of 
the fragile unity of the scientia de anima. 
'See above, section 3.3.4. 
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The philosophers of the mid-fourteenth century are convinced that they 
are able to determine what the innermost structure of the souls of annu-
lose and perfect animals is like. There is no hesitation in their answer to the 
thought experiment of the eye in the foot, even though they did disagree about 
what the right answer is. Their hesitation only starts at the level of the human 
soul. Once we take into account that the scientia de anima is meant to study 
all souls, we can see that there is no increasing empiricism in the fourteenth-
century De anima tradition. The fact that these commentators were convinced 
that we cannot demonstratively proceed from the operations of the human 
soul to its essential structure must be explained differently. For the very same 
philosophers were also convinced that proceeding from the operations to the 
essential structure is not only perfectly possible in the case of all other souls, 
but even that it is the proper way of proceeding in the De anima. Their discus-
sion of the essential structure of the soul, its mode of inherence in the body, 
and the implications of all of this for, for instance, the identity of accidents 
between the living body and the corpse, become more and more detailed. I 
would say that these discussion became so detailed that these were taken to 
their limits, to the point where Pierre d'Ailly did not even bother to mention 
the discussions any more. He simply gave Buridan's conclusions. At the same 
time, commentators increasingly doubted (under the influence of Ockham) 
the possibihty of actually demonstrating anything about the human soul. 
The result of these developments is a gap between our detailed demon-
strative knowledge of the structure of the souls of perfect animals and our lack 
of such knowledge about the structure of the human soul. If we consider what 
the commentators claim about the human soul from the perspective of their 
whole project in the scientia de anima, giving an account of all souls, their dis-
cussions no longer appear to be more empirical than those from the thirteenth 
century. Instead, they begin to appear as a final attempt to continue to discuss 
the human soul within the natural philosophical framework of the De anima, 
even though the unity of the scientia de anima is now almost impossible to 
maintain. An attempt that was bound to fail. 
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A Radulphi Britonis Questiones 
super librum de anima 
I have chosen to retain the orthography of the manuscripts, with some excep-
tions. I have introduced a c/t distinction and a u/v distinction that are not 
(consistently) found in the manuscripts. Paragraphing and punctuation are 
my own. Inversions and meaningless variants such as ille - iste and ergo -
ideo - igitur have not been included in the critical apparatus. 
The edition is not critical, nor is it meant to be. I have based the edition on 
MS F (Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conventi Soppressi, E. I. 252), 
following the editor of the third book of Brito's De anima commentary. ' But 
although F is a good manuscript in terms of legibility and relatively few ho-
moioteleuta, it also has a tendency to omit small, often important qualifica-
tions. In those cases where relevant qualifications are omitted, as well as in 
those cases where a word makes no grammatical or philosophical sense, I have 
not hesitated to take the reading from the second MS V ( Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 1059). In all other cases, I have tried 
to follow the reading of F as much as possible, which means that I have often 
retained readings that are stylistically awkward, and only in rare cases have I 
attempted to correct the sloppy use of the indicative and conjunctive. 
There are a few places where neither F nor V gives a reading that makes 
sense, usually because of a shared omission. In those rare cases, I have tried 
to remedy this by consulting a third manuscript, MS Ρ (Paris, Bibliothèque 
nationale, Lat. 14.705). This is the oldest known manuscript, which seems to 
contain a slightly different redaction.2 
' For the stemma, see RADULPHUS BRITO, Quaesttones De ammo, hber tertius, in: F. Fauser, 
Der Kommentar des Radulphus Brito zu Buch IH De anima, kritische Edition und philosophisch-
historische Einleitung, Munster: Aschendorff, 1974, 80. 
2See RADULPHUS BRITO, QdA, 64-66 
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Abbreviations:3 
add. 
coni. 
con. 
del. 
ƒ· 
in marg. 
inv. 
lin. 
om. 
scrips. 
sup. 
suppl. 
t 
(?) 
(!) 
[···] 
<.. .> 
: addidit 
: conicio 
: correxit 
: delevit 
: folium 
: in margine 
: invertit 
: linea 
: omisit 
: scripsit 
: supra 
: supplevit 
: locus corruptus esse videtur 
: lectio incerta 
: sic 
: deleted by the editor 
: inserted by the editor 
31 have followed the system of abbreviations suggested by the S.I.E.P.M. as described in A. 
DONDAINE, 'Abréviations latines et signes recommandés pour l'apparat critique des éditions de 
textes médiévaux', Bulletin de L· Société internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale, 
2(1960), 142-149. 
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F: MS Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conventi Soppressi, E. I. 252 
P: MS Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, Lat. 14.705 
V: MS Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 1059 
1.1 Utrum de anima possit esse scientia 
Circa librum De antma primo in generali queratur utrum de anima possit esse lei™ F, 9ra ν 
scientia. 
Arguitur quod non quia: omne illud de quo est scientia est intelligibile; sed 
anima non est intelligibilis; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia scientia est habitus in-
5 tellectualis; et ideo illud de quo est scientia est intelligibile. Minor probatur 
saltern de anima intellectiva et hoc dupliciter. Primo sic quia: nichil est intelli­
gibile nisi prius fiierit sensibile, quia, sicut patet tertio De antma, intelligentem 
necesse est fantasmata speculari; modo anima intellectiva non cadit sub sensu, 
nee per se nee secundum aliquam sui operationem; ergo non est intelligibilis. 
io Secundo probatur hoc idem quia: si anima intellectiva esset intelligibilis, 
tunc esset idem in actu et in potentia respectu eiusdem; hoc autem est incon-
veniens; quare etc. Probatio maior<is> quia: intelligibile ut sic est in actu 
respectu intelligentis, ut patet tertio De anima, quia obiectum est in actu re­
spectu potentie; intellectus autem est in potentia respectu intelligibilis; ergo, 
is si intellectus intelligeret seipsum, idem esset in actu et in potentia. Falsitas 
consequentis patet, quia actus et potentia sunt differentie maxime opposite, 
ut patet per Philosophum in prohemio huius. 
Item ad principale: illud de quo est scientia oportet habere partes et pas­
siones; sed anima non potest habere partes et passiones; ideo etc. Maior patet 
20 primo Postenorum, quia scientia est unius generis subiecti partes et passiones 
eius considerans. Minor patet per Philosophum in prohemio hutus, qui di-
cit quod anime nulla est propria operatic, sed omnes sunt totius coniuncti. 
Etiam quod habet passiones substat respectu earum; modo anima non potest 
substare respectu passionis cum sit forma simplex, quia, ut patet nono Meta-
7 AA 6 167; Aristoteles, De anima, III.7, 431al6-17 Cf De anima, III.8, 432a7-9 13 Forse« 
Aristoteles, De anima, III.4, 429al5-17 17 Aristoteles, De anima, 1.1, 402a26-27 
20 Aristoteles, Analytica Posteriora, 1.28, 87a38 21 AA 6:10; Aristoteles, De anima 1.1, 
403a7-10 24-25 Locus non inventus 
2 scientia ] et add V 3 arguitur ] primo add V 4—5 intellectualis ] intelligibilis V 6 sic ] 
om V 7 prius ] om V intelligentem ] intellective V 9 per ] secundum V sui 
operationem ] eius comparationem V 11 tunc ] om V in ] om V autem ] om V 
13 ut] sicutV patet] m add V 14 intellectus] intelligensV est] om V 15 seipsum] 
seV 16 patet] apparetV 17 philosophum] commentatoremV 18 oportet] debetV 
18-19 passiones] ideo etc. add F 20 quia] om V 24 nono] septimo V 
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physice, forma non est, nee materia, sed totum compositum est; et ideo cum 25 
anima intellectiva sit quedam forma, non est id quod est, sed id quo aliquid 
habet esse. 
Item Philosophus primo huius: dicere animam irasci simile est ac si dica-
tur texere vel edificare; set iste sunt false 'anima texit' et 'edificat'; ergo et illa 
'anima irascitur vel intelligit', et sic de aliis. Sed non sunt alie passiones anime. 30 
Ideo etc. 
Item quod habet passiones substat respectu earum; sed anima non substat, 
quia omne quod substat, substat ratione materie, que est primum substans; 
sed anima non habet materiam; ideo etc. 
Item anima non habet partes cum sit forma simplex. 35 
In oppositum est Philosophus, qui dicit quod ystoriam de anima, id est scien-
tiam de anima, in primis ponemus. Ergo intentio sua est quod de anima est 
scientia. Hoc etiam apparet per omnes commentatores. Unde Themistius di-
cit quod si anima de seipsa deeepta sit, quomodo de aliis fida putabitur? — 
quasi diceret: nullo modo. Etiam Philosophus dicit quod illa scientia prodest 40 
ad omnem veritatem; ideo nulla potest haberi sine ista. 
Ad illam questionem dico quod de anima potest esse scientia, quia de ilio 
potest esse scientia quod est ens, intelligibile et habet partes et proprietates 
que de ipso possunt probari, Modo anima est huiusmodi. 
Est enim ens, quia est actus corporis, ut dicit Philosophus secundo huius. 45 
Est etiam intelligibilis quantum ad vegetativam et sensitivam, quia ope-
rationes anime vegetative et sensitive apparent ad sensum, ex quibus opera-
tionibus possunt intelligi. Etiam quantum ad animam intellectivam ipsa est 
intelligibilis sicut et alia, ut dicit Philosophus tertio huius. Et circa hoc est 
difficultas de modo secundum quem anima intellectiva est intelligibilis. Et 50 
de hoc sunt due vie. Una est quod postquam intelligit alia, intelligit seipsam. 
Unde intellectus factus in actu per cognitionem rei intelligitur a se, sicut per 
cognitionem hominis vel lapidis intellectus est factus in actu et tunc, cum ipse 
sit factus in actu, intelligitur a se sicut et alia. Sed se intelligit ut est possibi-
28 Aristoteles, De anima 1.4, 408bll-13 36 Aristoteles, De anima I.l, 402a4-5 38 -
39 Themistius, Paraphrasis m libres Aristotelis De anima, 3y9^0; cf. AA 6:32 40 Aristoteles, 
De anima I.l, 402a5-6; cf. AA 6:3 45 Aristoteles, De anima ILI, 412a27-8; cf. AA 6:41 
49 Aristoteles, De anima, IIL4, 430a3; cf. AA 6:147 
25 nee materia ] et materia non est V est ] om. V 26 id ] illud V id | illud V 28 huius ] 
dicit quod add. V ac ] ut V 29 vel ] et V anima ] homo V edificat ] ita est ibi add. V 
33 quod substat ] substans V 34 sed ] om. V 36 quod ] om. V 37 ponemus ] ponete V 
38 apparet] patetV 41 ideo] ymmoV 43 ens] om. V 47 anime] om. V 48 ipsa] 
ista V 51 due] om. V Una] via add. V 52 per] om. V 53 cognitionem] 90nem 
scrips. V (passim) 54 factus ] om. V 
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55 lis. Et hoc est quod dicit Philosophus in tertio huius: 'Cum autem sic singula 
fiat', vult quod intelligit se sicut et alia. Sed hie est difficultas utrum simul et 
semel intelligat se et alia, vel successive, ita quod primo intelligat alia et po-
stea seipsum. Oppinio communis est, quousque de hoc sit discussum, quod 
primo intelligit alia a se et postea seipsum intelligit inquantum est informatus 
60 cognitione aliorum. Alia opinio est quod simul intelligit se et alia, quia idem 
est actus quo intellectus intelligit alia et intelligit se, quia substantia intellec-
tus possibilis non cognoscitur nisi per habitudinem | ad cognitionem aliorum. i6rb F 
Que autem istarum oppinionum sit verior inferius apparebit. 
Item habet partes subiectivas ut est in diversis speciebus et partes potesta-
65 tivas prout est in uno, sicut in bove anima habet plures potentias, et similiter 
de aliis. 
Item habet passiones, sic scilicet quod ratione sui subiecti passiones insunt 
toti coniuneto. 
Item habet operationes, saltem ut est in corpore, que insunt toti coniuneto 
70 per naturam anime, sicut intelligere, vivere, sentire et augmentare et generare 
et moveri et sie de aliis. Et sic de anima est scientia illa prout est forma cor-
poris. Etiam scientia illa est valde necessaria, quia secundum Philosophum in 
prohemio huius: ista scientia de anima proficit ad omnem veritatem, id est ad 
omnem scientiam, quia subiecti cognitio valet ad cognitionem aeeidentium; 
75 modo anima subiectum est omnium scientiarum; ideo etc. 
Sed est hie notandum quod ista scientia de anima est ut est perfectio cor-
poris. Modo aliquis dubitaret utrum de anima secundum se considerata pos-
set esse scientia. Commentator diceret quod non, quia ipse ponit quod anima 
intellectiva non possit separari a corpore. Ymmo ipse vult quod semper sit 
so coniuncta corpori quantum ad eius operationem. Et ideo secundum ipsum 
non possumus habere scientiam de ipsa anima in qua non determinetur de 
ipsa ut est coniuncta corpori. Tarnen secundum veritatem et fidem nostram 
et etiam secundum Philosophum intellectus est separabilis a corpore, quia, ut 
patet in secundo huius, separatur ab aliis potentiis sicut perpetuum a corrup-
55 Aristoteles, De anima III.4, 429b5 73 Aristoteles, De anima 1.1, 402a5-ó; cf. AA 6:3 
84 AA 6:52; Aristoteles, De anima 11.2, 413b26-27 
55 in ] om. V 55-56 sic singula fiat ] sicut singula fiant F 56 hic ] in hoc V 57 ita ] vel 
F 57-58 postea ] intelligat add. V 58 seipsum ] seipsam V 59 intelligit ] intelligat V 
60 cognitione] 90ne scrips. F (passim) 61 alia] om. V substantia] substantia^) F s'b2 
scrips. V 62 cognoscitur ] cognoscuntur F 63 autem ] om. V sit ] sint F 65 prout ] ut V 
bove ] anima add. V 66 de ] in V 67 sic ] om. F sui subiecti ] sua iste V 68 coniuneto ] 
composito V 69 Item ] quod V est ] sunt F coniuneto ] quod habet operationes saltem ut 
est in corpore que insunt toti coniuneto add. V 70-71 intelligere vivere... de aliis ] sentire 
intelligere et nutrirere(!) etc. V 71 est] eritV prout] u tV 73 id est] etV 74 omnem 
scientiam ] omnes scientias V 76 hie ] om. V 79 ipse ] om. V 80 corpori ] cum aliquo 
corporeV 81 determinetur] detenminaturV 82 Tarnen] undeV 
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tibili. Et ideo bene potest esse scientia de anima ut separabilis est secundum se 85 
et absolute. Sed ista scientia erit divina. Unde est intelligendum quod dictum 
est quod intellectus intelligit se ut est informatus cognitione alicuius rei. 
Aliquis dubitaret quomodo intellectus habet cognitionem sui ipsius ut est 
possibilis. Unde ut habet cognitionem rei visum est quomodo est intelligibi-
lis. Sed ut est possibilis antequam sit informatus cognitione rei dubium est 90 
quomodo intelligitur. 
Et dico, sicut Philosophus dicit primo Physicorum, quod materia, cum sit 
ens in potentia, per analogiam ad formam habet intelligi. Et intellectus pos­
sibilis, cum sit in potentia ad intentiones universales, sicut materia ad formas 
sensibiles, ut dicit Commentator tertio huius, habet intelligi per analogiam ad 95 
cognitionem que est informativa sui, ita quod primo cognoscit se ut est infor­
matus cognitione rei, et quia aliud est illud per quod est ens actu et alia est 
substantia ipsius intellectus possibilis que est in potentia ad ilium actum, ideo 
per habitudinem ad talem cognitionem intellectus possibilis potent cognosci. 
Tunc ad rationes. 100 
Ad primam. Cum dicitur 'illud de quo est scientia est intelligibile', conce-
datur. Et cum dicitur 'anima intellectiva non est intelligibilis', falsum est. Et 
cum probatur quia: 'omne illud quod est intelligibile oportet quod sit sensibi-
9rb ν le', dico quod aliquid potest esse intelligibile duphciter: vel primo et | princi-
paliter, vel ex intellectione alterius. Modo illud quod est intelligibile primo est 105 
sensibile vel secundum se vel secundum aliqua sui accidentia. Sed illud quod 
est intelligibile ex intellectione alterius non oportet quod sit sensibile, sed suf­
ficit quod illud sit sensibile ex cuius intellectione intelligitur, sicut privationes 
inteUiguntur per habitum. Et ideo non oportet quod privationes sint sensibi­
les, sed earum cognitio dependet ex cognitione alicuius quod est sensibile. Sic 110 
est in proposito, quia intellectus ex hoc quod alia cognoscit vel intelligit est in­
telligibilis secundario. Ita cognitio eius dependet ex cognitione aliarum rerum 
quas intelligit. Et cognitio illarum rerum dependet ex sensu. Sed de operatio-
ne anime vegetative et sensitive non est ita, quia operationes iste dependent ex 
sensu et ex hoc intelligimus animam vegetativam et sensitivam. 115 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'si intellectus esset intelligibilis, idem esset in actu 
et in potentia', dico quod idem esse in actu et in potentia respectu eiusdem 
92 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica 1.7, 191a8-l 1; AA 1:29 95 Locus non inventus 
86 est ] om. V quod ] quia V 87 informatus ] informatum F 92 Et ] om. V sit ] dicit 
V 96 que est informativa ) sine est informata F 97 alia ] aliud V est ] om. V 98 que ] 
quiV 105 ex] om. V 111 vel intelligit ] et sic V 112 aliarum] aliorumF 114 et] vel 
V 114-115 dependent ex sensu ] apparent ad sensum V 115 intelligimus] intelligitur V 
animam vegetativam et sensitivam ] anima vegetativa et sensitiva V 
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et eodem modo est inconveniens, sed alio et alio modo non est inconveniens. 
Et cum dicitur 'anima ut intelligens esset in potentia, secundum quod intel-
120 lecta esset in actu', dico quod intellectus ut est possibilis sic est intelligens, 
sed ut est informatus per cognitionem rei, ut sic est intelligibilis, sicut et alia 
intelligibilia. Et sic est intelligibilis et intelligens diversimode et in actu et in 
potentia. 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'de quo est scientia habet passiones', concedatur 
us vel saltern alterum per ipsum. Et cum dicitur 'anima non habet passiones', 
falsum est. Licet | enim anima separata non habeat passiones, ut considera- i6iva F 
tur hic totum compositum ex anima et corpore habet passiones, per animam 
tarnen. 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'illud quod habet passiones substat respectu ea-
130 rum', verum est vel est illud mediante quo alterum substat eis. Modo totum 
coniunctum substat passionibus per animam. Unde totius coniuncti est intel-
ligere et sentire per animam tarnen. Et sic patet ad illud quod Aristoteles dicit 
in prohemio et in primo capitule de erroribus. 
Ad aliud dicendum quod non omne substans respectu accidentium habet 
135 materiam. Et quando dicitur 'materia est primum substans', verum est re-
spectu formarum substantialium, non respectu accidentium, quia subiectum 
accidentium est ens actu. Sed contra: dicitur quod quedam accidentia conse-
quuntur subiectum ratione materie, ut quantitas, et quedam ratione forme, ut 
propria accidentia. Dicendum quod omnia sunt ratione forme ut est in mate-
140 ria. Sed quia forma perfectior habet formas imperfectiores in virtute, et aliqua 
accidentia consequuntur ad earn ut habet illas formas in virtute, sic anima 
rationalis habet in virtute sensitivum et Vegetativum et eodem modo forma 
mixti et forma que dat esse corporeum ut corpus est de genere substantie. Et 
aliqua insunt in homine ratione eius ut est rationalis, et aliqua ut habet vim 
us sensitivam et vegetativam, et sic de aliis. Ideo accidentia que insunt composito 
ratione qua hec forma habet in virtute formas imperfectiores, que sunt magis 
immerse materie, dicuntur esse ex parte materie. 
Ad aliud patet. 
1.2 Utrum de anima possit esse scientia naturalis 
118 inconveniens] impossibile V 119 ut] cum est V 121 informatus] ìctuadd.V et] 
ut V 122 intelligibilia] per cognitionem rei add. V et] ut V et intelligens ] sicut et 
V diversimode] est intelligibilis et intelligens add. V et] om. V 124 dicitur] illud add. 
V concedatur ] conceditur V 126 separata ] a corpore add. V 126-127 consideratur ] 
concediturV 127 hic ] hoc tarnen V 131 passionibus] om. V 137 accidentium] om. 
V contra] quia add. V 138 quantitas] qualitas F 140 in] in add. V et] in add. V 
141 formas] om. V 147 materie] et alia ex parte forme add. V 148 aliud] aliam V 
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161va F, 9rb ν Consequenter queritur utrum de anima possit esse naturalis. 
Arguitur quod non quia: illa que sunt moventia non mota non sunt physice 
considerationis, ut dicitur secundo Physicorum; sed anima est movens non 
mota; ergo etc. Maior patet. Minor patet, quia anima est principium motus 
et non mota, quia omne quod movetur est ens actu; sed anima non est ens 5 
actu sed actus, quia quod est ens actu est aggregatum ex materia et forma; 
modo anima non est aggregatum ex materia et forma, immo actus simplex; 
ergo anima non movetur; quare etc. 
Item forma que non est perfectio materie non est de consideratione natu­
ralis; sed anima, saltem intellectiva, non est perfectio materie; ideo etc. Maior io 
patet. Minor patet per Philosophum tertio huius: anima nullius corporis est 
actus. 
In oppositum est Philosophus, qui ponit scientiam de anima inter scientias 
naturales. Et Avicenna ponit librum suum esse sextum de naturalibus. 
Dicendum quod scientia de anima est naturalis, quia illa scientia est naturalis is 
que considérât formam perficientem materiam; sed ista scientia est huiusmo-
di; ergo etc. Maior patet secundo Physicorum. Minor <patet> per Philoso-
phum secundo huius, qui diffinit sic animam, dicens quod sit actus corporis 
etc. Et postea dicit quod illa diffmitio est communis. Ergo omnis anima est 
actus corporis sive materie. 20 
Item illud quo vivimus, sentimus et intelligimus principaliter non subiec-
tive est forma perficiens materiam; modo anima est illud quo principaliter 
vivimus, sentimus et intelligimus per Philosophum secundo huius; ideo etc. 
Maior patet per Philosophum ibidem, quia illud quo aliquid operatur est du-
plex: vel 'quo' sicut materiale, vel 'quo' sicut forma quod est illud quo ali- 25 
quid operatur principaliter. Minor patet per Philosophum ut dictum est, quia 
anima vegetativa est illud quo vivimus principaliter, sensitiva quo sentimus, 
intellectiva quo intelligimus. 
3 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica II.7, 198a27-29 11 Cf. Aristoteles, De anima III.4, 429a24-27 
17 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, 11.3, 194bl2-13 18 AA 6:41; Aristoteles, De anima, II.l, 412al9-
22, 27-28, b5-6 23 Aristoteles, De anima, II.2, 414al2-13; cf. AA 6:49 
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Tunc ad rationes. 
30 Ad primam. Cum dicitur 'ilia que sunt moventia non mota' etc., verum 
est vel non habentia attributionem ad motum. Et cum dicitur 'anima est mo-
vens non mota', dupliciter potest dici: primo quod anima est mota saltern 
per accidens, quia moto corpore moventur omnia que sunt in corpore, vel 
quod habet attributionem ad motum, quia est principium motus. Et cum 
35 dicitur quod anima non movetur, verum est per se. Tarnen per accidens bene 
movetur et habet attributionem ad motum. 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'anima intellectiva non est perfectio materie', fal-
sum est secundum fidem et veritatem. Et cum dicitur quod Philosophus dicit 
quod anima intellectiva nullius corporis est actus, dicendum quod Philoso-
40 phus sic intelligit quod nullius corporis sit actus, quia non est perficiens Or­
ganum, quia non exercet suam operationem mediante organo corporali sicut 
anima sensitiva, ut visus et auditus perficiunt Organum corporale. Et propter 
hoc dicit quod anima | intellectiva nullius partis corporis est actus. Vel au- i6rb F 
tem sicut communiter dicitur quod ipse intelligit quod nullius partis corporis 
45 est actus, quia non est actus deductus de potentia materie ab ipso generante. 
Sed Commentator aliter responderet. Diceret enim quod illud quod non est 
perfectio materie nee habens habitudinem ad materiam, tale non pertinet ad 
scientiam naturalem. Modo anima intellectiva, licet non sit perfectio corporis, 
dependet tarnen ex ipso corpore in sua operatione. 
1.3 Utrum subiectum in ilio libro sit corpus animatum vel anima 
Consequenter queritur utrum subiectum in ilio libro sit corpus animatum vel i6ivb F, 9rb ν 
anima. 
Arguitur primo quod anima sit hic subiectum per Philosophum, qui dicit 
quod propter utraque hic istoriam de anima in primis ponemus. Vult ergo 
s quod anima sit hic subiectum. 
Item in principio libri De sensu et sensato continuans istum librum cum 
ilio dicit sic 'quoniam determinatum est de anima' etc. Et ita vult quod anima 
sit hic subiectum. 
3 Aristoteles, De anima 1.1,40234-5 6 Aristoteles, De sensu et sensato 1.1, 436a 1-2 
29 tune] om.W 31 est] om. V 32 primo] om.V 33 omnia] eaV 34 motum] sed 
add. V 35 est ] sup. lin. F bene ] om. V 39-40 est actus... nullius corporis ] om. V 
43-45 vel autem... est actus ] om. V 3 primo ] om. V philosophum ] in littera add. V 
5 sit ] est V hic ] ibi V 6 et sensato ] om. V continuans ] continuando V 6-7 cum 
Ulo ] ad istum V 7 quoniam ] quod V est de anima ] om. F 
305 
APPENDIX A. RADULPHI BRITONIS Questiones super librum de anima 
Item <illud est ibi subiectum a quo intitulatur liber; sed> ille liber inti-
tulatur ab anima. Maior patet, quia intitulatio libri debet fieri a digniori in 10 
scientia. Illud autem est subiectum. Minor patet, quia ille liber dicitur De 
anima. 
Item illud est subiectum cuius passiones sunt inquisite; sed anime passio-
nes sunt inquisite, sicut sentire, intelligere etc. 
Item illud est subiectum sub cuius ratione omnia considerantur hie; sed is 
anima est huiusmodi; ideo etc. Maior patet, quia hoc est de ratione subiecti. 
Minor patet, quia de corpore non determinatur nisi ut est subiectum anime; 
ideo etc. 
Oppositum arguitur quia: sicut se habet scientia ad scientiam, sic se habet sub­
iectum ad subiectum; modo ista scientia est pars subiectiva subiecti scientie 20 
naturalis; ergo subiectum istius libri est pars subiectiva subiecti scientie natu­
ralis. Modo subiectum scientie naturalis est corpus mobile. Et anima non est 
pars subiectiva corporis mobilis, ymmo magis corpus animatum; igitur anima 
ψ' ν non est hic subiectum ymmo magis corpus animatum.) 
Item illud est subiectum in hac scientia cuius operationes et passiones sunt 25 
inquisite in hac scientia; modo operationes et passiones inquisite in hac scien­
tia sunt totius coniuncti et non ipsius anime; ergo totum coniunctum sive 
corpus animatum est hic subiectum. Maior istius rationis satis patere po­
test ex hoc quod subiectum est illud cuius passiones inquiruntur in scientia. 
Minor patet, quia iste operationes que sunt gaudere et tristari etc. non sunt 30 
operationes anime, ymmo totius coniuncti, ut dicit Philosophus primo huius 
in capitule de erroribus. Etiam dicit quod simile est dicere animam gaude­
re vel tristari et dicere earn texere vel edificare. Modo dicere earn texere est 
inconveniens. Ergo et intelligere est inconveniens. 
Ad illam questionem ego dico quod subiectum in hac scientia est corpus ani- 35 
matum sub ratione anime, vel sub ratione qua animatum. Et ratio huius 
potest esse duplex. Prima est illa quia: illud est hic subiectum cuius sunt 
31-32 Cf.Aristoteles,Deam'maI.l,4031al6-I9 32 Cf. Aristoteles, Deamma 1.4,408bl 1-13; 
AA 6:14 
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operationes et passiones hic inquisite; sed passiones hic inquisite sunt totius 
coniuncti; unde intelligere est totius coniuncti. Et anima est Ulud quo prin-
40 cipaliter ille operationes insunt toti coniuncto. Et ideo totum ratione anime 
est subiectum. Item Philosophus dicit secundo Physicorum quod quicumque 
habet considerare formam habet considerare materiam usque ad quid ut est 
subiectum forme, sicut qui considérât sanitatem considérât nervum ut sub-
iectum est sanitatis; modo anima est forma perficiens corpus; ergo conside-
45 rantem de anima oportet considerare de corpore ut est subiectum anime; ideo 
aggregatum ex corpore et anima est hic subiectum ratione anime. 
Et confìrmatur ex alio quia: quod est principium essendi alicuius est prin-
cipium intelligendi eius; modo anima est principium essendi totius coniunc-
ti; ergo est principium intelligendi. Et ideo totum est hic subiectum ratione 
so anime. Et propter hoc Philosophus in secundo huius diffiniens animam dif-
finit eam per corpus dicendo quod anima est actus corporis physici organici 
potentia vitam habentis. 
Tunc ad rationes. 
Ad primam. Cum dicitur quod Philosophus dicit ystoriam de anima etc., 
55 verum est. Pro tanto dicit hoc, quia principale sub cuius ratione consideratur 
totum coniunctum est anima. Per idem potest solvi dictum Philosophi in 
principio libri De sensu. 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'illud est hic subiectum a quo iste liber intitu-
latur', dico quod non oportet, quia aliquando liber intitulatur ab efficiente, 
60 aliquando a subiecto, et aliquando ab eo quod est formale in subiecto, sicut 
est in proposito. Iste liber intitulatur ab anima, quia anima est formale ratione 
cuius corpus animatum est hic | subiectum. i62ra F 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'illud est hic subiectum cuius sunt passiones hic 
inquisite', concedo. Et cum dicitur quod iste sunt ipsius anime solum, falsum 
65 est. Imo sunt totius coniuncti sicut subiecti, et hoc per animam, ita quod 
anima non intelligit vel sentit, sed totum compositum per animam. 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'illud sub cuius ratione omnia determinata hic 
considerantur est hic subiectum', dico quod li 'sub cuius ratione' potest dupli-
41 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, 11.2, 194a22-27 50 Aristoteles, De anima ILI, 412al9-22, 27-28, 
b5-6;cf.AA6:41 
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citer intelligi. Vel 'sub cuius ratione' sicut sub ratione subiecti quod conside-
ratur in scientia, vel sub ratione eius quod est formale in subiecto. Maior vera 70 
est in primo sensu et non in secundo. Et ad minorem dicendum quod ani­
ma est illud sub cuius ratione consideratur omnia hic, sicut sub ratione eius 
quod formale est in subiecto, <quia anima est illud> quo corpus animatum 
hic consideratur. Et non est illud quod consideratur sicut subiectum. 
1.4 Utrum omnis scientia speculativa sit de numero bonorum 
honorabilium 
lei" F, 9va v Consequenter queritur utrum omnis scientia speculativa sit de numero bono­
rum honorabilium. 
Arguitur quod non quia: sicut dicit Philosophus sexto Metaphystce versus fi-
nem 'bonum et malum sunt in rebus, verum et falsum sunt in anima'; mo­
do scientia est in anima; ergo non debet dici de numero bonorum, immo de s 
numero verorum. 
Item quod ordinatur ad malum non est de numero bonorum honorabi­
lium; modo aliqua scientia speculativa ordinatur ad malum, ut scientia sophi-
stica ordinatur ad deceptionem; ergo etc. 
Item quedam sunt scientie prohibite sicut nigromantia; ergo non omnis io 
scientia speculativa est de numero bonorum honorabilium. 
Item quod ordinai hominem ad malum non est est bonum; modo scien­
tia est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Minor patet, quia sicut dicit Philosophus primo 
Pollthce 'sevissima est iniustitia habens arma', id est habens scientiam vel sa-
pientiam deducendo malitiam suam. Vult ergo quod scientia potest ordinari is 
ad malum. Etiam videmus quod isti qui habent scientiam lucrativam, sicut 
qui sciunt leges, plura et maiora mala faciunt per scientiam suam quam Uli 
qui sunt ignari et ignorantes; quare etc. 
Item probatio quod non omnis scientia sit de numero bonorum honora­
bilium quia: bonum utile non est bonum honorabile, quia illa ex opposito 20 
distinguuntur, ut patet primo Ethworum; modo scientia est bonum utile, et 
3^1 AA 1:153; Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VIA, 1027b25-27 13-14 AA 15.10; Aristoteles, 
Politica 1.2, 1253a31-33 21 Aristoteles, Ethica, 11.3, 1104b30-31 
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maxime ista scientia, ut dicit Philosophus in littera, est bonum utile — di-
cit enim quod scientia de anima utilis est ad omnem veritatem et maxime ad 
naturam; ergo scientia speculativa non est bonum honorabile. 
25 Item illud bonum quod est ordinatum ad aliud non est bonum honora-
bile; modo omnes scientie speculative alie a mathematica ordinantur ad me-
taphysicam; ergo nulla scientia speculativa alia a metaphysica est honorabilis, 
sed magis laudabilis. 
In oppositum est Philosophus, qui dicit 'bonorum honorabilium notitiam 
so oppinantes' etc. 
Ad istam questionem ego dico duo. Primo quod omnis scientia est de numero 
bonorum. Secundo dico quod omnes scientie speculative sunt de numero 
bonorum honorabilium. 
Primum dedaratur sic quia: illud quod omnes homines naturaliter appe-
35 tunt est bonum; modo omnes homines naturaliter appetunt scire; ergo omnis 
scientia est bona. Maior patet primo Ethicorum et tertio Topicorum. Minor 
patet primo Metaphyske, ubi dicitur quod omnes homines natura scire desi-
derant. Item hoc probatur specialiter de scientiis speculativis quia: perfectio 
uniuscuiusque est summum bonum; modo scientie speculative sunt perfectio 
40 intellectus; ergo sunt eius bonum. 
Secundum dedaratur, scilicet quod scientie speculative sint bonum hono-
rabile, quia: quod queritur propter se et non propter aliud est bonum hono-
rabile; modo scientie speculative queruntur propter se, non propter alterum; 
quare etc. Maior patet per diffinitionem boni honorabilis et boni laudabilis. 
45 Unde bonum laudabile est quod queritur propter aliud, sicut scientie lucrative 
ut scientia medicinalis et consimiles, bonum autem honorabile est quod que-
ritur propter se, sicut satis potest haberi ex primo Ethicorum; modo scientie 
speculative queruntur propter se, quia queruntur propter fugam ignorantie; 
ergo sunt de numero bonorum honorabilium. 
so | Et tu dices: quare tunc philosophi non honorantur? Dico quod secun- i62rb F 
dum rei veritatem ipsi debent honorari. Unde Tullius dicit libello De sertectute 
22 Aristoteles, De anima 1.1, 402a5-7; cf. AA 6:3 29 Aristoteles, De anima LI, 402al-2 
36 AA 12:1; Aristoteles, Ethica, Lì, 1094a 1-3 AA 36:38; Aristoteles, Topica ULI, 116a 19-
20 37 AA 1:1, Aristoteles, Metaphysica LI, 980a21 47 Aristoteles, Ethica 1.6, 1096b 13-16 
51 Cf. Cicero, De senectute, 1.2 
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philosophie [non] est honor condignus: 'numquam satis laudari poterit no­
men philosophye'. Et Seneca dich 'philosophus apud pessimos est honoran-
dus'. Sed forte causa est quare non honorantur, quia homines non addiscunt 
nisi ad divitias et bona extrinseca, non tarnen addiscunt ad bona anime. 55 
Tune ad rationes. 
Ad primam. Cum dicitur 'bonum et malum sunt in rebus', causa istius 
propositionis est quia bonum et malum dieuntur ut terminant appetitum; 
modo appetitus non movetur ad illud quod habet in se, sed ad illud quod est 
extra se, sicut ad emptionem rei extra; et ideo dicitur quod bonum et malum, 60 
9vb ν que sunt termini appetitus, sunt in re. Sed verum et falsum sunt | in anima, 
quia sunt in conformitate intellectus ad rem vel disconformitate. Et quia ilia 
conformitas vel disconformitas est in intellectu, ideo dicitur quod verum et 
falsum sunt in intellectu. Quando ergo dicitur quod bonum et malum sunt 
in rebus, concedatur. Et cum dicitur 'scientia est in anima', dico quod anima 65 
potest considerar! dupliciter, vel ut est cognoscens et conformis rei, vel ut est 
quedam forma naturalis nata perfici scientiis. Modo verum et falsum sunt in 
anima ut est potentia cogitativa. Sed ut est quedam res et quedam forma natu­
ralis, scientia est bonum anime ut est perfectio eius. Et ignorantia est malum 
similiter eius. 70 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'quod ordinatur ad malum' etc., verum est si per se 
ordinetur ad malum. Et cum dicitur 'quedam scientie sunt huiusmodi, sicut 
sophistica ad decipiendum', dico quod non ordinatur per se ad decipiendum, 
ymmo ad hoc ordinatur ut aliquis sibi caveat a deceptione. Si autem aliquis 
decipiat alterum per sophisticam, hoc est per accidens. Et cum dicitur 'ni- 75 
gromantie sunt prohibite', credo quod ille non sunt scientie, quia non habent 
aliquem certum modum procedendi, ut apparet Ulis qui viderunt. Vel potest 
dici sicut Albertus dicit in quodam traetatu quod, licet iste scientie possint or­
dinari ad malum, tarnen cognitio ipsarum non est mala si quis non appücaret 
ipsas ad malum opus. so 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'quod ordinai hominem ad malum' etc., verum 
est si per se hoc facial. Et cum dicitur 'scientia est huiusmodi', dico quod 
non est verum per se. Sed si ita sii, hoc est per accidens. Et cum dicitur 
53 Cf Seneca, Epistulae morales ad Luahum, lib. II, ep. XIV 11 78 Locus non inventus 
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'sevissima est iniustitia habens arma', dico quod hoc est per accidens, nam 
85 habens appetitum perversum régulât et ordinat scientiam suam ad malum. 
Scientia tamen per se ordinatur ad bonum. 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'bonum utile non est honorabile', dico quod bo-
num utile potest intelligi dupliciter: vel quod est solum ad alterum ordinatum, 
ita quod numquam propter se quereretur sicut dieta, vel sicut potio amara. Et 
90 tale bonum utile non est bonum honorabile, ymmo ex opposito distinguun-
tur. Aliud est bonum utile quod, cum hoc quod queritur propter aliud, que-
ritur etiam propter se. Et tale bene potest esse honorabile. Modo scientia de 
anima est huiusmodi, quia cum hoc quod est utilis ad alias scientias, etiam 
propter se queritur. 
95 Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'bonum quod est ordinatum ad aliud non est ho-
norabile', verum est si sit ordinatum ad aliud tamquam propter operationem, 
ymmo illud est laudabile. Sed quod est ordinatum ad alterum tamquam ad 
scire et quod etiam propter se acquiritur, tale est bonum honorabile. Modo 
tales sunt scientie speculative alie a metaphysica. 
1.5 Utrum scientia de anima sit de numero difficiUimorum. 
Consequenter est questio utrum scientia de anima sit de numero difficiUimo-
rum. 
Arguitur quod non quia: ilia scientia que certiori modo procedit non est de 
numero difficilimorum; modo scientia de anima certiori modo procedit aliis 
5 scientiis, ut dicit Philosophus in littera; quare etc. 
Item: ilia scientia est facillima, non difficillima, | in qua cognoscibile est 
coniunctum cognoscenti; sed in ilia scientia de anima cognoscibile est con-
iunctum cognoscenti; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia facile est cognoscenti co-
gnoscere quod est sibi propinquum vel coniunctum. Minor patet, quia co-
10 gnoscens ibi est ipsa anima, etiam cognoscibile ibi est ipsa anima; modo idem 
est sibi ipsi maxime coniunctum; quare etc. 
Item: ilia scientia non est difficillima que procedit ex eis que experimur 
in nobis; sed scientia de anima ex talibus procedit; quare etc. Maior de se 
5 Cf. Aristoteles, De anima 1.1,402a 1-5 
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patet. Minor etiam patet, quia in scientia de anima procedimus ex opera-
tionibus anime. Ilias autem operationes anime quilibet experitur, sicut quod 15 
augmentatur, nutritur et sentit. 
Item: metaphysica, saltern quantum ad duodecimum librum, est longe 
difficilior quam ista scientia de anima, quia considérât totaliter abstracta a 
materia, ilia autem considérât coniuncta in esse cum sensibilibus; modo il-
la scientia que considérât omnino abstracta a sensibilibus est difficilior ilia 20 
que considérât coniuncta cum sensibilibus; ergo illa scientia de anima non est 
difficillima. 
In oppositum est Philosophus, qui dicit quod ilia scientia est de numero 
difficillimorum. 
Dicendum quod ilia scientia de anima inter alias omnes scientias naturales 25 
est de numero difficillimorum, quia illa scientia est de numero difficillimorum 
que habet difficultatem magnam tarn ex parte cognoscentis quam ex parte co-
gnoscibilis; modo anima habet difficultatem tam ex parte cognoscentis quam 
ex parte cognoscibilis; ergo scientia de anima inter scientias naturales est de 
numero difficillimorum. Maior patet, quia omnis difficultas scientie procedit 30 
ex parte intelligibilis vel ex parte intelligentis. Minor dedaratur. Primo quod 
sit difficilllima ex parte intelligibilis, saltem quantum ad animam intellecti-
vam, quia: illa est in potentia ad omnia intelligibilia et 'ante suum intelligere 
nichil est actu eorum que sunt, sed solum possibUis est vocatus', ut dicitur 
tertio hutus; modo omne quod intelligit, intelligit ut ens actu; cum ergo intel- 35 
lectus non sit ens actu, immo sola potentia, ergo ex parte intelligibilis, quod 
est ipse intellectus, est difficultas in illa scientia. 
Et si dicas quod eque difficile est intelligere materiam primam, de qua 
determinatur in libro Physicorum, sicut intellectum possibilem, quia sicut in-
tellectus potentialisO) est in potentia ad omnia intelligibilia, ita etiam materia 40 
prima est in potentia ad omnes formas naturales, et sic saltem primus liber 
Physicorum, in quo determinatur de materia prima, sit eque difficilis sicut liber 
De anima, ideo ad istud dico quod non est verum, quia, licet materia prima sit 
23 Aristoteles,Deamm<j)I.l>402alO-ll 35 Aristoteles, De antmalUA,429i2l-24 39 Eg 
Aristoteles, Physica, 1.9, 192a25-34 
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ens in potentia ad omnes formas naturales, potest cognosci ex transmutatione 
45 formarum naturalium circa ipsam materiam. Et quia, sicut dicit Commen-
tator primo Physicorwn, transmutatio apparet ad sensum immediate, ideo ex 
ipsa transmutatione potest cognosci materia prima. Sed operationes intellec-
tus possibilis et cognitiones que sunt circa ipsum non apparent ad sensum, 
neque eius substantia. Et ideo difficilior est cognitio de intellectu possibili 
so quam de materia prima. 
Etiam in ilia scientia est difficultas ex parte cognoscentis, quia omne quod 
cognoscimus, cognoscimus ex sensatis et ymaginatis, sicut apparet ex secundo 
huius et tertio; modo anima intellectiva non cadit sub sensu vel ymaginatione; 
ergo anima ex parte cognoscentis est difficilis ad cognoscendum. 
55 Et confirmatur et in idem redit quia: illud quod inter omnes res natura-
les remotius est a sensu, difficillimum est ad cognoscendum ex parte cognos-
centis; modo anima intellectiva inter formas naturales remotior est a sensu, 
quia est quedam forma media inter substantias separatas et immateriales et 
substantias sensibiles et materiales — est enim ultima forma ad quam con-
60 sideratio naturalis se extendit; ergo anima intellectiva difficilis est ad cogno-
scendum ex parte cognoscentis. Sed anima vegetativa et sensitiva non sunt ita 
difficiles ad cognoscendum, quia unusquisque experitur se nutriri et augmen-
tari et sentire. Item ad sensum apparent operationes earum, scilicet nutrire et 
sentire. 
65 Tunc ad rationes. 
Cum dicitur 'illa scientia que certiori modo procedit' etc., potest nega-
ri, quia alia scientia potest esse | difficilis quantum ad eius acquisitionem et i62vb F 
tarnen illa acquisita potest esse certus modus procedendi in ea. Vel potest 
concedi: eo modo quo est certissima non est diffìcillima. Et cum dicitur 'Phi-
70 losophus dicit quod ista scientia est certissima', dico quod duplex est modus 
procedendi | in illa scientia. Unus est modus procedendi qui est a priori pro- iora ν 
cedendo a subiecto ad eius operationes. Et alia investigatio est a posteriori 
ex operationibus investigando animam sive subiectum anime. Et quantum 
ad istum modum intelligit quod certo modo procedit, et sic non est difficilli-
46 Locus non inventus 52-53 Aristoteles, De anima III.8, 432a8-9 
44 ex ] parte temporis mutatione ex add F 46 transmutatio ] temporis mutatio scnps F 
47 ipsa] ista V transmutatione] temporis mutatione scnps F 48 ipsum ] ipsamC) F 
50 quam] quod V 51 etiam ] et V scientia] om V cognoscentis] quia omne quod 
cognoscentisadd F 53 et ] exadd V 56 difficillimum ] difficihusV 59-60 consideratie] 
cosei" scnps F 61 cognoscentis] cogscentis scnps F ita] istaV 63 et sentire] om F 
64 sentire ] etc. add V 66 cum dicitur ] om F 66-67 negan ] ista add V 67 quia ] 
aliqua add V scientia ] om F 68 acquisita ] acquisitici V 70 est ] om V 72 subiecto ] 
substantia anime V 73 subiectum ] substantiam V 74 modum ] processum V 
313 
APPENDIX A. RADULPHI BRITONIS Questtones super Itbrutn de anima 
ma. Sed quantum ad primum processum non est certa, et quantum ad ilium 75 
est difficillima. Vel potest dici quod scientia de anima certiori modo proce-
dit, quia ex eis que experimur in nobis procedit, et sic est facilis. Et quantum 
ad hoc quod inquirimus et investigamus modum secundum quem ilia que 
experimur in nobis fiunt ab anima, scientia de anima est difficilis. 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'ilia scientia est facillima in qua cognoscibüe est so 
coniunctum cognoscenti', dico quod cognoscibüe esse coniunctum cogno-
scenti potest dupUciter inteUigi: vel secundum proportionem que requiritur 
ad hoc quod aliquid cognoscatur, vel quia est coniunctum sibi secundum esse, 
non tamen secundum talem proportionem que requiritur ad hoc quod aliquid 
intelligatur. Modo si cognoscibüe cognoscenti primo modo sit coniunctum, 85 
scilicet secundum proportionem requisitam ad hoc quod intelligatur, tunc ve-
rum est quod tale sit facülimum ad cognoscendum. Tamen si sit coniunctum 
sibi secundum esse, et non secundum talem proportionem, non oportet. Et 
cum dicitur quod cognoscibüe in üla scientia est coniunctum cognoscenti, ve-
rum est secundum esse. Tamen secundum proportionem que requiritur ad 90 
hoc quod cognoscatur non est sibi coniunctum, quia est in potentia quantum 
ad inteüectum possibüem et omne quod intelligitur oportet esse ens actu. Et 
ideo non est ibi proportio que requiritur ad intelligibüe et inteUigens, quia üla 
proportio debet esse talis quod intelligibüe sit in actu tale quale inteUigens est 
in potentia. 95 
Ad aliam. C u m dicitur 'üla scientia n o n est difficiüima que procedi t ex 
eis que exper imur in nobis ' , ve rum est q u a n t u m ad istud. Et cum dici tur 
'ista scientia est hu iusmodi ' , verum est p rocedendo ex operat iombus ad sub-
iectum an ime et et iam q u a n t u m ad operat iones an ime vegetative et sensitive. 
Operat iones en im is tarum experimur in nobis. Sed q u a n t u m ad opera t iones 100 
an ime inteUective n o n est verum. Et ideo q u a n t u m ad h o c est difficillima. 
Ad aliam. C u m dicitur quod scientia de duodec imo Metaphystce est dif-
ficilior, ve rum est. Ncque Phüosophus dicit quod iUa scientia est difficillima, 
sed dicit q u o d est de n u m e r o difficillimorum. Etiam intelligit quod est de 
n u m e r o difficillimorum inter scientias naturales. 105 
1.6 Utnun universale fiat ab intellectu vel sit prêter Operationen! 
intellectus 
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Consequenter, quia Commentator dicit super illam partem 'universale aut ni- i62vb F, iora ν 
chil est aut posterius est' quod intellectus est qui facit universalitatem in rebus, 
ideo queritur utrum universale fiat ab intellectu vel sit prêter operationem 
intellectus. 
5 Arguitur quod sit prêter operationem intellectus quia: diffinibile est uni-
versale; sed aliquid est diffinibile prêter operationem intellectus; ergo etc. Ma-
ior patet, quia singularium non est diffinitio, ut dicitur septimo Metaphysice. 
Minor declaratur quia: aliquid est diffinibile per ea que insunt sibi essentia-
liter et non secundum accidentia; sed esse intellectum est esse accidentale rei 
io et esse verum extra animam est essentiale; ergo prêter esse intellectum est res 
diffinibilis. 
Item obiectum cuiuslibet potentie precedit potentiam cuius est obiectum; 
sed universale est obiectum intellectus; ergo precedit intellectum et eius ope-
rationem. Maior patet, quia obiecta prima sunt potentiis, ut patet secundo De 
is anima. Minor patet, quia quod quid est <est> obiectum intellectus; sed quod 
quid est est universale; ergo etc. 
Item si universale esset per operationem intellectus, hoc esset per ope-
rationem intellectus agentis vel possibilis. Non per operationem possibilis, 
quia intellectus possibilis secundum quod huiusmodi est in potentia passiva 
20 ad omnia intelligibilia; sed tale non est actu, quia omne agens agit secundum 
quod ens actu; ergo etc. Item non habet esse per operationem agentis, quia 
universale | est secunda intentio, que presupponit primam intellectionem si- i63ra F 
ve intentionem; sed intellectus agens non agit nisi quantum ad primam in-
tellectionem abstrahendo a fantasmatibus. Et postquam intellectio prima est 
25 in intellectu, super illam non se extendit ultra operatio intellectus agentis ad 
hoc quod fiat secunda intellectio sive secunda intentio; ergo per operationem 
intellectus agentis non habet esse universale. 
Item universale est quod natum est esse in pluribus; sed res reperibilis est 
in pluribus sine intellectu, sicut asinus vel equus; ideo etc. 
7 AA 1:182; Aristoteles, Metaphyska VII.15, 1039b27-1040a5 14-15 Forsan Aristoteles, De 
anima II.4, 415al8-22 
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In oppositum est Commentator, qui dicit quod intellectus facit universalità- 3o 
tem in rebus. 
Ad solutionem istius questionis primo videndum est quid significetur nomine 
prime intentionis et secunde, quia universale potest accipi et pro prima inten-
tione et pro secunda. Et primo ad hoc videndum est quid significetur nomine 
intentionis in communi. 35 
Unde notandum est quod intentio est illud quo intellectus tendit ad aliud, 
et hec est cognitio in ipso intellectu existens. Et hoc est manifestum secun-
dum interpretationem, quia intentio est in aliud tentio. Sed prima intellectio 
rei qua intelligitur primo ex proprio suo fantasmate est prima intentio in abs-
tracto, et res sic intellecta dicitur prima intentio in concreto, sicut cognitio ho- 40 
minis vel asini que sumitur ex proprio suo fantasmate dicitur prima intentio 
in abstracto, et res iste sic intellecte dicuntur intentio prima in concreto. 
Secunda intentio est secunda rei cognitio que non sumitur a modo essen-
di proprio vel fantasmate proprio rei, sed est quedam secunda cognitio rei 
respectu alterius et sumitur ex aliquo modo essendi communi corespectivo, 45 
sicut esse universale vel universalitas. Unde universalitas est cognitio vel ratio 
cognoscendi rem ut nata est esse in pluribus, et universale in concreto est esse 
cognitum rei ut est in pluribus. 
Et similiter in complexis, sicut 'homo currit' est quoddam complexum se-
cundum intellectum. Hoc autem complexum potest intelligi vel ratione unio- so 
nis subiecti et predicati secundum esse intellectum primum quo fit. Et hec 
cognitio est ut prima intentio in abstracto, et hoc sic cognitum est prima in-
tentio in concreto. Sed hoc idem cognitum, vel ut dubitatur de inherentia pre-
dicati cum subiecto, vel ut ponitur pro alio et sic de aliis, dicitur 'questio' vel 
'propositio', que sunt nomina secundarum intentionum concretarum. Set ille 55 
cognitiones quibus cognoscitur tale complexum ut pro alio positum dicuntur 
secunde intentiones in abstracto in talibus. Et simili modo est in consimilibus. 
Sed de hoc alibi super logicam plenius est discussum. 
Tunc ad questionem est dicendum quod quia universale est nomen in-
tentionis concrete, ideo potest accipi vel pro prima intentione concreta vel 60 
30 Averroes, Commentanum Magnum in Anstotehs De Anima Libros, 1225"6 
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secunda. Si sumatur primo modo, tunc dicendum quod quantum ad illud 
quod materiale est in significato suo non est ab intellectu, quia res sive quod 
quid est rei que intelligitur non est ab intellectu; sed illud quod est materiale 
in significato concreti universalis primo modo sumpti est quod quid est rei 
65 sive natura, quia intellectio quecumque denominative predicatur de obiecto 
suo et ipsum concemit in concreto, sicut album concemit suum subiectum 
et ipsum denominat; ergo quod materiale est in significato universalis primo 
modo dicti non est ab intellectu aliquo. Si autem sumatur quantum ad illud 
quod est formale ibi, quod est ipsa prima intellectio rei qua res dicitur intellec-
70 ta et intellectus intelligens, tunc dicendum quod non fit effective ab intellectu 
possibili sed agente. Quod non a possibili probatur quia: intellectus possibilis 
est in pura potentia respectu intellectionis saltern quantum ad intellectionem 
primam; sed quod est in pura potentia respectu alterius non est causa effectiva 
eius, sed solum potest esse causa susceptiva; ideo etc. Sed tarnen effective est 
75 ab intellectu agente vel ab anima mediante intellectu agente, quia Philosophus 
dicit quod sicut intellectus possibilis est in potentia fieri omnia intelligibilia, 
scilicet quantum ad cognitionem rerum intelligibilium, sic intellectus agens 
est potens omnia intelligibilia potentia intellecta facere actu intellecta. Et sic 
omnis prima intellectio que recipitur in | intellectu possibili effective fit ab in- iorb ν 
so tellectu agente una cum fantasmatibus. Sed per quern modum hoc fit inferius 
patebit. 
Si autem sumatur 'universale' pro secunda intentione in concreto, eodem 
modo dicendum quod quantum ad illud quod est ibi materiale non est ab 
intellectu, quia sicut prima intellectio denominat rem que intelligitur primo 
85 intellectu, sic | secunda intellectio sive secunda intentio denominat rem ipsam i63rb F 
secundum quod secundario intelligitur. Sicut enim hec est vera 'homo abs­
olute intelligitur', sic hec est vera: 'homo est aliquid intellectum in pluribus'. 
Sed tale esse intellectum ut in pluribus est quod significatur nomine universa­
lis; sed res ilia que est sic intellecta potest esse sine operatione intellectus; ergo 
90 universale <sumptum> pro re que significatur materialiter nomine universalis 
potest esse sine operatione intellectus. 
Tarnen notandum est quod intentio universalis potest attribuì rei que ha-
bet esse solum in intellectu et potest illam rem concernere et de illa concretive 
predicari. Et tunc obiectum suum, quod materialiter importatur nomine uni-
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versalis, vel posset importari, non esset sine operatione intellectus. Sed tale 95 
obiectum non est quod primo concemit intentio universalis, quia esse in plu-
ribus, quod est modus essendi ex quo sumitur universale, non est reperibile 
primo in eis que sunt in intellectu, sed in eis que sunt extra animam, licet 
unitas rei in pluribus sit secundum intellectum. 
Sed diceret aliquis quod obiectum quod concernit intentio secunda uni- 100 
versalis est res primo intellecta et non res secundum se; sed res primo intel-
lecta non est sine operatione intellectus; ergo quod materiale est in significato 
universalis ut est secunda intentio non est sine intellectu. 
Ad hoc dicendum quod rem primo intellectam esse obiectum secunde in-
tentionis potest intelligi dupliciter: vel quod aggregatum ex re et prima intel- 105 
lectione rei sit obiectum eius. Et hoc non est verum, quia tunc ista non esset 
vera 'homo est species' vel 'animal est genus', quia homo ut significatur et 
animal non significant hominem intellectum et animal intellectum, sed signi-
ficant veram naturam hominis et animalis. Sed species et genus si respicerent 
aggregatum ex re et intentione prima pro obiecto, de tali aggregato denomi- 110 
native predicarentur <et> verificarentur. Ergo tunc de homine et animali et 
sic de consimilibus, que talia congregata non significant, sed naturam rei se-
cundum se non possent intentiones iste concrete predicari. Item tunc essent 
eiusdem rei due intellectiones simul in intellectu, quia res primo intellecta in-
telligeretur secunda intellectione et sic simul esset intellectio prima rei in actu 115 
in intellectu et secunda intellectio eiusdem rei. 
Alio modo potest intelligi rem primo intellectam esse obiectum secunde 
intentionis, quia res que primo secundum se intelligitur et absolute postea 
intelligitur intellectu respectivo, sicut primo intelligitur homo vel animal se-
cundum se et postea intelligitur sive intelligibilis est ut est in pluribus; modo 120 
intellectus rei secundum se est prior quam intellectus eius ut est in pluribus, 
qui est respectivus intellectus. Et sic concedo quod obiectum secunde inten-
tionis est res intellecta primo intellectu, id est res que prius secundum se in-
telligitur et postea intelligitur secunda intellectione respectiva. Et sic prima 
intentio non est obiectum ncque pars obiecti respectu intentionis secunde, li- 125 
cet presupponat rem esse prius intellectam secundum se, sicut respectivum 
presupponit absolutum. Sed res ratione alicuius modi essendi communis et 
respectivi existentis in ea est obiectum eius. 
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Si autem sumatur intentio universalis concreta ratione formalis quod est 
130 in significato suo, tunc adhuc dico quod non fit ab intellectu possibili, sed ab 
agente et obiecto ratione modi essendi ex quo sumitur talis intentio. Cuius 
ratio est quia: intellectus possibilis est in potentia passiva respectu intellec-
tionis secunde sicut respectu prime; sed quod est in potentia passiva respec-
tu alicuius non est effectivum eius, ut prius declaratum est; ergo etc. Maior 
135 patet, quia omne intelligere est pati ab intelligibili quod est obiectum illius 
intellectionis, ut patet in tertio De anima. Minor patet de se. Sequitur er-
go quod intellectus possibilis non est effectivus secunde intellectionis rei. Sed 
talis intellectio est secunda intentio, ut prius visum est. Ideo etc. Sed quod in-
tentio universalis in abstracto vel ratione eius quod formale est in significato 
HO intentionis universalis in concreto causaretur ab intellectu agente et obiecto 
ratione modi essendi correspondentis Uli intentioni in re sive in obiecto pro-
batur quia: universale quantum ad rationem formalem suam est intellectio 
rei ut est in pluribus; sed omnis intellectio que est in intellectu possibili sive 
in anima mediante possibili effective est ab obiecto et intellectu agente; er-
145 go etc. Maior patet ex dictis, quia universale significai aliquid intellectum ut 
in pluribus. Minor similiter patet, quia omnis intellectio est ab obiecto ef-
fective, quia ab obiecto sumit de|terminatam speciem. Item effective est ab i63va F 
intellectu agente saltern respectu eorum que primo intelliguntur, quia ab eo 
habet esse abstractum; sed intellectio eorum que secundario intelliguntur ex 
150 intellectione aliorum habet esse ab intellectu agente mediate, scilicet mediante 
intellectione illorum ex quorum intellectione intelliguntur. 
Item si ponatur quod intentio universalis sit quantum ad suum formale 
intellectio rei cum respectu ad plura superaddito, ita quod intentio prima et 
secunda non sunt due intellectiones sed una intellectio sumpta secundum se 
155 et in respectu ad plura, sicut aliqui dicunt, adhuc magis patet quod fit ab in-
tellectu agente et obiecto, quia non est dubium quin prima intentio rei fit ab 
intellectu agente et obiecto; ergo cum secunda intentio non différât a prima 
nisi per respectum superadditum, erit similiter ab intellectu agente. 
Item si ponatur quod intentio universalis sit prima intellectio secundum 
160 quod ad rem primo intellectam sequitur aptitudo essendi in pluribus, ad-
huc patet quod est ab intellectu agente et obiecto, quia, ut dictum est, prima 
intellectio est effective ab obiecto et intellectu agente. 
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Si autem sumatur universale sicut solet aliquando accipi, vel pro quiditate 
et natura rei secundum se, quod est universale in potentia, vel pro quidita-
te ut sibi applicari sive attribuì potest intentio universalis, sic non habet esse i65 
ab intellectu, quia intellectus non est causa rei existentis extra animam. Sed 
quiditas et natura rei cui attribuibilis est intentio universalis primo est res ve-
ra extra animam, quia, ut dictum est, non attribuitur rei ut intellecta est, sed 
rei existent! extra, quia res extra animam habet modum essendi sibi corre-
spondentem, scilicet esse in pluribus suppositis. Dato enim quod intellectus i70 
non esset, asinus esset plurificatus per diversa supposita. Ergo si sumatur ilio 
modo, universale non est ab intellectu. 
Sed adhuc circa dieta notandum est quod intentiones, cum sint quedam 
intellectiones, vel quedam intellecta in concreto sumpta, predicantur de re 
obiecta denominative, non quia sint in obiectis sicut in subiecto, sicut dici- 175 
tur homo albus ab albedine in ipso existente formaliter, sed quia sunt in eis 
sicut in obiecto et hoc est esse in aliquo movente vel efficiente respectu ea-
rum. Et ideo sicut dicitur 'Sortes est percutiens' percussione que est in passo, 
et similiter 'color videtur' visione que est in oculo (quia color efficit visionem 
in oculo), et similiter 'scibile scitur' scientia que est in anima, sic intentio- 180 
nes concrete que quantum ad suum esse formale quod est intellectio sunt in 
anima, denominative predicantur de obiectis earum, quamvis non sint in eis 
iova ν sicut in subiecto. Unde sicut ista est vera | 'lapis intelligitur' intellectione que 
est in anima, sic illa 'homo est species' et sic de aliis, quia esse genus et species 
et sic de aliis intentionibus secundis sunt quedam intellectiones, vel quedam iss 
esse intellecta. Et ideo predicantur denominative de obiectis suis. 
Ad rationes. 
Ad primam. Cum dicitur 'diffinibile est universale', verum est accipiendo 
'universale' pro quiditate rei cui potest attribuì ratio universalis. Sed accipien-
do 'universale' pro intentione secunda non est verum quod omne diffinibile 190 
sit universale isto modo. Item licet diffinibile sit universale sumptum pro re 
primo intellecta, tarnen diffinitio non debetur sibi ncque datur ei pro ilio es-
se intellecto, sed pro esse suo quiditativo et per sua principia essentialia, que 
sunt extra animam. Et quando dicitur in minori 'aliquid est diffinibile prêter 
operationem intellectus' etc., dicendum quod diffinitio non esset rei nisi esset 195 
intellectus diffiniens, ncque res est diffinibilis nisi in habitudine ad intellectum 
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diffinientem. Sed tamen non propter hoc datur ab intellectu diffinitio rei pro 
esse intellecto, sed pro esse vero quod habet extra. Unde differt dicere rem 
difïmiri vel esse diffinibilem sub aliqua ratione intelligendi acceptam, vel sub 
200 aliquo esse intellecto, et rem diffiniri vel esse diffinibilem pro esse intellecto, 
quia pr imum dictum est verum, sed secundum falsum est. Et ideo diffinitio 
que datur de re accepta sub aliqua ratione intelligendi non est sine intellectu. 
Tamen non datur diffinitio ab intellectu rei pro ilio esse intellecto, sed pro suo 
esse quiditativo et essentiali pro sua realia principia. 
205 Ad aliam. Quando dicitur Obiectum potentie precedit potentiam' etc., 
verum est secundum se et absolute | acceptum. Sed obiectum ut actu obicitur i63vb F 
sive ut actu immutat potentiam simul est cum potentia, quia agens in actu et 
passum simul sunt. Et quando dicitur in minori quod universale est obiec-
tum intellectus, verum est accipiendo 'universale' pro quod quid est rei cui 
210 potest ratio universalis sive intentio attribuì. Et istud precedit operationem 
intellectus, u t dictum est, et est sine operatione intellectus. 
Ad aliam. Quando dicitur 'aut esset per operationem intellectus possibi-
lis, aut agentis', dicendum est quod est per operationem agentis accipiendo 
'universale' p ro ipsa cognitione vel intentione in abstracto, vel pro eo quod 
215 est formale in significato universalis in concreto sumpti. Et quando dicitur 
quod intellectus agens non agit super illud quod est in intellectu, sed super 
fantasmata, verum est primo et immediate. Sed per abstractionem quiditatis 
a fantasmatibus fit apta nata intelligi ut una in pluribus. Et per consequens 
fit apta nata quod sic ab intellectu possibili intelligatur. Et sic mediate sive ex 
220 consequent! intellectus agens agit ad secundam intellectionem sive intentio-
nem secundam univeralis. Vel potest dici quod intellectus agens immediate 
agit in intentionem secundam universalis, quia eo quod res est fantasiata es-
se in pluribus per actionem intellectus agentis, potest intelligi ut in pluribus, 
et hoc sic intellectum est universale. Quod autem fantasia possit cognoscere 
225 rem ut in pluribus patet quia: numerus et pluralitas est quid sensibile, licet 
sit commune sensibile. Et ideo fantasia que percipit omnia sensibilia commu-
nia potest plurificationem suppositorum cognoscere, sicut cognoscit suppo-
sita alicuius nature secundum se. Sed bene verum est quod supposita ratio-
ne nature sive quiditatis non cognoscit, sed ratione accidentium sensibilium 
230 illorum suppositorum. 
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Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'universale est quod est in pluribus', dicendum 
quod hoc est universale in potentia, scilicet res cui intentio universalis potest 
attribuì. Sed universale in actu est res intellecta ut una in pluribus. Et hoc non 
est sine operatione intellectus agentis. 
1.7 Utrum natura specifica sit una. 
lés1* F, ιον» v Consequenter quia Themistius dicit ibi 'animal autem universale' etc. quod 
genus est conceptus sine ypostasi, ex thenui similitudine singularium collectus 
et subdit 'species autem natura quedam vult esse et forma', queratur utrum 
natura specifica sit una, dato quod intellectus non esset, sicut natura asini vel 
equi et sic de aliis. 5 
Arguitur quod sic quia: omne quod est ens reale circumscripto intellectu est 
unum circumscripto intellectu; sed natura speciei circumscripto intellectu est 
ens reale; ideo etc. Maior patet, quia ens et unum convertuntur. Minor patet, 
quia dato quod non esset intellectus, adhuc esset extra animam quiditas asini 
vel equi et sic de aliis entibus realibus. 10 
Item per illud per quod aliquid est distinctum ab aliis et in se indistinctum 
est unum. Sed dato quod intellectus non esset, adhuc natura asini vel equi et 
sic de aliis ab invicem erunt distincte realiter, et per consequens quelibet in se 
esset indistincta, quia indistinctum nichil reale addit super esse distinctum; et 
ideo per illud per quod aliquid est ab alio distinctum est in se indistinctum. 15 
Ergo natura asini et equi et sic de aliis speciebus est una, dato quod intellectus 
non esset. Maior declaratur quia: unum est quod in se est indistinctum et ab 
alio distinctum. Minor patet ex dictis; ideo etc. 
Item in ilio in quo aliqua non differunt, in ilio conveniunt; sed diver­
sa supposita eiusdem speciei circumscripto intellectu non differunt in natu- 20 
ra speciei; ergo circumscripto intellectu conveniunt in natura speciei, et sic 
natura speciei in eis est una. Maior et minor satis videntur esse probabililes. 
Item uni intellectui per se correspondet aliquid unum in re, aliter esset 
fictus intellectus; sed species habet unum intellectum per se, quia natura spe­
cifica videtur primo intelligibilis; ergo in re est unitas nature correspondens 25 
isti intellectui, et sic natura speciei in re est una. 
1 Themistius, In de anima I, 8-922"25; cf. AA 6:34 
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Item septimo Metaphystce dicit Aristoteles quod generans general alium 
propter materiam, et secundum formam est idem generans et generatum, quia 
forma n o n dividitur; ergo vult quod forma specifica in generante et genito 
30 sit secundum se una et quod solum est ibi multiplicatio per materiam; ergo 
natura specifica secundum formam est una, dato quod non esset intellectus. 
Item hoc videtur esse de intentione Themistii, ut patet in auctoritate preal­
legata. 
Item octavo Metaphystce vult Philosophus quod forma secundum se est 
35 una. Et dicit similiter ibidem quod que n o n habent <materiam> sensibilem 
vel intelligibilem sunt statini unum. Ex hoc arguitur: quod secundum se | non i64ra F 
dividitur nisi per materiam, secundum se est u n u m ; sed natura speciei n o n di­
viditur numeraliter nisi per materiam et n o n secundum formam; ergo natura 
specifica secundum se est una in diversis individuis circumscripto intellectu. 
40 Item diversitas inter aliqua duo presupponit unitatem cuiuslibet illorum 
in se, quia omnis mult i tude presupponit unitatem cuiuslibet sue partis in se; 
sed quiditas asini realiter, dato quod n o n esset intellectus, et quiditas equi sunt 
diverse; ergo quelibet in se est una, dato quod intellectus n o n esset. 
Item nisi natura speciei esset una in diversis individuis, n o n plus conveni-
45 rent duo individua unius speciei quam duo individua diversarum specierum; 
hoc est falsum; ideo etc. Probatio consequentie quia: sicut diversa individua 
diversarum specierum differunt per essentiam, ita individua eiusdem speciei, 
quia non habent convenientiam in aliqua | essentia vel natura; sed consequens iovb ν 
est falsum; ergo etc. 
so Item si natura specifica n o n esset res alia prêter singularia, nee haberet ali-
quam unitatem realem secundum se, tunc non esset ordo realis inter species, 
sed solum inter individua; sed consequens est falsum et contra Philosophum 
octavo Metaphystce, qui vult quod species et forme substantiales sint sicut nu-
meri. Et ideo sicut in numeris est ordo pr ions et posterioris, sic in speciebus 
55 est ordo perfectioris et imperfections, et similiter prioris et posterioris. Proba-
tio consequentie quia: in re extra natura specifica non haberet unitatem et per 
consequens neque entitatem; et si non haberet entitatem, non haberet ordi-
nem ad aliam speciem, sed solum individua habent ordinem, que habent esse 
extra animam. 
27 Aristoteles, Metaphysica VII 7, 1032b30-32 34 Aristoteles, Metaphysica VIII, 1045b3-
4 35 Aristoteles, Metaphysica VIII.6, 1045b23-24 53 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica VIII.3, 
1043b34-1044al0; AA 1:204, 205 
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In oppositum arguitur per Philosophum septimo Metaphysice, qui dicit quod 60 
universalia non habent esse prêter esse quod habent in singularibus; sed na-
tura speciei est universalis; ergo non habet esse nisi inesse quod habet in sin-
gularibus; sed in duobus singularibus non est natura una, quia Sortes et Plato 
non sunt unus homo, sed plures; ideo etc. 
Item Commentator in duodecimo Metaphysice vult quod universalia sunt 65 
unum secundum rationem et intentionem; sed species est universale; ergo 
unitas speciei est unitas secundum rationem et intentionem, et per conse-
quens non est unitas realis. 
Item omne existens extra animam est unum numero secundum Boethium 
De umtate et uno, qui dicit quod omne quod est, ideo est, quia unum numero 70 
est; sed quod unum numero est non est commune secundum speciem neque 
natura specifica ut specifica est; ideo etc. 
Ad istam questionem aliquis posset dicere quod unitas secundum speciem es-
set aliqua unitas realis et quod non solum unitas numeralis est unitas realis, 
sed etiam unitas secundum formam, quia sicut argutum fuit forma secundum 75 
se non dividitur. Et ideo secundum se est indivisa et per consequens una. 
Item duo asini maiorem convenientiam realiter videntur habere quam asinus 
et bos. Et hoc non esset nisi natura in qua conveniunt esset una secundum se. 
Verumptamen credo aliter esse dicendum ad questionem quod natura 
specifica potest considerari dupliciter: vel sigillatim ut est in quolibet sup- so 
posito et divisim, sicut in Sorte salvatur natura hominis secundum se, dato 
quod non esset alius. Alio modo potest accipi natura speciei ut natura speciei 
simul est in duobus suppositis vel pluribus suis. 
Si sumatur primo modo, dico quod natura speciei est una unitale essen-
tial! et reali prêter unitatem numeralem qua est una per principium indivi- 85 
duationis per quod numeraliter distinguitur a quocumque alio supposito sue 
speciei. Et hoc probatur dupliciter. Primo sic quia: forma specifica de se non 
est una numero neque plures numero secundum quod diversa individua eius-
dem speciei differunt numeraliter. Sed hoc habet per principia individuantia 
que sunt quedam accidentia superaddita, ut alibi fuit declaratum. Ex hoc ar- 90 
guitur sic: natura specifica ut est in aliquo uno supposito est aliquod ens per 
formam suam prêter esse quod habet per principium individuans quod est 
60 AA 1.174; cf. Aristoteles, Categoriae, 5, 2al9-27 65 Cf. AA 1.280, Averroes, In XU 
Metaphysicorum, com. 4, f. 292 D 69-70 Boethius, De umtate et uno (PL, 63,1075A) 
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superadditum sue essentie. Sed per illud per quod aliquid est ens, per illud est 
unum, quia ens et unum convertuntur. Et ilia unitas est alia ab unitate quam 
95 habet per principium individuans, sicut et entitas quam habet per formam 
substantialem est alia ab entitate quam habet per principia individuantia. Ha­
bet esse indivisum numeraliter secundum quantitatem determina|tam et di- i64rb F 
visum ab alio individuo eiusdem rationis. Sed per formam suam habet esse 
indivisum secundum essentiam suam et a quolibet alio divisum secundum es-
100 sentiam. Ergo natura specifica ut est in aliquo individuo est una unitate reali 
sive essentiali que est a forma sua substantial!, que est alia unitas ab unitate 
qua est unum numeraliter per principium individuans. Assumpta propositio 
probatur quia: si forma specifica de se vel de sua ratione esset una numero, 
nunquam posset in diversis reperiri numeraliter. Et similiter, si de se esset 
los plures, nunquam tota salvaretur in aliquo uno supposito. Ergo cum possit 
esse in uno et in pluribus, de se ncque est una numero ncque plures. Et sic 
patet assumpta propositio. Sed maior probatur quia: quodlibet Individuum 
indudit formam suam substantialem per quam habet esse; et per eandem est 
habens naturam speciei, quia ut suppone eadem est forma per quam Sortes 
ι io habet esse substantiale, et per quam est homo et animai, et per quam est Sor­
tes; sed per principia individuantia sive per principium individuans habet esse 
divisum numeraliter ab aliis individuis eiusdem speciei que sunt eiusdem ra­
tionis cum ipso; et in se sic est indivisum numeraliter indivisione opposita 
divisioni in diversa supposita numeraliter differentia; ergo per formam suam 
ι is substantialem habet esse prêter esse quod habet per principia individuantia. 
Minor patet ex dictis. Ideo etc. 
Item secundo hoc probatur: natura specifica potest intelligi prêter princi-
pia individuantia; sed non habet esse separatum a singularibus suis; ergo cum 
iste intellectus non sit fictus, ipsa quiditas in quolibet supposito habet esse 
no reale prêter esse quod habet per principia individuantia que sibi accidunt. Sed 
sicut aliquid habet esse, sic habet esse unum, ut prius dictum est. Et Aristote-
les déclarât quarto Metaphysice quod ens et unum convertuntur. Ergo natura 
specifica ut in uno supposito est, sive ut est in quolibet supposito divisim et 
sigillatim, habet unitatem realem prêter unitatem quam habet per principia 
125 individuantia. Nam natura speciei si sumatur ut est in diversis suppositis si-
mul, sic non est aliquid unum realiter in duobus suppositis simul, sed solum 
122 AA 1:90; Aristoteles, Metaphysica IV.2, 1003b22-3 
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secundum rationem. Cuius ratio est quia: nichil quod pertinet ad essentiam 
unius individui est in altero individuo, quia ncque materia eadem est diver-
sorum individuorum, neque forma; sed nichil pertinet ad essentiam individui 
substantie composite nisi materia vel forma; ideo etc. Et idem iudicium est 130 
de individuis accidentium, que sunt individua individuatione subiecti. Sed 
de individuis quantitatis aliter est, quia quantitas est illud quo aliquid est for-
maliter divisum in partes eiusdem rationis, et in se indivisum indivisione op-
posita divisioni, quia ilia individua se ipsis sunt formaliter indivisa in se et 
divisa numerali ter ab aliis. Si autem dicatur quod quantitas secundum se non 135 
est divisibilis, sed quantum ad hoc quod dicit subiectum habens quantitatem, 
tunc subiectum illud erit indivisum in se et divisum ab alio per quantitatem 
formaliter. 
Item si in duobus individuis esset una natura communis realiter prêter 
quod est in Sorte et in Platone et sic de aliis individuis, tunc illa esset ter- 140 
tia natura a natura aliorum, et sic universalia secundum esse separata essent a 
singularibus; hoc est falsum et contra Philosophum septimo Metaphysice; ideo 
etc. Unde notandum quod licet materia Sortis et Platonis sint diverse nume-
1 ira ν raliter, et similiter | alia est | forma substantialis Sortis et Platonis, tamen illa 
distinctio istarum formarum non est per formas substantiales, sed per distinc- 145 
tionem materie. Et distinctio materie est per distinctionem quantitatis, ut alibi 
fuit declaratum. 
Ad rationes. Quando dicitur: 'omne quod est ens reale est unum', verum 
est unitate que convertitur cum ente. Et cum dicitur 'natura speciei, sicut 
hominis vel asini, est ens reale', verum est ut est in quolibet suo supposito 150 
divisim et sigillatim. Tamen ut simul in duobus vel pluribus suppositis est 
non est una natura neque est ens, sed entia, sicut Sortes et Plato non sunt ens 
neque unum, sed entia. 
Ad aliud. Cum dicitur 'per illud per quod aliquid est distinctum ab aliis 
et in se indistinctum est unum', concedatur modo quo est indistinctum in se 155 
i64va F et dis|tinctum ab alio, modo ilio est unum. Et cum dicitur 'natura equi et 
142 AA I 174; cf Aristoteles, Categonae, 5, 2al9-27 
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asini sunt distincte realiter, dato quod intellectus non esset', dicendum quod 
ut sunt in suis suppositis sigillatim acceptis sunt ab invicem distincte per suas 
formas substantiales; et quelibet in se per eandem formam est indistincta, et 
160 sie quelibet est una. Sed ut sunt simul in diversis suppositis natura asini et 
equi et sie de aliis speciebus non est in se indistincta et distineta ab aliis, sed 
sunt plures nature asini vel equi et sic de aliis, quarum quelibet est indistincta 
in se et distincta ab alia natura alterius speciei. Et sic non sequitur quod natura 
specifica in pluribus individuis simul sit una realiter, sed est plura una, ut ita 
165 loquatur, sive est plurificata in pluribus quarum quelibet est in se una. 
Ad aliam. Quando dicitur 'in ilio in quo aliqua non differunt, conve-
niunt', verum est secundum quod huiusmodi. Et cum dicitur quod duo indi-
vidua conveniunt in natura speciei realiter, dico quod falsum est, quia nichil 
reale quod est in uno est in alio. Unde ncque materia ncque forma est eadem 
170 realiter in utroque, sed solum secundum intellectum. fLicet enim unum In-
dividuum non différât ab alio per formam, que forma unius est alia realiter a 
forma alterius. Etiam forma alterius que pertinet ad speciem, quia per eandem 
formam realiter participant naturam speciei et suppositi illius speciei. f 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'uni intellectui per se' etc, concedatur vel in na-
175 tura intellecta in aliquo modo essendi ex quo sumitur talis intellectus. Et 
quando dicitur 'species habet unum intellectum' etc., verum est. Et ideo in 
re, scilicet in quolibet supposito sigillatim sumpto sibi correspondet una na-
tura. Sed in diversis simul non est una natura sibi correspondens. Unde ex 
fantasmate cuiuslibet individui potest intellectus cognoscere naturam secun-
180 dum se speciei et abstracte prêter singularia et ut apta nata est esse in pluribus 
singularibus. 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur quod generans general aliud propter materiam 
etc., dicendum quod sunt idem secundum formam ydemptitate speciei, que 
ydemptitas non est realiter in duobus suppositis. Et sic forma non secundum 
185 speciem et intellectum, sed realiter est forma indivisa in diversis individuis. 
Vel aliter dicendum quod pro tanto dicit Philosophus quod idem sunt secun-
dum formam, et quod forma non dividitur in eis, quia, licet habeant diversas 
formas, tarnen non differunt per formas. Unde differt dicere quod duo indi-
157 sunt] invicem add V realiter dato quod intellectus non esset ] om V 158 ab] ad 
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vidua habent diverses formas substantiates et quod differunt per formas suas 
substantiales, quia primum dictum est verum, sed secundum est falsum. 190 
Ad aliud. Quando dicitur quod Themistius dicit quod species vult esse 
natura una quedam etc., dicendum quod verum est quod species est natu-
ra quedam ut est in unoquoque individuo sigillatim sumpto. Sed ut est in 
diversis simul non est natura quedam, sed plures nature. 
Ad aliam. Quando dicitur secundum Aristotelem octavo Metaphystce 'for- 195 
ma secundum se est una et non dividitur' etc., dicendum quod Philosophus 
ibi loquitur de formis separatis a materia totaliter, sicut sunt intelligentie. Et 
in eis forma sua est per quam sunt ens et unum, ncque ibi sunt individua dif-
ferentia solo numero sub una specie, quia per idem est indivisa quelibet in 
se et divisa ab alio secundum speciem et secundum individuum. Vel potest 200 
dici quod forma specifica secundum se est una ut est in quolibet individuo 
sigillatim et secundum se accepto. Et similiter ut est simul in pluribus non est 
divisa per se, sed per accidentia et pro tanto dicitur una, quia secundum se per 
se non est divisa, sed tarnen per principia individuantia est divisa. Et alia est 
forma unius a forma alterius individui. 205 
Ad aliud. Cum dicitur 'diversitas aliquorum presupponit unitatem cuiu-
slibet in se', verum est. Et quando dicitur 'quiditas asini realiter est diversa 
a quiditate hominis circumscripto intellectu' etc., dicendum quod verum est 
secundum quod realiter reperitur in diversis suppositis secundum se sumptis 
et divisim. Sed si accipiatur ut simul est in pluribus suppositis non est quidi- 210 
tas asini diversa a quiditate equi vel hominis, sed quiditates plures asinorum a 
quiditatibus equorum diverse sunt. Et ideo non sequitur quod quiditas asini 
ut simul est in pluribus suppositis sit una in se, sed est una ut est in quolibet 
supposito secundum se et sigillatim sumpto, ut dictum est prius. 
i64vb F Ad aliud dicendum est ad maiorem per inter |hemptionem, quia indivi- 215 
dua diversarum specierum per essentiam et per formas suas differunt, et non 
solum sunt habentia formas diverses, sed differunt per formas suas. Set in-
dividua eiusdem speciei, licet habeant formas diversas, non tarnen differunt 
per formas suas, sed per principia individuantia. Et quando dicitur 'sicut illa 
individua diversarum specierum non conveniunt in aliquo reali, sic individua 220 
eiusdem speciei non conveniunt in aliquo uno reali', dicendum quod licet 
non sit u n u m reale commune in duobus individuis eiusdem speciei, tarnen 
195 Aristoteles, Metaphysica Vili 6, 1045b3^1 
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multiplicatio nature spécifiée in eis non est per essentiam et formam, sicut 
in diversis individuis diversarum specierum. Et ideo magis conveniunt duo 
225 individua unius speciei quam individua diversarum specierum. 
Ad aliud dicendum quod esset ordo realis inter naturam specificam ut est 
in unoquoque individuo secundum se et sigillatim sumpto et naturam alte-
rius speciei in aliis individuis. Et sic natura specifica est una extra ammani, ut 
visum est. Item inter naturam multiplicatam in pluribus individuis unius spe-
230 ciei et naturam alterius multiplicatam in aliis individuis esset ordo perfections 
et imperfectioris. 
Ad rationes in oppositum patet solutio, quia bene probant quod natura 
speciei ut est simul in duobus suppositis non est una realiter, sed solum est 
una secundum rationem. Sed ut est in quolibet supposito divisim accepto 
235 bene est una, sicut natura specifica hominis in Sorte secundum se accepto est 
una et similiter in Platone et sic de aliis. Ncque contra hoc procedunt rationes 
adducte ad oppositum, sicut patet inspicienti. 
1.8 Utrum accidentia ducant in cognitionem substantianun. 
Consequenter queritur utrum accidentia ducant in cognitionem substantia- i64vb F, ir- ν 
rum. 
Arguitur quod non quia: secundum quod dich Plato 'nichil agit ultra suam 
speciem'; sed cognitio substantie est ultra cognitionem accidentis|; ergo co- i r b v 
5 gnitio accidentis non ducit in cognitionem substantie ipsius. Maior est evi-
dens per Platonem. Et potest probari per Philosophum primo De generatione 
capitulo 'de activis et passivis', ubi dicit quod agens assimilatur passo in fine 
licet sint contraria in principio. Istud idem dicit Philosophus secundo De ani­
ma in ilio capitulo 'determinatis autem hiis'. Minor de se est evidens, videlicet 
io quod predicte cognitiones sunt distincte, quia obiecta sunt distincta. 
Secundo arguitur quia: esset circulatio, quia si accidentia ducerent in co­
gnitionem substantie, cum ipsum quod quid est ducat in cognitionem acci-
dentium, ergo a primo ad ultimum cognitio accidentium ducerei in cognitio­
nem substantie et e converso. 
is Item eadem sunt principia essendi et cognoscendi, ut dicit Philosophus 
secundo Metaphysice; sed accidentia non sunt principia essendi ipsius sub-
3 Locus non inventus 6-7 Cf. AA4:13; Aristoteles, De generarione 1.7, 324al0-14, 323b31-33 
8-9 Aristoteles, De anima II.5,418a4-6 16 Forsan Aristoteles, Metaphysica II.l,993b29-30; 
cf. AA 1:42 
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stantie, sed magis e converso, sicut de se patet; ergo sequitur quod accidentia 
non sunt principia cognoscendi ipsam substantiam. 
Quarto sic arguitur quia: vel primo cognoscitur substantia vel accidens. Si 
substantia, tunc accidens non ducit in cognitionem ipsius primo. Si tu dicas 20 
quod accidens, hoc non potest esse, quia tunc sequeretur quod ipsa substantia 
non esset primum obiectum intellectus, quod esset contra Philosophum tertio 
De anima. Item tunc accidens primo significaretur nomine entis, quia quod 
primo per aliquid intelligitur primo significatur. Ergo sequitur de necessitate 
quod ipsum accidens non primo cognoscitur. 25 
Quinto arguitur sic: ilia que a diversis potentiis cognoscuntur, cognitio 
unius non ducit in cognitionem alterius; sed ipsum accidens et substantia a 
diversis potentiis cognoscuntur; ergo cognitio unius non ducit in cognitio­
nem alterius. Et sub ilia ratione sub qua fiierit aliquid obiectum unius non 
apprehenditur ab alia potentia diversa nisi solum secundum accidens. Ma- 30 
ior patet, quia cum color et sonus cognoscuntur a virtute auditiva et visiva, 
que sunt diverse potentie, cognitio unius non ducit in cognitionem alterius. 
Minor est evidens, quia accidens est obiectum sensus, substantia autem est ob­
iectum intellectus, secundum quod apparet tertio De anima, que sunt diverse 
potentie. 35 
In oppositum est Philosophus in littera, qui dicit quod non solum quod quid 
est valet ad cognoscendum causas accidentium inherentium substantiis, sed 
accidentia magnam partem conferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid est. 
Ad istam questionem, de qua sunt diverse vie de modo per quem cognitio 
accidentis confert ad cognitionem substantie, dicendum est primo ponendo 40 
unam viam et deinde enumerando alias, distinguendo tarnen primo de acci-
i65ra F dentibus, quia quedam sunt communia, quedam | propria. Unde de acciden-
tibus communibus non est verum, sed magis de accidentibus propriis, secun­
dum quod dicit Themistius super prohemium. De accidentibus communibus 
probatio quod nichil faciant quia: ilia que indifferenter habent reperiri in di- 45 
versis speciebus non magis ducunt in cognitionem unius determinate quam 
alterius, sicut de se manifestum est; sed accidentia communia sunt huiusmo-
di; quare etc. De accidentibus propriis satis patet per Philosophum tertio De 
22-23 Cf. Aristoteles, De anima UIA, 429al5-16 34 Cf. Aristoteles, De anima UIA, 429al5-
16 36 AA 6:7; Aristoteles, De anima I 1, 402b21-22 44 Forsan Themistius, De anima I, 
ρ 12" β9 48^19 AA 6.167; Aristoteles, De amma III.8, 432a8-9 
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APPENDIX A. RADULPHI BRITONIS Quesnones super librum de anima 
anima, qui dicit quod intelligentem in actu necesse est fantasmata speculari; 
so sed ipsa fantasmata possunt esse accidentia propria substantiarum. 
De modo ponendi secundum quern ilia accidentia faciunt ad cognitionem 
substantie prima via talis est. Primo distinguendo de substantiis, quia quedam 
sunt substantie coniuncte qualitatibus sensibilibus; que habent cognosci ex 
fantasmatibus suorum suppositorum, que existunt sub quibusdam accidenti-
55 bus et sub determinata quantitate. Sed alie sunt substantie que sunt separate 
a qualitatibus sensibilibus et a materia fantasiata. Modus autem secundum 
quem talia accidentia propria faciunt ad cognitionem substantie talis est, quia 
illud quod movet fantasiam non est solum accidens ncque subiectum, sed sub-
iectum accidentis sub ratione accidentis, quia forma non agit ncque materia, 
60 sed totum compositum ratione forme. Et tale compositum sive concretum 
existens in fantasia sub esse materiali — ex eo quod talis virtus est materia-
lis, quia non profiindat se usque ad quiditatem rei — in virtute luminis in-
tellectus agentis irradiantis super fantasmata immutai intellectum possibilem 
quantum ad cognitionem quiditatis secundum se, prêter hoc quod cognoscat 
65 accidentia sub quorum ratione quiditas erat fantasiata. Et isto modo acciden-
tia propria valent ad cognoscendum quod quid est, non quia accidens primo 
cognoscatur ab intellectu possibili, sed quia ipse intellectus dependet ex sen-
satis et ymaginatis. Sed substantie secundo modo diete cognoscuntur per sua 
accidentia communia vel propria ipsarum vel suorum effectuum. Et ex ac-
70 cidentibus propriis devenimus in cognitionem ipsarum, et ille cognoscuntur 
per cognitionem effectuum suorum qui ad sensum apparent et ab negationem 
condicionum et proprietatum multarum que sunt in istis substantiis materia-
libus, sicut quod sunt immateriales, incorporales etc. Sed substantie sensibiles 
cognoscuntur ex fantasmatibus propriis a fantasia cognitis et cognoscuntur ab 
75 intellectu prius materialiter quam sua accidentia per que sunt a fantasia cogni-
te. Et quia videmus aliquod corpus, scilicet superceleste, moveri circulariter et 
regulariter et etemaliter, possumus devenire ad cognoscendum quod sit alia 
substantia immaterialis movens et non mota et etema. Et tales substantie non 
primo a nobis cognoscuntur, sed magis accidentia. 
so Aliqui autem dicunt sic: quod primo intelligitur accidens et postea substantia, 
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quia accidens causatum est ab ipso quod quid est, et causa est in suo effectu 
virtute; ideo ex cognitione accidentium devenitur in cognitionem ipsius quod 
quid est, sicut ex cognitione effectus devenimus in cognitionem cause. 
Sed illud non valet propter duo, quia si prius intelligeretur accidens quam 
quod quid est, tunc, cum illud quod prius intelligitur prius per nomen si- 85 
gnificetur, tunc significaretur accidens per quodcumque nomen significans 
utrumque prius quam substantia sive ipsum quod quid est. Et ita nomine 
entis prius significaretur accidens quam substantia, quod nullus diceret. Item 
illud est proprium et primum obiectum intellectus quod primo cognoscitur ab 
intellectu; modo ipsum quod quid est est primum obiectum intellectus, sicut 90 
apparet in tertio huius, et non accidens; ergo ipsum quod quid est prius intel­
ligitur quam accidens. Item de hoc quod dicunt quod accidentia — quia sunt 
causata ab ipso quod quid est — ducunt in cognitionem ipsius quod quid est, 
sicut effectus ducit in cognitionem cause, istud non valet, quia cognitio sub­
stantie ut est causa non est cognitio essentialis substantie sive secundum se et 95 
absolute; ergo si ipsum quod quid est cognosceretur per accidentia ut causa 
per effectum, tunc non habemus cognitionem essentialem substantie; modo 
hoc est inconveniens; quare etc. Et ideo oportet dare alium modum per quem 
accidentia valeant ad cognitionem quod quid est. 
Et ideo alii aliter dicunt quod accidentia ilio modo valent ad cognoscendum 100 
165* F quod quid est, quia primo accidentia fantasi|antur et cognoscuntur ab intel­
lectu et postea intellectus statini devenit in cognitionem entis, quia ratio entis 
est in quolibet ente. Et inde devenit in cognitionem substantie, quia per prius 
'ens' dicitur de substantia quam de accidente. Et sic ipsa accidentia valent ad 
cognitionem substantie sive ipsius quod quid est. 105 
Sed illud non valet propter rationes immediate tactas, quia isti ponunt, 
11™ ν sicut alii, quod prius intelligatur accidens | quam substantia, quod est fal-
sum. Etiam volunt ipsi quod illud quod primo intelligitur est ens; et 'ens' 
per prius dicitur de substantia; ergo illud quod primo intelligitur est substan­
tia. Et tarnen volunt quod accidens primo cognoscatur quam substantia; ergo 110 
implicant contradictoria in dictis suis. 
Aliter dici potest et probatur quod primo intelligitur ens ex hoc quod fantasia 
solum fantasiatur accidens substantie, et in quolibet ente includitur ratio entis 
in communi. Et ideo ex hoc quod fantasia est in actu fantasiandi aliquod ac­
cidens, per virtutem intellectus agentis poterit intelligi ens in communi, quod 115 
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APPENDIX A. RADULPHI BRITONIS Questtones super hbrum de anima 
est primum obiectum intellectus secundum Avicennam, et postmodum deve-
niet intellectus in cognitionem substantie, quia ens per prius est in substantia 
quam in accidente. Et secundum istam viam intellectus non cognoscit prius 
accidens quam substantiam. 
120 Aliter dicitur a quibusdam, et istam viam alias tenui, supponendo primo 
quod, quando virtutes alique sunt connexe et ordinate ad invicem, una 
illarum, scilicet inferiori, existente in sua operatione, ex hoc statim superior 
virtus potest cognoscere aliquid quod non est cognitum a virtute inferiori. 
Et hoc potest declarari in sensibus disparatis, sicut aliquo leso in digito, 
125 oculus advertit ad locum lesionis, quamvis oculus non cognoscat illud quod 
ledit. Eodem modo est in virtute extimativa et visiva, que sunt virtutes 
ordinate. Unde ovis oculus quando videt colorem lupi, quamvis virtus visiva 
non appréhendât speciem inimici, tarnen virtus extimativa, que est virtus 
superior ad virtutem visivam, statim percipit speciem inimici virtute visiva 
130 existente in sua operatione. Modo virtus intellectiva superior est ad virtutem 
fantasticam; et ideo, quando virtus fantastica est in fantasiando aliquod 
proprium accidens, tunc in virtute intellectus agentis abstrahentis aliquam 
rationem intelligendi a fantasmatibus, tunc intellectus possibilis intelligit 
ipsum quod quid est sine hoc quod intelligat ipsum accidens prius. Et hoc est 
135 quod Philosophus dicit in littera. Dicit enim sic: 'cum enim habeamus tradere 
secundum fantasiam de accidentibus, aut omnibus aut pluribus, et tunc de 
substantia habebimus optime aliquid dicere'. Unde non vult quod fantasia 
cognoscat ipsum quod quid est, neque quod intellectus cognoscat ipsum 
accidens, sed quando fantasia fantasiatur ipsa fantasmata, tunc intellectus 
140 fertur in ipsum quod quid est virtute intellectus agentis abstrahentis aliquam 
rationem intelligendi ab ipsis fantasmatibus. 
Etiam alia via est per quam potest dici quod accidentia valent ad cogno-
scendum quod quid est, quia quod intelligitur ab intellectu, hoc est sub aliqua 
ratione intelligendi, que ratio intelligendi non est illud quod intelligitur, sed 
us illud sub quo aliquid intelligitur; modo iste rationes intelligendi sumuntur ex 
modis essendi, qui modi essendi sunt fantasiati; modo cum fantasia fantasia-
tur aliquod fantasma vel modum essendi rei, tunc virtute intellectus agentis 
abstrahitur ab ilio modo essendi aliqua ratio intelligendi per quam intelligi-
tur talis res. Unde illud quod intellectus agens abstrahlt non est ipsum quod 
135 Aristoteles, De anima I 1,402022-25 
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quid est, sicut communiter dicitur, sed est ratio intelligendi. Sed illud quod iso 
intelligitur est quod quid est et substantia. 
Contra istas duas vias arguitur quia: ipse supponunt unum dubium, sci-
licet quod substantia non intelligatur per propriam speciem, sed per speciem 
sive rationem sumptam ab accidentibus. Item secundum istas vias substan-
tia vel quod quid est nullo modo esset in fantasia, sed solum accidentia sua; 155 
sed hoc videtur inconveniens, quia sola forma accidentalis non agit in sensum 
i65va F vel fantasiam, sed compositum ex subiecto | et forma; ideo etc. Item Phi-
losophus dicit quod nichil intellectus possibilis intelligit nisi sit fantasiatum, 
quia dicit quod sicut se habent sensibilia ad sensum, sic fantasmata ad intellec-
tum; sed secundum istos quiditas non esset fantasiata aliquo modo, sed solum 160 
accidentia; ideo etc. 
Est una alia via communis quod quid est est in fantasmatibus sicut causa in 
effectu. Et ideo virtute intellectus agentis abstrahitur ipsum quod quid est a 
fantasmatibus. Et tunc intellectus possibilis ipsum quod quid est intelligit. 
Tarnen istud non valet quia: cognitio substantie ut causa non est cogni- 165 
tio eius secundum se et essentialis, sed accidentalis, et sic de substantia non 
habetur cognitio prima secundum quod substantia est, quod falsum est. 
Primam viam magis credo esse veram. 
Tunc ad rationes. 
Ad primam. Cum dicitur 'nichil agit ultra suam speciem', concedatur 170 
quod nichil agat ultra suam speciem virtute propria. Sed si agat virtute alte-
rius bene potest, ut patet de caliditate ignis, que non agit ncque generai ignem 
virtute propria, sed magis virtute ignis. Et quando dicitur in minori 'cogni-
tio substantie est extra cognitionem accidentis et e converso', certe verum est, 
et tarnen cognitio accidentis non agit cognitionem substantie virtute propria, 175 
sed virtute intellectus agentis et virtute substantie in qua habet esse, secundum 
quod visum est in positione. Vel potest dici quod sola cognitio fantasiata ac-
cidentis non facit cognitionem substantie, sed fantasma totius aggregati ex su-
biecto et accidente, quod indudit substantiam (licet materialiter et sub ratione 
accidentis), formaliter in virtute intellectus agentis facit cognitionem substan- iso 
tie secundum se in intellectu possibili propter hoc quod intellectus cognoscat 
accidentia. 
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Ad secundam rationem. Cum dicitur quod esset circulatio, dico quod 
non est verum. Et cum dicitur 'ipsum quod quid est facit ad cognitionem 
185 accidentis et e converso', dico quod non est verum eodem modo, quia ipsum 
quod quid est facit ad cognitionem accidentis cognitione perfecta et completa; 
sed e converso est cognitione incompleta. 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'eadem sunt principia essendi et cognoscendi', 
verum est sic quod ilia que sunt principia essendi sunt principia cognoscendi, 
190 non tarnen e converso. Et cum dicitur in minori 'accidentia non sunt principia 
essendi' etc., verum est. Et quando tu dicis ulterius 'ergo non sunt principia 
cognoscendi', dico quod tu facis fallaciam consequentis a destructione ante-
cedentis, quia quecumque sunt principia essendi sunt principia cognoscendi, 
non tarnen e converso. 
195 Ad quartam rationem. Cum dicitur 'vel primo cognoscitur substantia vel 
accidens', concedo. Et cum dicitur in minori 'si primo cognosceretur acci-
dens, substantia non esset primum obiectum intellectus', bene volo quod ac­
cidens non primo cognoscatur ab intellectu possibili in istis substantiis infe-
rioribus, licet in substantiis separatis bene possit esse. Sed modus secundum 
200 quem facit ad cognitionem quod quid est dictus fuit in prima via. 
Ad ultimam rationem. Cum dicitur 'illa que a diversis potentiis cogno-
scuntur' etc., bene volo in potentiis que non sunt ordinate, sicut potentia gu­
stativa et auditiva, sed in potentiis ordinatis non est verum. Et quando dicitur 
in minori 'accidens et substantia a diversis potentiis cognoscuntur', verum est, 
205 sed ille potentie sunt ordinate. | Et sic dicendum est ad istam questionem. 11* ν 
1.9 Utrum anima habeat propriam operationem. 
Consequenter queritur utrum anima habeat propriam operationem. i65va F, ι ivb ν 
Arguitur quod sic quia: cuiuslibet potentie abstracte est operatio abstracta; 
modo anima intellectiva est potentia abstracta; ergo habet operationem abs­
tractam. Maior patet, quia operatio proportionatur virtuti cuius est operatio, 
5 et ideo virtus abstracta habet operationem abstractam. Minor patet per Phi-
losophum in principio secundi hutus. Dicit enim quod anima quantum ad 
aliquam partem eius, scilicet intellectivam, nullius corporis est actus. Ergo est 
6 Cf Aristoteles, De anima ILI, 413a4-7 
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potentia abstracta a corpore et per consequens habet operationem abstractam 
a corpore. Et si habet operationem abstractam a corpore, illa est sibi propria, 
i65vb F quia ex quo est | abstracta non communicat corpori in illa operatione. 10 
Item Philosophus dicit quod si anima haberet propriam operationem, 
contingeret earn separari a corpore, et si non haberet propriam operationem 
non contingeret earn separari. Tunc arguo: illud quod potest separari a 
corpore habet propriam operationem in qua non communicat corpori; sed 
anima intellectiva potest separari a corpore; ergo etc. Maior patet per Phi- is 
losophum, ut dictum est, et per Themixtium ibidem. Dicit enim Themistius 
quod dignitas in natura est quod nichil fit otiosum; modo si anima intellectiva 
posset separari a corpore et non haberet propriam operationem, tunc esset 
otiosa, quod est inconveniens. Minor patet per Philosophum secundo huius, 
ubi dicit quod anima inteilertiva separatur ab aliis partibus anime, sicut 20 
perpetuum a corruptibili. 
Tertio sic arguitur: illa operatio est propria anime que non exercetur per 
Organum corporale; modo intelligere non exercetur per Organum corporale; 
ergo videtur quod sit solius anime. Minor patet de se. 
In oppositum videtur esse Philosophus in isto prohemio. 25 
Et arguitur ratione quia: si aliqua esset operatio propria anime, maxime 
videretur intelligere; sed intelligere non est operatio propria anime; ergo etc. 
Maior patet, quia in ista operatione minus indiget anima corpore quam in 
aliis. Minor patet, quia intelligere vel est fantasia vel non est sine fantasia, ut 
dicit Philosophus; modo fantasia est virtus corporalis; ergo intelligere non est 30 
sine corpore. 
Ad istam questionem dico quod 'aliquam operationem esse propriam anime' 
potest intelligi dupliciter: vel quia non communicat corpori in illa operatione 
sicut instrumento (quia non est talis operatio exercita per Organum corpo-
rale), vel quia non communicat corpori in illa operatione sicut obiecto vel 35 
subiecto. Modo quando queritur utrum sit aliqua operatio propria anime, 
dico quod sic primo modo, scilicet in qua non communicat corpori sicut 
instrumento vel organo corporali. Sed secundo dico quod non habet ali-
lo Themistius, Paraphrasis in libros Aristotehs De anima I,p. lo48"" 19 AA 6:52; Aristoteles, 
De anima 11.2, 413b26-27 30 Aristoteles, De anima 1.1,403a8-9 
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quam propriam operationem in qua non communicat corpori sicut obiecto 
40 vel subiecto. 
Primum declaratur sic quia: ilia operatio est propria anime isto modo in 
qua anima non operatur mediante aliquo organo corporali; modo aliqua est 
operatio talis anime ad quam exercendam non indiget aliquo organo, sicut est 
intelligere; ergo talis operatio est propria ipsius anime isto modo, scilicet in 
45 qua non communicat corpori sicut instrumento vel organo. 
Secundum declaratur. Et primo quod non habeat operationem propriam 
in qua non indigeat corpore sicut obiecto, et hoc in hac vita quia: intellige-
re est quedam operatio que indiget fantasmate vel re fantasiata sicut obiecto; 
mModo res fantasiata est res corporalis et fantasia est virtus corporea; ergo 
so ad hoc quod anima intelligat, indiget corpore sicut obiecto vel sicut aliquo 
requisito propter representationem sui obiecti, ita quod ad hoc quod appré-
hendât suum obiectum indiget corpore. Modo operatio que videtur maxime 
propria anime est intelligere. Ergo si non potest exercere istam quin indigeat 
corpore sicut obiecto vel sicut aliquo requisito propter representationem sui 
55 obiecti, nullam operationem habet <in> qua non indiget corpore ad hoc ut 
ipsam exerceat. 
Sed utrum anima indigeat corpore sicut subiecto ad exercendum suam 
operationem, Commentator diceret quod non, quia secundum ipsum sub-
stantia anime intellective non est perfectio corporis, et ideo intelligere, quod 
60 est operatio anime intellective, non est in corpore sicut in subiecto. Et ra-
tiones istius operationis in tertio huius apparebunt. Sed quia ista opinio est 
erronea et contra fidem et veritatem, quia vile esset nature humane quod non 
haberet intellectum perfectionem sui. Et per consequens intelligere dependet 
ex corpore quodam modo sicut ex subiecto, quia operatio non est magis abs-
65 tracta quam suum subiectum; modo anima intellectiva est forma substantialis 
corporis, ut apparebit inferius, et perfectio corporis; ergo oportet quod intel-
ligere sit in corpore sicut in subiecto. Hoc tarnen est per accidens, quia po-
tentia anime intellective fundatur in essentia anime immediate et secundum 
quod separabilis est, non mediante organo corporali. Et | quia ipsa essentia i66ra F 
70 anime intellective est in corpore et perfectio corporis, ideo per accidens isto 
modo est in corpore, quia est operatio anime dum existit in corpore. Unde 
accidit anime intellective quod sit actu perficiens materiam secundum quod 
in ea fundatur potentia intellectiva. Cuius ratio est: si ipsa separata a corpo-
re, remaneret potentia intellectiva, et ideo, cum intelligere sit operatio anime 
41 isto] primo V 42 aliquo] om. V aliqua] alia F 43 aliquo] om. V organo] 
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mediante potentia intellectiva accidentaliter, per accidens est quod intelligere 75 
nostrum in hac vita dependet ex corpore sicut ex subiecto. 
Alie autem operationes anime, sicut sentire etc., dependent ex corpore 
sicut ex subiecto, quia non fundantur in essentia anime immediate, sed me­
diante corporali organo. 
Tunc ad rationes. so 
Ad primam. Cum dicitur 'potentie abstracte est operatic abstracta', ve­
rum est: sicut est abstracta, sic habet operationem abstractam. Et cum dicitur 
'anima intellectiva est potentia abstracta', verum est isto modo: quod non ha­
bet Organum corporale. Et sic bene volo quod habet propriam operationem 
ad quam exercendam non indiget corpore sicut organo. Sed non est potentia 85 
sic abstracta ita quod sit solum separata a corpore. 
Ad secundam. Cum dicitur 'si anima habet operationem propriam' etc., 
concedatur. Et cum dicitur 'anima est separabilis a corpore', Commentator 
diceret quod non esset separabilis a corpore secundum operationem, quia, 
licet non intelligat in ilio corpore, intelligit tarnen in alio, licet secundum sub- 90 
stantiam esset separabilis. Sed de hoc non curo. Quando ergo dicitur 'anima 
est separabilis', verum est, 'ergo habet operationem propriam', verum est. Ta­
rnen ilia operatio non est talis qualem habet in hac vita, quia anima in hac 
vita inteUigit ex sensatis et ymaginatis. Sed quando est separata a corpore non 
sic intelligit, sed per revelationem superioris intelligentie, vel per species infu- 95 
sas, vel per habitus acquisitos hic, vel secundum aliquem alium modum. Et 
propter hoc dicit Philosophus in tertio huius quod nos non reminiscimur post 
mortem eorum que fecimus in hac vita. 
Ad tertiam rationem. Cum dicitur 'illa operatio est propria anime que non 
exercetur per Organum corporale', verum est, quia non dependet ex corpore 100 
i2ra ν sicut ex organo. Non est tarnen sic propria quin dependeat ex corpore sicut | 
ex subiecto vel obiecto modo quo dictum est prius. 
LIO Utrum naturalis diffinit per materìam, logicus vero per formam 
166" F, 12" v Consequenter queritur circa illam partem ubi Philosophus dicit quod natura-
lis diffinit per materiam, logicus vero per formam, utrum hoc sit verum. 
97 Aristoteles, De anima III.5, 430a24-26 
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Arguitur primo quod naturalis non diffiniat per materiam, quia illud quod 
est principium diffiniendi rem est principium cognoscendi earn; sed materia 
5 non est principium cognoscendi; ideo etc. Maior patet, quia diffinitio datur 
causa innotescendi ut habetur sexto Topicorum. Minor patet, quia materia 
est de se ignota ut apparet primo Physicorum; tale autem non est principium 
cognoscendi aliud. 
Secundo sic arguitur: si diffinitio naturalis haberet dari per materiam sen-
io sibilem, aut ibi poneretur materia sensibilis ut sensibilis est, aut materia que 
est sensibilis non ut sensibilis est. Si dicatur quod ponatur ibi materia sen-
sibilis ut sensibilis est, ergo in diffinitione substantiarum materialium opor-
tet ponere qualitates sensibiles, et per consequens accidentia, quia sensibilitas 
inest sibi per accidentia. Et tunc diffinitiones substantiarum darentur per ad-
15 ditamentum. Ncque datur per materiam que sensibilis est non ut sensibilis 
est, quia tunc diffinitio naturalis non differret a mathematica, quia mathe-
matica diffiniuntur per materiam que sensibilis est non ut sensibilis est, quia 
coniuncta sunt in esse cum sensibilibus. 
Item tertio ostenditur quod logicus non diffiniat per formam quia: qui 
20 diffinit per totum aggregatum ex materia et forma non diffinit per formam 
magis quam per materiam; modo logicus diffinit per totum aggregatum ex 
materia et forma, quia per genus et differentias; modo genus et differentia, 
sicut animai et rationale, dicunt totum aggregatum ex materia et forma; ergo 
etc. Maior patet, quia in aggregato non magis est forma quam materia. 
25 Oppositum utriusque vult Philosophus 
Ad islam questionem dico quod naturalis diffinit per materiam sensibilem, 
logicus vero per formam. 
Ad declarationem primi est intelligendum quod materia sensibilis que po-
nitur in diffinitione | rerum naturalium potest considerari tripliciter: uno mo- i66,b F 
30 do secundum se et absolute ut est indifferens ad quamlibet formam, non con-
siderando earn ut sensibilis est, ncque ut habet ordinem ad formam deter-
minatam. Et sic non debet poni in diffinitione naturalium, quia materia isto 
6 Aristoteles, Topica VI.l, 139bl4-15 7 Cf. AA 2.29, Aristoteles, Physica 1.7, 191a8-l 1 
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m o d o n o n est pr inc ip ium intelligendi aliquid, quia ignota est ut sic, et tale 
n o n est p r inc ip ium cognoscendi aliquid. 
Alio m o d o potest considerari materia s e c u n d u m q u o d sensibilis, id est, 35 
ut est sub disposit ionibus sub quibus sentitur. Et a d h u c ilio m o d o mater ia 
n o n pon i tu r in diffinitione natural ium, quia iste disposit iones sunt acciden-
tia; m o d o accidentia n o n p o n u n t u r in diffinitione substantie; ergo materia u t 
est sensibilis ilio m o d o n o n poni tur in diffinitione na tura l ium, quia illud per 
quod est sensibilis sunt accidentia. 40 
Tert io m o d o potest considerari materia u t habet o rd inem et respectum 
ad fo rmam de te rmina tam, ex quo respectu q u e m habet ad talem formam dé-
terminât sibi complexionem determinatam qual i ta tum sensibilium ad hoc u t 
talis forma in tali materia introducatur , ita quod qualitates sensibiles n o n in-
c ludun tur in sua essentia, sed requirit ta lem disposi t ionem vel talem compie- 45 
x ionem qual i ta tum sensibilium in respectu q u e m habet ad formam determi-
na tam. Et p rop te r hoc dicitur materia sensibilis, et n o n quia qualitates sen-
sibiles in sua essentia includantur . M o d o mater ia ilio m o d o poni tur in dif-
finitione na tura l ium, quia diffinitio realis, cu iusmodi est diffinitio naturalis , 
debet habere partes diffiniti sub rat ione sub qua sunt par tes eius sub propri is 50 
rat ionibus. Et hoc habetur in p r imo Phystcorum, ubi dici tur quod diffinitio di-
vidit in singularia, id est, dicit partes diffiniti sub propr i is rationibus acceptas. 
M o d o mater ia que est pr incipium re rum na tura l ium est pr incipium e a r u m 
secundum o r d i n e m q u e m habet ad de te rmina tam fo rmam, sicut carnes et os -
sa sunt mater ia s ecundum respectum q u e m habent ad formam h u m a n a m vel 55 
asinam. Ergo talis materia poni tur in diffinitione na tura l ium. Unde no t an -
d u m quod carnes et ossa in sua ratione nu l lum accidens includunt, sed so lum 
dicunt mate r iam. Dicunt tarnen earn in ordine ad f o r m a m determinatam, et 
ex hoc requir i tur quod sit disposita sic vel sic. Sed illas dispositiones in sua 
ratione non includunt. 60 
N o t a n d u m tarnen est q u o d ille o rdo mater ie ad de terminatam fo rmam 
n o n a t tendi tur ex parte materie absolute (quia de se est indifferens ad o m -
n e m formam) , sed a t tendi tur in materia ex ord ine fo rmarum, que sibi invicem 
succedunt in materia, et etiam agentium. U n d e octavo Metaphysice habe tu r 
quod ex vino fit acetum immediate , set ex aceto n o n fit immediate v inum, sed 65 
per mul tas alterationes. Et similiter ex vivo fit m o r t u u m immediate, sed ex 
m o r t u o n o n fit v ivum immediate . 
51 Aristoteles, PJiysica I 1, 184bll-12 64 Aristoteles, Metaphysica VIII 5, b34-1045a6 
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Secundum declaratur, scilicet quod logicus diffiniat per formam. luxta quod 
est intelligendum quod duplex est diffinitio logica: una que datur in termi-
70 nis logicalibus, sicut est diffinitio syllogismi, vel inductionis, vel alicuius en-
tis logicalis, et de tali diffinitione logica non loquitur Philosophus. Alia est 
diffinitio logica que datur per genus et differentias. Modo genus et differen-
tia dicunt totum aggregatum sub aliqua ratione que sumitur ab aliquo modo 
essendi consequente formam, sicut ratio animalis sumitur ab hoc quod est 
75 sentire et moveri secundum locum, que consequuntur animal ratione forme. 
Et ratio huius quod est rationale sumitur ab hoc quod est ratiocinari, quod 
consequitur formam humanam. Et propter hoc dicitur quod diffinitio logica 
datur per formam, id est, per aliquid quod significat totum aggregatum sub 
aliqua ratione intelligendi que sumitur a modo essendi consequente formam. 
so Vel potest dici quod, quia logicus diffinit per genus et differentiam, que 
significant aggregatum ex forma et materia, et forma est illud quod est ibi 
principaliter et sub cuius ratione totum intelligitur, quia omne quod intelligi-
tur, intelligitur per formam per quam est ens actu, ideo dicitur quod diffinitio 
logica datur per formam. Item propter aliud, scilicet quia non accipit mate-
85 riam sub propria ratione materie sicut fit in diffinitione | naturali, ideo per i66va F 
oppositum ad modum diffinitionis naturalis dicitur diffinire per formam. 
Sed secundum Commentatorem diceretur aliter. Commentator enim vult 
septimo Metaphysice et secundo huius quod in eis que significant aggregatum 
ex materia et forma, sicut 'homo', nomen per prius dicitur de forma, secun-
90 do de aggregato, tertio de materia. Modo tenendo istam viam diceretur quod 
diffinitio logica datur per formam pro tanto, quia nomine generis et differen-
tie, per quas datur diffinitio logica, primo importaretur forma. Et propter hoc 
diceretur quod diffinitio logica datur per formam. Tarnen istud non videtur 
valere quia: in istis substantialibus aggregatis ubi partes non habent esse, sed 
95 totum aggregatum (quia forma non est, sed est illud quo aliquid est), neque 
materia habet esse, sed aggregatum ex materia et forma habet esse, non vide-
tur istud esse verum, quia illud quod habet esse est illud quod significatur. Et 
ideo, cum aggregatum sit illud quod habet esse, ideo aggregatum per nomen 
habet significar! et non partes. Et ideo prima via tenenda est. 
loo Tunc ad rationes. 
88 Locus non inventus 
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Ad primam. Cum dicitur 'illud est principium diffiniendi rem' etc., ilia 
ratio est soluta ex dictis, quia materia prima secundum se et absolute non 
habet poni in diffinitione, quia ut sic non est principium cognoscendi aliquid 
cum de se sit ignota. Sed materia considerata in ordine vel respectu ad formam 
i2rb ν determina|tam, ut sic potest bene poni in diffinitione, quia isto modo habet 105 
intelligi et cognosci per analogiam ad formam, ut habetur primo Physicorum. 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'si daretur per materiam, aut poneretur ibi materia 
ut sensibilis est' etc., dico quod ibi ponitur materia sensibilis ut sensibilis est 
et non ut sensibilis est, id est, sub dispositionibus sub quibus sentitur, sed 
ut habet ordinem ad formam determinatam naturalem, ex quo ordine exigit 110 
determinatam complexionem qualitatum sensibilium. Et cum dicitur 'tunc 
ergo in diffinitione rerum naturalium poneretur accidens', dico quod non, 
quia materia isto modo non includit aliquod accidens. 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'qui diffinit per totum aggregatum' etc., ista ratio 
soluta est, quia totum aggregatum per quod datur diffinitio logica significatur 115 
sub ratione forme, id est, sub aliqua ratione intelligendi que sumitur ab aliquo 
modo essendi consequente formam. Et ideo diffinitio logica dicitur dari per 
formam et non per materiam, et etiam propter alias dictas causas in positione. 
ILI Utnun anima sit substantia 
i66va F, i2rb v Circa secundum De anima secundum ordinem Philosophi procedamus, pri­
mo querendo utrum anima sit substantia. 
Arguitur quod non quia: quod est substantia est per se subsistens; anima non 
est per se subsistens; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia proprietas substantie est per 
se subsistere, quia substantia dicitur a substare. Minor patet, quia quod est 5 
per se subsistens est ens actu; modo anima non est ens actu, ymmo est actus; 
ideo etc. 
Item quod est ens in alio non est substantia; anima est ens in alio; ergo 
non est substantia. Maior patet, quia substantia non est ens in alio, ymmo est 
ens in se. Per hoc enim distinguitur ab accidente. Minor patet, quia anima est 10 
in corpore. 
106 AA 2:29; Aristoteles, Physica 1.7, 191a8-l 1 
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Item quod advenit alicui enti in actu non est substantia; sed anima advenit 
alicui enti in actu; ideo etc. Maior patet per Commentatorem in Ulo secundo. 
Vult enim quod hec est differentia inter formas accidentales et substantiales, 
is quia forma substantialis advenit enti in potentia, sed forma accidentalis ad­
venit enti in actu. Minor declaratur quia: anima advenit corpori disposito et 
organico, sicut patet per diffinitionem anime qua dicitur quod anima est actus 
corporis organici phisici etc.; modo corpus organicum est ens actu, quia iste 
organizationes presupponunt formam substantialem per quam est ens actu; 
20 ideo etc. 
Item illud quod diffini|tur per additamentum est accidens; anima est i66vb F 
huiusmodi, quia in diffinitione anime ponitur corpus, quod est additum 
extra essentiam anime. 
In oppositum est Philosophus et Commentator 
25 Dicendum quod anima est substantia, quia sicut dicit Commentator 'digni-
tas est in natura, quia substantia dignior est quolibet accidente'; modo anima 
quibusdam substantiis est dignior; ergo multo fortius anima est dignior quo­
libet accidente. Sed tale non est accidens. Ergo relinquitur quod anima sit 
substantia. 
30 I tem h o c p r o b a t u r per Avicennam Sexto naturalium, quia q u o d est pr inci­
p i u m m u l t a r u m o p e r a t i o n u m que n o n possunt reduci ad al iquod accidens est 
forma substantialis; m o d o a n i m a est p r i n c i p i u m tal ium o p e r a t i o n u m , quia 
est pr inc ip ium sentiendi, vivendi et intelligendi et ille operat iones n o n pos­
sunt reduci in al iquod accidens, et h o c principaliter. Et dico 'principaliter ' , 
35 quia aliqua potent ia a n i m e bene est p r i n c i p i u m ta l ium o p e r a t i o n u m , tarnen 
n o n est principale et p r i m u m pr inc ip ium; ergo a n i m a est substantia. 
I tem ex n o n substantiis n o n fit substantia; sed ex a n i m a et corpore fit 
substantia composita, sicut animal; ergo a n i m a est substantia. 
T u n c ad rationes. 
40 Ad p r i m a m . C u m dicitur 'quod est substantia est per se subsistens', ve­
r u m est q u o d est substantia composita, vel substantia que est per se ens, vel 
13 AA 6:114; Averroes, Commentanum magnum m libros De anima II, com. 4, ρ 13332-1342 
25 Averroes, Commentanum magnum m libros De anima II, com. 2, ρ. 13θ'β; cf. AA 6:113 
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ens actu. Sed substantia que est pars substantie, cuiusmodi est forma vel ma-
teria, non est per se subsistens. Unde nomen 'substantie' per prius dicitur de 
substantia composita quam de materia vel forma. 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'quod est in alio' etc., dico quod aliquid potest esse 45 
ens in alio dupliciter. Vel sicut accidens in subiecto, quod est in aliquo ente 
in actu; et tale non est substantia. Vel sicut perfectio in perfectibili, vel forma 
substantialis in materia; et tale quod est ens in aliquo ente in potentia bene est 
substantia; modo anima ilio modo est ens in alio. 
Ad aliud. Cum dicitur 'quod advenit enti in actu non est substantia', ve- so 
rum est si maneat in sua actualitate in adventu eius. Et cum dicitur 'anima 
advenit enti in actu', falsum est modo quo dictum est. Et cum dicitur 'adve-
nit corpori organico', dico quod in adventu anime omnes iste organizationes 
et dispositiones corrumpuntur et consimiles introducuntur dispositionibus 
precedentibus. Perfectiores tarnen sunt quam précédentes. 55 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'quod diffinitur per additamentum' etc., dicendum 
quod maior non est vera in substantiis imperfectis, que per se non subsistunt, 
sed solum inquantum sunt partes alicuius quod per se subsistit; et talis est 
anima; ideo etc. 
II.2 Utrum anima sit materia vel compositum 
i66vb F, 12* v Consequenter queritur utrum anima sit materia vel compositum. 
Arguitur quod sit materia quia: quicquid est ens in potentia est materia; sed 
anima est ens in potentia; ideo etc. Maior patet, quia materia substantivatur 
per posse, ut vult Commentator in De substantia orbis. Et ideo quod est in 
potentia est materia. Minor patet, quia anima sensitiva est in potentia ad sen- 5 
sibilla, et anima intellectiva est in potentia ad intelligibilia. Et hoc etiam vult 
Philosophus in secundo huius et tertio. 
Item quod habet proprietates materie est materia vel habens materiam; 
sed anima habet proprietates materie; quare etc. Maior patet, quia proprietas 
non est sine eo cuius est proprietas. Minor apparet saltern de intellectiva et 10 
4 AA 10:7; Averroes, De substantia orbis I, f. 3 L 7 Cf. Aristoteles, De anima II.5, 418a3^1; 
De anima 111.4, 429al5-16 
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sensitiva, quia proprietas materie est recipere et pati, et ilia conveniunt anime 
sensitive et intellective, quia anima sensitiva recipit species sensibiles et anima 
intellectiva recipit species intelligibiles. Etiam habent pati, quia intelligere est 
pati et etiam sentire est pati. 
is Deinde probatur quod anima sit aggregatum corpus ex materia et forma 
quia: quod movetur est corpus; anima movetur; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia 
mobile est ens actu et tale est compositum ex materia et forma. fEt hec est 
materia in istis inferioribus. Minor patet quia, moto corpore movetur anima.t 
Item quod habet cognoscere corpus compositum est corpus; sed anima 
20 habet cognoscere corpus; quare etc. Maior patet, quia simile simili cognosci-
tur. Minor patet de se. 
In oppositum utriusque est Philosophus. 
Dicendum quod anima est forma et non materia ncque compositum. Primum 
apparet sic, quia illud quo vivimus, sentimus et intelligimus principaliter est 
25 forma; modo anima est huiusmodi; ideo etc. Ma|ior apparet in isto secundo, i67ra F 
quia illud quo operamur est duplex, sicut illud quo sanamur est duplex, quia 
sanamur corpore sicut materia et sanitate sicut forma. Et ideo illud quo vivi­
mus et sentimus et intelligimus principaliter est forma. Etiam quia operatio 
procedit a forma, sicut apparet secundo De generatione, ubi dicitur 'forme 
30 est agere, materie vero pati'. Hoc etiam vult Commentator, qui dicit quod 
operatio facit scire formam, sicut transmutatio materiam. Et ideo illud quo 
vivimus etc. est forma, cum iste sunt operationes quedam; modo anima est 
huiusmodi, ut habetur in isto secundo; ideo etc. 
Item ostendendo quod anima vegetativa non sit materia, quia materia est 
35 ens in potentia; sed anima vegetativa est potentia activa — est | enim prin- i2va ν 
cipium activum operationum; quare etc. Item anima sensitiva et intellectiva 
non sunt materia, quia materia est in potentia ad formas reales sub esse rea­
li; sed anima sensitiva est in potentia ad formas intentionales, anima autem 
intellectiva est in potentia ad formas intelligibiles; quare etc. 
40 Item ncque anima est corpus, quia corpus uno modo accipitur ut est trina 
dimensio, scilicet longum, latum et profundum. Et sic corpus est de genere 
quantitatis; modo anima non est de genere quantitatis; ideo etc. Alio modo 
25 Cf. AA 6:53; Aristoteles, De anima 11.2, 414a4-8 29 AA 4:39; Aristoteles, De generatione 
II.9, 335b29-31, 35 30 AA 1:216; Averroes, In XII Metaphystcorum Vili, com. 12, f. 220 G 
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APPENDIX A. RADULPHI BRITONIS Questtones super librum de anima 
dicitur corpus ut est aggregatum ex materia et forma sub ratione intelligendi 
sumpta essentialiter ab ilio apparenti quod est esse corporeum vel dimensio-
natum. Et sic corpus est de genere substantie et est genus animalis. Et anima 45 
isto modo non est corpus, quia corpus ilio modo est ens actu; sed anima non 
est ens actu, sed est actus quidam; ideo etc. Alio modo dicitur corpus ut di-
cit alteram partem aggregati distinctam contra animam. Et sic anima non est 
corpus, quia anima ilio modo non est materia; sed corpus isto modo dicit 
materiam; ideo etc. Relinquitur ergo quod sit forma. 50 
Tunc ad rationes in oppositum. 
Ad primam. Cum dicitur 'quod est ens in potentia est materia', verum 
est si sit ens in potentia ad formas sensibiles sub esse reali. Si autem non sit 
in potentia ad formas sensibiles, vel non sit in potentia ad istas sub esse reali, 
non oportet; modo anima quantum ad intellectivam non est in potentia ad 55 
formas sensibiles sub esse reali, sed sub esse intentionali vel intelligibili. 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'quod habet proprietates materie est materia' etc., 
verum est si habeat eas eo modo quo sunt materie. Sed si alio modo, non 
oportet. Et cum dicitur 'anima habet recipere et pati' etc., dico quod materia 
habet recipere formas reales sub esse reali. Sed anima recipit formas sensibiles 60 
et intelligibiles sub esse intentionali. Eodem modo pati cum abiectione forme 
contrarie est proprietas materie passione proprie dieta. Sed anima non pati-
tur passione proprie dicta, que est cum abiectione forme contrarie, set magis 
passione improprie dicta, que est receptio perfectionis. Unde talis passio est 
salus et perfectio, ut Philosophus dicit secundo hums. 65 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'quod movetur est corpus', verum est quod per 
se movetur. Sed si moveatur ad motum alterius et per accidens, non oportet; 
modo anima movetur per accidens ad motum alterius, quia ad motum totius 
aggregati. 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'quod habet cognoscere corpus est corpus', falsum 70 
est. Et cum dicitur quod simile simili cognoscitur, verum est quod illud quod 
cognoscitur simile est aliquo modo cognoscenti, non quantum ad esse reale, 
sed quantum ad esse speciem sub esse intentionali receptam in cognoscente. 
Et non oportet quod quantum ad esse reale sit simile sibi. Ideo etc. 
65 Cf AA 6.94-95, Aristoteles, De anima II.5, 417b2-16 
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II.3 Utrum anima sit forma substantialis corporis 
Consequenter queritur utrum anima sit forma substantialis corporis. i67ra F, 12™ ν 
Arguitur quod non quia: quod advenit enti in actu non est forma substantialis; 
sed anima advenit enti in actu; ideo etc. Maior patet per Commentatorem 
supra secundum huius. Minor patet, quia anima advenit enti in actu, scilicet 
5 corpori organizato. Modo organizatum est in actu, quia organizationes iste 
presupponunt formam substantialem. 
Item nulla substantia diffinitur per additamentum; sed anima diffinitur 
per additamentum; ergo non est substantia. Maior patet per Philosophum 
septimo Metaphysice, qui dicit quod diffinitiones accidentium | dantur per ad- i67rb F 
10 ditamenta et non diffinitiones substantiarum. Minor patet, quia diffinitur sic: 
anima est actus corporis etc.; igitur ponitur aliquod additum extra essentiam 
anime, scilicet corpus. 
Item ilia forma qua ablata remanet idem corpus numero quod prius non 
est forma substantialis; anima est huiusmodi; quare etc. Maior patet per Phi-
15 losophum in littera, qui dicit quod si dolabra esset corpus, acuties esset sua 
forma substantialis, et ista acutie remota non remanet dolabra nisi equivoce. 
Minor patet, quia corpus mortuum idem numero est cum vivo. Et hoc proba-
tur quia: eadem accidentia numero remanent in vivo et mortuo, sicut color. 
Edam et eadem compago membrorum et eedem cicatrices. Et sensus hoc iudi-
20 cat; modo accidens unum numero non transfertur de subiecto in subiectum; 
ergo manet idem corpus numero quod prius ablata ipsa anima. 
Item quod advenit alicui habenti formam que non corrumpatur in eius 
adventu advenit enti in actu, et per consequens non est forma substantialis; 
modo anima advenit alicui habenti formam que non corrumpitur in eius ad-
25 ventu; ergo etc. Minor patet, quia anima advenit corpori organico. Modo 
probatio quod forma istius non corrumpitur in adventu anime, ncque iste or­
ganizationes, quia: quicquid corrumpitur a suo contrario corrumpitur. Modo 
forme precedenti non contrariatur forma sequens, quia forma sequens est si-
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cut perficiens formam precedentem et complens earn. Neque organizationes 
sequentes sunt contrarie precedentibus, quia sunt similes sibi. Neque etiam 30 
generans contrariatur forme, quia illud quod inducit formam non est contra-
rium Uli forme, quia generans general sibi simile; sed generans inducit Ulam 
precedentem formam et suas organizationes. Quare etc. 
Item si Ule dispositiones corrumperentur, tunc frustra fuissent introducte 
in materia; modo hoc est inconveniens; ergo anima advenit enti in actu. 35 
In oppositum est Philosophus, qui vult quod anima est substantia que est 
forma substantialis corporis. 
Et dicendum quod anima est forma substantialis corporis. Et hoc probatur 
tripliciter vel quadrupliciter. Primo sic quia: Ula forma est forma substantialis 
corporis qua remota non remanet idem corpus numero quod prius nisi equi- 40 
voce; sed remota anima a corpore non remanet idem corpus numero quod 
prius; ideo etc. Maior patet per PhUosophum in littera, qui dicit quod si dola-
bra esset corpus naturale acuties esset sua forma substantialis qua remota non 
remaneret dolabra nisi equivoce. Sed quia ita non est, scüicet quod dolabra 
non est corpus physicum, sed artificiale, ideo remota acutie adhuc remanet 45 
dolabra quantum ad eius substantiam, quia tota substantia artificialium est 
sua materia. Ergo intentio sua est quod idem est forma substantialis corporis 
qua remota non remanet idem corpus numero quod prius. Minor patet, quia 
remota anima a corpore ampUus non potest in suam operationem, sicut non 
potest nutriri, augmentari, neque sentire, neque intelligere. Ergo non est idem so 
quod prius nisi equivoce, quia sicut apparet quarto Meteororwn unumquod-
que ens habet suam operationem propriam in qua, cum potest, est Ulud, cum 
autem non potest, non est Ulud nisi equivoce, sicut oculus cum potest videre 
i2vb ν est oculus, cum autem non potest videre non est oculus | nisi equivoce, sicut 
lapideus sive depictus. 55 
Item Ulud per quod distinguitur aliquid ab alio essentialiter est forma 
substantialis eius, quia forma distinguit et separat; ergo actus substantialis 
est qui distinguit et separat substantialiter; modo animatum distinguitur ab 
inanimato per animam; quare etc. 
36 AA 6-42; Anstoteles, De amma 11.1,412319-20 42 Aristoteles, De ammali. 1, 412b 12-15 
51 AA 5·26; Aristoteles, Meteora IV.12, 390310-13, 389b31 
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60 Item illud quo primo et principaliter vivimus et sentimus et intelligimus 
est | forma substantialis; sed anima est illud quo vivimus principaliter quan- i67va F 
tum ad animam vegetativam, quo sentimus quantum ad animam sensitivam, 
et intelligimus quantum ad animam intellectivam; quare etc. Maior patet, 
quia illud quo aliquod operatur duplex est. Unum sicut materia et aliud sicut 
65 forma. Et ideo cum anima sit illud quo principaliter operamur, erit forma 
substantialis et ab ipsa procedei operatio substantialis. 
Item ex quo anima est substantia et est forma, ergo est forma substantialis. 
Tunc ad rationes. 
Ad primam. Cum dicitur 'quod advenit enti in actu', verum est si ma-
70 neat ens in actu in adventu eius, sed si corrumperetur eius actualitas non est 
verum. Et cum dicitur 'anima advenit enti in actu', dico quod illa actualitas 
in adventu anime corrumpitur et consimilis forma et consimiles dispositiones 
introducuntur. 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'nulla substantia habet diffiniri per additamen-
75 tum', verum est de substantia composita. Sed substantia que non est com-
posita, que non est per se ens, sicut materia vel forma, bene habet diffiniri 
per additamentum; modo anima est substantia non composita, sed substantia 
simplex; ideo habet diffiniri per corpus cuius est forma et perfectio. 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'illud quo ablato remanet idem corpus quod prius' 
80 etc., concedatur. Et cum dicitur 'anima ablata remanet idem corpus quod 
prius', falsum est. Et cum probatur quia: remanent eadem accidentia in vi-
vo et mortuo, dico quod non manent eadem accidentia numero, sed solum 
similia. Et cum dicitur quod sensus hoc iudicat, dico quod sensum non est 
credendum de ydemptitate accidentium, sed solum de similitudine, quia qui-
85 ditas rei solum ab intellectu percipitur et non a sensu. Modo esse sensibile 
non est quiditas coloris, ymmo est accidens eius, quia illa est in secundo mo-
do dicendi per se: 'color est visibilis', ut dich Philosophus in ilio secundo. Et 
ideo de ydemptitate coloris vel alicuius alterius sensibilis non est credendum 
sensum. 
90 Sed tu dices: unde ergo sunt illa consimilia accidentia in mortuo de novo 
creata? Non enim apparet aliquod generans quod sit causa omnium istorum 
87 Cf. AA 6:67; Aristoteles, De anima 11.7, 418a29-30 
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accidentium. Hoc non est contra sensum, sicut si aliquis habeat vulnus et non 
sit ibi aliquod vulnerans. Unde etiam hoc est quod accidentia casualia, sicut 
cicatrix et similia, semper manent similia in vivo et mortuo, quia ilia acciden­
tia casualia, sicut cicatrix, non sunt maioris necessitatis in mortuo quam in 95 
vivo; modo ista possunt inesse et non inesse vivo; ergo etiam possunt ines­
se mortuo et non inesse mortuo. Et sic non semper erunt eadem in vivo et 
mortuo. Cuius oppositum patet, quia si aliquis habeat cicatricem vivus, habet 
cicatricem etiam mortuus. 
Dicendum est ad illa: quando primo queritur a quo sunt ilia accidentia in 100 
mortuo, dicendum quod sunt a generante formam illam sequentem, quia qui-
cumque dat formam dat omnia accidentia consequentia formam, secundum 
intentionem Commentatoris tertio De celo et mundo, sicut qui dat formam 
gravis dat omnia accidentia consequentia formam gravis. Ideo cum illa ac­
cidentia sint consequentia illam formam sequentem, ideo generans qui illam 105 
formam introducit habet illa accidentia introducere. 
Et tu dices: verum est de accidentibus propriis que sunt consequentia formam. 
Sed de accidentibus casualibus que non consequuntur formam, sicut est color 
et similia, quare est quod illa manent eadem? 
De colore facile est solvere, quia non manet idem color in mortuo et vi- 110 
vo, nisi rarissime hoc contingat, ymmo si aliquis dum erat vivus est albus vel 
rubeus, mortuus est magis pallidus. Tarnen si queras quare est similis color 
in vivo et mortuo, dico quod color causatur in corpore ex commixtione ele-
mentorum in mixto, nisi sit color artificialis, sicut per picturam, sicut apparet 
libro De sensu et sensato. Modo talis vel talis commixtio elemento rum con- 115 
i67vb F sequitur formam mixti| et consimiles dispositiones consequuntur similes for­
mas. Modo forma precedens et forma consequens in materia sunt propinque 
in perfectione, quia secundum Philosophum forme secundum quemdam or-
dinem habent introduci in materia, quia secundum Commentatorem primo 
Metaphysice primo introducuntur forme magis universales et deinde minus 120 
universales. Ex hoc ergo patet quod forme habent ordinem in materia. Unde 
non quecumque forma est in quacumque materia, sed determinata post deter-
103 Locus non inventus 115 AA 7:36; Averroes, In de sensu p. 1537"8 119-120 AA 1:32; 
Averroes, In XII Metaphysicorum I, com. 17, f. 14 Κ 
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minatam, sicut apparet octavo Metaphysice, quia sicut ibi dicitur post formam 
vini non introducitur forma quecumque, set forma aceti que similis est ei in 
125 gradu perfectionis, sicut forma ordinate sequens est similis forme vini; et for-
ma non introducitur nisi in materia disposita, ut apparet secundo hums, quia 
actus activorum sunt in patiente disposito. Ideo dispositiones que sunt in ma-
teria cum forma sequent! sunt similes dispositionibus que sunt in materia cum 
forma precedenti. Et ideo cum color sequatur formam ratione commixtionis 
130 elementorum et consimilis commixtio sit in mortuo et vivo, consimilis color 
est in vivo et mortuo. 
Sed de accidentibus casualibus est diffìcile quare manent simula sicut de 
cicatrice semper in mortuo et vivo. Et dico ad hoc quod, sicut apparet ex 
intentione actorum medicine, cum sit solutio continui, natura, inquantum 
135 potest, intendit consolidare partes et reunire. Unde herbe et emplastra que 
ibi ponuntur sunt sicut coadiuvantia naturam removentia humores qui oc-
currunt ad locum lesionis ne ibi putréfiant. Et propter hoc illas medicinas 
oportet ibi apponere, ncque propter aliud ilia apponuntur nisi ad removen-
dum ilia impedimenta ut fiat reunitio per naturam. Cicatrix ergo que est facta 
HO per consolidationem partium est operata per naturam rei, quia natura inten-
dit consolidare partem lesam fdispositioni quam prius habeat maius quantum 
potest.f Ergo illud opus est a natura et forma rei, licet vulnerane sit causa, ta-
rnen rei consolidatio est consequens formam. Et ideo quia iste forme sunt 
propinque in gradu perfectionis, ideo oportet quod iste perfectiones utrius-
145 que sint similes. Et idem dico de vulnere quod consimile vulnus manet in vi-
vo et mortuo propter similem causam, quia sunt forme similes et ideo debent 
habere dispositiones similes. Et ideo sicut quando erat vivus non erant con-
solidate, multo minus in mortuo sunt consolidate vel reiuncte. Vel aliter po-
test dici quod vulnus est dispositio ad corrumptionem | forme prioris faciens i3ra ν 
150 etiam ad introductionem forme sequentis. Ideo manet consimilis dispositio 
in materia sub forma sequent! sine novo vulnerante, sicut in aliis corporibus 
dispositiones facientes ad corrumptionem prioris forme et ad generationem 
123 Aristoteles, Metaphysica VIII.5, 1044b34-35 126 AA 6-55; Aristoteles, De amma II 2, 
414all-12 
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sequentis manent consimiles post corrumptionem prioris forme, sicut patet 
cuilibet consideranti. 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'adveniens alicui habenti formam que non cor- 155 
rumpitur' etc., concedatur. Et cum dicitur quod advenit corpori organizato, 
et tales dispositiones non corrumpuntur, neque forma precedens, quia ni-
chil contrariatur eis, dico quod ista forma precedens et ille dispositiones pré-
cédentes corrumpuntur per accidens ex introductione forme sequentis. Et 
ad hoc dedarandum suppono quod forma non introducatur in materia ni- 160 
si sit disposila ad receptionem talis forme, ut habetur in hoc secundo, sicut 
sepe est preallegatum, ita quod si corrumpuntur dispositiones quas requirit 
forma in materia, et corrumpitur ilia forma. Secundo suppono quod gene-
rane semper intendit inducere in materia formam sibi similem. Modo sicut 
vult Avicenna primo Canoms et tertio Canoms: virtus formativa existens in 165 
homine primo est coagulativa menstrui, postea vero virtute caloris et virtu-
tis plasmative membra formantur et consolidantur in illa materia. Et postea 
continue per virtutem caloris astringuitur humidum superfluum et membra 
consolidantur in tantum quod dispositiones ille, que erant sub forma inani-
i68ra F mati sive sub forma menstrui, amplius non sunt proportionales ut | forma 170 
inanimati amplius possit ibi stare, ita quod ad tantum gradum perfectionis 
deducitur istud menstruum quod forma menstrui vel inanimati corrumpitur 
et postea forma animati ibi introducitur, quia propinque sunt iste forme in 
perfectione. Quando ergo queritur: quid corrumpit istam formam preceden-
tem et dispositiones précédentes, dico quod generans per accidens, quia per 175 
alterationem semper inducit perfectiores dispositiones in materia, ita tarnen 
quod forma precedens non potest stare cum talibus dispositionibus, quia cum 
corrumpuntur dispositiones proportionales forme precedenti, oportet ipsam 
corrumpi. Et cum dicitur 'omne quod corrumpitur a suo contrario corrumpi-
tur', verum est quod corrumpitur per se. Sed quod corrumpitur per accidens 180 
non oportet. Modo forma precedens corrumpitur per accidens ex hoc quod 
corrumpuntur dispositiones proportionales sibi. Sed tu dices quod non opor-
161 Aristoteles, De anima II.2, 414a26-27 165 Locus non inventus 
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tet formam precedentem corrumpi in adventu sequentis forme, quia forma 
sequens est sicut perfectie perficiens primam. Modo due forme substantiales 
185 habentes ordinem, quarum una est completa alia incompleta, possunt simul 
bene stare. Licet illud dicatur probabiliter, tarnen non valet, quia omnis for­
ma substantialis quantumcumque sit incompleta dat esse actuale et simplici-
ter — quod apparet, quia inter formas substantiales forma elementorum est 
incompletissima — et tarnen ilia dat esse simpliciter et actuale; modo om-
190 nis forma adveniens enti in actu est forma accidentalis; ergo anima adveniens 
habenti talem formam precedentem, si ilia maneat, erit forma accidentalis. Et 
ideo non stant tales forme substantiales simul quarum una est completa et alia 
incompleta. 
Cum dicitur quod si ilia forma precedens corrumpitur, tunc frustra fuisset 
195 introducta in materia, dico quod non est verum, quia natura non potest intro-
ducere formam quameumque post quameumque immediate, sed determina-
tam post determinatam. Unde ibi est quidam ordo ex parte formarum et non 
ex parte materie, quia materia est indifferens ad quamlibet formam. Et ideo 
ut materia esset disposila ad recipiendum talem formam, scilicet animam, 
200 oportuit istam formam precedentem et tales dispositiones precedere. 
II.4 Utrum ex anima et corpore fiat unum essentialiter 
Consequenter queritur utrum ex anima et corpore fiat unum essentialiter. i68ra F, 13" ν 
Arguitur quod non quia: magjs differunt actus et potentia quam duo contra­
ria; sed ex duobus contrariis non fit unum essentialiter; ergo ncque ex actu et 
potentia fit unum essentialiter. Sed anima est sicut actus et corpus est sicut 
5 potentia. Ergo ex corpore et anima non fit unum essentialiter. Maior patet, 
quia ambo contraria sunt entia in actu. Sed potentia et actus sunt unum in 
actu et alterum in potentia. Et ille differentie sunt maxime opposite, ut vult 
Commentator in prohemio huius. 
Item ex diversis essentialiter non fit unum essentialiter; actus et poten-
lo tia sunt diversa essentialiter; quare etc. Maior patet, quia hoc implicai con-
tradictionem quod diversa essentialiter sint unum essentialiter. Minor patet, 
8 AA 6:26; Averroes, Commentarium magnum in libros De anima I, com. 10, p. IO20"21 
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quia actus et potentia sunt differentie maxime opposite. Talia autem differunt 
essentialiter. 
Oppositum arguitur quia: sicut Philosophus dicit: non est querenda causa 
quare ex materia et forma fit unum, nisi quia unum est in actu et alterum est is 
in potentia; modo anima est actus et corpus est in potentia; quare etc. 
Dicendum quod ex anima et corpore fit unum per se. Secundo dico quod 
non est querenda causa intrinseca quare ex corpore et anima fit unum per se. 
Tarnen bene est querenda causa extrinseca quare ex istis fit unum. 
Primum declaratur quia: quandocumque aliqua sic se habent quod unum 20 
est actus et alterum in potentia, ex Ulis fit unum per se; sed anima et corpus 
sunt huiusmodi secundum quod 'corpus' dicit alteram partem aggregati; ergo 
ex istis fit unum per se. Maior patet per Philosophum. Minor etiam patet 
per Philosophum, qui dicit quod anima est actus, et corpus, ut dicit alteram 
partem aggregati, est in potentia ad ilium actum et ad esse quod dat sibi iste 25 
actus. 
Secundum declaratur, scilicet quod non est querenda causa intrinseca 
quare ex anima et corpore fit unum, quia: illa causa intrinseca vel esset 
IÖS* F materia vel forma. | Non materia, quia materia est ens in potentia; sed 
quod est ens in potentia secundum quod huiusmodi non est causa unionis 30 
materie cum forma; ergo ista causa intrinseca non est materia. Ncque etiam 
forma, quia illa forma vel esset substantialis vel accidentalis. Non est forma 
substantialis, quia tunc due forme substantiales essent in materia, scilicet illa 
que unitur materie et illa que esset causa illius unionis. Et tunc ex anima 
et corpore non esset unum essentialiter. Ncque est forma accidentalis, quia 35 
forma accidentalis presupponit formam essentialem vel substantialem. Et 
tunc sequeretur idem inconveniens quod prius: quod due forme substantiales 
essent perficientes materiam. 
Tarnen querenda est causa aliqua extrinseca quare ex materia et forma fit 
unum, quia illa est que inducit formam in materia; modo istud est generans; 40 
ideo generans est causa extrinseca quare ex materia et forma fit unum. 
Tunc ad rationes. 
14 Cf AA 6:43; Aristoteles, De anima II 1, 412b6-8 
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Ad primam. Cum dicitur 'magis différant actus et potentia' etc., dico quod 
aliqua diffère potest esse dupliciter. Vel secundum se et absolute, vel per com-
45 parationem ad aliquod tertium constitutum ex Ulis. Modo quando dicitur 
'magis différant actus | et potentia' etc., verum est secundum se et absolute, i3rb ν 
sed non magis différant per comparationem ad tertium compositum ex Ulis, 
quia duo contraria sunt duo entia que habent duo esse. Et ideo non possunt 
constituere tertium. Sed actus et potentia non habent duo esse, quia ens in 
so potentia non habet aliud esse nisi illud quod dat sibi forma. Et ideo actus 
et potentia magis possunt facere unum per se quam duo contraria, quia duo 
contraria non habent unum esse. 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'ex diversis essentialiter non fit unum essentialiter', 
verum est si sint actu distincta. Sed si unum est in potentia ad alterum que 
55 non habent nisi unum esse, ex istis fit unum; modo materia et forma sunt 
huiusmodi, sive actus et potentia; ideo ex istis fit unum per se. 
II.5 Utrum diffinitio anime sit bene data 
Consequenter queritur circa diffinitionem anime qua dicitur quod anima est i68rb F, i3rb ν 
actus corporis organici physici potentia vitam habentis, utrum sit bene data. 
Arguitur quod non. Et primo quod non sit actus corporis quia: quod est actus 
materie non est actus corporis; anima est actus materie; quare etc. Maior 
s patet, quia corpus 'dicit' aliquid in actu et non materiam primam; ergo quod 
est actus materie non est actus corporis. Minor patet, quia anima est forma 
substantiaUs que est materie prime. 
Deinde arguitur quod non sit actus corporis physici. Actus corporis phy­
sici est natura; anima non est natura; quare etc. Maior patet. Probatio minoris 
io quia: natura est principium motus ad unam differentiam positionis tantum; 
anima non est huiusmodi; quare etc. Maior patet in istis que moventur, sicut 
gravia et levia non moventur ad quamlibet differentiam positionis, sed sursum 
solum et deorsum solum. Minor patet per Philosophum in ilio secundo, qui 
dicit quod anima est principium motus ad quamlibet differentiam positionis, 
is sicut ante et retro, sursum et deorsum etc. 
13 AA 6:47; Aristoteles, De anima II 2, 413bl-5 
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Item de hoc quod dicit quod est actus corporis organici. Contra quia: 
forma debet proportionari materie; sed anima est forma simplex simpliciter; 
ergo materia sibi proportionata debet esse simplex substantia. Modo corpus 
organicum non est simplex substantia. Quare etc. Maior patet, quia sicut 
dicitur in isto secundo 'actus activorum sunt in patiente et disposito'. Minor 20 
patet de se. 
Item contra illam partem 'habentis vitam in potentia' quia: illud quod ha-
bet principium vite in actu non est in potentia ad vitam; sed corpus cuius ani-
ma est actus habet actu principium vite; quare etc. Maior de se patet. Proba-
tio minoris quia: tale corpus actu habet animam; modo anima est principium 25 
vite; quare etc. 
In oppositum est Philosophus, qui dicit quod anima est actus corporis orga-
nici physici potentia vitam habentis. 
Dicendum quod ilia diffinitio bene data est de anima. Propter quod intelli-
gendum quod in diffinitione forme — sive sit substantialis sive accidentalis 30 
— debet poni subiectum illius forme et aliquid aliud quod pertineat ad essen-
tiam illius forme. Modo ilia ponuntur in ilia. Primo ponitur quod est actus 
168™ F substantialis ex | parte anime. Ibi etiam ponitur 'corporis physici' etc. ex parte 
corporis. Ideo ilia diffinitio est bene data de anima, cum sit quedam forma. 
Unde si forma diffiniatur in abstracto, subiectum habet poni ibi loco differen- 35 
tie et aliquid sui generis loco generis. Si autem in concreto, tunc habet poni 
loco generis suum subiectum. 
Item probatio quod sit forma corporis vel actus quia: forma magis perfecta 
exigit materiam magis perfectam; modo anima est magis perfecta quam for-
ma elementorum vel quam forma inanimatorum; ergo exigit materiam magis 40 
perfectam quam ilia forma. Illa autem materia non est aliud quam corpus. 
Ergo anima est actus corporis. Sed iuxta hoc est notandum quod ibi non ac-
cipitur corpus ut dicit aggregatum ex materia et forma sub ratione dimensio-
nati. Nam corpus isto modo est genus ad animai. Alio modo potest accipi 
corpus ut est trina dimensio, scilicet longum, latum et profundum. Et sic cor- 45 
pus non est materia anime, sed est de genere quantitatis. Tertio modo potest 
accipi corpus ut est materia habens ordinem ad determinatam formam. Et 
20 AA 6:55; Aristoteles, De anima 11.3, 414al 1-12 27 AA 6:41; Aristoteles, De anima II. 1, 
412al9-22, 27-28, b5-6 
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sic, ut corpus 'dicit' materiam primam ut est in ordine ad formam determi-
natam, anima est actus corporis. Sed est intelligendum, quia dictum est quod 
so subiectum anime est magis perfectum quam subiectum vel materia aliarum 
formarum, quia ista perfectio que est in materia anime non est ita perfecta ex 
parte qua corpus est, sed est ita ex respectu ad determinatam formam, scilicet 
ad animam. 
Secundum probatur quod sit actus corporis physici quia: anima vel est 
55 actus corporis naturalis vel artilìcialis. Non est actus corporis artificialis, quia 
actus istius est accidens secundum quod artificiale. Etiam non est actus cor-
poris artificialis, quia actus istius secundum quod artificialis est introducitur 
ab arte, non ab aliquo generante vel ab aliquo extrinseco. Ergo anima est actus 
corporis naturalis. 
60 Tertio dico quod anima est actus corporis organici quia: omnis forma que 
habet diversas potentias et operationes mediantibus Ulis potentiis exigit plu-
ra organa in subiecto cuius est ad exercendum illas operationes; modo anima 
est habens diversas potentias et diversas operationes; ergo etc. Maior patet, 
quia si per u n a m partem diverse operationes fièrent, una operatio impediret 
65 aliam et non operarci distincte secundum operationes. Minor patet, quia po-
tentia vegetativa habet potentiam nutritivam, augmentativam et generativam; 
et iste potentie habent diversas operationes, sicut nutritiva habet conservare 
substantiam nutriti, augmentativa habet ipsum ducere ad perfectam quanti-
tatem, potentia generativa habet speciem conservare. Anima sensitiva habet 
70 etiam multas potentias, sicut potentiam visivam, auditivam, odorativam et sic 
de aliis, que habent diversas operationes. Etiam sensus communis habet di-
versas potentias, sicut ymaginativam et memorativam. Ergo anima exigit plu-
ra organa in corpore cuius est ad exercendum istas operationes. Etiam anima 
intellectiva secundum quod intellectiva est non habet Organum in corpore, ta-
75 men in sua operatione dependet ex virtute aliqua corporali que est in organo 
sicut ex fantasia. 
Item anima est actus corporis habentis vitam in potentia, quia duplex est 
potentia. Quedam est separata ab actu precedens actum, alia est coniuncta 
<actui>, sicut apparet intentione Philosophi secundo Penhermenetas versus 
so finem, ubi dicit quomodo possibile sequitur ad necesse. Quod ergo habet vi-
79-80 Cf. Aristoteles, De mterpretattone, 13, 23a8-18 
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tam in actu habet vitam in potentia, loquendo de potentia coniuncta actui, 
quia si Sortes esset, possibile est ipsum currere, et est in potentia ad curren-
i3va ν dum potentia coniuncta actui. Des enim oppositum | quod non potest curre­
re, ergo non esset; modo corpus cuius actus est anima habet vitam; ergo habet 
vitam in potentia coniuncta actui. Aliter autem exponitur ilia pars 'habentis 85 
vitam in potentia' secundum communem expositionem. Non quod sit abi-
ciens vitam, ut Philosophus dicit, vel animam, immo habet actu principium 
vite, vel in potentia precedente actum, vel in potentia coniuncta actui. In 
potentia precedente sicut in scientia; modo ille qui habet scientiam est in po­
tentia ad considerare secundum illam scientiam; ergo eodem modo, qui habet 90 
animam sensitivam et intellectivam est in potentia ad operari secundum illas. 
Sed de anima vegetativa non est ita, quia ista est semper in suo actu. Et illud 
quod habet animam est in potentia coniuncta actui ad operationem et non in 
potentia precedente actum. Vel aliter potest exponi quod anima est actus cor-
i68vb F poris habentis vitam in potentia, quia corpus illud cuius actu est | anima de se 95 
non habet vitam, sed de se est in potentia ad vitam, quam habet per animam. 
Tunc ad rationes. 
Ad primam. Cum dicitur 'quod est actus materie non est actus corporis', 
falsum est, quia corpus non accipitur ibi ut est actu aggregatum, sed ut est 
pars aggregati vel pro materia prima sub ordine ad determinatam formam. 100 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'quod est actus corporis physici est natura', conce-
datur. Et cum dicitur 'anima non est natura', falsum est. Et cum dicitur 'natu­
ra est principium motus ad unam differentiam positionis tantum', dico quod 
natura potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo ut est principium motus ad ubi 
tantum. Et illa natura est principium motus ad unam differentiam positionis. 105 
Alia est natura que non solum est principium motus, immo est principium 
vivendi. Et talis natura bene est principium movendi ad omnes differentias 
positionis. Et illa natura magis est perfecta quam alia; talis est anima; ideo etc. 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'forma debet proportionari materie', concedatur. 
Et cum dicitur 'anima est simplex', verum est. Tarnen habet multas potentias 110 
et operationes. Et ideo oportet quod habeat diversas partes in corpore cuius 
est et diversa organa ad exercendum illas operationes, ita quod ratio magis 
potest deduci ad oppositum quam ad propositum. 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'quod habet vitam in actu', verum est, non habet 
vitam in potentia remota ab actu, sed bene potest habere vitam in potentia 115 
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coniuncta actui. Vel aliter, sicut dictum est in positione: verum est quod non 
est in potentia ad actum primum vite, sed bene est in potentia ad actum se-
cundum, qui est operari quantum ad animam sensitivam et intellectivam. Et 
quantum ad vegetativam est in potentia coniuncta actui ad actum secundum, 
120 quia ilia numquam cessât a sua operations 
II.6 Utrum in partibus animalis anulosi decisis sit anima 
Consequenter queritur utrum in partibus animalis anulosi decisis sit anima. i68vb F, i3va ν 
Arguitur quod non quia: si in partibus animalis decisis anulosi esset ani­
ma, tunc quelibet pars animalis ipsius esset animal, sicut quelibet pars anguil­
le esset anguilla; modo hoc est falsum, quia tunc unum animai esset multa 
5 ammalia, quod est inconveniens; quare etc. Maior patet, quia quod habet ani­
mam saltim sensitivam est animai. Et ideo si partes animalis anulosi haberent 
animam, essent ammalia. 
Item si in partibus animalis anulosi esset anima, sicut in partibus anguil­
le, tunc eodem modo in partibus hominis decisis esset anima, vel in partibus 
io leonis; modo istud est falsum; ergo etc. Probatio consequentie quia: anima 
hominis vel leonis est magis perfecta quam anima animaüs anulosi; modo 
forma magis perfecta est maioris virtutis et potentie quam forma minus per-
fecta; ergo si anima animalis anulosi potest stare in parte decisa, multo fortius 
anima hominis potent stare in partibus hominis decisis. 
is Item in toto animali anuloso aut sunt plures anime in actu aut una in 
actu et plures in potentia. Non potest dici quod sint plures anime in actu, 
[sed plures in potentia] quia tunc unum animai esset plura ammalia quod 
est impossibile. Tunc arguitur: forma substantialis que educitur de potentia 
ad actum introducitur a generante; ergo anima, si sit actu in parte animalis 
20 anulosi decisa, cum prius esset in toto in potentia, introduceretur in <illa> ab 
aliquo generante; modo dividens partes animalis non est generans; ergo per 
divisionem, anima que prius erat in toto animali in potentia reduceretur ad 
actum; quare etc. 
In oppositum est Philosophus in littera. 
25 Dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod in partibus animalis anulosi decisis 
non est anima. Et si dicatur eis quod ille partes decise moventur localiter, et 
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si pungantur retrahunt se, et sic habent sensum et motum et per consequens 
animam, dicunt ad hoc quod ille motus non est ab anima, sed est a calore et 
spiritu ibi remanente, quia quando calor et spiritus vult exire, propter visco-
sitatem humoris sui non potest exire. Et tunc facit quamdiu est in corpore 30 
i69ra F quemdam motum. Sed illud non valet, quia agens instrumentale | non agit 
nisi in virtute agentis naturalis principalis; modo calor et spiritus sunt agentia 
instrumentalia respectu ipsius anime; ergo non agunt nisi in virtute anime. 
Et ideo si in partibus animalis anulosi decisis non manet anima, amplius non 
manet calor, vel si manet aliquis calor, non est eiusdem speciei. Tarnen non 35 
poterit movere motu convenienti animato et sic non possunt ibi agere. 
Ideo dico quod in partibus animalis anulosi decisis et in partibus pianta-
rum decisis est anima, quia propria operatio alicuius forme arguii illam for-
mam; modo in partibus animalis anulosi decisis et etiam plantarum est pro­
pria operatio anime, quia propria operatio anime est sentire et movere secun- 40 
dum locum; ergo ubi iste operationes sunt, ibi est illa forma, scilicet anima; 
modo partes animalis anulosi decise sentiunt, sicut partes anguille decise, si 
pungantur, retrahunt se, et si apponantur sibi aliqua fcongaudentiaf, dilatant 
se et movent se, sicut in aqua; sic etiam est in multis aliis animalibus, sicut in 
muscis, quia partes istorum decise moventur dummodo maneant partes circa 45 
capud, et in aliis animalibus que sunt ad modum aranearum que habent lon-
gas tybias; ergo in multis partibus decisis est anima. Et etiam partes plantarum 
i3vb ν decise, si transferantur | alibi, vivunt et fructificant. 
Set tria sunt notanda. Primo quod si qualitercumque illa animalia divi­
dantur, non salvatur ibi anima, sed oportet quod ex transverso dividamus et 50 
secundum quantitatem notabilem, quia si dividantur secundum partes minu­
tas, tunc non esset ibi sensus ncque motus, quia tales partes non sunt suf-
ficienter disposile ut anima possit ibi salvari per aliquod tempus. Etiam si 
dividantur ex longo per medium spine, ibi non manet anima. Eodem modo 
est in plantis. Si dividantur per medium medulle, non possunt iste partes vi- 55 
vere. Et causa huius est quia in istis animalibus et plantis illud quod est ibi 
sicut medulla vel spina est loco cordis in quo est principium vite. Et ideo, si 
dividantur ex longo, non manet ibi proportionale cordi in quo est principium 
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vite. Sed si ex transverso dividantur, adhuc manet ibi aliquid cordis et ideo 
60 habent animam. 
Secundo est notandum quod partes animalium decise non possunt diu 
vivere sicut partes plantarum, quia ad conservationem forme animalis plures 
organizationes requiruntur in materia quam ad conservationem forme piante. 
Unde in partibus animalis decisis non est proportio in dispositionibus requi-
65 sitis ad divisionem sufficientem ipsius. Non enim ipsa pars sufficienter est 
organizata ut anima possit ibi stare. Sed in partibus piante decisis bene potest 
stare anima. Si enim transplantentur, possunt vivere, quia possunt reformare 
sibi organa per que suscipiant vel trahant sibi alimentum secundum radices, 
quia minores organizationes requirunt in materia quam anima sensitiva. 
70 Tertio est notandum quod partes animalium perfectorum maiorem or-
ganizationem requirunt in materia quam anima animalium imperfectorum. 
Et ideo, licet in partibus animalis anulosi decisis per aliquod tempus sit ani-
ma, tarnen in partibus animalium perfectorum non habet esse, quia propter 
eorum perfectionem maiorem organizationem requirunt in substantia. 
75 Tunc ad rationes 
Ad primam. Cum dicitur 'si in partibus animalis decisis etc., tunc queli-
bet pars animalis esset animal', verum est incompletum. Tarnen animal se-
cundum se est animal completum et perfectum. Et cum dicitur quod pars 
anguille esset anguilla, verum est incompleta et imperfecta. 
so Ad aliam. Cum dicitur quod tunc in partibus hominis et sie de aliis esset 
etc., dico quod non sequitur, quia anima animalis anulosi minorem organiza-
tionem requirit ad hoc ut salvetur in materia quam anima animalis perfecti, 
sicut hominis vel leonis. Et cum dicitur quod anima hominis vel leonis est 
magis perfecta quam anima animalis anulosi, verum est. Et cum dicitur quod 
85 forma magis perfecta est maioris potentie, concedatur. 'Ergo magis poterit 
salvari in partibus decisis animalis perfecti' non sequitur, quia posse salvari 
in partibus decisis non pertinet ad perfectionem eius et potentiam, ymmo ad 
eius imperfectionem. 
| Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'omnis forma que educitur de potentia ad ac- i69rb F 
90 tum' etc., propter solutionem istius rationis intelligendum quod ille forme, 
scilicet animalium anulosorum et plantarum, sunt propinque multum formis 
inanimatorum. Et ideo, sicut in Ulis formis [illa] que sunt in toto in actu 
permixto potentie per solam divisionem una forma fit due forme, sicut per 
61 animalium] aliumscrips. V diu] om. V 62 partes] om. F 63 plante] plantarumV 
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solum dividens unum lignum fit duo ligna, sic etiam fit in istis propter sui im-
perfectionem. Tunc ad rationem. Cum dicitur 'omnis forma substantialis que 95 
educitur de potentia ad actum educitur a generante', dico quod quedam sunt 
forme educte de potentia materie prime ad actum, et de tali forma verum est 
quod habet educi a generante. Alia est potentia non ilio modo potentia per-
mixta actui, et forma que sic est in potentia potest reduci ad actum per solum 
dividens. Talis autem est forma animalium anulosorum et plantarum. 100 
II.7 Utrum tota anima sit in qualibet parte corporis animati 
i69rb F, i3vb v Consequenter queritur utrum tota anima sit in qualibet parte corporis ani-
mati. 
Arguitur quod non quia: si tota anima esset in qualibet parte corporis, que-
libet pars animalis esset animal et quelibet pars plante esset planta; istud est 
inconveniens; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia ubicumque est tota anima, ibi est 5 
totum animai. Et confirmatur quia: sicut dicit Philosophus secundo hmus: 
sicut se habet pars ad partem, ita totum ad totum; ergo sicut tota anima est 
perfectio totius corporis, sic pars anime est perfectio partis corporis; et si ita 
est, non ergo tota anima est in qualibet parte corporis. 
Item anima est actus corporis organici; modo quelibet pars animalis vel 10 
plante non est <sufficienter> organica ad recipiendum totam animam; ergo 
tota anima non est in qualibet parte corporis. Maior patet per diffinitionem 
anime. Minor patet de se. 
Item illud quod est extensum extensione corporis non est totum in qua-
libet parte corporis; modo anima est extensa extensione corporis; ergo etc. 15 
Maior patet, quia enim albedo est extensa extensione parietis, ideo tota albe-
do non est in qualibet parte parietis. Minor patet, quia anima est perfectio 
corporis. 
Item ab ipsa essentia anime fluunt potentie anime. Ergo si tota essentia 
anime esset in qualibet parte corporis, tunc etiam potentie anime essent in 20 
qualibet parte corporis. Modo hoc est falsum, quia in alia parte est potentia 
auditiva et in alia potentia visiva, et sic de aliis sicut apparet. Quare etc. 
Item anima tota est perfectio totius corporis; ergo ipsa tota non est per-
fectio partis corporis. Antecedens patet de se. Probatio consequentie quia: 
6 Aristoteles, De anima II l,412b22-24 
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25 diversorum non est una perfectie; modo totum corpus et pars corporis sunt 
diversa; quare etc. 
Oppositum arguitur quod omnes partes totius sunt sub forma totius. Tunc 
arguitur: forma que perficit aliquod totum corpus perficit quamlibet partem 
totius; sed tota anima est perficiens totum corpus animatum; ergo anima est 
30 in qualibet parte. 
Item illud idem vult Albertus. 
Et hoc etiam probatur quia: quelibet pars corporis habet operationes ani­
me, quia nutritur, augmentatur. Cum ergo operationes anime non possunt 
esse sine essentia anime, tota essentia est in qualibet parte corporis, cum sit 
35 forma impartibilis. 
Dicendum quod tota anima vel potest esse tota totalitate quantitativa, <vel 
totalitate potestativa>, vel totalitate essentie. Totalitas quantitativa est secun­
dum extensionem quam habet per accidens extensione corporis in quo est, 
tquia forma que est perfectio materie, si sit educta de potentia materief Et 
40 de hoc infra videbitur. Modo anima non | est tota in qualibet parte corporis i4,a ν 
loquendo de ista totalitate, quia illud quod est extensum extensione corporis 
non est totum totalitate quantitativa in qualibet parte corporis, sicut albedo 
que est extensa extensione parietis non est tota totalitate quantitativa in una 
parte corporis. Modo anima est extensa extensione corporis cum sit perfectio 
45 eius, saltern ilia que est educta de potentia materie secundum unam oppinio-
nem. Quare etc. Neque intelligo quod anima habeat totalitatem quantitatis 
per se, sed per accidens, scilicet extensione corporis in quo est. 
Secundo dico quod anima tota totalitate potestativa non est tota in qua­
libet parte corporis. Et intelligo per totalitem potestativam animam totam 
so cum eius potentiis. Modo | ilio modo non est tota in qualibet parte corporis. i69va F 
Cuius ratio est quia: si anima tota esset in qualibet parte corporis isto modo, 
tunc secundum quamlibet partem corporis posset operali omnes suas ope­
rationes, sicut videre, audire, odorare, et sic de aliis; sed hoc est falsum, quia 
secundum partem determinatam aliam et aliam exercet operationem, quia se-
55 cundum oculum videt et per aurem audit et sic de aliis; quare etc. Maior 
patet, quia ubicumque est principium operationum ibi possunt esse operatio­
nes; ergo si in qualibet parte corporis esset tota anima quantum ad eius omnes 
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potentias, que sunt operationis principium, tunc secundum quamlibet partem 
anima posset operari, quod est inconveniens; quare etc. 
Item tertio, loquendo de totalitate essentiali, dico quod isto modo tota 60 
anima est in qualibet parte corporis, quia operationes anime que sunt nutrire, 
augmentari et sentire sunt in qualibet parte corporis; modo operationes anime 
non sunt sine anima; ergo in qualibet parte corporis est essentia anime. Tunc 
arguo: ubicumque est essentia anime ibi est tota essentia anime, quia essentia 
anime non est partibilis; modo in qualibet parte corporis est essentia anime; 65 
quare etc. Et est simile quia sicut tota essentia albedinis salvatur in qualibet 
parte vel in quolibet gradu, licet non salvetur eius tota quantitas. Sed nota 
quod anima primo est corporis animati perfectio, sed est perfectio partium ut 
sunt sub forma totius. 
Tunc ad rationes. 70 
Ad primam. Cum dicitur 'si tota anima etc., tunc quelibet pars animalis 
esset animal', dico quod non sequitur, quia licet anima sit tota in qualibet par-
te corporis essentialiter, tarnen non est in qualibet parte corporis potestative; 
modo anima totalitate potential! facit to tum animal vel plantam totam. Vel 
potest dici aliter quod non sequitur, quamvis anima tota sit in qualibet parte 75 
corporis, quod quelibet pars corporis sit animal, quia licet tota anima sit in 
qualibet parte corporis, tarnen non est in qualibet parte sicut in eo quod per-
ficit primo. Ymmo primo perficit animal totum; et quia partes sunt in toto, 
ideo perficit partes. Unde ad hoc quod sit animal oportet quod sit p r imum 
perfectibile ab anima. Ideo non oportet quod pars animalis sit animal. Et cum so 
dicitur 'sicut se habet pars ad partem, ita to tum ad totum' , verum est accipien-
do partem potestativam et totum potestativum. Et de isto loquitur Aristoteles 
ibi. Quod apparet, quia dicit quod si oculus esset animal, visus esset sua for-
ma vel anima. Loquitur ergo ibi de parte potential! et toto potential!. Et cum 
dicitur 'in tota anima est perfectio totius corporis, ergo etc.', bene probat ista 85 
ratio quod tota anima totalitate potestativa perficit totum corpus et non partes 
corporis. Sed non probat quin perficiat partem totalitate essentiali. 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'anima est actus corporis organici', verum est tam-
quam eius quod pr imo perficit. Et cum dicitur 'quelibet pars corporis non est 
sufficienter organica' etc., verum est respectu totius anime quantum ad suam 90 
totalitatem potestativam. Et ideo sic tota anima non est in qualibet parte. Vel 
82-83 AA 6:44; Aristoteles, De anima ILI, 4I2bl8-19 
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aliter concedatur maior, sicut prius, et cum dicitur 'quelibet pars' etc., verum 
est ut sigillatim accepta, tarnen ut partes sunt in toto perficiuntur ab essentia 
anime, ita quod totum animal est quod primo perficitur; et partes secundario 
95 perficiuntur ut sunt in toto. 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'illud quod est extensum' etc., ilia ratio sua via pro-
cedit. Bene enim probat quod anima que est extensa extensione corporis, de 
qua postea videbitur, totalitate quantitativa non est in qualibet parte corporis 
ut extensa extensione corporis. 
100 Ad aliam. Cum dicitur quod potentie anime fluunt ab essentia anime, 
dico quod non fluunt ab essentia immediate, sed mediate, quia mediantibus 
determinatis organis. Et ideo non oportet quod potentie anime sint in qua­
libet parte corporis, quia in qualibet parte corporis non sunt organa habilitata 
ad istas potentias anime. Et si dicas quod Philosophus dicit in De motibus ani-
105 malium quod anima est in corporis medio, scilicet in corde, sicut monasteria 
in medio civitatis, dico quod loquitur ibi de anima quantum ad suam poten-
tiam motivam; et | verum est quod illa potentia motiva est in determinata i69vb F 
parte corporis, scilicet in corde. 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'tota anima est perfectio totius corporis', dico quod 
ι io non primo sequitur, sed magis e converso sequitur quod sit perfectio partis. Et 
cum dicitur quod pars et totum sunt diversa, dico quod quodam modo sunt 
diversa et quodam modo non sunt diversa. Unde illud quod est pars et illud 
quod est totum sunt diversa, tarnen illud quod est pars ut pars est sub forma 
totius et est in potentia in toto, fnon sunt diversa sic faciunt idemf. Et ideo 
ι is est actus totius et partis. Et ideo ratio non valet. 
II.8 Utrum anime brutorum sint extense per accidens quantum ad 
essentiam extensione corporis 
Et quia suppositum est quod anime brutorum, que sunt educte de potentia i69v'' F 
materie, sunt extense per accidens quantum ad essentiam extensione corporis, 
queritur de hoc utrum hoc sit verum. 
104-105 Cf. AA 8:8, 8:10; Aristoteles, De mottbusammalium 10, 703al4, 29-32, 36-37 
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Et arguitur quod non quia: si anima istorum animalium esset extensa exten­
sione totius, tunc equaliter ipsa anima denominaret quamlibet partem; sed 5 
hoc est falsum. Non enim quelibet pars asini est asinus. Maior patet, quia 
propter quod anima plante est extensa extensione plante, ideo quelibet pars 
plante est planta et quelibet pars vivi est vivum. Minor apparet de se. 
Item ille forme que non habent indifferenter babitudinem ad totum per-
fectibile et ad partes non sunt extense extensione totius cuius sunt; sed forme 10 
animalium brutorum saltern perfectorum non habent eandem habitudinem 
ad totum et ad partes; ergo non est extensa per accidens essentia anime isto­
rum animalium perfectorum. Maior patet, quia nos videmus quod forme que 
i4rb ν | secundum essentiam suam indifferenter possunt esse in toto et in parte di-
viduntur per accidens divisione eius in quo sunt, sicut patet de albedine que is 
quantum ad essentiam totam salvatur indifferenter in toto et in parte; et ideo 
dividitur sua essentia per accidens divisione quantitatis. Minor patet, quia 
non indifferenter se habet tota essentia anime brutorum perfectorum in toto 
et in qualibet parte, quia in tota essentia anime consistit totum animal; modo 
totum animal non est in qualibet parte animalis; ideo etc. 20 
In oppositum arguitur quia: receptum in aliquo recipitur ad modum recipien-
tis; sed anima recipitur in subiecto extenso per quantitatem; ergo ille forme 
sunt per accidens extense. 
Ad hoc est intelligendum quod quedam sunt forme non educte de potentia 
materie et quedam sunt educte de potentia materie; modo ille forme que non 25 
sunt educte de potentia materie, cuiusmodi est anima intellectiva, ista non est 
extensa extensione subiecti in quo est, quia talis forma non educitur de poten­
tia materie extense; et ideo talis forma non est extensa per accidens extensione 
subiecti in quo est. 
Item anima intellectiva potest per se subsistere separata; sed talis forma 30 
non videtur de necessitate extensa secundum essentiam extensione quantita­
tis; ideo etc. Sed anime brutorum quedam sunt magis imperfecte que eodem 
modo respiciunt totum et partes, sicut anime animalium anulosorum ut an­
guille et consimilium. Et de istis non est dubium quod dividuntur divisione 
facta in toto, ut patet de se et per Aristotelem. Et ideo iste sunt extense per 35 
accidens extensione totius in quo sunt. Sed alie sunt anime brutorum perfec­
torum, sicut equi et asini. Et de istis est dubitatio. Et una positio ponit quod 
non extenduntur per accidens extensione quantitatis subiecti, et ratio huius 
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positionis tacta est. Alia est positio que ponit quod tales forme sunt per acci-
40 dens extense extensione subiecti. Et rationes huius sunt primo: supponendo 
quod tales forme educuntur ab agente naturali per transmutationem materie 
de potentia materie. Modo materia prima non subicitur actioni vel transmu-
tation! agentis naturalis, sed materia quanta sive sub aliqua quantitate, quia 
agens naturale agit per coniunctum et per motum. Modo materia que est su-
45 biecta motui est materia quedam sub aliqua forma existens. Tunc arguitur 
sic: illa forma que in fieri dependet ex materia extensa et educitur de poten-
tia materie extense videtur extendi extensione eius cuius est; sed anima talium 
animalium est huiusmodi, sicut patet ex dictis; ideo, quia educitur de potentia 
materie extense prius quam per quantitatem aliquam, ideo etc. 
so Item si materia talium esset extensa et non forma, tunc aliqua pars | mate- no" F 
rie esset extensa in qua non esset forma substantialis; et sic illa pars compositi 
non esset aliquid substantialiter per aliquam formam, quod est impossibile; 
ideo etc. Set no tandum quod non eodem modo iste forme sunt extense per 
accidens sicut anime animalium anulosorum, quia essentia illius est extensa 
55 per accidens et secundum essentiam et secundum virtutes saltern in aliquibus. 
Et in aliis animalibus anulosis alique virtutes sunt extense, sicut virtus motiva 
in anguillis et consimilibus animalibus. Sed in istis, licet essentia per accidens 
sit extensa per totum, tarnen quelibet eius virtus non est extensa per totum, 
quia non in qualibet parte asinus vel equus videt vel audit. Sed de tactu est 
60 alia ratio quare per totum corpus ammalia sentiunt tactu, quia hoc est prop-
ter necessitatem, ut patet secundo De anima. Sine enim tactu non potest esse 
animai. Et ideo indiget animal habere tactum in qualibet parte ne ab excelienti 
tangibili secundum aliquam partem corrumpatur. 
Ad rationes. 
65 Quando dicitur quod tunc quelibet pars denominaretur ab ipsa anima 
etc., dicendum quod asinus vel equus et alia ammalia perfecta non solum 
dicunt aliquod to tum habens essentiam anime in qualibet parte, sed dicunt 
aliquod to tum habens diversa organa ad exercendum diversas operationes se-
cundum diversas potentias. Et ideo non oportet quod quamvis anima eorum 
70 sit extensa, quod eodem modo quelibet pars dicatur asinus vel equus totus. 
61 Cf. Aristoteles, De anima II.2, 413b4-9 
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Nee simile est de animalibus anulosis, sicut visum est in positione, quia in 
aliquibus virtus et potentia per totum dividuntur secundum divisionem et 
extensionem totius. Et sic non est de istis. 
Ad aliud dicendum quod essentia anime istorum animalium indifferenter 
potest esse in toto et in qualibet parte quantum ad essentiam. Sed quantum 75 
ad hoc quod quantitas per accidens istarum animarum perficiat tota totum et 
tota quantitative quamlibet partem, non est indifferenter se habens ad totum 
et ad partes. Similiter quantum ad virtutes vel potentias non equaliter se ha-
bent anime istorum animalium tote totalitate virtuali vel potestativa ad totum 
animal vel ad partes. Et ad illud quod dicitur de albedine, dicendum quod so 
salvatur tota sua essentia in qualibet parte. Sed tota sua virtus motiva non sal-
vatur in qualibet parte respectu sensus, quia plus potest movere visum maior 
albedo quam minor. Et cum dicitur quod anime brutorum non indifferenter 
se habent etc., dicendum, sicut prius dictum est, quod tota essentia anime non 
constituit totum animai, sed tota essentia anime totalitate essentiali et virtuali 85 
sive potestativa. Et illa non est in qualibet parte, ut visum est prius. Ideo ratio 
non valet. 
Ratio in oppositum procedit sua via de forma educta de potentia materie. 
Et ideo, licet anima intellectiva sit forma in materia extensa, tarnen quia a 
materia non dependet in esse ncque de potentia materie educitur, non oportet 90 
quod sit extensione materie extensa. 
II.9 Utrum potentie anime sint aliquid additum supra essentiam 
anime 
i7ora F, i4rb v Consequenter queritur utrum potentie anime sint aliquid additum supra 
essentiam anime. 
Arguitur quod non quia: sicut se habet potentia materie ad materiam, ita se 
habet potentia anime ad animam; modo potentia materie nichil addit supra 
materiam; quare etc. Minor apparet per Commentatorem in De substantia 5 
orbis, qui vult quod materia substantiatur per posse. Et hoc probatur per ra-
tionem quia: si potentia materie aliquid adderei supra essentiam materie, ita 
quod esset aliquod accidens additum essentie materie, tunc aliqua forma ac-
14™ ν cidentalis esset | prior in materia quam forma substantialis. Modo hoc est 
5-6 AA 10:7; Averroes, De substantia orbis I, f. 3 L 
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io impossibile, quia nulla forma accidentalis potest esse prior in materia nisi 
presupposita forma substantiali. Maior patet, quia ilia potentia in materia 
precedit quamlibet formam substantialem. Ergo si ilia potentia aliquid addit 
essentie materie, tunc forma accidentalis precedei substantialem. 
Item si potentia anime aliquid adderei supra essentiam anime, tunc anima 
15 esset in potentia ad istas potentias. Et tunc queratur de ilia potentia per quam 
est in potentia ad illas potentias: aut est de essentia anime aut est additum 
sibi? Si sit de essentia anime, eadem ratione standum fuit in prima potentia. Si 
autem sit aliquid additum essentie anime, tunc anima erit in potentia ad illam 
potentiam, quia anima est in potentia ad illud quod non est de sua essentia. 
20 | Et tunc queratur de ilia alia potentia: aut est de essentia anime aut non? Si i70rb F 
sic, pari ratione standum fiiit in prima. Si non est de sua essentia, tunc ergo 
est in potentia ad illam. Et tunc queratur de ilia potentia; et sic procedetur in 
infinitum in potentiis anime. Cum ergo hoc sit inconveniens, inconveniens 
est dicere quod potentia anime aliquid addit supra animam. 
25 Item illud quod est principium operationum non distinguitur ab essentia 
anime; modo potentie sunt principium operationum, sicut potentia vegetativa 
est principium nutriendi, augmentandi et generandi, et potentia sensitiva est 
principium sentiendi; quare etc. Maior patet, quia illud quod est principium 
operationum anime est ipsa anima. 
30 Item illud per quod animatum distinguitur ab inanimato est forma et ni-
chil additum supra formam, quia actus est qui distinguit et separat, ut ap-
paret septimo Metaphysice; modo per potentiam anime animatum differì ab 
inanimato et etiam unum animatum ab alio, sicut pianta ab animali; quare 
etc. 
35 Oppositum arguitur quia: quod est de genere relationis est aliquid additum 
supra essentiam anime; modo potentia est de genere relationis; quare etc. 
Maior patet, quia essentia anime est in genere substantie et genus relationis 
est aliquid additum ipsi substantie. Minor patet de se. 
Item illud quod multiplicatur manente una essentia anime est aliquid ad-
40 ditum supra essentiam anime; sed potentie anime multiplicantur manente 
32 AA 1:187; Aristoteles, Metaphysica VII.13, 1039a7 
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una essentia anime; quare etc. Maior patet, quia si nichil adderei supra es-
sentiam, tunc multiplicata potentia multiplicaretur substantia anime. 
Ad istam questionem aliqui dixerunt quod potentia anime nichil addit supra 
essentiam anime, sicut potentia materie nichil addit supra materiam. Aliqui 
autem dicunt quod 'potentia anime' potest sumi dupiiciter: vel pro subiecto 45 
ipsius potentie vel respectus, vel pro ipso respectu. Et primo modo nichil ad-
dit. Sed secundo modo, sic dicunt quod addit aliquid supra essentiam. Sed 
istud non videtur valere, quia sicut iam apparebit potentia anime non est re-
spectus. Et de hoc quod dicunt quod subiectum potentie potest accipi pro po-
tentia, istud non videtur possibile, quia subiectum potentie debet dici potens so 
et non potentia. Ideo dico quod potentie anime sunt aliquid additum supra 
essentiam anime, quia potentie anime sunt principium operationum activum 
vel passivum; modo illud quod est principium operationum est naturalis po-
tentia de secunda specie qualitatis; tale autem est aliquid additum supra es-
sentiam anime; ergo etc. Maior patet per Philosophum in ilio secundo, qui 55 
dicit quod sensus est quo sentimus, potentia vegetativa est qua nutrimur et 
augmentamur, et sic de aliis. Ergo potentie anime sunt principium operatio-
num activum quantum ad potentiam vegetativam, vel passivum quantum ad 
potentiam sensitivam et intellectivam. Minor patet, quia naturalis potentia 
secundum quam aliquid habet naturalem potentiam aliquid facile faciendi est 60 
de secunda specie qualitatis; modo tale est aliquid additum supra essentiam 
anime, quia qualitas est aliquid additum essentie anime. 
Item si potentie anime non differrent ab essentia anime, tunc in realita-
te potentie non differrent potentia vegetativa et intellectiva, auditiva et visiva, 
quia realiter non essent aliud quam essentia anime que simplex in essentia es 
est et indivisibilis; sed hoc est falsum; ergo etc. Falsitas consequentis apparet 
de se, quia si potentia visiva et auditiva non differrent, ubi esset auditus esset 
visus et e converso. Et similiter, si voluntas et intellectus non differrent reali-
ter, tunc sicut intellectus est potentia cognoscitiva, sic voluntas esset potentia 
cognoscitiva. Sed probatio consequentie quia: si nichil realiter addunt supra 70 
essentiam anime, queram per quid realiter differrent. Non per essentiam ani-
me, quia in hoc omnes conveniunt. Non per respectum ad operationem, quia 
ille respectus sequitur realitatem potentie et etiam sequitur actum naturaliter, 
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quia prius est considerare extrema relationis quam relationem. Ergo prius est 
75 considerare potentiam (que est principium operationis) et operationem quam 
intelligatur talis respectus. 
Item potentia dicit principium operationis. Sed respectus non est princi­
pium operationis, neque substantia sub respectu, ita quod respectus sit causa 
operationis. Si autem dicatur quod ille respectus concomitatur principium 
so operationis, | tunc ille respectus non induditur in ratione potentie, sed sola i70va F 
essentia anime est potentia. Et tunc, sicut prius dictum est, potentie anime 
realiter non differrent. 
Tunc ad rationes. 
Ad primam. Cum dicitur quod sicut se habet potentia materie etc., dico 
85 quod non est simile, quia potentia anime non est respectus quidam, ymmo 
est virtus que est principium operationis; sed potentia materie est respectus 
ad actum; ideo non est maioris entitatis quam ille actus. Etiam, dato quod 
potentie anime essent respectus quidam, quod tarnen non est verum, adhuc 
non est simile de potentia materie et de potentia anime, quia potentie anime 
90 sunt ad actum accidentalem, sed potentia materie est ad actum substantialem. 
Etiam potest negari minor, quia potentia materie non est de essentia materie. 
Et cum dicitur quod materia substantiatur per posse, verum est, quia imme­
diate ad essentiam materie consequitur potentia. Et cum dicitur 'tunc forma 
accidentalis precederei substantialem' etc., dico quod iste respectus non est 
95 aliquid reale, quia non est maioris entitatis quam actus ille ad quem est et ille 
actus non est ens reale. Quare etc. 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'si potentie anime essent aliquid additum essentie 
anime, tunc anima esset in potentia ad illas', verum est in potentia coniuncta 
actui, quia non est impossibile animam habere suas potentias. Et cum dicitur 
loo 'illa potentia per quam est in potentia ad suas potentias aut est aliquid sibi ad­
ditum' etc., dico quod nichil est sibi additum, quia anima per suam essentiam 
habet suas potentias, ita quod potentia anime ad suas potentias non est ali-
quid additum sue essentie, ymmo per suam essentiam est in potentia ad suas 
potentias, sicut homo per suam essentiam habet risibilitatem, scilicet per for-
105 mam immediate. Vel potest dici quod potentia que est ipsius anime ad suas 
potentias non est alia nisi illa quam habet materia ad formam substantialem 
(que est anima), que ab ipso generante in|troducitur, quia generans introdu- i4vb ν 
74 considerare ] construere F est ] om V 75 considerare ] construere F et ] vel V 
81 potentie] potentia V 83 ad rationes] om. F 84 quod] om V 88 potentie] potentia 
V adhuc ] ad hoc V 89 matene ] anime V anime ] materie V 90 sunt ] sunt add F 
ad] autemC) add V 91 quia] quodV potentia] potentie F 93 dicitur] quodiufii V 
95-96 et ille actus ] etiam F 96 non ] om V 97 potentie ] potentia V essent ] esset 
V 98 illas] illamV coniuncta] coniucta scrips F 103 suam essentiam ] sua essentia F 
104 nsibihtatem ] t'nbili""" scrips F 
371 
APPENDIX A. RADULPHI BRITONIS Questiones super librum de anima 
cens animam introducit potentias mediante anima. Et sic non eadem ratione 
fuit standum in prima sicut in illa. 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'illud quod est principium operationum' etc., ve- no 
rum est principium primum, sed quod est principium instrumentale ope-
rationum differt ab anima ipsa; modo potentie anime non sunt principium 
primum operationum, sed magis sunt principium instrumentale. 
Per idem ad aliam. Cum dicitur quod animatum distinguitur ab inanima-
to per potentiam anime, dico quod non primo, ymmo per essentiam anime 115 
distinguitur primo. Item solet sic arguì: forma substantialis est potentior et 
perfectior quam accidentalis; sed forma accidentalis est sua potentia, sicut ca-
ler est sua potentia calefactiva; ideo etc. Et ad hoc potest dici per interemp-
tionem minoris, quia potentia calefactiva est aggregati ex subiecto et caliditate 
ratione caloris que differt a caliditate. Vel potest dici quod non est idem iudi- 120 
cium utrobique, quia forma accidentalis est subiecti entis actu cuius est agere 
per talem formam, sicut calidum agit per calorem, et sic calor est potentia adi-
va calidi vel ignis. Sed forma substantialis est materie, que est in pura potentia 
et per consequens non potest agere. Ideo non est simile. Ncque ad perfectio-
nem forme pertinet quod immediate aliquis agat per earn, sicut patet ex dictis, 125 
considerando ea interius. 
11.10 Utrum potentie anime sint in anima sicut in subiecto vel in 
corpore 
i7ova F, i4vt> v Consequenter queritur utrum potentie anime sint in anima sicut in subiecto 
vel in corpore. 
Arguitur quod sint in anima quia: sicut se habet potentia corporis ad cor-
pus, sic se habent potentie anime ad animam; modo potentie corporis sunt 
in corpore sicut in subiecto, sicut potentia calefactiva ignis est in igne sicut in 5 
subiecto; ergo potentie anime sunt in anima sicut in subiecto. Maior patet per 
locum a simili. Minor patet de se. 
Item in ilio est potentia anime sicut in subiecto cuius est operari secundum 
illam potentiam; modo operari secundum potentiam anime debetur ipsi ani-
me. Et maxime hoc est verum in ista operatione que est intelligere, quia anima 10 
est intelligens secundum se sine corpore, quia si anima non operaretur secun-
dum se, tunc non posset separari a corpore, quia si esset separata a corpore et 
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non haberet operationem propriam, esset otiosa; quod est inconveniens, quia 
in natura nichil est otiosum. 
is Oppositum arguitur quia: cuius est actus eius est potentia; modo actus et 
operatio anime totius coniuncti est et non anime; ergo potentia erit totius 
coniuncti et non anime. Maior patet per Philosophum in De sompno et vigilia. 
Minor patet, quia Philosophus dicit capitula de herroribus \ quod simile est i70vb F 
dicere animam gaudere vel tristari et dicere earn texere vel edificare. Et in De 
20 sensu vult quod ille potentie anime sunt in organo corporali. 
Ad istam questionem dico quod potentie anime distinguuntur per operatio-
nes. Modo ille operationes anime quedam sunt que sunt exercite per Organum 
corporale, sicut videre, sentire et sic de aliis, alie sunt operationes que non sunt 
exercite per Organum corporale. Tarnen licet ita sit, sunt totius coniuncti per 
25 animam, sicut intelligere est totius coniuncti, licet non sit exercitum per Orga-
num corporale, quia dicimus quod homo per se intelligit. Tunc dico quod in 
potentiis Ulis que sunt principium operationum mediante organo corporali, 
ille non fiindantur in essentia anime immediate, sed in toto coniuncto sunt 
ratione anime, quia eius cuius est operari secundum aliquam potentiam est il-
30 la potentia cum eo modo quo eius est operari; modo operari secundum illam 
potentiam est totius coniuncti mediante organo et ratione anime, ut homo 
audit per aurem et per oculum videt; ergo talis potentia est in organo vel in 
toto coniuncto mediante organo et ratione anime. Si autem queratur de illis 
potentiis quarum operationes non sunt exercite per Organum corporale, sicut 
35 est potentia volitiva et intellectiva, dico quod illa potentia anime fiindatur in 
essentia anime, quia ille potentie quarum operationes sunt exercite per Orga-
num corporale sunt in toto coniuncto mediante organo. Ergo per oppositum: 
ille potentie quarum operationes non sunt exercite per Organum corporale 
non fiindantur in aliqua parte corporis, sed in essentia anime immediate. Sed 
40 talis est potentia intellectiva et volitiva. Ergo fiindantur in essentia anime im-
mediate. Tarnen in hac vita semper est talis potentia in toto coniuncto sicut 
intelligere que est totius coniuncti. Sed in alia vita alium modum intelligen-
di habet anima sicut per revelationem superioris intelligentie vel per aliquem 
alium modum qui magis pertinet ad theologos. 
17 AA 7:70; Aristoteles, De somno et vtgih I, 454a8 18 AA 6:14; Aristoteles, De anima 1.4, 
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Tunc ad rationes. 45 
Ad primam. C u m dicitur 'sicut se habent potentie corporis ad corpus ' 
etc., dico quod n o n est simile, quia potentia corporis est totius coniuncti, ac-
cipiendo corpus ut dicit totum aggregatum et non ut est materia pura (quia 
ilio m o d o n o n habet aliquod accidens), quia ad operationes corporis suffi­
cit corpus. Sed ad operationes anime n o n sufficit anima, quia anima n o n so 
est sufficiens principium illarum nisi mediante organo. Bene tarnen dicuntur 
potentie anime que sunt totius coniuncti per animam. 
Ad aliam. C u m dicitur 'in ilio sunt potentie anime' etc., concedatur. Et 
cum dicitur quod anime est operari, falsum est, y m m o totius coniuncti est 
operari mediante determinato organo, sicut videre est totius coniuncti me- 55 
diante oculo. Et cum dicitur quod anima potest etc., dico quod ilia operatic 
non est exercita per organum corporale, ideo potest esse anime separate, ut 
dictum est. 
II. 11 Utrum potentie anime fluant ab essentia anime 
i70vb F, Η* v Consequenter queritur utrum potentie anime fluant ab essentia anime. 
Arguitur quod non quia: illud a quo aliquid fluit est transmutabile; essentia 
anime non est transmutabilis; ideo etc. Maior patet, quia fluxus est quedam 
transmutatie. Minor patet, quia essentia anime est simplex et indivisibilis, 
transmutabile autem est divisibile. 5 
Item ab eodem indivisibili non possunt plura procedere, sicut apparet se­
cundo De generatione versus finem, ubi dicitur quod idem secundum quod 
idem natum est facere idem; modo essentia anime est una et indivisibilis; ergo 
ab una essentia anime non possunt plures potentie procedere. 
Item si potentie anime procédèrent ab essentia anime, aut fluerent ab es- 10 
sentia anime sicut a causa materiali, vel formali, vel efficienti, vel finali; sed 
nullo istorum modorum fluunt ab essentia anime; quare etc. Probatio mino-
ris. Primo quod non fluant ab ea sicut a causa materiali quia: ille potentie 
anime non habent fiindari in essentia anime sicut in subiecto, ymmo in to-
to coniuncto. Neque etiam sicut a causa efficiente quia: causa efficiens est is 
unum principium motus, sicut apparet secundo Physicorum; modo potentie 
6-7 AA 4:43; Aristoteles, De generatione 11.10,336a27-28 16 Forsan Aristoteles, Physica 11.3, 
194b27-29 
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non procedunt ab anima per motum | et transmutationem. Neque etiam sicut is" ν 
a causa formali quia: ille potentie sunt quedam accidentia anime; modo ali-
quid non est de forma suorum accidentium; quare etc. Neque | sicut a causa i7ira F 
20 finali quia: anima ordinatur ad suas operationes; modo non potest ordinari ad 
suas operationes nisi mediantibus suis potentiis; ergo anima ordinatur ad po-
tentias et non e converso. Ergo potentie anime nullo modo fluunt ab essentia 
anime. 
Oppositum arguitur quia: illud quod est causatum ab essentia anime fluit ab 
25 essentia anime; potentie anime sunt causate ab essentia anime; ideo etc. Et 
confirmatur quia: a quocumque fluit operatic, ab eodem fluit potentia que 
est principium illius operationis; modo operationes anime fluunt ab essentia 
anime sicut, sentire et intelligere; quare etc. 
Dico quod 'fluere ab aliquo' potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo cum quo-
30 dam motu et transmutatione et proprio fluxu. Alio modo potest accipi 'fluxus' 
pro omni emanatione vel causalitate alicuius ab aliquo, et sic est improprie 
fluxus. Modo potentie anime non fluunt ab anima proprio fluxu, quia quan-
documque aliquid fluit ab aliquo ilio modo, illud a quo fluit est in potentia et 
reducitur ad actum per transmutationem et motum ab aliquo agente; modo 
35 anima non est sic in potentia ad suas potentias quod reducatur de potentia 
ad actum tamquam a generante per transmutationem et motum, ymmo illa 
potentia qua anima est in potentia ad suas potentias est potentia coniuncta 
actui, quia cum anima est introducta a generante, statim habet suas potentias 
ab eodem agente, mediante tarnen anima; ergo potentie anime non fluunt ab 
40 essentia anime proprio fluxu. 
Secundo dico quod potentie anime fluunt ab essentia anime accipiendo 
'fluxum' improprie, sicut dictum est. Cuius ratio est quia: illud quod causatur 
ab anima aliquo modo fluit ab anima sive ab essentia anime fluxu improprie 
dicto, qui est causalitas quedam; modo potentie anime sunt causate ab ani-
45 ma; quare etc. Maior patet. Probatio minoris. Primo quod sint causate ab 
anima sicut a causa finali quia: potentie anime sunt sicut instrumenta anime 
mediantibus quibus anima est principium operationum (unde iste potentie 
anime sunt fiindate in organo sicut instrumento); modo agens instrumenta­
le ordinatur ad agens principale; ergo ille potentie et organa in quibus sunt 
50 ordinantur ad animam sicut ad fìnem. Etiam aliquo modo fluunt ab anima 
sicut a causa materiali, quia iste sunt in toto coniuncto mediante organo; er-
17 ab anima ] om. V et] per add. V 19 de] om. F 21 suas] om. V suis] om. V 
24 quia ] quod V 27 anime ] om. F 32 fluxus ] om. V 32-33 quandocumque ] quam-
cumque V 33 aliquid ] om. F aliquo ] alio V potentia ] ad illud add. V 36 tamquam ] 
om. F 39 tarnen ] cum V 43-44 improprie dicto ] om. F 48 fundate ] finite F organo ] 
ordineV 51-52 ergo] om. F 
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go aliquo modo sunt in anima sicut in subiecto secundum quod anima est 
pars totius coniuncti. De potentia intellectiva non est dubium, quia ilia im-
mediate fiindatur in essentia anime. Etiam fluunt ab anima sicut a causa ef-
ficiente secundum unam oppinionem, quia omnes operationes anime sunt in 55 
toto coniuncto per animam effective; ergo et potentie que sunt principium 
operationum sunt in toto coniuncto per animam. Et hoc dicitur communiter 
quod anima est principium suarum operationum, quia totum coniunctum 
per animam habet suas operationes. Alia oppinio ponit quod anima nullo 
modo est principium effectivum suarum potentiarum, quia tunc idem esset 60 
in actu et in potentia respectu eiusdem, quia anima esset in actu respectu sua-
rum potentiarum inquantum eas efficeret, et esset in potentia inquantum eis 
substaret. 
Sed circa hoc est difficultas, quia si solum subiectum esset susceptivum 
suarum passionum, et eodem modo anima respectu suarum potentiarum, 65 
tunc non esset alia ratio quare passio determinate esset in subiecto sive po-
tentie anime in anima, sicut videmus de aere qui solum est receptivus lumi-
nis, et ideo solum habet lumen in presentia corporis illuminantis. Ergo cum 
subiectum determinet sibi suam passionem et anima suas potentias, videtur 
quod aliquam rationem habet tpredicandi(?) effective respectu earumf. Item 70 
generans non causât potentias anime vel alias passiones proprias conséquen-
tes essentiam anime vel alterius subiecti, nisi mediante anima vel alia forma 
substantial! subiecti cuius sunt passiones. Ergo oportet quod ilia forma (que 
est media in isto ordine causalitatis) aliquam causalitatem habeat per quam 
determinatur talis passio in subiecto. Quare non est sola causalitas materialis, 75 
quia illud quod est in potentia secundum quod huiusmodi non déterminât 
sibi aliquam passionem; ergo etc. Notandum tarnen quod ibi non est propria 
m * F causalitas efficientis, quia talis est per transmutationem | et motum. Sed est 
ibi quedam simplex originatio vel emanatio ad modum efficientis, quia hoc 
consequitur ex ilio et habet esse ex esse illius secundum determinatum ordì- so 
nem. Et si sic dicatur, potest dici ad rationem quod talis potentia anime ad 
suas potentias est semper coniuncta actui. Et ideo non est inconveniens sic 
aliquid esse in actu et in potentia respectu eiusdem. Sed sic non est de poten-
tia anime respectu operationis que est sentire et intelligere, quia illa potentia 
est remota aliquando ab actu. Et ideo non potest anima se ipsam ad talem 85 
actum reducere in tali operatione. 
Tunc ad rationes. 
54 etiam fluunt ] et fluit V 55 oppinionem ] operationem V quia ] et V 59 oppinio ] 
operano V 64 susceptivum ] receptivum V 66 quare ] quia V 68 et ideo ] qui 
F 70 habet] habeat V predicandi(?) ] p'ndi scrips F om V 71 causât] general V 
73 ergo ] in marg F 75 quare ] et hoc V 79 simplex ] om V originatio ] organo V 
82 ideo ] om V 84 et ] vel V 85 anima ] animam F 
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Ad primam. Cum dicitur 'illud a quo aliquid fluit' etc., ilia ratio sua via 
procedit, quia bene probat quod potentie anime non fluunt ab essentia anime 
90 proprio fluxu, ymmo per simplicem emanationem, ut dictum est. 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'ab eodem non procedit nisi idem' etc., verum est 
immediate. Sed ab eodem indivisibili bene possunt plura procedere medianti-
bus diversis organis et secundum ordinem quemdam; modo sic procedunt iste 
potentie anime, quia ille potentie procedunt ab essentia anime secundum que-
95 mdam ordinem, quia primo est potentia vegetativa via generationis, deinde 
sensitiva et deinde intellectiva. Via perfectionis est e converso. 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'aut fluerent ab essentia anime sicut a causa ma-
teriali' etc., dico quod fluunt a causa materiali aliquo modo, ut visum est. Et 
cum dicitur quod ille potentie non habent fimdari in essentia anime, verum 
100 est precise, sed fundantur in toto coniuncto, tarnen per animam. Et cum dici-
tur quod non sunt a causa efficiente, quia causa effìciens est unum principium 
motus etc., verum est de efficiente per motum et transmutationem. Sed aliud 
est effìciens unum principale esse; modo anima non est effìciens respectu po-
tentiarum per transmutationem et motum, sed per simplicem emanationem. 
los Et cum dicitur 'ncque sunt a causa formali', verum est, quia forme non est 
forma; sed anima est forma; quare etc. Et cum dicitur quod neque sunt a 
causa finali, falsum est, ymmo sunt sicut instrumenta ad essentiam anime. Et 
cum dicitur 'anima est propter operationes', verum est, sicut causa propter 
effectum, quia operationes sunt effectus anime. 
11.12 Utrum potentie anime habeant ordinem inter se 
Consequenter queritur utrum potentie anime habeant ordinem inter se. i7irb F, i5ra ν 
Arguitur quod non | quia: ilia que ex opposito distinguuntur sub aliquo non i5rb ν 
habent ordinem prioris et posterioris; sed potentie anime ex opposito distin­
guuntur sub anima; quare etc. Maior patet, quia talia sunt coequeva sub 
s ilio. Neque sunt ordinata secundum prius et posterius. Minor patet quia: 
Philosophus distinguit animam in diversas potentias eius. 
Item si potentie anime haberent ordinem, aut hoc esset ex parte anime aut 
ex parte obiectorum aut ex parte operationum; nullo istorum modorum ha­
bent ordinem; quare etc. Probatio minoris. Quod non ex parte anime primo 
io quia: anima est indivisibilis; modo in eo quod est indivisibile non est aliquis 
ordo. Neque etiam ex parte obiectorum, quia obiecta sunt disparata non ha-
89 fluunt ] fluant V 90 ut ] et V 94 potentie ] om. V 95 via ] viam F 96 deinde ] de 
V 98 fluunt] sicutadd.V 99 habent] haberentV 100 tarnen] om. V 101 sunt] sit 
V 103 principale] principium V 105 sunt] sicut V 106 sed] om. F sunt] sicut V 
2 sub ] ab F non ] nisi F 3-4 distinguuntur ] om. F 7 haberent ] hanc F 8 ex parte ] 
om. F operationum ] sed add. V 
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bentia ordinem ad invicem, sicut alimentum et sensibile. Ncque etiam ex par­
te operationum, quia ille etiam sunt disparate et diverse, sicut alia est operatio 
sensus et intellectus. 
In oppositum est Philosophus, qui dicit quod potentie anime se habent sicut is 
figure, quia sicut figure se habent consequenter et una aliam includit, ut tri-
gonum in tetragono, etiam Vegetativum induditur in sensitivo et sensitivum 
in intellectivo. 
Ad istam questionem dico quod potentie anime habent ordinem inter se et per 
comparationem ad animam et ad obiectum et ad operationes. Primo: quod 20 
habeant ordinem inter se apparet, quia ilia habent ordinem inter se quorum 
unum precedit alterum et induditur in subiecto cuius est alterum; modo po­
tentie anime sunt huiusmodi, quia una precedit aliam et includit earn, sicut 
subiectum cuius est potentia perfectior includit aliam potentiam minus per-
fectam, sicut trigonum induditur in tetragono; quare etc. Unde duplex est 25 
ibi ordo: unus via generationis, alius via perfectionis. Via generationis poten-
17Γ" F tia vegetativa est prior, postea sensitiva, deinde appetitiva, motiva | secundum 
locum et intellectiva. Sed via perfectionis est e converso, quia posterius in 
generatione est prius in perfectione. Etiam habent ordinem per comparatio­
nem ad animam, quia ille potentie anime non immediate fluunt ab anima, sed 30 
secundum quondam ordinem, quia primo ordine generationis fluit potentia 
vegetativa, que est propter esse individui vel speciei (individui quantum ad 
potentiam nutritivam et augmentativam vel speciei quantum ad potentiam 
generativam), deinde est potentia sensitiva via generationis et deinde intel­
lectiva. Habent etiam ordinem per comparationem ad obiecta, et iste ordo 35 
est penes communitatem maiorem vel minorem obiectorum. Et sic poten­
tia intellectiva est prior, quia obiectum eius est communius, quia quicquid 
est sensibile est intelligibile et non e converso, quia multa sunt intelligibilia 
que non sunt sensibilia, sicut substantie separate et alia que intelliguntur ex 
intellectione aliorum. Deinde est potentia sensitiva, quia eius obiectum est 40 
communius obiecto potentie vegetative, quia multa sunt sensibilia que non 
sunt alimentum; et potentia visiva sic est prior quam alii sensus, quia obiec-
15 Aristoteles, De anima II.3, 414b28-32 
12 alimentum] aliter V et] ad V etiam] om. V 13 sicut] quiaV 14 et] alia est 
operatio add. V 15 anime] om. V 16 una] unamV 17 tetragono] tetragona F tegrano 
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tum visus est in substantiis superioribus et inferioribus. Habent etiam ordi-
nem ex parte operationum, quia operatio unius presupponit operationem al-
45 terius, sicut operatio sensus presupponit operationem potentie vegetative. Ad 
hoc enim quod quis sentiat, oportet quod habeat vitam. Et operatio potentie 
intellective presupponit etiam operationem potentie sensitive. Quare etc. 
Tunc ad rationes. 
Ad primam. Cum dicitur 'ilia que ex opposite distinguuntur' etc., dico 
so quod aliqua bene possunt esse ex opposito distincta sub aliquo genere, tarnen 
inter se comparata possunt habere ordinem, sicut species numeri sub numero 
sunt distincte ex opposito, et tamen numeri inter se comparati bene habent 
ordinem, quia temarius precedit quaternarium et sic de aliis. Etiam potentie 
anime non sunt sub anima sicut species sub genere. 
55 Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'aut haberent ordinem ex parte anime' etc., dico 
quod habent ordinem ex parte omnium istorum. Et cum dicitur quod essen-
tia anime est indivisibilis etc., dico quod licet anima sit indivisibilis quantum 
ad suam essentiam, tamen per comparationem ad ipsam aliqua possunt esse 
ordinata secundum quod prius et posterius recedunt ab essentia anime. Et 
60 cum dicitur 'in indivisibili non est ordo', verum est in essentia indivisibilis, 
tamen in hiis que procedunt ab ipso indivisibili bene potest esse ordo. Et cum 
dicitur quod ncque ex parte obiectorum, quia obiecta diversa sunt, dico quod 
<non> accipitur ibi ordo ex parte obiectorum eo quod obiecta sunt diversa, 
sed eo quod obiectum unius potentie potest esse communius quam obiectum 
65 alterius. Et cum dicitur quod ncque ex parte operationum, quia ille sunt di-
verse, verum est quod sunt diverse. Tamen una presupponit aliam, et ideo 
sunt ordinate. 
11.13 Utrum potentie distinguantur per actus et actus per obiecta 
Consequenter queritur utrum potentie distinguantur per actus et actus per i7ivM5rbv 
obiecta. 
Arguitur quod non quia: prius non distinguitur per posterius; potentia prior 
est quam operatio; ergo potentie non distinguuntur per actus. Maior patet 
43 est ] et add. V substantiis ] sensu V inferioribus ] posterioribus V 44 quia ] com. 
quarum FV 45 sensus ] sensitive V 46 quis ] aliquis V 47 etiam ] om. V 54 sub ] sup. 
Un. F 55 haberent ] haberet F 56 et cum dicitur ] om. V quod ] quia V 60 in ) om. V 
verum est] verum est add. F 61 procedunt] preceduntV potest] possunt V 62 quia] 
quod V 63-64 accipitur ibi... eo quod ] om. (hom.) V 66-67 et ideo sunt ordinate ] om. 
V 1 actus ] et actus add. F 
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de se. Probatio minoris quia: causa prior est suo effectu; potentia est causa 5 
operationum; quare etc. 
Item si potentie distinguerentur per actus et actus per obiecta, tunc 
ubicumque essent diversa obiecta secundum speciem essent diverse potentie. 
Modo hoc est falsum, quia album et nigrum sunt diversa obiecta formaliter 
et tarnen percipiuntur ab una potentia, scilicet a potentia visiva. io 
In oppositum est Philosophus. 
Dicendum quod potentie distinguuntur per actus et actus per obiecta. Propter 
quod est intelligendum quod quedam sunt potentie anime active et quedam 
passive. Potentie passive sunt sicut potentia sensitiva et intellectiva. Modo iste 
potentie passive distinguuntur per obiecta, quia per illud aliquid distinguitur 15 
quod educit ipsum de potentia ad actum; modo obiectum potentie passive 
educit ipsam de potentia ad actum, sicut visibile educit visum de potentia ad 
actum et intelligibile intellectum; quare etc. Maior patet, quia unumquod-
que distinguitur secundum quod ens actu; et ideo per quod aliquid est ens 
i7ivb F actu, per illud distinguitur, quia actus distinguit | et separat, ut videtur no- 20 
no Metaphysice. Minor patet per Philosophum secundo hums, qui dicit quod 
sensibile educit sensum de potentia ad actum et intelligibile intellectum. Et 
potentie active habent distingui per obiecta et operationes. Propter hoc est 
intelligendum quod ille potentie active ordinantur ad operationes suas et ob-
iecta, sicut potentia nutritiva et augmentativa ad conservationem individui, 25 
potentia generativa ordinatur ad conservationem speciei. Sunt ergo propter 
operationem sicut propter finem. Etiam sunt propter obiectum sicut propter 
finem, quia sicut apparet primo Ethtcorum ubicumque prêter operationem est 
operatum, operatum habet rationem finis, sicut in domo prêter edificationem 
est aliquod operatum, scilicet ipsa domus, que habet ibi rationem finis. Et 30 
i5va ν ideo in istis operationibus obiectum habet rationem finis] respectu potentie. 
Tunc arguo: quandocumque est aliquid ordinatum in alterum tamquam in 
finem, per illud habet distingui; modo potentie ordinantur ad actus et actus 
ad obiecta tamquam ad finem, ut visum est; ideo etc. 
11 Forsan AA 6-56; Aristoteles, De anima 11.4,415a 16-21 20-21 Locus non inventus 21 Cf 
Aristoteles, De anima II.5,418a3-4 28 Aristoteles, Ethica ad Nicomachum 1.1,1094a5-6 
10 visiva] visuali V 14 potentie passive ] om V 14-15 modo iste potentie ] manifeste 
et vere V 16 quod] per ipsum V ipsum ] om V 19 quod] est add V 20 videtur] 
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35 Item illud quod est prius quoad nos est principium distinguendi via doc-
trine respectu eius quod est posterius quoad nos; modo operationes quoad 
nos sunt priores potentiis, et obiecta operationibus; quare etc. 
Tunc ad rationes. 
Ad primam. Cum dicitur 'prius non distinguitur per posterius', verum est 
40 simpliciter prius et etiam quoad nos. Tarnen illud quod est simpliciter prius, 
posterius tarnen quoad nos, potest distingui per posterius simpliciter, prius 
tarnen quoad nos. Et sic potentie distinguuntur per operationes, quia ope-
rationes sunt priores quoad nos quam potentie. Etiam potest negari minor, 
quia obiecta et operationes habent se in ratione finis in potentiis activis, et in 
45 passivis se habent sicut efficiens educens ipsas de potentia ad actum. 
Ad aliam. Cum dicitur 'si ita esset etc., tunc ubicumque essent diversa 
obiecta' etc., verum est diversa obiecta per se et prima. Et cum dicitur quod 
hoc est falsum, quia album et nigrum sunt diversa obiecta, dico quod album 
et nigrum non sunt diversa obiecta visus, ymmo lumen vel color ad quam 
so habent reduci album et nigrum est primum obiectum visus. 
35 est ] om. V 36 respectu eius ] illud F 36-37 quoad nos ] om. V 40 prius ] non 
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Some remarks on Buridan'si?) 
prima lectura 
In 1991, Benoît Fatar published two commentaries on Aristotle's De anima, an 
expositto and a commentary per modum quaesttoms, under the title Le Tratte de 
l'âme de Jean Buridan [De prima lectura]. ' According to Fatar, both commen-
taries — which are not ascribed to any author in the manuscripts — should be 
ascribed to John Buridan and taken together constitute the first of three sets of 
lectures on the De anima, the so-called prima lectura.1 The text has been used 
in a number of articles and books, sometimes to show how Buridan's views 
changed over the years.3 
Although the commentary has been used to document developments in 
Buridan's thought, Patar's proof of its authenticity has not been accepted by 
everyone. The three scholars who reviewed the work, Sten Ebbesen,4 Zénon 
Kaluza,5 and Christoph Flüeler6, all expressed their doubts. In addition to 
these doubts formulated by the reviewers, the text has a long history of as-
criptions. John Buridan, Nicole Oresme, Blasius of Parma, and Dominicus 
de Clavasio have all been considered to be the author at one time or another.7 
' Β PATAR, Le Traité de l'âme de Jean Bundan [De prima lectura] Édition, étude critique et 
doctrinale, Louvain-la-Neuve [etc.]: éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie [etc.], 1991. 
2The MS Tonno, Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria, H.III.30, which Patar uses to supple-
ment the missing parts of the so-called pnma lectura does contain an attribution. But besides 
the fact that the text contained in this manuscript is probably a compdation of several lectures, 
the ascription is extremely difficult to read, and there is no consensus about how to read it. The 
ascription looks like <??Iasio', however, so it certainly not ascribed to Bundan. 
3The most important of these is Zupko's monograph on Bundan, where it is included 
in the list of authentic works. See ZUPKO, John Bundan See also J. Zupko, 'John Bun-
dan', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL 
= <http7/plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/buridan/> (accessed October 1, 2010). 
But the text is also used, for example, in KLIMA, 'Buridan's Theory of Definitions'. 
* See Dialogue, 33, 1994, 758-762. 
5See Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologtques, 79, 1995, 136-139 
6See Fretburger Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und Theologie, 42, 1995, 218-224. 
7See Patar's introduction to the edition, pp. 66*-70* 
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According to Patar, however, as stated in the introduction to his French trans­
lation of the text, most of the serious scholars now accept Buridan as the au­
thor.8 
Both the expositio and the quaesttones of the prima lectura are based on 
two manuscripts, the most important of which is MS Brugge, Stadsbibliotheek, 
477 — the only manuscript that contains both texts. Unfortunately, how­
ever, this manuscript is missing several pages, stopping abruptly in the middle 
of question 11.15 and resuming in the middle of what may be question III.3. 
Patar collated the expositio with MS Avignon, Bibliothèque municipale, 1093. 
He collated the quaesttones with MS Torino, Biblioteca Nazionale Universi-
taria, H.III.30. This Torino manuscript contains a commentary per modum 
quaestioms on the De anima that is similar in some, but not all respects to the 
commentary contained in Brugge, 477. According to Patar, the Torino com-
mentary is a compilation of multiple lectures on the De anima by Buridan that 
often corresponds, especially in the first two books, to the text in Brugge, 477.9 
Because of the missing pages in the Brugge manuscript, the edition 
of the quaesttones is in fact a compilation of two commentaries from two 
manuscripts. Following Brugge up until its abrupt end in 11.13, Patar 
continues his edition by using the text of Torino, switching to Brugge again 
an soon as possible, that is, in question III.3.10 Strangely enough, on several 
occasions where both Brugge and Torino fail — according to Patar — to 
give an adequate text, the text is emended by using Nicole Oresme's(!) 
commentary on the De anima} ' 
Patar's argument for Buridan's authorship is long and detailed, but it 
roughly consists of three steps. The first step is the establishment of a shared 
authorship of the expositio and the quaesttones. The second step is proving that 
Buridan is the author of the expositio. The final step is the inference that Buri-
dan must also be the author of the quaesttones. Patar establishes the shared 
authorship of the expositio and the quaesttones by tracing the references in the 
expositio to corresponding quaesttones. He found ten of these reference, for 
example on ƒ 239va: "unde, sicut oculus est alterius rationis a pede, ita ilia 
β
Β. PATAR, Jean Bundan Commentaire et Questions sur le Traité de l'âme. Introduc-
tion, traduction et notes, Les Presses Philosophiques, 2004, 105· "Ma demonstration de 
l'authenticité du Traité de l'âme contenu dans le manuscrit 477 de Bruges est aujourd'hui ad-
mise par les meilleurs experts La plupart des chercheurs sérieux admettent effectivement qu'il 
s'agit bien d'une œuvre de Buridan." 
'ANONYMUS PATAR, QdA, 95*-97*. 
l0Patar made the decision to indicate the switch of manuscripts in the edition by the use of 
a slightly different font and the addition of ' (T) ' to the header of the verso pages; an unfortunate 
decision, since this indication is very easily overlooked if one is unaware of the fact that it will 
occur in the middle of book II, on ρ 352 
1
 ' For instance, on ρ 364, lines 47-8, 372, lines 46-7, 378, line 92, 400-401, lines 29-31, etc. 
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pars animae quae est in oculo est alterius rationis ab ilia parte animae equi 
quae est in pede. De hoc magis in quaestione." 
Having established the shared authorship of the two commentaries, Patar 
proceeds to demonstrate that the expositio was written by Buridan. He does 
this by showing that several passages from the expositio in MS Brugge, 477 to 
a large extent match an expositio that we know was written by Buridan, con­
tained in MS Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 2162. 
In addition, he shows that there are three passages in the quaestiones that 
match with questions in Buridan's commentaries on the De generatione et cor-
ruptione, the Ethica, and the Meteora. 
The arguments that establish a shared authorship between the expositio 
and the quaestiones are reasonably convincing, although not as conclusive as 
Patar makes it appear. The evidence that is presented is not sufficient to estab-
lish a shared authorship with certainty, but there are indeed some indications 
that point to a relation between the two texts. The same, however, cannot be 
said for his arguments that Buridan is the author. The demonstration that 
tries to connect the expositio to a known expositio written by Buridan fails to 
take into account that expositiones tend to be very similar even between differ-
ent authors. Because the structure is dictated by Aristotle's text — and because 
virtually all commentators agreed on at least a substantial set of the distinc-
tions and explanations that needed to be introduced —, the expositiones genre 
left little room to be original. The demonstration that begins with the quaes-
tiones, on the other hand, is based on references that are too general to link 
the commentary conclusively to Buridan, or any other commentator for that 
matter.12 
Patar seems to be aware that his deductive arguments might not convince 
everyone, at least not immediately, and also uses a supportive argument that, 
if true, certainly adds plausibility to his thesis: "En examinant attentivement 
les 5 versions connues, on constate que dans chacune on retrouve la même 
doctrine, les mêmes prises de position, les mêmes arguments."13 Doctrinal 
similarity, even if it can never prove a particular authorship, should be ac-
cepted as important evidence to support it. But in spite of Patar's claim, it is 
precisely the doctrinal similarity that is lacking on a number of key issues. The 
localization of the vital powers in the body, the (non)identity of the sensitive 
and intellective soul in man, and the number of common sensibles, all of these 
are topics where the alleged prima lectura differs substantially from Buridan's 
position in his other known commentaries on De anima. This in itself nei-
l2Paul Bakker and I are working on an article in which we examine the question of the au-
thorship of the Anonymus Patar in detail. See P. J. J. M. BAKKER A N D S. W. DE BOER, 'Buridan's 
commentaries on the De anima' (in preparation). 
1 3 A N O N Y M U S PATAR, Q Ì M , 81. 
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ther proves nor disproves that Buridan is the author, but it does refute Patar's 
supporting argument of doctrinal similarity. 
Let me give just one example, which I discuss in detail in section 5.4.4: 
Sexta conclusie: in eodem, sicut in bruto, sunt plures animae partiales. 
Patet ex dictis, n a m alia est anima ossis et alia est an ima carnis; istae 
autem animae sunt animae partiales. Sequitur corollarie quod, si ilia 
pars animae quae est in pede equi esset in oculo equi, n o n videret: patet, 
quia ilia pars animae equi quae est in pede n o n est apta nata nee ordi­
nata ad videndum. Sequitur edam hoc esse falsum q u o d aliqui dicunt 
de anima equi quod ita anima equi quae est in pede videret, si haberet 
Organum sicut ilia quae est in oculo. 1 4 
This passage alone already counts as strong evidence against the identi­
fication of what I refer to as Anonymus Fatar with John Buridan. Buridan 
explicitly defends that we should give the opposite answer. In fact, that we 
should give the opposite answer forms a crucial element of his project of de­
scribing how the soul is internally structured and how it relates to the body. In 
another known set of lectures on the De anima, Buridan gives the same answer 
to the thought experiment as he gives in his ultima lectura.13 
At the same time, it cannot be denied that this anonymous commentary is 
closely related to Buridan's commentary. Some parts of it are practically ver­
batim the same as passages from Buridan's commentary. On the other hand, 
the same situation applies to Oresme's commentary. For example, the ques­
tions on the possibility of self-knowledge that can be found in the third book 
of both Oresme's and Anonymus Patar's commentaries are virtually identi­
cal. And more importantly, in those places where Oresme and Buridan de­
fend different positions, Anonymus Fatar usually defends the same position 
as Oresme. 
Given the importance of this commentary in documenting developments 
in the De anima tradition in the fourteenth century, I need to take at least a 
preUminary stand on the status of the alleged prima lectura. I see no reason 
to attribute the commentaries to Buridan. Patar's own arguments for the au­
thorship are inconclusive at best, and there is substantial additional evidence 
against the attribution. Given that there is not enough evidence to conclu­
sively assign an author, I will simply treat the commentary as an anonymous 
H ANONYMUS PATAR, QdA, II.5, 27QM-67. 
15This set is sometimes referred to as the secunda lectura, but that qualification is not found 
in the manuscripts. MICHAEL, Johannes Buridan: Studien, 684, refers to it as quaestiones (sed 
non de ultima lectura). JOHN BURIDAN, Questiones de anima (sed non de ultima lectura), MS 
Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Pal. Lat. 1045, 98vb-99ra: "Sed potentia 
visiva principalis est in pede. Ideo si fieret oculus in pede, videret in pede. Nee propter hoc est 
frustra in pede, quia ibi excercet aliam operationem." 
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commentary on the De anima written probably around the middle of the four­
teenth century. My hypothesis is that the so-called prima lectura is a compi­
lation work, based partly on Oresme and partly on Buridan, but this can be 
nothing more than a hypothesis at this moment. In any case, I will consider 
it to be exactly what it is: an anonymous commentary on De anima, written 
in the same context and around the same time in which the commentaries by 
Oresme and Buridan were also written. As with all other anonymous com­
mentaries, I will refer to it by using the name of its editor, as the Anonymus 
Fatar. 
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In dit proefschrift ontwikkel ik een duiding van de transformaties van de De 
anima traditie in de periode van c. 1260 tot c. 1360. Na een inleidend hoofd-
stuk (hoofdstuk 2) waarin ik de receptie van De anima in de dertiende eeuw 
beschrijf, documenteer ik drie van deze transformaties in detail in de daar-
op volgende hoofdstukken. De achtergrond daarbij wordt gevormd door een 
interpretatie van de ontwikkelingen in de veertiende eeuw die al eerder door 
Jack Zupko is ontwikkeld. De veertiende eeuw, zo stelt hij, laat een toene-
mende empirisering zien. Dat wil zeggen, er is een beweging gaande waarbij 
men steeds minder geïnteresseerd is in discussies over de (onzichtbare) essen-
tie van de ziel en zich in plaats daarvan steeds meer richt op discussies over de 
waarneembare activiteiten van levende wezens. 
In hoofdstuk 3 bespreek ik een een aantal methodologische vragen die bin-
nen De anima commentaren werden behandeld. Het gaat daarbij met name 
om de volgende kwesties: ( 1 ) is een wetenschap die de ziel bestudeert eigenlijk 
wel mogelijk, en zo ja, wat voor soort wetenschap is het dan? (2) wat wordt er 
door zo'n wetenschap precies bestudeerd? (3) is deze wetenschap inderdaad 
zo moeilijk en tegelijkertijd zo zeker als Aristoteles beweert? Dergelijke vra-
gen komen in bijna alle commentaren op De anima voor, maar er blijkt iets 
merkwaardigs mee aan de hand te zijn. In tegenstelling tot wat ze lijken te 
suggereren wordt er helemaal geen methodologie ontwikkeld die vervolgens 
in de rest van het commentaar wordt toegepast. Ik probeer te laten zien dat 
deze methodologische vragen beter anders gelezen kunnen worden, namelijk 
als manieren om om te gaan met interne spanningen binnen De anima. De 
op het eerste gezicht methodologische vragen blijken vooral manieren te zijn 
om de fragiele eenheid van de scientia de anima in stand te houden. Bij de 
behandeling van deze vragen draait het er telkens om, te garanderen dat ook 
het bestuderen van de mensenziel binnen deze wetenschap kan plaatsvinden. 
In hoofdstuk 4 onderzoek ik vervolgens hoe de middeleeuwse commenta-
toren Aristoteles' definitie van de ziel als 'eerste act van een fysisch organisch 
lichaam dat in potentie leeft' opvatten. Ik doe dit aan de hand van twee mo-
dernere exegeten, namelijk John Ackrill en Jennifer Whiting. In 1973 publi-
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ceerde Ackrill een artikel waarin hij aantoonde dat de aristotelische definitie 
van de ziel problematisch is. Het probleem komt voort uit Aristoteles' be-
schrijving van de ziel - lichaamverhouding in termen van vorm en materie. 
Net zoals een standbeeld bestaat uit een materie, bijvoorbeeld brons, en een 
vorm, bijvoorbeeld de vorm van een paard, zo bestaan levende wezens uit een 
materie, namelijk het lichaam, en een vorm, namelijk de ziel. Deze analogie 
is uitermate geschikt om duidelijk te maken dat ziel en lichaam niet twee zelf-
standige, afzonderlijke entiteiten zijn, net zo min als de vorm en materie van 
het standbeeld dat zijn. De ziel bestaat als vorm van het lichaam en niet op 
zichzelf, net zoals de vorm van het beeld enkel als vorm van het brons bestaat 
en niet op zichzelf. De analogie, zo beweert Ackrill, loopt echter stuk zodra we 
wat scherper kijken naar de materiekant van het verhaal. 
De materie van een standbeeld kan ook op zichzelf bestaan. Wanneer we 
het beeld omsmelten houden we immers nog steeds het brons over. Enkel de 
vorm van het beeld is dan verdwenen. Bij het levende lichaam werkt dit echter 
anders. Als de vorm van het lichaam verdwijnt, namelijk bij overlijden, dan is 
niet alleen de ziel weg, maar is ook het lichaam geen lichaam meer. Althans, 
dat is wat Aristoteles keer op keer beklemtoont. Een lijk is geen lichaam, ten-
zij we de term lichaam dubbelzinnig toepassen. Maar als dat zo is, dan kan 
het lichaam niet de materie van de ziel zijn op dezelfde wijze als het brons de 
materie van de paardenvorm was bij het standbeeld. De vorm - materieter-
minologie blijkt, aldus Ackrill, slecht toepasbaar op de ziel - lichaamverhou-
ding. Dit artikel heeft veel reacties losgemaakt waaronder die van Whiting. Zij 
brengt tegen Ackrill in dat Aristoteles 'lichaam' op twee manieren gebruikt in 
zijn teksten. Aan de ene kant is er het lichaam als iets dat leeft. Dit lichaam 
blijft inderdaad niet bestaan als de vorm, de ziel, verdwijnt. Maar er is ook het 
lichaam als het fysieke materiaal waaruit levende wezens zijn opgebouwd. En 
dit lichaam blijft wel (een tijdlang) bestaan na overlijden. Aristoteles ontloopt 
met dit onderscheid, aldus Whiting, het probleem waar Ackrill op wees. 
Ik laat zien dat varianten op de interpretaties van Ackrill en Whiting al 
in de Middeleeuwen zijn ontwikkeld. Met name de veertiende-eeuwse com-
mentatoren zijn zich scherp bewust van de problemen die samenhangen met 
het toepassen van het vorm - materiekader op de ziel - lichaamverhouding. 
Ze besteden om die reden steeds meer aandacht aan de vraag in hoeverre het 
levende lichaam identiek is met het lijk. Ik laat bovendien zien hoe de ontwik-
keling van deze discussies gestuurd wordt door twee andere tradities. Vanuit 
de theologie worden de problemen op scherp gesteld in Quodlibeta discussies 
en in de zogenaamde Correctoria literatuur. En aan een andere natuurfilo-
sofische traditie, die van de commentaren op De generatione et corruptione, 
worden veel van de argumenten ontleend. Dit leidt ertoe dat steeds meer ma-
teriaal uit De generatione zijn weg vindt naar De anima en omgekeerd. 
414 
SAMENVATTING 
In hoofdstuk 5, tenslotte, onderzoek ik hoe de commentatoren de ziel en 
haar verhouding tot het lichaam beschrijven in termen van haar essentie, ver-
mogens, en acten. De rode draad daarbij is een gedachte-experiment dat in de 
loop van de veertiende eeuw erg populair wordt. Dit experiment gaat als volgt: 
we weten allemaal dat het gezichtsvermogen van een paard gelokaliseerd is in 
zijn oog. Immers, alleen door zijn ogen te gebruiken kan het paard iets zien. 
Maar stel nu dat door goddelijk ingrijpen — of, zo zouden we ook kunnen 
zeggen, door genetische manipulatie — er een oog gevormd wordt in de voet 
van dat paard. Kan dat paard dan ook iets zien met dat oog in zijn voet? De 
meningen over het juiste antwoord op die vraag lopen in de veertiende eeuw 
uiteen. Johannes Buridanus antwoordt bevestigend, terwijl Nicole Oresme 
en de Anonymus Patar juist ontkennend antwoorden. Deze commentatoren 
blijken een fundamenteel verschil van mening te hebben over de wijze waarop 
de ziel in een levend wezen tegenwoordig is, ondanks de vele overeenkom-
sten in hun theorieën. Ik laat daarbij zien dat de Parijse commentaartraditie 
op De anima in het midden van de veertiende eeuw sterk beïnvloed is door 
de theorieën die Willem van Ockham in zijn Sententieëncommentaren heeft 
ontwikkeld. Zo stelt bijvoorbeeld iedereen in de periode voor Ockham dat de 
ziel en haar vermogens ontologisch onderscheiden zijn, terwijl iedereen vanaf 
Ockham stelt dat er tussen beide geen ontologisch onderscheid bestaat. Ook 
in de details van de discussies halverwege de veertiende eeuw is de invloed van 
Ockham aan te wijzen. 
Daarnaast toon ik aan dat er nog een belangrijke transformatie plaatsvindt 
in de veertiende eeuw, welke begint met het commentaar van Radulphus Bri-
to. Vanaf dat moment brengen commentatoren een nieuwe volgorde aan in 
het bepalen van de wijze waarop de ziel tegenwoordig is in het lichaam. Ze 
kiezen ervoor om te beginnen met die planten en dieren waarbij het moge-
lijk is om een stuk afte snijden zodanig dat er twee levende wezens ontstaan. 
Denk daarbij aan het stekken van een plant, of het doormidden snijden van 
een regenworm. Pas wanneer voor deze groep van betrekkelijk eenvoudige 
organismen de wijze waarop de ziel tegenwoordig is in het lichaam is vastge-
steld, kijken ze naar de tweede groep. Deze groep bestaat uit de complexere 
dieren die we niet doormidden kunnen snijden met eenzelfde resultaat. Mede 
op basis van de conclusies van de analyse van de eerste groep wordt vervol-
gens ook hier de ziel - lichaamrelatie vastgesteld. Pas dan wordt er gekeken 
naar de laatste groep, die van de mensen. Ik laat zien dat veel van de doctri-
naire verschillen in de veertiende eeuw met betrekking tot de ziel - lichaam-
verhouding terug te voeren zijn op een onderliggend, en impliciet verschil van 
mening over de criteria op basis waarvan we conclusies over de ene groep mo-
gen doortrekken naar de volgende groep. Ook laat ik zien dat in de veertiende 
eeuw de ziel - lichaamverhouding bij de mens meer en meer wordt beschouwd 
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als uitzonderlijk. Zo uitzonderlijk zelfs dat praktisch geen van de conclusies 
die we bereiken in het onderzoek naar de eerste twee groepen doorgetrokken 
mag worden naar de mens. 
De consequentie van de transformaties die ik in deze drie hoofdstukken 
heb beschreven is, dat aan het eind van de veertiende eeuw het haast onmo-
gelijk is geworden om de scientia de anima nog als een eenheid te denken. 
Aan de ene kant zijn de discussies over de ziel - lichaamrelatie in de loop van 
de veertiende eeuw steeds technischer en gedetailleerder geworden. Aan de 
andere kant is in diezelfde periode steeds meer nadruk gelegd op de manie-
ren waarop mensenzielen verschillen van alle andere zielen. De combinatie 
van deze twee factoren leidt ertoe dat het haast onmogelijk is geworden om 
nog vol te houden dat de scientia de anima een enkele natuurfilosofische we-
tenschap is waarin alle zielen, inclusief de mensenzielen, bestudeerd worden. 
De veertiende-eeuwse traditie eindigt daarom in een impasse. Het blijkt geen 
periode van een toenemende empirisering te zijn, maar eerder een periode 
waarin de breekbare eenheid van de De anima traditie verloren gaat. Er lijken 
slechts twee mogelijkheden over te blijven wanneer we willen blijven vasthou-
den aan de stelling dat de scientia de anima ook de menselijke ziel bestudeert. 
Ofwel deze wetenschap behoort niet tot de natuurfilosofie, maar bijvoorbeeld 
tot de metafysica, of vormt zelfs een soort tussenwetenschap {scientia media). 
Ofwel, we moeten weer de overeenkomsten tussen de mensenziel en de andere 
zielen gaan benadrukken, met als risico dat de menselijke ziel haar unieke sta-
tus verliest. Beide bewegingen zijn inderdaad waarneembaar in de vijftiende 
eeuw. 
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